











The Spectre Within:  















PhD English Literature 




     This thesis examines spectrality in Elizabethan literature, focusing on the ghost as 
a figuration of disjuncture within contemporary constructions of the dead.  Taking 
account of the cultural unease and uncertainties about the afterlife generated during 
the Reformation, I explore how particular conceptualizations of the dead manifest 
instabilities that move the figure of the ghost into the disturbing role of the spectre.  
The literature I examine ranges from Elizabethan translations of Seneca and key 
theological treatises to examples of the English revenge tragedy produced by 
Shakespeare, Marston, and Chettle.  In drawing upon this cross-section of work, I 
highlight the resonances between varying forms of spectrality in order to explore 
ways in which the ghost incorporates, but also exceeds, the theatre’s requirement for 
dramatic excess.  It thus becomes clear that the presence of the spectre extends 
beyond the immediate purposes of particular writers or genres to expose a wider 
disruption of the relation between, and ontologies of, the living and the dead.          
      The theoretical apparatus for this project is drawn primarily from deconstruction 
and psychoanalytic theory, with attention to the uncanny as an area in which the two 
intersect and overlap.  These modes of analysis usefully highlight areas of 
disturbance and slippage within the linguistic and conceptual structures by which the 
living and dead are defined and understood.  In adopting this approach, I aim to 
expand upon and complicate existing scholarship concerning the figure of the ghost 
in relation to sixteenth-century theological, philosophical, mythological, and popular 
discourses and traditions.  I do so by demonstrating that the emergence of the 
uncanny arises through a culturally specific haunting of the form and language of 
Elizabethan treatments of the dead.  The spectre thereby emerges as a figure that is as 
much the product as the cause of instabilities and erosion within the Elizabethan 
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there sits Death, there sits imperious Death,  
Keeping his circuit by the slicing edge.  
                                                        (Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine Sig. E3[r])  
 
 
     The spectre of death haunts Elizabethan literature and art as a figuration that both 
reifies and destroys the relation between the living and the dead.  It appears through 
the iconography of the Dance of Death and the funeral arts; the intense theological 
debates concerning the afterlife; the corpses that litter the stage and the ghosts that 
pursue revenge in the history plays and tragedies of the theatre.  As Marlowe’s 
Tamburlaine gloats to his intended victims, death maintains its “circuit” implacably.  
Like all spectres, it has no cessation, no respect for boundaries, no limits.  Always, it 
waits for the living, ever-present yet deferred and unknowable.  Since the living are 
always alive, death should remain invisible, banished to a future that is never here.  
The dead should remain invisible also, expelled by the rituals of funeral and burial 
from the presence of the living.  It is precisely this, however, that makes the dead so 
ripe for the production of spectrality: for nothing is so unsettling and corrosive as the 
emergence of the fixed, absent state of death within the protected borders that 
demarcate the space occupied by the living.   
     The staging of that spectrality is the focus of this thesis.  I use this phrase, not in 
the sense of the theatrical dramatization of spectres (although much of my primary 
material does focus upon plays) but in regard to the conditions that form the grounds 
for, and topography of, the hauntings of Elizabethan literature.  The pervasive 
presence of the ghost is a central figure in this type of haunting, not only because it 
enters into narratives concerning the return of the dead, but because, where it enters 
the spectral (a distinction to which I will return a little later), it perfuses the 
interiority of the living with the presence of death.  As such, the ghost constitutes 
both the conditions for, and figuration of, the uncanny.  Overused by playwrights to 
the point that it is often verging on the parodic by the end of the sixteenth century, 
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the pre-Hamlet Elizabethan ghost has been variously celebrated, maligned, and 
dismissed by countless critics.  Dover Wilson exemplifies a common critical trend 
when he assesses the typical Elizabethan ghost as “a classical puppet, borrowed from 
Seneca, a kind of Jack-in-the-box, popping up from Tartarus at appropriate 
moments” (What Happens in Hamlet 55).
1
  Early modern sceptics were not always 
impressed by the theatrical appeal of this style of ghost either: the ever-sceptical 
Thomas Nashe addresses the topic repeatedly and devotes much of his 1592 work 
The Terrors of the Night or, A Discourse of Apparitions to mocking popular beliefs 
about ghosts, complaining memorably that “spirits of the aire” are “in truth all show 
and no substance” (Sig. Cii[r]).  But despite the supposed tiredness of the figure, two 
of the Renaissance’s most memorable ghosts – Old Hamlet and Banquo – do not 
arrive until around the turn of the century.  The earliest quarto of Hamlet was written 
sometime in the few years preceding its first publication in 1603, and Macbeth was 
written around 1606.
2
  The ghost, it seems, was only just warming up. 
     It is commonplace for critics to position this development as an anomaly that 
arises through Shakespeare’s genius, as he reimagines the seemingly tired, formulaic 
ghost of his contemporaries’ work and renders it newly unsettling.  E. Pearlman’s 
“Shakespeare at Work: The Invention of the Ghost” provides an excellent example of 
this kind of historicized account of Shakespeare’s “radical reinvention of the Ghost,” 
charting numerous innovations over the course of Julius Caesar, Hamlet, and 
Macbeth in contrast with the “familiar creatures of Elizabethan convention” (71, 73).  
In comparison with the standard characteristics of preceding ghosts – which are 
typically “a trifle campy,” histrionic and verbose – Pearlman suggests that “it is 
almost impossible to exaggerate how startling and original” Old Hamlet’s ghost 
                                                 
1
 Wilson refers us in particular to the satirical complaint in the anonymous play A Warning for Faire 
Women, in which Comedy protests to Tragedy that the latter must have “a filthie whining ghost, / Lapt 
in some fowle sheete . . . Comes skreaming like a pigge halfe stickt, / And cries Vindicta, revenge, 
revenge” (Anon. Sig. [A2v]).  This encapsulates the stock Elizabethan ghost at its most extreme, 
although it does not really constitute an accurate representation of all treatments of the ghost prior to 
Shakespeare’s innovations. 
2
 The evidence regarding Hamlet’s date of writing is somewhat unclear and the matter is considerably 
confused by the existence of the earlier, lost play, the Ur-Hamlet.  For an overview of key arguments, 
see Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor’s introduction to the Arden edition of the 1604 quarto, pp. 43-59.  
For a discussion of the complications introduced by the existence of multiple versions of the play, see 
pp. 74-86.  There are no published editions of Macbeth until Shakespeare’s 1623 folio but scholars 
generally agree that it was written in about 1606.  Nicholas Brooke provides an excellent outline of 
the evidence concerning this dating in his introduction to the play, pp. 59-64. 
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would have been when it was first performed (71-72).  Such accounts are appealing 
in their tracking of the nature and effectiveness of Shakespeare’s revisions to the 
ghost’s narrative function, dialogue, appearance, and (most importantly) unsettling of 
assumptions about the proper place of the ghost within some form of afterlife.  
However, it is a central premise of this thesis that the literary and dramatic evolution 
of the ghost is by no means so linear in terms of its engagement with the uncanny: 
and that Shakespeare’s remarkable treatment of the ghost is in many respects an 
escalation of an ongoing engagement with the unassimilable aspects of death within 
Elizabethan culture.  Although the theatrical properties of Shakespeare’s innovations 
transform the figure of the ghost, the resulting uncanniness arises in conjunction 
with, rather than isolation from, the spectral workings of the wider discursive 
constructions of death within Elizabethan culture. 
     I want to consider the ghost, not only as a product of the struggle to come to terms 
with the problems that death poses for the living, but also as a figuration of a wider 
form of spectrality, the hauntings of language and epistemology that disrupt the 
ontology of the subject through their (dis)connections to the dead.  The figure of the 
ghost is not inherently disturbing (or at least not radically so), despite belonging to 
the supernatural: the extent to which it generates the uncanny is contingent upon the 
environment in which it emerges.  It becomes spectral where it operates as a figure of 
linguistic and psychic excess: where its functioning exceeds the categories and terms 
by which it is understood and thereby erodes the very structures of its own entry into 
signification.  Because the spectre moves within, between, and outside of the 
structures by which we define and understand the world and our own subjectivity, it 
disturbs our security and disallows the emergence of alternate forms of containment.  
The dead become particularly generative of such spectres during the Reformation as, 
amidst the conflicted space of competing understandings of death and the afterlife, 
they occupy ever more unstable territory.   
     This thesis functions, then, at the intersections between the turbulent historical 
conditions that produce a particular unease in understandings of death; the structures 
of language as a site of disjuncture and slippage in those understandings; and the 
psychoanalytic discourse that relates such disturbances to their source within, and 
impact upon, the human psyche.  For these purposes, I limit this study to a body of 
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literature broadly described as Elizabethan, although I have treated the parameters of 
this descriptor somewhat liberally.  My choice of primary literature includes the early 
Elizabethan translations of Seneca and ranges through to later examples of revenge 
tragedies, focusing primarily on Henry Chettle’s The Tragedy of Hoffman and 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Hamlet, and Macbeth.  Strictly speaking, Macbeth is 
Jacobean but I include it here on the basis that its treatment of the uncanny and the 
figure of the ghost enters into the wider emergence of spectrality in literary 
engagements with death during Elizabeth I’s reign and epitomises the disturbances 
therein.  I also look at theological treatises with particular resonance in this area, 
primarily that of Ludwig Lavater’s Protestant tract Of Ghostes and Spirites Walking 
by Nyght and Pierre Le Loyer’s Catholic response, A Treatise of Specters.  While 
neither of these were written by English theologians, they were both written and later 
translated into English around this period, the former being published in English in 
1572 and the latter in 1605.
3
  Both works are representative of, and influential within, 
contemporary discursive constructions of the ghost and share important links to the 
production of spectrality in literary and dramatic engagement with this figure. 
     I choose this selection of literature, not because it constitutes any broad 
representation of the literature available in this area or even of the range of beliefs 
surrounding the ghost but rather, because some of these texts draw out the spectral in 
ways that have sometimes been partially or entirely overlooked by their critics, while 
others (specifically the Shakespeare plays) exemplify the spectral more openly.  The 
aim of this thesis is not to provide a survey of Elizabethan literary ghosts, nor to 
make claims that are somehow universally applicable to them.  Rather, it focuses 
upon the way in which spectrality often pervades, and is figured by, specific ghosts 
within Elizabethan literature and examines the mechanisms by which this occurs and 
to what effect.  I therefore exclude detailed consideration of a number of prominent 
ghosts, such as the ghost of Andrea in Thomas Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy, the 
ghosts of Albanact and Corineus in Locrine (one of the apocryphal Shakespeare 
plays), and the ghost of Gorlois in Thomas Hughes’ The Misfortunes of Arthur.  
These ghosts exhibit fewer spectral characteristics than those I have chosen to 
                                                 
3
 Lavater’s work was originally published under the title of Von Gespaenstern  in Zürich in 1569 and 
then in Latin in 1570 under the title of De Spectris (also in Zurich).  Le Loyer’s text was first 
published in French as Quatre Livres des Spectres in Angers in 1586. 
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examine, despite sharing stock attributes such as the desire for revenge and 
deployment of Senecan and/or other classical images and language.   
     In order to understand the grounds for the spectrality I address in this thesis, it is 
necessary to take into account the historical and cultural conditions that underpin the 
ghost and the dead more generally in the second half of the sixteenth century.  In 
particular, we must pay attention to the social, psychological, and epistemological 
complexity underpinning Elizabethan conceptualizations of death amidst the changes 
of the Reformation.  Eric Mallin provides a useful starting point for this in Godless 
Shakespeare, recounting a conversational remark made by Stephen Greenblatt in 
which the latter seeks to construe “the idea of Renaissance unbelief” as a product of 
religion by pointing out that it arises, and is understood within, the religious 
structures of concepts such as “heresy”.  In response, Mallin argues that, while “an 
active and vocal godlessness” amongst Elizabethans would have been hopelessly 
dangerous, this does not mean that it was not possible to think in ways that were 
anterior or alien to religious systems or that religion necessarily claims psychological 
primacy (3).  Mallin’s aim here is to establish a basis for claiming that Shakespeare’s 
work extends beyond orthodoxy or religious boundaries.  However, his observation 
has a broader applicability in that it highlights the complexity of human thought even 
in an environment dominated by theological prescription and the potential for 
conceptual constructions to extend beyond the constrictions of hegemonic systems of 
understanding.  As Catherine Belsey observes in “Shakespeare’s Sad Tale for 
Winter,” in addition to religious narratives, “other influences” persisted within early 
modern England “that were not so firmly under the control of orthodoxy, whether 
Catholic or Protestant” (3).  For her, it seems “that the official knowledge 
promulgated by theology, whether Catholic or Protestant, rarely tells the whole 
cultural story” (25). 
     This point is amply demonstrated at a much broader level in regard to social and 
cultural responses to the Church’s reformulation of death.  Historical research 
increasingly suggests that, during and after the Reformation, individual 
understandings were not consistent either in adhering to, or departing from, the 
Church’s teachings on the dead, particularly with respect to the nature and existence 
of ghosts.  In theory, the ghost no longer had a home within the Protestant framework 
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of death.  The later medieval Church had generally assimilated and often even 
encouraged belief in ghosts as the spirits of the returned dead, on the basis that they 
were able to return from the intermediate space of purgatory (Schmitt 6).  This did 
not mean that apparitions were commonplace or that they were always held to be the 
spirits of the returned dead – the point was subject to theological debate and 
apparitions were also associated with other manifestations of the supernatural and 
with perceptual error – but it was widely understood from the twelfth century 
onwards that they had a logical place within the structuring of the afterlife.
4
  Within 
the first few years of Elizabeth I’s reign, ghosts became officially defunct as the 
Church severed the links between the living and the dead, removing intercessory 
practices and rejecting Purgatory officially when the Church published its Thirty-
Nine Articles in 1563.
5
  Along with eliminating the staging point from which the 
dead might return, the most zealous reformers restricted possible interpretations of 
visiting spirits to position them firmly as either angels or (more likely) demons.  
Surveys of popular responses to those changes indicate a wide and complex range of 
understandings that varied far beyond mere adherence to, or rejection of, the 
Protestant constructions of the afterlife.  This was scarcely new – Marshall 
demonstrates that even in the medieval period, ghost sightings and beliefs were 
complex and fraught with contradictions – but it marked an increasingly wide 
destabilisation in understandings of the dead (Beliefs and the Dead 12-18).  Clergy 
across the Church were inconsistent in their teachings and perspectives and the 
populace often continued to engage in cultural practices designed to assist or 
communicate with the dead (such as funeral and memorial practices and Hallowe’en 
                                                 
4
 For more on beliefs about the nature and function of ghosts, including their place within pagan and 
Christian belief, see Schmitt’s Ghosts in the Middle Ages, esp. pp. 4-5, 25-26, 178-81.  Prior to the 
twelfth century, the Church generally rejected the idea of the dead returning, under the lingering 
influence of Saint Augustine’s teachings (Schmitt 17-24, Belsey 8-9).  Even once the medieval 
Church embraced the existence of ghosts, its teachings indicated that visits from the dead could only 
occur in accordance with God’s “special providence”; however, Peter Marshall demonstrates that 
popular belief and accounts of medieval ghost sightings did not always conform to this or other 
theological principles (Beliefs and the Dead 15-17).  Marshall identifies the persistence of belief in 
connections between the living and the dead and the dead’s potential to return as a sign of the 
persistence of  “apotropaic folk custom” as well as Catholicism, the two sharing “fluid boundaries” 
(Beliefs and the Dead 137).  For an overview of the key strands of belief and practices surrounding the 
dead in this period, see Marshall’s Beliefs and the Dead pp. 12-18 and Keith Thomas’s Religion and 
the Decline of Magic, pp. 701-724.  
5
 The specific section that dispensed with purgatory was Article 22, which declares the “Romyshe 
doctrine concernyng purgatory” to be “vainly fayned, and grounded upon no warrauntie of Scripture, 
but rather repugnaunt to the word of God” (Sig. [Biiv]). 
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bell-ringing).  Popular beliefs in purgatory lingered even amongst non-Catholics, and 
other non-purgatorial constructions of the ghost persisted as well (Marshall, Beliefs 
and the Dead 127, 129-39, 262).
6
  Moreover, while some Protestant theologians 
sought to assign the persistence of ghost beliefs to the uneducated masses, ghost-
sightings persisted – even, on occasion, amongst members of the Protestant clergy 
(Beliefs and the Dead 246-47).   
     But sceptics existed also, even outside of Protestant parameters.  Although he was 
scarcely inclined to express open religious doubt, Reginald Scot’s provocative 
treatment of ghosts in The Discoverie of Witchcraft scoffs at Catholic ghost lore in a 
fashion that leaves little room for more legitimate supernatural figures either. 
(Marshall 239).    More strikingly, across the population, “educated sceptics (like 
Horatio in Hamlet) were as liable to see apparitions as anyone else” despite their 
rejection of the systems through which such apparitions might be thought (Marshall, 
“Old Mother Leakey” 100).  Lavater’s Of Ghostes and Spirites Walking By Night 
complains of precisely this problem when it states that “Many not only of the 
common sorte, but also menne of excellent knowledge” are afflicted by uncertainty 
about the existence and nature of ghosts (Lavater 10).
7
  This problem is then 
reiterated by his translator, Robert Harrison, who comments in his introduction to the 
volume that he is carrying out the translation in response to the lack of existing 
guidance on the matter when “there be many also, even nowe a dayes, which are 
haunted and troubled with spirites, and knowe not howe to use them selves” (Sig. 
[aiir]). In short, the reformed Church’s establishment of a fundamental divide 
                                                 
6
 Marshall points out that “the hardline of some clerical writers that all apparitions were demonic 
illusions was only one of a set of interpretive possibilities”.  More ambivalent understandings 
occurred in instances such as “some Elizabethan and early Stuart Protestant providentialist writings, 
where spirits in the likeness of wronged dead persons act as agents of God’s vengeance against the 
wrong-doers” (“Old Mother Leakey” 100-01).   Marshall thus argues for a more complex cultural 
response to the Protestant dismissal of ghosts than Keith Thomas, who argues that there was little 
confusion amongst the early reformers but it grew in subsequent years (Religion and the Decline of 
Magic 704-06).  For a survey of theological and popular changes to ghost beliefs during the 
Reformation, see Marshall’s Beliefs and the Dead pp. 232 – 264, Thomas, pp. 701-24, and R.C. 
Finucane’s Appearances of the Dead: A Cultural History of Ghosts, pp. 90-114.  G. Bennett also 
provides an excellent glimpse into early modern understandings of the ghost in “Ghost and Witch in 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” including in regard to theological issues – see esp. pp. 6-9. 
7
 Marshall observes that Lavater and Harrison’s comments regarding the persistence of ghost beliefs 
reflected a wider concern amongst a number of prominent English Protestant theologians (Beliefs and 
the Dead 247).  See for instance William Perkins’ A Discourse of the Damned Art of Witchcraft, 
which states that the belief that “dead men doe often appeare and walke” among the living “is indeede 
the opinion of the Church of Rome, and of many ignorant persons among us: but the truth is 
otherwise” (115).  
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between the living and the dead was subject to breaching in ways that were not 
always consistent with any established systems of belief.   
     With the Protestant structures of the afterlife unable to assimilate either 
conflicting popular beliefs or reports of actual ghost sightings, a heightened 
instability emerged within the terms by which the Elizabethans conceptualized the 
dead.  A number of historicist critics have argued convincingly in recent decades that 
these developments accompanied a marked unease in English society’s treatment of 
the dead that manifests itself in the period’s literature.  Michael Neill’s Issues of 
Death and Robert Watson’s The Rest is Silence both suggest that, in conjunction with 
secular developments within areas such as science and philosophy and in the midst of 
cultural shifts that fostered the importance of social distinctions and individual 
identity, the reformers’ teachings gave death a heightened sense of finitude.  This 
was particularly because the elimination of intercession and purgatory isolated the 
dead from “the reach of their survivors” and rendered death “a more absolute 
annihilation than ever” (Neill 38).  Additionally, although the political and 
theological changes liberated the individual’s spiritual fate from the spiritual 
interventions of the Church, this came with a catch: autonomy demands increased 
responsibility.  What constitutes spiritual liberation in one respect brings also an 
increased sense of culpability and the associated problem of fallibility: and “the 
sinfulness” of individual “interiority” was rendering it increasingly “impossible to 
imagine satisfactorily the survival of a full selfhood in heaven” (Watson 6).
8
  Thus 
death held a heightened threat of eternal torture, since the elimination of purgatory 
also erased the escape afforded by the painful but finite purging of sins.
9
    
     This is not to suggest, of course, a sudden outbreak of mass terror, nor a 
widespread rejection of Protestant teachings about death.  Nor were anxieties about 
                                                 
8
 Watson focuses more on the Jacobean period, but his observation about the problem of achieving 
salvation incorporates the events of later sixteenth-century England also: a problem arose in regard to 
“the familiar laws of supply and demand: assurance about personal salvation was declining while 
attachment to both the external properties and the internal subjectivities of the human individual were 
increasing” (2).   
9
 As Neill points out, such fears reach a dramatic peak in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, in which Faustus 
longs for the reassuring finitude of purgatory as he faces the prospect of eternal damnation in his final 
moments: “Let Faustus live in hel a thousand yeeres, / A hundred thousand, and at last be savd. / O no 
end is limited to damned soules”) (Sig. [F2v]).  The actual experience of purgatory was much debated 
over the centuries but by the early sixteenth century, was generally considered equivalent to the 
tortures of hell; however, as Faustus perceives, it was nevertheless comforting insofar as it constituted 
a means to attain eventual entry to heaven (Marshall, Beliefs and the Dead 25-26).   
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death entirely new, for medieval culture was by no means free of expressions of 
cultural anxiety concerning death and the afterlife.  It does suggest, however, that the 
frames of reference within which people understood death were strained increasingly 
under the competing forces of discursive constructions of death and individual and 
social need.  Watson and Neill both link such shifts to the development of certain 
treatments of death in the English tragedy, in which death increasingly became an 
enemy that was to be overcome. For instance, Watson observes that the revenge 
tragedy treated death as “a contingent event” that “can be cured by destroying its 
immediate agent,” the execution of revenge upon the killer effecting a triumph over 
the cause, if not the result, of death (44).  Neill, on the other hand, associates the 
revenge tragedy with an endeavour to combat death through the preservation of 
memory, with the stock character of the ghost forming part of the wider attempt to 
redress death’s abrogation of the individual through the perseverance of the dead 
within the memory and current space of the living (245).  Both critics trace a course 
of progress in which literary treatments of the dead evolve in response to 
contemporary unease in the period’s theological (re)constructions of death, thereby 
manifesting a residual fear, uncertainty, and instability in the terms and structures 
through which the dead are conceived and understood.
10
   
     Such research suggests that the persistent return of the ghost figures broader 
difficulties in the cultural accommodation of changes in death and in the relation 
between the dead and the living.  The tension between conflicting constructions of 
death and individual or popular needs creates fertile ground for increasingly 
unassimilable forms of the ghost to arise.  It is not surprising, then, that the return of 
the dead in the period’s literature become unstable as conflicted understandings of 
what it is to be dead pervade the structural workings of language in related 
                                                 
10
 Phoebe Spinrad’s The Summons of Death on the Medieval and Renaissance English Stage also 
provides an excellent exploration of the ways in which the problems of death are conceptualized and 
expressed within Medieval and Renaissance theatre and iconography.  Her account focuses more 
closely on the dramatic treatment of the topic within a selection of plays, with less attention to the 
wider historical conditions underpinning cultural constructions of death.  William Engel’s Death and 
Drama in Renaissance England: Shades of Memory explores how memory and mnemonics inform the 
conceptualization and performance of death within the theatre.  In a related vein, his earlier work 
Mapping Mortality: The Persistence of Memory and Melancholy in Early Modern England provides a 
detailed examination of the symbolic and iconographic aspects of early modern responses to the 
problems of mortality.  Susan Zimmerman’s The Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare’s Theatre 
makes an outstanding contribution in this area also, focusing primarily on the problematization of the 
dead within the Shakespearean corpus.   
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discourses.  While the terms employed in discursive constructions of the dead inform 
individual and collective understandings, the language through which those terms are 
constructed is neither stable nor contained.  As deconstruction suggests, this is in part 
inherent in the very nature of language: but the effect is heightened where the 
instability of language meets the escalation of shifting tensions within the 
formulation of the concepts it constructs.  In an environment in which rapid and 
uneven changes are occurring even within the constitution of the categories of life 
and death, the terms themselves become increasingly unstable.  Moreover, since 
those terms are not constituted through theological structures alone and are not 
separable from their linguistic connections to other historical and cultural discourses, 
instabilities in conceptualizations of the dead are heightened by a further slippage at 
the site of language.  The uncanny emerges within these paradigmatic fractures, as 
familiar, delineable, and containable conceptions of death merge inextricably with 
the nebulous territory of what is unknown and unassimilable.  The ground becomes 
ripe for a haunting. 
     Historicist approaches often place Elizabethan ghosts within a linear schema in 
which particular cultural and literary conditions (such as the inheritance of classical 
and medieval forms, narratives, and themes) are responsible for specific figurations 
of the ghost.  The atemporality of those ghosts and their spectral effects function to 
disturb precisely such fixing of historical conditions.  In invading and eroding the 
boundaries of the categories upon which they depend – not just appearing inside that 
from which they are excluded but troubling the very distinction between inside and 
outside – spectres enter into the territory of the uncanny.  It is particularly significant 
that “death,” “dead bodies” and “the return of the dead” are, as Sigmund Freud 
points out, common causes for profoundly uncanny experiences (“The Uncanny” 
241).  This perhaps suggests that, of all categories, death is that within which we are 
least able to tolerate movement.  Since death is the ultimate immobilizer, the most 
contained, isolated, and inanimate state (in visible and biological terms at least), and 
the state against which the living are defined, we can bear no rupturing of its borders, 
no movement.  As that which the living cannot avoid or contest (at least not 
successfully), it is also the ultimate category of the natural: the one event that is 
unavoidable and biologically fixed irrespective of culturally specific understandings 
11 
 
of what it holds.  Hence, any threat to the boundaries of death, and in particular to the 
immobility of the dead, is almost invariably generative of the unnatural or 
supernatural and often a concomitant emergence of the uncanny.   
     In its radical indeterminacy, its erosion of the boundaries that are essential to its 
functioning, the uncanny is notoriously difficult to define.  Studies of the uncanny 
throughout the last century have typically fallen back upon a description of the 
effects it generates in order to establish its function as a category, with Freud’s 
foundational essay “The Uncanny,” struggling as much as any to define the term.  
Freud describes the uncanny or “die unheimlichkeit”
11
 as a “feeling”, an 
“experience”, an “atmosphere”, an “effect”, and a specific “class of the frightening” 
(“The Uncanny” 219, 249, 227, 246, 220).
12
  For my purposes, the most important 
aspect is that which Nicholas Royle highlights in his summary of Freud’s findings 
when he outlines the uncanny as “a critical disturbance of what is proper,” “a crisis 
of the natural, touching upon everything that one might have thought was ‘part of 
nature’,” and “a peculiar commingling of the familiar and the unfamiliar,” 
particularly where “something unhomely” is revealed “at the heart of hearth and 
home” (The Uncanny 1).  In this, we must be aware that the “natural” does not fall 
outside of the workings of linguistic and philosophical construction but is rather a 
product of them.  Hence, Freud is at pains to point out that if the supernatural occurs 
within the accepted bounds of perceptive or “material reality” in a literary text, then 
its naturalization – its assimilation of the supernatural within the (imaginary) norms 
of the text – prohibits the uncanny from arising (“The Uncanny 250).
 13
   In other 
                                                 
11
 The two terms are not quite synonymous, being subject to the play of differences that inevitably 
marks a translated word or text (Royle 11).  Psychoanalytic and literary critics vary in which term they 
deploy, often for no clear reason.  For my purposes, this distinction is not substantially important and 
for purposes of consistency and clarity, I therefore employ the English term “uncanny” throughout. 
12
 Derrida describes Freud’s conceptualization of the uncanny as displaying “an uncontrollable 
undecidability in the axiomatics, the epistemology, the logic . . . and of the thetic or theoretic 
statements” (Archive Fever 46).  Hélène Cixous observes Freud’s essay to be “a niggling, cautious, 
yet wily and interminable pursuit (of ‘something’ – be it a domain, an emotional movement, a 
concept, impossible to determine yet variable in its form, intensity, quality and content).”  It is a 
“fleeting . . . search whose movement constitutes the labyrinth which instigates it” (“Fiction and Its 
Phantoms” 525).  As these descriptions suggest, the fashion in which Freud’s writing reflects the 
content of his elusive subject matter is at least as reflective of the nature of the topic as of his 
approach. 
13
 Rather surprisingly, Freud claims on this basis that literature often does not produce a sense of the 
uncanny in relation to an event that would invoke it in “reality” and that “the supernatural apparitions 
in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Macbeth or Julius Caesar . . . are no more really uncanny than Homer’s 
jovial world of gods” because they fit within an “imaginary reality imposed on us by the writer” (“The 
12 
 
words, what is “natural” alters according to the terms of the cultural (and/or textual) 
environment in which it arises and therefore so does the production of the uncanny 
and its relation to the supernatural.  But where the uncanny does arise, it breaches our 
understanding of such categories, eroding the distinctions between what is 
understood to belong or not belong.  It is accordingly associated with the “sense of a 
secret encounter,” not with something “out there” but with something that disrupts 
the relation between “what is inside and what is outside” (Royle 2).   
     The experience of the uncanny, then, is linked to both sense and perception and, 
crucially, to the means by which perception is produced.  In his essay “On the 
Psychology of the Uncanny,” Ernst Jentsch (one of Freud’s contemporaries), 
emphasises the capacity for that which is “new,” different, or “hostile” to generate a 
sense of the uncanny because of a delay in producing “conceptual connections” 
between the object and the individual’s “previous ideational sphere” (8-9).  What is 
familiar and understood is differentiated from what is not by the individual’s ability 
immediately to assimilate “the phenomenon in question into its proper place” within 
existing categories of knowledge; failure to do so produces “disorientation” and often 
a resultant “shading of the uncanny” (8-9).  Although Freud justly criticises this work 
as simplifying the uncanny to what is merely unfamiliar or out of context, Jentsch’s 
theory usefully signals that the Freudian intermingling of the foreign and the homely 
is a function of what the conscious is (un)able to taxonomize.  Thus the production of 
the uncanny is specific to the individual’s intellectual and conscious functioning in 
relation to his environment.  The production of the uncanny supernatural (including 
the figure of the spectre) is inextricably linked to the degree to which the text 
incorporates the apparition within its cultural, theological, and philosophical terms in 
the same way that it would, in the “real” world, be linked to the individual’s personal 
understandings of what is natural, normal, and familiar.  The uncanny is therefore 
inextricably associated with issues of language as the means by which we construct 
and comprehend our inner and outer worlds.   
                                                                                                                                          
Uncanny” 250).  These examples are, by Freud’s own criteria, flawed, since the plays that he cites 
purport to be retellings of actual historical events and it is clear in all three of these plays that the 
encounter with a ghost is both unexpected and radically disturbing.  Derrida treats Freud’s scepticism 
towards the literary production of the uncanny with incredulity, commenting that Freud’s claim is “all 
the more surprising in that all the examples of Unheimlichkeit in this essay are borrowed from 
literature!” (Specters of Marx 245).   
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     John Newton observes in “Reading Ghosts: Early Modern Interpretations of 
Apparitions” that ghosts are read through existing “cultural schemata”.  In an early 
modern context, they are “assumed into a pre-existing world view, or meta-narrative, 
in which their existence can only be accounted for in the context of an overall 
scheme of religious thought” (67).  However, this assertion implies that there is 
always a means for the ghost to be assimilated, that theological structures are always 
able to accommodate the ghost in some way even if only through disqualifying it as a 
legitimate figure.  I would argue instead that the ghost enters into the role of the 
spectre precisely because, in some instances, it exceeds such meta-narratives and 
cannot therefore be accounted for in existing structures of language and thought.  
This is the point at which the psychoanalytic framework of the uncanny meets the 
deconstructive dismantling of linguistic and conceptual containment.  In Jacques 
Derrida, Royle argues that Derrida’s work is inherently associated with the uncanny.  
Deconstruction’s function, he suggests, is to disturb, displace, and transmute the 
“verbal, conceptual, psychological, textual, aesthetic, historical, ethical, social, 
political and religious landscape” but also to expose that such “seismic 
transformations” are already present in the texts (any texts) themselves (26).  It is this 
destabilization, this subversion of the seemingly solid ground of language and 
knowledge, that produces the deconstructive spectre in much the same way that the 
breaching of the natural and familiar generates the ghosts of the psychoanalytic 
uncanny.   
     This is why Royle comments that “monsters lurk everywhere in Derrida’s work”.  
What is monstrous is “intimately connected with what is normal, with normality and 
normalization” – the monstrous can only be named as such through its opposition to 
what is normal, but deconstruction, like any event that is generative of the uncanny, 
disturbs that opposition, exposing that what is outside or opposed to the normal may 
also inhabit it (111).  Thus deconstruction is both descriptive and productive of 
spectrality.  Where psychoanalysis locates the uncanny at the site of the border 
between the conscious and the unconscious, deconstruction similarly situates it in the 
borders and structures that form the systems of thought and language.  The spectre is, 
in both instances, the apparition of that which breaches the border and thereby 
destabilizes the opposition between what lies upon either side.  This is why Ernesto 
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Laclau describes Derrida’s treatment of the spectre as “a classic deconstructive 
move: the specter being undecidable between the two extremes of body and spirit, 
these extremes themselves become contaminated by that undecidability” (“The Time 
is Out of Joint” 87).  The spectre haunts the terms of its own construction, the crucial 
distinctions between past and present, life and death, presence and absence. 
     To be clear about my choice of terminology here, I should acknowledge that the 
term “spectre” may be used to denote any visual apparition ranging from a 
“phantom, or ghost” to an imagined “object or source of dread or terror” or even a 
“reflection” (OED “spectre,” def. 1, 3).  All of these connotations will become 
important at various points throughout this thesis and others will arise through early 
modern usages of the term in my primary texts.  Like the “spirit,” the “shade,” and 
indeed the “ghost,” the “spectre” is slippery and changeable in its early modern 
deployment.  For this reason, I do not attempt here to distinguish in any depth 
between their implications in modern and Elizabethan usages as my own 
deployments of these terms inevitably shift according to whether I am adopting my 
own theoretical terminology or entering into the terms deployed within my primary 
texts.  Instead, I endeavour to consider spectres and ghosts in the (con)textual forms 
that they take in any text under discussion, making clarifications only where a given 
context requires further explanation.  By and large, I habilitate early modern terms to 
the lexicon of my critical apparatus as appropriate whilst remaining alert to the 
nuances and implications of their original usage.  My own usage of the term 
“spectre” will generally invoke its deconstructive and uncanny senses, in which the 
spectre constitutes, not merely the figure of the ghost as the visual manifestation of 
the spirit of the dead, but relates more closely to the functioning of the ghost where it 
refuses the containment or logic of structures of knowledge.   
     With that established, we may consider that the ghost, as Christopher Prendergast 
puts it in “Derrida’s Hamlet,” inhabits a “place/non-place” because there is no space 
between these oppositions and yet the ghost can be relegated to neither pole (45).  
Like Derrida, Prendergast refers here to the ghost that is decidedly spectral in its 
effects.  This is not simply, or at least not only, a matter of binary opposition in 
qualities associated with oppositional terms but rather of the opposition that arises 
from the boundaries that function to differentiate particular categories.  Life is 
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continuous with death in terms of the individual’s linear progression across time and 
mortal bodies possess the same spiritual substance as the dead: but the act of dying 
functions to generate a division that, in Protestant theology at least, positions the 
dead in isolated opposition to the living.  In the presence of the spectral, though, the 
poles themselves begin to crumble as the failure of exclusion erodes the fixity of 
their positions.  Prendergast observes that ontological “displacement” underpins 
Derrida’s reading of the ghost’s “radical indeterminacy” rather than the more usual 
theological problematization of critical debate (45-46).  In Spectres of Marx, Derrida 
identifies the ghost’s ontological indeterminacy – its occupation of an indeterminate 
state “between presence and absence . . . material embodiment and disembodiment” 
– as the condition of its spectrality.  Thus, “it inhabits a space of pure virtuality, and 
what in that space is swallowed up is the ontological ground of Being itself” 
(Prendergast 45).  To a certain extent, this is a function of any ghost, in that ghosts 
always occupy an indeterminate territory between and within the conditions of 
presence and absence and its related categories of opposition (life/death, past/present, 
and corporeal substance/spirit, to name three of the most prominent).  However, in 
the wider context of Hamlet, the spectrality of this specific ghost cannot and does not 
function independently of its disruption of theological contexts: nor, indeed, does the 
spectrality of any ghost exist outside of or anterior to, the culturally-specific 
structures (philosophical, theological, linguistic) that its spectrality disturbs.  Rather, 
it is its paradoxical ability to inhabit but also exceed these structures that generates 
its uncanny effects. 
     This conceptualization of the ghost is central to this thesis and has been usefully 
explored in some areas by Marjorie Garber’s important approach to the topic in 
Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers.  Published in 1987, Garber’s work explores the 
uncanny extensively in Shakespeare’s work, using a predominantly psychoanalytic 
framework.  Garber examines ghostliness in a number of Shakespeare’s plays in 
order to demonstrate, not only the uncanniness that psychoanalytic, poststructural, 
and postmodernist theories expose within his work, but also “the way in which 
Shakespearean texts . . . have mined themselves into the theoretical speculations that 
have dominated our present discourses, whether in literature, history, psychoanalysis, 
philosophy, or politics” (xiii).  The subsequent exploration incorporates a kind of 
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intertextual reading of Shakespeare’s work to demonstrate that theoretical modes of 
enquiry are not something that we merely project backwards upon his drama and the 
historical aspects of its production, but also arise in conjunction with, and response 
to, its constant breaching of boundaries.  Thus for Garber, the uncanniness within 
Shakespeare’s work is doubly uncanny in that it not only manifests ghosts within its 
own time, but also ghosts us, as critics that come after, but also within, the conditions 
of his writing.   Garber’s reading of this uncanniness is particularly helpful, not only 
for the light it sheds on ghostliness within individual plays such as Hamlet and Julius 
Caesar, but also for the way in which it establishes a basis for considering the 
broader atemporality of the spectre.  In breaching its own cultural conditions for the 
structuring of categories such as life and death, past and present, the spectre speaks 
to us through its resonance with our own modes of enquiry into precisely the same 
events.        
     In some respects, the collection of essays in Ewan Fernie’s Spiritual Shakespeares 
constitutes a similar endeavour as it sets out to liberate the treatment of the spiritual 
(and therefore spirits) from the theological strictures to which historicists have often 
bound the topic.  Refreshingly, Fernie sets out to compile a collection of essays that 
identifies spirituality as a “dimension of the plays” that is “illuminated by, but 
remains irreducible to, any established theory or theology” (2).  Identifying 
spirituality as anterior to religion and as a “mode of opposition to what is,” he argues 
that Shakespeare’s work is “sufficiently ‘real’ to be haunted by spiritual alterity from 
within,” producing unidentifiable forces that operate outside of the confines of 
specific ideologies and theologies (9, 5).  This is the source of many of the 
characters’ crises, such as those generated by the supernatural events that plague 
Richard III, Brutus, and Macbeth.  Fernie takes to task critics such as Greenblatt for 
minimizing the spiritual forces at work within the protagonists’ demises.  He 
proposes instead that we “think in terms not so much of spiritual truth as truths.  For 
a drama cut loose of its medieval moorings in an epoch of religious fission and the 
emergence of scepticism, spirituality is not a secure given, so much as a questionable 
and open structure of being and experience.”  Hence, “Shakespearean pluralism 
involves competition between possible absolutes, and resistance to the absolute as 
well” (7).  In this, Fernie does not directly address the matter of the uncanny but 
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indirectly identifies the grounds for it, by working to show that the excess and 
dissolution of boundaries within Shakespeare’s drama are more than products of the 
tensions between historical (and often specifically theological) forces, but arise 
through the presence of something more, something other at work within his 
negotiations between competing cultural forces.  What is perhaps most useful here is 
his alignment of the spiritual with that which the spectres in Shakespeare’s work 
show us when they refuse the constraints of the systems of knowledge.  Both expose 
that we may sometimes learn more from what we cannot know than from what is 
already established and therefore marked by its own limits. 
     Some recent critical approaches to issues of uncanniness in Shakespeare’s work 
have also focused on the Gothic in an attempt to challenge the linear, historical 
narratives that place this as a specifically eighteenth-century event.  Two volumes 
have been produced recently that are helpful in this respect.  Christy Desmet and 
Anne Williams argue in their Introduction to Shakespearean Gothic that 
Shakespeare’s work is not only foundational to later Gothic literature but generates, 
in and of itself, many of the qualities that we now associate with the genre.  In 
particular, they highlight Shakespeare’s disturbance of “rules,” suggesting that “in 
authorizing the ‘barbarous’ and the irrational, in affirming the burden of the past, 
Shakespeare invited us to contemplate the human elements that escape the bounds of 
reason and do not obey its laws” (2, 7).  Similarly, John Drakakis and Dale 
Townshend’s Gothic Shakespeares navigates the seeming atemporality of 
Shakespeare’s engagement with the dark and often transgressive preoccupations 
associated with the later body of work in the eighteenth century and beyond.  In his 
introduction, Drakakis points out that Shakespeare’s work, with its “investment in 
the resources of the supernatural,” death, and the sphere of “human experience” 
outside of the rational, qualifies itself as belonging to the Gothic (1).   These 
collections of essays work towards identifying the many ways in which qualities that 
typify this genre have considerable force prior to the eighteenth century, exposing the 
complexity of the relation between Shakespearean and later bodies of work we now 
classify as the Gothic.  Although most of the essays in these volumes address 
material outside of the parameters of this thesis, their explorations of the 
intertextuality of Shakespeare and the Gothic is helpful in drawing attention to how a 
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text’s themes, concerns, modes of enquiry, and literary devices may emerge through 
a complex engagement with its environment in a way that often denies subsequent 
critical constructions of historical situation and genre.  In the latter volume, 
Townshend’s chapter “Gothic and the ghost of Hamlet,” is of particular interest for 
the way in which it shows the spectre in Hamlet to be linked directly to the struggle 
to comprehend death and the failure of mourning, an issue that I will take up in some 
depth in Chapter Two.  Townshend demonstrates that modern psychoanalytic 
conceptions of mourning and spectrality connect directly with the treatment of such 
issues in Hamlet: for the spectres in Shakespeare, like those of eighteenth-century 
Gothic, manifest the (failed) compulsion to come to terms with the nature of death.  
     Zimmerman’s The Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare’s Theatre makes a 
helpful addition to this field of study from another focal point, turning the 
longstanding critical interest in early modern treatments of the dead towards the issue 
of corporeal indeterminacy.  Zimmerman draws attention to the body as a 
“hermeneutic matrix for the human being” that is problematic in its slippages 
between polarised categories determining what is “visible,” material and known, 
with what is uncertain and obscured from view (1).  Pointing to corruptibility of the 
corpse as a site at which such divisions are eroded, she goes on to highlight the 
problematization of the body and the dead within contemporary theological and 
scientific discourses, and related aspects of its treatment in the theatre.  Zimmerman 
traces a pattern emerging within Shakespeare’s work in which the body becomes a 
site of ontological indeterminacy and epistemological instability in regard to 
understandings of the human.  Thus, although she does not directly set out to 
investigate the uncanny, her research provides fruitful insights into the instability 
within early modern conceptualizations of the dead that is generative of, and figured 
within, the increasingly spectral ghosts. 
     While focusing primarily on Shakespeare’s plays, Zimmerman’s treatment of the 
wider conditions of early modern understandings of the dead draws attention to the 
fact that the ghost’s spectrality is not specific to Shakespeare’s work.   It seems to me 
that Shakespeare is not so much alone in his production of uncanny and often Gothic 
disturbances of the dead, as he is uniquely effective.  That is to say, his spectacular 
breaching of conventions and of psychological and cultural boundaries in his 
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treatments of the dead magnifies, rather than invents, a disturbance present within 
wider engagements with the figure of the ghost.  The stage upon which Shakespeare 
places his most compelling and disturbing ghosts is already primed for, and indeed 
generative of, precisely such spectres.  Recently, Belsey has called into question the 
enduring assumption that Shakespeare’s creation of a genuinely unsettling spectre in 
Hamlet, rather than a conventional “bloodcurdling but not eerie” ghost, was entirely 
new (1).  She turns to popular stories outside of Protestant and Catholic constructions 
of ghosts and the afterlife to draw attention to “the long tradition of popular ghost 
lore that successive doctrinal prohibitions and appropriations were unable to 
suppress” (8). Her detailed tracing of the resonances between Hamlet and popular 
stories that functioned outside of the structures of religious understanding constitutes 
an important addition to existing accounts that have so often limited the play to a 
simple interaction between Protestant and Catholic perspectives, with perhaps a few 
added elements of the most well-known strands of folklore or classical mythology.
14
  
Belsey is convincing in her argument that “the ghost lore and the storytelling skills 
that make the apparition in Hamlet chilling grow out of the conventions of popular 
narrative” (24).  However, in tracing the familiar patterns of the literary histories of 
Elizabethan stage ghosts, Belsey endorses the traditional view that “outside 
Shakespeare and prior to Julius Caesar in 1599, extant stage ghosts are not uncanny” 
(7).  While locating Hamlet within a wider tradition of ghostly disturbance and 
ostensibly liberating it from the critical assumption that “Shakespeare invented the 
uncanny virtually single handed,” Belsey tacitly affirms the perspective that he 
produced the earliest known theatrical examples and does not address the possibility 
of its emergence within other contemporary modes of writing outside of popular 
folklore (7). 
     Indeed, this is indicative of a much wider trend amongst critics looking at issues 
of early modern spectrality: Shakespeare may not have dreamt it up alone, but 
attention to the uncanny is oddly absent from critical approaches to ghosts and the 
                                                 
14
 Belsey notes that it is not possible to liberate these narratives entirely from the theology of the time, 
since “there are few surviving popular tales where vernacular ghost lore is not interlaced with scraps 
of Church teaching.”  Nevertheless, she contests that “we have . . . fragmentary access to material that 
retains enough vernacular elements to demonstrate their survival into Shakespeare’s time and beyond” 
(11).  I would suggest that this may well denote the inseparability of popular belief from Church 
teachings in the immediate social context as well as in terms of the writings that survive, although 
Belsey does not pursue this point further. 
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dead within the writing of his contemporaries.  Such perspectives seem to be the 
product of a kind of historical sleight-of-hand, an established reading of the 
Elizabethan corpus that conjures them into an assigned role within the narratives of 
literary history in regard to treatments of the dead.  It is as though Shakespeare’s 
extraordinary generation of the spectral draws a veil over other writings, hiding from 
view the instabilities and shifting terms of other, less radical engagements with 
death.  But if, as Belsey argues, Shakespeare’s engagement with the uncanny was 
preceded by earlier examples of its presence in contexts such as that of folklore, this 
suggests that we might do well to examine the work of contemporary writers with 
sharper attention to their treatment of the dead, outside of the traditional, historicized 
accounts of their literary role.   
     David Punter outlines an emerging critical movement towards such modes of 
analysis in his essay “Spectral Criticism.”  Spectral criticism, as he describes it, is “a 
substrate of all dealings with text, an undecidable ground on which our reading 
occurs, a reinvocation of a terrorizing but desired communion with the dead” (260).  
Drawing upon the foundation of Derrida’s Specters of Marx, he points out that: 
 
          Derrida engages with the looping circularity of history, whereby there is, as in  
          the Gothic, never an origin, or a never-origin, a state whereby the past refuses  
          to be entirely occluded but remains to haunt the apparent site of enlightened  
          new beginnings: in the beginning – apparently – is the apparition.  History  
          therefore cannot be written without ghosts, but the point goes further than this:  
          the narratives of history must necessarily include ghosts – indeed they can  
          include little else – but they will also be written by ghosts.  History is a series  
          of accounts of the dead, but it is also a series of accounts by the dead; the  
          voices we overhear in our dealings with history are spectral without exception,  
          they spectralize the possibility of knowledge. (262) 
 
This approach suggests that scholarly and critical approaches to the writing of the 
past are not only unable to preclude the ghosts of history, but are also produced by its 
ghosts.  The spectres in question are not merely the narrative figures of ghosts but are 
those that write history: they are the voices that return now, for the first time, as we 
address the writings of the past, but also that emerge through our own voices, as our 
engagement with history and historical texts is inseparable from the history that 
constructs us.  Thus they are to do with the sense “that we are, as it were, looking at 
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the wrong side of the paper (or at the paper before, or after, it has been temporarily 
inscribed)” so that the text is “open to construal as the ‘text instead’, the wrong text, 
a ghostly alteration of a prior state of material being which is unsusceptible of 
recapture” (267).   
     Such an approach enables a movement beyond the recapturing of an historical 
voice or voices to examine the spectral workings, the incompleteness and 
transgressions within the text that enable it to move outside of the structures we 
identify in our (re)constructions of history.  One of the most important points here is 
Punter’s suggestion (in regard to the postcolonial) that “the phantomatic” may “be a 
function of specific relations between and among languages, so that the issue of the 
speaking voice” would have to “be considered in terms of the ‘foreigning’ of the 
apparently natural, the inner sense of a language not our own” (268).  This concept is 
important to my approach to the language in which Elizabethan writers construct the 
dead, realizing, not only the “partiality of all our efforts” to access their writings 
through “accurate historical exhumation,” but the impossibility of the Elizabethans 
being any more able to hermetically contain and control their treatment of the dead 
(271).  It is not only history, after all, that cannot access the gaps, the incompletions 
and hauntings of the texts that we examine, but all entries into language, into the 
employment of networks of significations with no origin, end, or limits.  So while 
Punter returns us once more to Old Hamlet as the ghost par excellence and the ghost 
that continues to haunt our readings of the spectre, it is in order to consider that 
“spectral criticism” does not attend to the matter of knowing – as Hamlet attempts 
(although fails) to do – but “thrives . . . not on the originary voice but on the echo” 
(273).  For Punter, “Hamlet tells us of secrets; it cannot, by definition, tell us secrets” 
(274)   
     In this thesis, I work to call forth a few more of those secrets, to look at the 
spectral workings of broader treatments of the ghost that speak with and to, the 
profoundly uncanny figures in Hamlet and other Shakespearean works.  I begin by 
looking at treatments of the dead in the early Elizabethan translations of Seneca, 
focusing primarily on Jasper Heywood’s translations of Thyestes, John Studley’s 
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Agamemnon, Alexander Neville’s Oedipus, and Thomas Nuce’s Octavia.
 15
  
Compiled into a single volume by Thomas Newton in 1581, most of the translations 
(including all of those which I address here) were undertaken in the 1560s.
16
  These 
texts demonstrate a marked spectrality as they call the Senecan dead into the 
conflicted language of their contemporary environment.  Critics of these translations 
have largely failed to register their significance as individual literary works that 
function, like other texts, in a complex relation with the linguistic and cultural 
conditions of their production.  Broadly speaking, criticism has fallen into two 
streams.  In the first, critics approach the translations as cultural relics of the 
Elizabethan approach to translative processes, assessing how faithful a translation is 
to the “original" or how aesthetically pleasing it is, with an accompanying critique of 
stylistic and formal properties.  Evelyn Spearing, who has strongly influenced the 
last century of criticism in this field, exemplifies the typical result of this approach 
when she observes that the Tenne Tragedies have little “dramatic quality” and their 
value lies only “in the interest of their language and style, in their metrical and 
grammatical forms, and in their influence on the development of the Elizabethan 
drama” (“The Elizabethan ‘Tenne Tragedies of Seneca’” 458).  Despite paying close 
attention to the linguistic workings of the translations, their innovations and creative 
treatment of the source texts, she assumes that the translations function as somewhat 
inferior copies of the Senecan originals.   
     Other critics have largely followed suit throughout the last century.  For instance, 
in “Adapting to the Times: Expansion and Interpolation in the Elizabethan 
                                                 
15
  Although originally assumed to be authored by Seneca, Octavia’s authorship is now generally 
attributed elsewhere by modern scholars.  John Fitch, for example, argues that the play was probably 
written after Nero’s death in 68 AD and no later than the 90s.  Nevertheless, it forms a functional part 
of the Senecan corpus amongst the Elizabethan translations, not only because the Elizabethans 
believed it to be the work of Seneca but also because of the role that it takes up within the 
mythological, historical, and thematic network constructed throughout Seneca’s tragedies.  For an 
outline of the key points of debate in the play’s authorship, see Fitch pp. 510-12.  
16
 As Jessica Winston indicates in “Seneca in Early Elizabethan England,” critics often focus upon 
Newton’s 1581 quarto of The Tenne Tragedies of Seneca because it immediately preceded a sharp rise 
in Senecan-inspired drama (31).  Because there is little variation between editions, the distinction 
between criticism of Newton’s quarto and the earlier publication of individual translations from 1559 
through the 1560s is largely unimportant for my purposes.  Only one of the translations in this edition 
(Newton’s version of Thebais) was new, although Studley’s Phaedra [Hippolytus] and Hercules 
Oetaeus, written around 1566-67, are not known to have been previously published (Norland 253).  
Neville’s version of Oedipus was the only text to undergo any significant revision for Newton’s 
edition and none of the amendments significantly affect the passages I discuss here.   
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Translations of Seneca,” Howard B. Norland addresses the way in which the 
translators alter their source texts “in keeping with the sixteenth-century conception 
of tragedy” and with the contemporary audience in mind, but does not alter his 
critical framework significantly from that of earlier critics (262).  He incorporates a 
range of considerations in terms of form, content, and interpretation but perpetuates 
the commitment to assessing “fidelity” to the original texts (259).  Occasionally 
critics gesture in the direction of a more culturally specific reading of the translations 
– in his Introduction to Heywood’s translation of Thyestes, Joost Daalder goes so far 
as to describe the text as “fundamentally a Renaissance play as much as a classical 
one” – but there are few real attempts to engage seriously with the implications of 
viewing the translations as specifically Renaissance texts (xxvii).   
     The second stream of criticism focuses more closely on the longstanding debate 
about Senecan influence within the development of Renaissance drama.  In this, 
some critics do consider cultural perception, but usually only in order to explore 
what it suggests about how the translations function as conduits for the transmission 
of Senecan influence within the evolution of the English tragedy.
17
  In “Seneca and 
English Tragedy,” for instance, G.K. Hunter considers formal, ethical, philosophical, 
and theological differences between the Latin and English versions of Seneca, but 
only in order to argue against the predominant critical trend that identifies English 
tragedy as being heavily indebted to Senecan influence.  Considerably more attention 
has been paid to the broader cultural reception of Seneca as part of the debate 
concerning Senecan literary influence – for example, in looking at how Stoic ideas 
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 Prominent criticism in favour of the argument that the translations play a role in the wider 
transmission of Senecan influence include T.S. Eliot’s “Seneca in Elizabethan Translation” and B. R. 
Rees’ “English Seneca: A Preamble,” the latter of which concludes, rather offputtingly, that “English 
Seneca . . . was the midwife assisting at the birth of English drama” (133).  Some critics who support 
the notion of Seneca as an important dramatic influence argue that a more complex model is 
nevertheless required to understand the complexities of historical influence.  This includes Gordon 
Braden’s Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition, Rees’ “English Seneca” (123-25), 
Daalder’s introduction to Thyestes (xxi-xv), and Robert Miola’s Shakespeare and Classical Tragedy: 
The Influence of Seneca.  A smaller body of scholarship argues against the translations (and indeed the 
Senecan corpus itself) having a substantial influence upon drama, such as Howard Baker’s Induction 
to Tragedy, F. L. Lucas’s Seneca and Elizabethan Tragedy, and Sander M. Goldberg’s “Going for 
Baroque.”  The latter highlights the need for more specific conceptualization of elements such as 
dramatic action and rhetoricity in discussions of the relation between the Renaissance and Senecan 
tragedy.  For an overview of the scholarship up until 1978, see Frederick Kiefer’s “Seneca’s Influence 
on Elizabethan Tragedy: An Annotated Bibliography.”  
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are perpetuated and/or transformed through their reception into the Christian climate 
of Elizabethan England – but the translations are not usually the central focus here.   
     What is conspicuously absent from most of this debate is any endeavour to 
produce sustained consideration of the translations in regard to their assimilation of 
the formal and mythological properties of Seneca’s texts into the framework of 
Elizabethan language and discourses.  The cultural and linguistic specificity of the 
translators’ reception of Seneca, the qualities that see the Latin brought forth, not 
only into the English language, but into the philosophical, theological, and cultural 
climate of Elizabethan England, remain relatively unexplored.
18
  The lack of 
theoretical material employed in addressing the Senecan translations across the 
spectrum of criticism is perhaps responsible for (or indicative of) some of the 
limitations of work in this field.  Even amongst the small number of critics that 
attend to the translations as texts of individual significance, it is seldom that any 
attempt is made to engage with translation theory in any meaningful way.  Yet in 
recent decades, translation theorists have increasingly called into question the 
practice of positioning translations as secondary by-products or copies of “original” 
texts.  Octavio Paz highlights one of the most important aspects of this shift when he 
comments that “all texts,” including translations “are originals . . . . Up to a point, 
each translation is a creation and thus constitutes a unique text”.  For him, true 
originality is impossible even in the so-called original text, “because language itself, 
in its very essence, is already a translation – first from the nonverbal world, and then, 
because each sign and each phrase is a translation of another sign, another phrase” 
(“Translation: Literature and Letters” 154).  Thus, Paz suggests that the term 
“original” is itself somewhat illusive, according a linguistic and creative priority to a 
source text that disguises its own dependence upon, and entry into, the significatory 
networks of other texts, other writings that endlessly contribute to the cross-
referential structures of language.  He also suggests that while the translated text 
inevitably enters into an exceptionally close relationship with its source, this relation 
                                                 
18
 Douglas Green argues in “Newton’s Seneca,” that “the old debate about the extent of the 
collection’s influence . . . has obscured other possible effects” and goes on to explore the significance 
of Newton’s translation of Thebais just as the English tragedy turns from instructive morality to the 
“mimetic representation of characters involved in an ethical action” (93-94).  Green’s essay is rare in 
that it gives serious consideration to the inevitably transformative effects of re-writing a Senecan text 
in an altered historical context.  However, its focus upon Newton’s translation renders it of limited 
relevance for my purposes.     
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is by no means isolated or contained.  At the same time that the translation performs 
a doubling of the source text, it must equally enter into a relationship with the 
linguistic structures, discourses, texts, and contexts that are specific to the 
functioning of the language into which it translates. 
     In Chapter One, I draw out the spectral qualities of this relation between the 
source and translated texts through theoretical frameworks offered by Walter 
Benjamin and Jacques Derrida.  I do so in order to examine how, in the Senecan 
translations, the spectral aspects of translation both resonate with, and greatly 
amplify, the disturbances of the dead.  These works introduce Seneca’s revenants 
into English at a time when the dead are already inhabiting unstable ground and 
claim them at once to be both ancestor and offspring.  They are marked in advance 
by the source texts that they are not and at the same time inscribe Seneca’s material 
with the language and therefore the discursive structures of Elizabethan English.  I 
examine the relationship between the source and translations in some depth, not with 
a view to assessing the accuracy or quality of the translations, but in order to 
consider the ways in which the assimilation of Seneca’s Latin into the Elizabethan 
cultural environment transforms its content, unsettling the terms by which the dead 
are understood, and thereby also their containment.  In doing so, I make no claim to 
positioning the translations of the dead as directly influential upon other, subsequent 
drama and literature, but rather work to establish a destabilisation of the dead that 
enters into a wider cultural disruption of the ontologies of the dead and their relation 
to the living. 
     In Chapter Two, I look at specific strategies by which the living endeavour to 
contain the dead through the compulsion for ritualized burial, and then move on to 
considering the ways in which breaches of burial are generative of the spectral.  
Drawing attention to the structural polarisation of terms that underpins the 
production of categories such as “living” and “dead,” I examine theological extracts 
from Perkins and Lavater with a view to establishing how they endeavour to separate 
fully the living and the dead, and to what effect.  Using deconstructive theory, I 
explore how the mutual exclusivity of the terms and constructions used in such 
treatments of the dead is marked by the conditions of its own failure.  I also look at 
the psychoanalytic structures that underlie the imperative to bury.  As a figure that 
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reifies the disruption of burial, the ghost exposes the way in which death lurks within 
the space of the living.  More than that though, it demonstrates the way in which 
death is constitutive of the living and therefore integral to the existence of that which 
it destroys.  Freudian and Derridean theories of mourning suggest that the formation 
and preservation of the inner self is paradoxically both dependent upon death and 
also its banishment: but the structures of mourning are often troubled, particularly in 
the Elizabethan revenge tragedy.  The resulting failure of the living to lay the dead 
satisfactorily to rest and to mourn adequately – to bury the dead fully and finally – is 
fundamental to the production of spectrality and concomitant interior disruption in 
texts such as The Tragedy of Hoffman and Hamlet. 
     Of course, in both of these plays, the melancholic inability to relinquish the dead 
father is related to an injunction that, in seeming conflict with the requirement for 
burial, calls for the son to bear the father’s memory.  Both Hamlet and Hoffman 
commit to preserving this memory, but are haunted by the effects, as remembering 
the dead and remembering the living are neither separable nor the same and therefore 
disrupt the temporal structures through which memory operates.  In Chapter Three, I 
consider how the problematic commitment to remembrance marks the very being of 
the bereft son in a way that corrupts his ability to function within time.  This effect is 
connected to the ghost’s wider problematization of temporality and its 
epistemological categories.  The longstanding debate amongst Hamlet’s critics 
regarding the ghost’s positioning within Catholic and Protestant theologies testifies 
in itself to the ghost’s resistance to assimilation by the structuring forces of 
theological discourse and related philosophies.  What is so significant about the 
ghost’s indeterminacy is that, as it simultaneously inhabits and exceeds ontological 
and spiritual categories, it erodes their very foundations.  I look particularly closely 
at how the spectral disruption of time destabilises the structures of inheritance so that 
linear progress – pursuit of that which would put the time to rights – is underpinned 
by the (temporal) conditions of its own failure.  In this, the nature of inheritance 
becomes defined, not by the material, biological, social, or political rewards that are 
passed through time, but by the control of time as the structure that enables their 
trafficking, enabling the heir to inherit in time and proceed with the business of 
living.  In texts such as Hamlet, Macbeth, and The Tragedy of Hoffman, this also 
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becomes what is least subject to mortal control.  The living cannot, in the presence of 
the spectre, inherit and also liberate themselves from the effects of the lingering 
presence of the dead. 
     Indeed, this erosion of the boundaries between the living and the dead bleeds into 
the most immediate means by which the living comprehend and position themselves 
in relation to their outer environment.  In Chapter Four, I explore this problem 
further, focusing on the corruption of perception that pervades Elizabethan 
constructions of the spectre.  Unsurprisingly, the matter of determining the accuracy 
of visual perception is of crucial importance in a culture in which the interpretation 
of apparitions links directly to the veracity of opposing theological accounts of such 
sightings and, accordingly, may influence the salvation of the soul.  When considered 
in conjunction with philosophical and theological conceptualizations of the nature of 
vision and perception, episodes of visual uncertainty problematize the matter of 
accurately perceiving any kind of independent, exterior reality, drawing the subject 
instead into a complex relation between inner and outer worlds.  In this process, the 
spectre exposes that which is usually hidden within the interior of the gazing subject 
as well as the exterior domain in which the ghost emerges.  In returning an image 
that fails to correlate with the subject’s understanding of the external environment, 
the spectre often functions as a reflection that exposes a fundamental disjuncture 
within the structures by which inner and outer worlds are conceived and separated. 
     Throughout my exploration of this topic, I examine and quote from original 
publications of my primary texts rather than modernised editions.  Since the process 
of editing and modernising punctuation and spelling inevitably involves a certain 
degree of interpretation, I examine texts in their original form in order to avoid any 
loss of nuance or ambiguity that may be significant in the generation of spectrality.  I 
have compared my primary material to modern, edited texts where available and note 
any significant errors or problems in the original publication where it is relevant to 
my argument.  I largely preserve original spelling and punctuation in my quotations 
from primary texts, other than silently expanding contractions and ampersands, and 
restoring the spelling of those letters originally modified to suit the printing process.  
For purposes of clarity, I have made occasional corrections to punctuation and 
spelling and restored letters that have been obscured in the original text where it is 
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necessary for sense.  All changes to spelling are marked by brackets.  Citations from 
these works vary according to the text, as some were originally published with page 
numbers and others only with signatures.  For plays from Shakespeare’s first folio, 
page numbers are specific to the section of the folio, as comedies, histories, and 
tragedies were divided into sections with independent page numbering.  I have 
therefore preceded all page references for these texts with a number corresponding to 
the relevant section of the folio – most citations are from the third section, which 
contains the tragedies. 
     In regard to the authorship of translations, it should be noted that I make an 
implicit distinction between translations of “literary” texts (such as the works of 
Seneca) and translations of theological doctrine.  The Senecan translations, including 
the modern translations of Fitch and Frank Justus Miller, are listed under the relevant 
translators’ names in my Works Cited list.  The other translations of contextual 
material – specifically theological tracts such as those of Perkins, Lavater and Le 
Loyer – are listed under the original authors’ names and I largely refer to them as the 
authors throughout my discussion.  This is not because I wish to suggest that the 
latter texts are any less subject to the transformative effects of translation that I 
discuss in Chapter One than are literary texts.  Rather, it reflects the fact that I 
primarily utilize these texts to highlight particular instances of cultural, 
philosophical, and/or theological discourses that provide significant resonances 
between, or context for, my discussion of literary and theoretical material.  The finer 
distinctions between original and source text are therefore of less significance to my 
line of enquiry and have been excluded from consideration.  The same principle 
applies, of course, to translated theoretical material such as the English translations 
of Derrida that I employ throughout. 
     In terms of editions, I generally use the earliest published edition of a primary 
text.  The notable exception to this is Hamlet, for which I use the text of the second 
quarto published in 1604, based on the premise that it offers a more complete and 
credible treatment of the play’s material than the so-called “corrupted” first quarto of 
1603.  I use the 1631 edition of Chettle’s The Tragedy of Hoffman as the earliest 
extant copy of the play.  Although some alterations may have been made between its 
original publication (around the same time as Hamlet) and this later date, it retains all 
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of the qualities of an Elizabethan play and there is no cause to treat it as a later work.  
It will be noted that I largely treat the plays discussed in this thesis under the 
category of “literature” and with attention primarily to their textual, rather than 
performative qualities.  I do so on the basis that a static text that has been effectively 
fixed through the medium of publication may offer insights that are less readily 
identifiable within the endlessly fluid and variable space of dramatic performance.  
Whilst many plays would not, of course, have originally been written in their 
published form prior to or even during their staging, their written legacy is no less 
important for that, nor indeed less a product of their cultural context.  It is worth 
noting too that a number of dramatic works were not necessarily intended for 
performance.  Although there is evidence that some Senecan plays were performed 
around the time of the Senecan translations – specifically Oedipus, Troas, and Medea 
– only Oedipus is known to have been performed in English translation and it 
appears entirely possible that some of the translations were undertaken purely as 
literary endeavours (Winston 30 n.5, 32, 48-49).
19
   
     In seeking to expose the spectres within this selection of literature, I assume that 
we are able to speak to them still, or rather, with them, for it is perhaps more apposite 
to suggest that the spectre speaks first and foremost to us.  The ghosts that stalk 
through the literary and dramatic history of the dead are at their most potent where 
we are willing to listen to them, to avoid construing them as mere products of 
particular narratives, forms, and functions within literary history and consider the 
ways in which they repeatedly haunt the conditions and frameworks of their own 
production.  It is here that they have most to offer us, for in manifesting the 
instability of the processes by which Elizabethans constructed and attempted to 
constrain the functioning of death, they expose also the instability of ontology itself, 
                                                 
19
 For more on the debate as to the possible performance of the translations, see H. B. Charlton’s The 
Senecan Tradition in Renaissance Tragedy pp. 145, 153-58 and C. H. Conley’s The First English 
Translators of the Classics, p. 29 (both of whom argue in favour of a number of  translations having 
been performed) and Henri de Vocht’s “Introduction” to Jasper Heywood and His Translations of 
Seneca’s Troas, Thyestes, and Hercules Furens, pp.xxxiii-xxxiv (which argues against it).  Much of 
the debate rests on conjectures regarding the nature of the translations, such as T. S. Eliot’s and Jack 
O’Keefe’s speculations that Heywood’s invention of Achilles’ vengeful ghost seems designed for 
dramatic performance (Eliot, “Introduction” xlviii-xlix; O’Keefe, “Innovative Diction in the First 
English Translations of Seneca”  92).  Bruce Smith pieces together an interesting account of the 
conditions of production for Neville’s Oedipus (as well as performances of other incomplete Senecan 
translations by Alexander Nowell and William Gager) in “Toward the Rediscovery of Tragedy: 
Productions of Seneca’s Plays on the English Renaissance Stage.”   
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of our accounts of what it is to be, and to be alive.  In this, they speak to us, outside 
of (their) time to call into question the means by which we understand the living, the 







Spectres of Translation 
 
 
Through paunch of rivened earth, from Plutos rain 
With goastly steps, I am returnd again. 




     In Nuce’s translation of Octavia, the dead Agrippina announces her entry onstage 
with an assertion of her return.  Like all spectres, Agrippina functions as a revenant: 
she “begins by coming back” (Derrida, Specters 11).  This is true in more than one 
sense, for Agrippina’s return is not just the return of the dead woman (the mother and 
murder victim of the Roman emperor Nero), but also of the ghost found in the first-
century pseudo-Senecan Latin manuscript from which Nuce translates.  Agrippina 
belongs not only to the past of the play’s living, but to the past of the text itself; thus, 
she has made precisely the same return before.  Her movement from the past (when 
she was) to the present (when she is not) is doubled by the effect of the movement 
from the Latin text to the English translation.  This is not strictly a temporal 
movement, although there is an obvious chronological sequence at work in which the 
Latin precedes the English.  Nor is it simply a linguistic movement.  Constructed 
within the culturally specific frameworks of Elizabethan language, the English 
through which the ghost now returns cannot function as an uncomplicated vessel for 
the same figure merely to return in a different tongue.  In translated form, the figure 
of the English Agrippina manifests itself as the Latin Agrippina, but is neither 
synonymous with, nor isolable from that predecessor.  To put it another way, as 
Agrippina appears again, for the first time, she manifests and refuses her Latin past at 
the same time that she manifests and refuses her existence within the present English 
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text.  Alien to herself, the dead woman passes from one language into the next to 
become a figuration of the hauntings of translation. 
     As Agrippina’s entry suggests, a special relation exists between the return of the 
dead and the functioning of translation that calls for particular attention where the 
two coincide.  The return of the dead involves, at the outset, a movement beyond 
limits – beyond time, mortality, and (in Reformation England) the reassuring 
structures of theological and philosophical ontologies.  In calling the ghosts of 
Senecan texts into another time, another language, another culture, the Elizabethan 
translations are expositive of the way in which the very process of translation – in 
itself a return – is the stuff of which spectres are made.  A distinct resonance exists 
between the nature of translation and the ontological and temporal paradox of the 
ghost.  In Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History, Andrew Buse and Peter 
Stott outline the basic problem of the ghost thus: 
 
          The ghost cannot be properly said to belong to the past . . . for the simple  
          reason that a ghost is clearly not the same thing as the person who shares its  
          proper name.  Does then the ‘historical’ person who is identified with the ghost  
          properly belong to the present?  Surely not, as the idea of a return from death  
          fractures all traditional conceptions of temporality.    The temporality to which  
          the ghost is subject is therefore paradoxical, as at once they ‘return’ and make  
          their apparitional debut (11). 
 
The problem of the ghost, then, is that it fails to occupy a clearly locatable position 
within existing categories by which the living and the dead function: it disturbs the 
delineation of time, identity, and presence.  So too, the translation.  An English 
translation of a Latin text is not the same text as the original; yet nor is it entirely 
separate or independent.  In entering into another language, translations enter also 
into the cultural and discursive contexts that are inseparable from that language’s 
constitutive elements and frameworks of signification.  When the Senecan ghosts of 
Agrippina, Thyestes, Tantalus, and Laius return in the Elizabethan translations, they 
do so as Seneca’s ghosts and yet they are no longer that which Seneca wrote.  If the 
ghosts are the same and yet not identical with their formerly living selves, this is true 
also of their relationship with their prior existences in the Latin original.   
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     As I suggested in my Introduction, this aspect of the relationship between source 
and translative texts has been notably absent from existing critical treatments of the 
Elizabethan translations of Seneca.  This body of scholarship has largely excluded 
consideration of the culturally transformative aspects of translation to focus instead 
upon the matters of dramatic influence and/or formal and stylistic comparisons 
between English and Latin texts.  Such approaches typically manifest assumptions 
about the nature of translation that fall within the wider spectrum of “normative” 
approaches to translation.  In Translation, Poetics, and the Stage: Six French 
Hamlets, Romy Heylen points out that since the eighteenth century, predominant 
translation theories have positioned the translation as a text that can be assessed 
according to fixed criteria in order to determine the extent to which they succeed in 
reproducing the original (2-3).  Even prior to the eighteenth century though, such 
conceptions are in evidence.  For instance, John Dryden observes in the preface to 
his translation of Ovid’s Epistles that “the sence of an Authour, generally speaking, is 
to be sacred and inviolable” so that “a Translator has no . . . Right” to alter it: “’tis 
his business to make it resemble the Original” (Sig. [a3r-a3v]).  Dryden goes on to 
compare translation to the copying of artwork, an image he furthers in his preface to 
Sylvae: Or, the Second Part of Poetical Miscellanies: “Translation is a kind of 
Drawing after the Life; where every one will acknowledge there is a double sort of 
likeness, a good one and a bad. . . . I cannot without some indignation, look on an ill 
Copy of an excellent Original” (Sig. a3[r-v]).  Such ideas are then formulated in 
more depth by subsequent scholars such as Alexander Tytler, whose Essay on the 
Principles of Translation in 1791 establishes a foundation for translators to duplicate 
the “ideas,” stylistic elements, and readability of the original: principles that are 
repeated in much of the following two centuries of translation theory (Heylen 2). 
     As the critical responses to the Elizabethan translations suggest, such approaches 
establish a hierarchy between the privileged source text and the secondary 
translation.  This is particularly clear in early to mid twentieth-century criticism, 
although it by no means ends there.  Eliot’s “Seneca in Elizabethan Translation” is 
one of the few essays to catalogue the modifications and variations within the 
translations with comparatively little privileging of the Senecan text, but a more 
typical approach is that of Rees when he complains that the translators “accentuated” 
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Seneca’s literary “defects by emphasizing them through their own” (“English 
Seneca: A Preamble” 128).  Even in late twentieth-century criticism, such 
judgements persist, albeit often in less overt form: for instance, Norland observes 
Heywood’s addition of a choral passage in the second Act to have a logical function 
but complains nevertheless that it “seems especially inappropriate to Senecan drama” 
(245).  Norland, like others before him, charts a series of the notable disparities 
between source and translations, partly in order to note the effects that they have 
upon the text but also to assess their validity or adherence to the qualities of the Latin 
texts.  These types of conceptualizations of the translation process imply that the 
source text is in some way pure, with a claim to linguistic, creative, cultural, and 
temporal priority.  The translation is therefore designated an impure derivative, 
judged by how closely it can reproduce the purity of the original but, by virtue of its 
altered state, is never quite able to attain the same condition.   
     However, recent translation theory has begun to challenge such formulations, 
calling for more complex understandings of the nature and function of translations as 
individual works (Heylen 1).
 20
  Heylen describes the linguistic problems of 
translation as “almost trivial if one takes into account the different historical and 
socio-cultural backgrounds as well as the different literary codes operating in the 
receiving literature” (22).  She argues that translation should not be viewed as “a 
derivative or secondary literary activity.  As a form of interliterary communication it 
is a unique sign-producing act whereby the translator must choose between different 
sets of cultural norms and values,” negotiating between the “poetics or ideologies” of 
the original and “receiving” cultures (21).  The extent to which the translator 
privileges one over the other influences the extent to which the source text is 
acculturated (23).  Heylen further suggests that, in minimizing the issue of cultural 
specificity, “normative” translation theories fail to recognize that “the conditions 
required to produce ‘equivalence’ differ from period to period, and from language 
culture to language culture” so that what functions to re-produce an “original” text in 
one set of social, cultural, and historical circumstances may differ substantially in 
another (4).  I would add to this that actual equivalence can only be illusory, given 
not only the issues of socio-cultural, historical, and literary gaps but also the slippage 
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 Heylen provides a useful survey and critique of some of the key strands of translation theory in 
recent decades.  See esp. pp. 5-25. 
35 
 
and deferral that is inherent within language (a point to which I will return shortly).  
Heylen’s argument is useful though in illuminating the fact that, in order to translate 
at all, Studley, Heywood, Nuce and Neville’s language must function in dialogue 
with their wider environment, including but also extending beyond that of their Latin 
sources.   
     Indeed, Renaissance translation theorists themselves demonstrate an awareness 
that the relationship between original and source texts is not one of simple 
transmission or reproduction.  Warren Boutcher points out that in Laurence 
Humphrey’s 1559 Latin text The Interpretation of Languages, or, On the Method of 
Translating and Explicating Sacred and Profane Authors, translation is not separated 
from other modes of writing.
21
  Because “literary translation into English” is 
considered to be a part of the wider forms and practices “of classical learning . . . it is 
not really distinct from other forms of imitative literature”.  Rather, it is “a special 
case, a work rewriting one particular original, rather than drawing more eclectically 
on a number” (“The Renaissance” 48). 
22
  Therefore, it was often “the point the 
translator wished to make, or the meditation he or she wished to offer regarding a 
particular issue” that took prevalence over translative accuracy (51).  Accordingly, 
Elizabethan translations might best be viewed as functioning, in Boutcher’s terms, as 
“‘original’ works by authors who happen to be translating” or as the equivalent of 
“particular stage productions” that produce “original and unique performances of 
texts” (46, 49).
23
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 This text was not translated into English at the time.  The translation of its name here is provided by 
Boutcher.  Thomas M. Greene also discusses some important aspects of early modern translation 
theory in regard to the broader transmission of classical forms and ideas in Renaissance literature, 
particularly poetry.  See The Light in Troy, pp. 28-53. 
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 The purpose of Elizabethan translation largely excluded the modern aim to disseminate a book that 
would not otherwise be accessible; and in any case, those readers sufficiently well-educated to be 
reading the plays in translation, and interested in doing so, would typically have had the education to 
read them in Latin (Daalder xxvi).  Instead, motivations for translating ranged from the desire to 
enhance and improve the English language (a motivation previously shared by Roman translators) to 
social, political, and literary ambitions and pecuniary gain (Schulte and Biguenet 2; Boutcher 50). 
23
 Nashe, of course, would disagree, having made clear in his preface to Robert Greene’s Menaphon 
his distaste for “triviall translators” who bleed Seneca dry so that he “at length must needes die to our 
stage” and for those who he leaves “to the mercie of their mother tongue, that feed on nought but the 
crummes that fal from the translators trencher” (3[r], [1v]).  Whilst reflecting the extent of Senecan 
influence amongst his contemporaries, Nashe’s opinion is not reflective of a widespread resistance to 
such material since Senecan material was clearly popular and, as Winston points out, the practice of 
incorporating material from other sources was scarcely controversial in Elizabethan England (29).  
However, Senecan ghosts did provide excellent fodder for other satirists also: for instance, in Jonson’s 
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     With this in mind, it is clear that normative approaches to translation demonstrate 
inherent flaws within their structural opposition between source and translation.  
Spearing exemplifies this when she expresses the common complaint that Seneca is 
“utterly inferior . . . to the Greek dramatists” before observing that the translators 
“often accentuate [Seneca’s] faults and obscure his merits” (“The Elizabethan ‘Tenne 
Tragedies of Seneca’” 456-57).  In doing so, she illustrates that, if the Senecan 
source texts are positioned as pure originals against which the translations are judged 
as a secondary work, they may as easily be found inferior when placed within 
alternative pairings.  While the very term “original” implies priority in both 
temporality and importance, the original text itself is no more inherently contained 
and incontaminate than its subsequent translations.  This conflict is not merely a 
problem generated by the supposed literary or dramatic inferiority of Seneca, as 
Spearing’s reading suggests, but rather it manifests the more fundamental problem of 
the “impurity” of language (Derrida, “Roundtable on Translation” 100).  Derrida’s 
work demonstrates that as a system of signification, language is dependent upon 
“prior structures.”  The association of a particular meaning with a specific word (or 
chain of words) is possible only through a linguistic structure that exists through 
“differentiation” (Culler, On Deconstruction 96).  A particular word can bear a 
specific signification only through a structure that differentiates both the word and 
meaning from others.  The process of signification is therefore dependent on pre-
existing structures, but as every pre-existing structure is equally dependent on other 
prior differentiations in much the same way, there is no originary event.  At the same 
time, differences are not fixed, so meaning cannot be traced back to a systematic 
series of differences either (Culler 96).  Presence is inscribed within absence: 
absence within presence.  Language cannot, therefore, consist of a series of pure 
terms that are self-contained and/or stable.  Moreover, if any linguistic utterance is 
dependent upon the differentiations it produces and invokes, the language within 
which it operates cannot be self-contained because the differentiations contained 
therein must draw upon (and be distinguished from) those of other languages.  
      It is clear from this that an “original” or source text, like a translation, is 
constituted through its relation to others.  As a related issue, translation can never 
                                                                                                                                          
mockery of dramatic ghost scenes in Poetaster (Sig. [F2v]).  For a closer look at the Elizabethan 
reception of Senecan plays, see Smith’s “Toward the Rediscovery of Tragedy.” 
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properly duplicate the effect that occurs when a source text is written in one language 
but contains traces of another.  Derrida suggests that “translation can do everything 
except mark this linguistic difference inscribed in the language, this difference of 
language systems inscribed in a single tongue.”  The translation cannot accommodate 
the multiple “languages or tongues” contained in any “one linguistic system.”  
Moreover, that impurity threatens “every linguistic system’s integrity” as well as the 
translative process (“Roundtable” 100).  This has two key implications here.  Firstly, 
it suggests that the source text is not at one with itself: the Senecan text may be 
written in Latin but its language, its contents, are not hermetically sealed.  Most 
obviously, it carries also the mark of Greek, but also of other languages, cultures, 
texts, that play a constitutive role in both Latin and the text itself.  Hence, the 
hierarchical positioning of two texts may express a critical preference based on 
aesthetic, dramatic, or other criteria at a particular moment, but it does not express a 
relative purity within the privileged text.  Secondly, since the language of the 
translation is subject also to the same conditions, it cannot reproduce those of the 
original, irrespective of the quality of the specific translation.  There is always a gap, 
a distance produced through the unique qualities and impurities of each of the 
languages.   
     The role of the translation, then, is not simply to capture some form of originary 
purity or essence.  Derrida observes an intersection between Benjamin’s “The Task 
of the Translator” and the “central metaphor” of Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok’s “The Shell and the Kernel,” both of which produce a conception of the 
original containing an “‘untouchable’” property that the translation is unable to 
access.
24
  This quality or “kernel” is that which cannot be drawn into the language of 
the translation but requires the translator “to go toward the unthought thinking of the 
other language” (“Roundtable” 115).  Derrida relates this to a structure of desire, in 
which “the desire or the phantasm of the intact kernel is irreducible – despite the fact 
that there is no intact kernel” . . . and there never has been one” (115).  
Untranslatability relates instead to the impurity that ensures that a language cannot 
function in a state of containment: in its imperfection, its failure to constitute perfect, 
contained modes of signification, it is subject to slippage and deferral that is not 
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 For Benjamin, see esp. pp. 77-81.  For Abraham and Torok,  Derrida refers specifically to the essay 
“The Shell and the Kernel,” on pp. 79-98 of their collection of essays by the same name. 
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reproducible in another linguistic system.  In this, Derrida is building upon his work 
in “Plato's Pharmacy,” in which he observes an unresolvable problem within the 
translation of the word pharmakon, which means (amongst other things) both 
“remedy” and “poison”.   Since the two connotations are inseparable because each is 
inscribed within the other, “the choice of only one of these renditions by the 
translator has as its first effect the neutralization of the citational play”.  The 
difficulty, then, is that “textuality being constituted by differences and by differences 
from differences . . . is by nature absolutely heterogeneous and is constantly 
composing with the forces that tend to annihilate it” (98).  Thus a translation must be 
both “violent” and “impotent: it “destroys the pharmakon but at the same time 
forbids itself access to it, leaving it untouched in its reserve” (99).   
     Derrida’s formulation of this problem clarifies a difficulty expressed by the 
Elizabethan translators themselves.  The prefatory material to the translations often 
suggests that the following work stages the return, rather than the replication, of 
Seneca’s work, but a return that, like a ghost, is never at one with itself.  Whilst 
pronouncing the translator’s ability and intention to convey accurately the matter of 
Seneca’s work, prefatory comments frequently acknowledge discontinuities between 
the translation and source texts in a way that suggests fundamental disjunctures 
between the two languages (fuelled in no small part by the sixteenth-century 
perception of English as an inferior tongue).
25
  For instance, in H.C.’s address to the 
reader of Studley’s Agamemnon, we are advised to: 
 
          deme him not presumtious,  
          whom muses moved ryght, 
          The statlye style of Senec. Sage 
          in vulgar verse to wryght (Sig. [₡viv]).   
 
Vernacular English or “vulgar verse” – a description that has often been applied to 
Studley’s work in the pejorative, as well as in the sense of the common language – is 
inherently different from the “statlye style” of Seneca’s Latin.  Even in Thomas 
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 Massimiliano Morini argues that the perception of English as an inferior language fades in the later 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries under the influence of humanists, who fostered patriotic 
pride and a sense that English had now evolved through contact with other languages (Tudor 
Translation in Theory and Practice, 40). 
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Peend’s subsequent address, which claims that Studley transmits the Latin text “in 
perfect englysh ryme,” the reader has to be invited to read correctly by warning that 
the piece will attract “spytefull” responses from some but that “men dyscrete and 
learned will / read thinges with judgement right” (Sig. [₡viir-v]).  Studley follows 
suit, apologizing for the “rude maner” and “barbarusnes” of his work in comparison 
with his fellow translators Heywood and Neville but suggesting that the reader 
should nevertheless be able to “embrace it for the excellencie of the matter therin 
conteyned” (Sig. [Aiiiv] – [Aiiiir]).  The English version is tacitly acknowledged to 
diverge from the Latin, but those who are sufficiently well-educated are supposed to 
appreciate the essential similarities. 
     Those similarities lie in the supposed transmission of the spirit or meaning of the 
original work.  The translators typically claim that, while their task is hampered by 
the impossibility of achieving a perfect match for Seneca’s style in English, it is not 
necessary to prioritise the transmission of narrative and linguistic details in order to 
convey the essential qualities of the Latin.
26
  In effect, their commentaries are 
suggestive of the desire for the illusive “intact kernel” that can never be accessed by, 
or transmitted through, the translative language (Derrida, “Roundtable” 115).  While 
the tension between linguistic transformation and adherence to the source text 
testifies to the singularity of both translation and original, and is amplified by 
acknowledgement of the conscious processes of filtration, substitution, and 
expansion, the translators insist upon their ability to convey the essential substance of 
the original.  At the same time, the very existence of such claims signals an 
awareness of the impossibility of this task.  In his preface to Oedipus, Neville 
informs his readers that “he hath somtymes boldly presumed to erre fró his Author, 
rovynge at Rando[m] where he lyst: adding and subtracting at pleasure” but instructs 
them “let not that engendre disdainful suspicion . . . . Marke thou rather what is ment 
by the whole course of the historie” for although the “base tran[s]lated Tragedie” is 
“from his Author in worde and Verse far transformed,” it is “in Sense lytell altred” 
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 Such claims clearly rest upon a different understanding of what is essential to the text than that 
which has predominated within translation theory in the following centuries.  For more on 
philosophical, theoretical, and practical approaches to translation throughout the Renaissance, see 





  What we are reading, we are supposed to assume, is what 
Seneca really meant – even if he wrote something rather different.  Heywood adopts 
much the same approach in advising the reader of Troas that he has “endevored to 
kepe touche with the Latten, not woorde for woorde or verse for verse” but by having 
“observed their sence” (Sig. [Aiiiiv]).
28
   He shows no sign of considering this at 
odds with the fact that he has “with addicyon of mine owne pen, supplied the want of 
some thynges,” including radically altering three of the choruses and adding a scene 
in which Achilles’ ghost returns from the underworld (Sig. [Aiiiir]).
29
  Similarly, in 
his preface to Medea, Studley claims to have largely followed “the darke sence of the 
Poet” before going on to acknowledge that in “the fyrste Chorus . . .  I sawe nothyng 
but an heape of prophane storyes, and names of prophane Idoles: therfore I have 
altered the whole matter of it” (Sig. [Aiiir-v]).   
     Such commentaries alert us to the fact that the “sence” of a work is not stable over 
time and that neither, therefore, is what is required or perceived to convey it.  The 
claim to reproduce sense but not linguistic detail is a claim of having accessed that 
essential (but illusory) kernel of the source text, but it is riven with its own 
contradiction.  If this achievement requires or enables the transformation of formal 
properties, narrative elements, and even characters in translation, then the original 
text’s sense is not containable or isolable as either a linguistic or literary property but 
is specific to a particular network of language at a particular moment.  In order to 
remain the Senecan text in English translation, the Senecan text must radically 
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 In the substantially revised version of Oedipus that is published as part of Newton’s collection of 
the translations in 1581, Neville’s claim is altered to “somewhat transformed” rather than “far 
transformed,” seemingly aiming to persuade that the two texts are closer than his earlier preface 
suggested (77).  His young age at the date of the earlier translation (he was possibly as young as 
sixteen at the time of its publication) may have played an influence in its less strategic wording. 
28
 Scholars vary as to whether they use the original title of Troades or Heywood’s title Troas when 
discussing Heywood’s translation.  For consistency, I adopt the more commonly used Troas and I 
have accordingly identified the text with this title in my Works Cited list.  In later translations such as 
those of the Loeb editions, the title is expressed in English as “Trojan Women.” 
29
 A number of critics observe Heywood’s approach to translation to differ substantially between 
texts.  Like Spearing, O’Keefe describes Troas as “very freely rendered”, Thyestes as “a somewhat 
more precise translation” and Hercules Furens as “exact, yet stilted,” with a greater reliance upon 
“Latinisms and other words of his own construction” (94).  Nevertheless, Heywood claims to have 
translated accurately the original text even in the case of the substantially modified Troas.  Kiefer 
offers a useful overview of the changes introduced in Neville’s Oedipus and Heywood’s Troas and 
Thyestes in Fortune and Elizabethan Tragedy, in which he considers the nature of the changes in 
relation to their thematic and dramatic functions - see pp. 60-82.  Norland’s “Adapting to the Times” 
and Vocht’s Jasper Heywood and His Translations of Seneca’s Troas, Thyestes and Hercules Furens 
also discuss Heywood’s adaptations: see Norland pp. 244-48 and Vocht pp. xxvii-xxxiii. 
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transform and thereby shatter the illusion of continuity with itself.  This is implicit in 
Heylen’s description of translation as a “teleological activity” – a writing in which 
the translator reads, interprets, and rewrites from a retrospective position (5).  The 
original, after all, does not itself remain constant over time.  Even if a manuscript is 
preserved intact, passed on through the centuries without modification, it must 
increasingly be rendered out of time, out of culture, its language becoming 
increasingly alien to itself.  Benjamin describes the translated work as issuing “from 
the original – not so much from its life as from its afterlife”, the period “when in the 
course of its survival a work has reached the age of its fame” (“The Task of the 
Translator” 73).
30
  Hence, “in its afterlife – which could not be called that if it were 
not a transformation and a renewal of something living – the original undergoes a 
change.  Even words with fixed meaning can undergo a maturing process. . . . What 
sounded fresh once may sound hackneyed later; what was once current may one day 
sound quaint” (74).   
     What Benjamin describes here is a kind of gradated cultural translation in which a 
text evolves over time as it becomes isolated from its originary environment because, 
whilst the printed word may remain physically unchanged, signification does not.  
Anterior to the translative process, the text alters even if read with an appreciation for 
the historical, cultural, and linguistic differences of the original context, because the 
original text has in fact passed on.  To translate the original text into English, then, 
effects transformation upon transformation.  In response to the issue of what occurs 
when a text “comes back” – which implies translation, but also any form of return in 
which the original text is drawn into the context of another’s work – Derrida 
observes “it is never the same text, never an echo, that comes back to you. . . . or, if 
there is, it’s always distorted” (“Roundtable on Translation” 158).  The translator’s 
reformulation of the source text into another language not only draws it into a new 
realm, an additional space in which endless strands of signification are called upon 
and (re)arranged, but does so in a manner that is unique to the translator’s ear.  The 
ear that hears the text re-authors the text, whether it is the translator who physically 
rewrites it into another language or the audience who receives it.  Originality, in the 
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 Benjamin makes this assertion on the basis that the “concept of life is given its due only if 
everything that has a history of its own . . . is credited with life.”  Thus, the “range of life must be 
determined by history rather than by nature” (73). 
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sense of a textual point of origin or a starting point at which a story might claim to 
begin, ceases to have meaning here.  The systems of signification that the story 
enters into are stable neither in the predecessive text nor in the translation.   
     When we approach the Elizabethan translations of Seneca, then, we are 
considering texts that are something more than a mere vehicle for the transmission of 
Senecan influence or cultural relics of a particular era of translation practices.  In 
agreement with Benjamin’s work in “The Task of the Translator,” Derrida observes 
that a “contract” exists between “the original and the translating text” in which the 
“translation augments and modifies the original” so that this evolution enables the 
“survival” of both text and language.  While a translation promises “reconciliation” 
between the two, though, it can never fully achieve this: there remains always that 
which is untranslatable (“Roundtable” 122-23).
31
  The unique relationship between 
translation and original renders them both integrally linked and irreconcilable.
32
  
Derrida goes on to suggest that “the original is in the situation of demand, that is, of a 
lack or exile.  The original is indebted a priori to the translation.  Its survival is a 
demand and a desire for translation . . . . Translation does not come along in addition, 
like an accident added to a full substance; rather, it is what the original text 
demands.”  The two are equally “indebted” (153).  This should not be taken to 
suggest that the translation exists only as a sub-set or offshoot of its predecessor, or 
that the two must function together to form some kind of unified whole.  Rather, we 
are dealing here with translation as a process of supplementation. 
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 Benjamin specifically applies this idea to translations that “are more than transmissions of subject 
matter” and arise from originals that contain a special quality of “translatability” (72-73).  Yet there 
remains always those elements of language that cannot be translated, the sacred text that occupies the 
position of a proper name in some way and cannot take any other (76).  Derrida summarizes this when 
he observes that in Benjamin’s formulation, “sacralization or the sacred is the untranslatable, and 
every time there is some proper name in the language that does not let itself become totally common, 
that cannot be translated, one is dealing with a text that is beginning to be sacralized.  One is dealing 
with poetry” (“Roundtable” 148).  I do not take this argument into account as a means to distinguish 
certain originals as more or less sacred or translatable than others because, as Derrida himself 
comments, “in a certain way, literature is the untranslatable” (148).  Therefore, I consider that the 
Elizabethan translations are bound to be subject to this principle of sacralisation. 
32
 Heywood implies as much in his preface to Thyestes when he describes a dream in which Seneca 
appears and requests him to “make me speake in straunger speeche / and sette my woorks to sight, / 
And skanne my verse in other tongue / then I was woont to wright” so that Heywood might “renewe 
my name” (Sig. [*vv-*vir]).  Thus Heywood too suggests that the translation does not preserve the 




     In Of Grammatology, Derrida argues that Rousseau’s invocation of the 
supplement – a linguistic relation in which a term that appears “self-sufficient” is 
supplemented and opposed by a successor – reveals a disturbance of the supposed 
purity or integrity of the anterior term: 
 
          the supplement supplements.  It adds only to replace.  It intervenes or  
          insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void.  If it  
          represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a presence.   
          Compensatory [suppléant] and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a  
          subaltern instance which takes-(the)-place [tient-lieu].  As substitute, it is not  
          simply added to the positivity of a presence; it produces no relief, its place is  
          assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness.  Somewhere, something  
          can be filled up of itself, can accomplish itself, only by allowing itself to be  
          filled through sign and proxy.  The sign is always the supplement of the thing  
          itself. (145) 
   
Derrida adds that “this second signification of the supplement cannot be separated 
from the first. . . . But the inflexion varies from moment to moment.  Each of the two 
significations is by turns effaced or becomes discreetly vague in the presence of the 
other.”  But there remains always the fact that “the supplement is exterior, outside of 
the positivity to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be replaced 
by it, must be other than it” (145).   
     Thus we see a double movement.  The supplement functions as an addition or “a 
surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence” but 
in performing this act of seeming completion, it exposes a deficiency within the 
previous sign (144).  As Culler puts it, “the supplement is an inessential extra, added 
to something complete in itself” but in forming that completion it exposes the “lack 
in what was supposed to be complete” (103).  Accordingly, Derrida’s conception of 
the supplement suggests that “the indefinite process of supplementarity has always 
already infiltrated presence, always already inscribed there the space of repetition 
and the splitting of the self” (Derrida, Of Grammatology 163).  Like a ghost that 
appears in the place of the (formerly) living, the original and translation – each of 
them separable and complete – work to replace and add to one another.  Despite 
arriving after the source text in terms of its historical creation, the translation may 
function as an anterior presence that is supplemented when we refer to the source 
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text: the source constitutes a completion, bearing a fullness that the translation is 
unable to access or attain.  Yet, as Benjamin and Derrida show, the translation 
equally supplements the source, exposing a deficiency in its presence by completing 
a certain lack, adding to the source without quite displacing it.  While existing in 
seeming opposition, both original and translation are inscribed within the presence of 
the other.   The translation must produce linguistic displacement in calling the source 
text into another language: as in Derrida’s example of the pharmakon, it must 
neutralize or modify the “citational play” of certain elements of the original’s 
language and produce differences from the differences comprising that language 
(“Plato’s Pharmacy” 98).  But as it does so, that which it cannot call forth – that 
which is modified, displaced, or deferred, and therefore inaccessible within the 
translation - is not wholly isolated or excluded.  Instead, the supplementarity of each 
sees the presence of both translation and original inscribed within the presence (and 
therefore difference) of the other.   
     As we turn to look more closely at the Elizabethan translations, then, we are 
dealing with texts that manifest the writings of Seneca, not merely by representing or 
reimagining his work in English form, but by entering into a mutually transformative 
relationship with it. This process is not fundamentally so very different from that of 
the writing of “original” works: rather, it magnifies the engagement of the text with a 
particular set of linguistic, cultural, and literary elements in a way that exposes the 
disjunctures as well as the points of commonality between translation and source.  If 
the translation calls the original work into a new environment in which it 
supplements that which formerly seemed complete, this is because it does not and 
cannot encapsulate or duplicate that which it follows.  The translation and original 
haunt one another, neither isolable from, nor continuous with that which they inhabit.  
And it is here, within the already spectral site of the translative process that the 
cultural haunting of language emerges to bring the Senecan dead into newly 
unsettling contexts. 
 
The hauntings of Seneca 
     The dead are uniquely figurative of the spectral workings of language.  The 
absence of death marks out the boundaries of presence; the dead delineate the 
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boundaries of the living.  Paradoxically, the dead perform this function by being that 
which is most unknown and most circumscribed at once.  To be constituted as the 
living, the living need the dead; to be is to be haunted by the dead who, in occupying 
the borders of the living, expose the dependency of the living upon the oppositional 
presence of those who are now absent.  Beyond comprehension, the dead must be 
accorded a defined space in order to mark out what it is to be alive.  The dynamics of 
this relation are evident also within language.  Derrida points out that, if writing 
consists of oppositions, as Plato suggests, the “contrary values” of oppositional terms 
are contingent upon an externality in relation to each other, so that “one of these 
oppositions (the opposition between inside and outside) must be accredited as the 
matrix of all possible opposition.”  But rather than writing “being governed by these 
oppositions,” perhaps it “opens up their very possibility without letting itself be 
comprehended by them”.  In other words, if it is only “writing – or the pharmakon” 
that enables “the strange difference between inside and outside” to arise, writing 
cannot merely occupy a position within the structures it describes or be governed by 
the “concepts” that it forms.  It “leaves only its ghost to a logic that can only seek to 
govern it insofar as logic arises from it,” with the result that logic itself is exceeded 
(“Plato’s Pharmacy” 103).  In this formulation, “every model of classical reading is 
exceeded . . . at the point where it attaches to the inside of the series – it being 
understood that this excess is not a simple exit out of the series, since that would 
obviously fall under one of the categories of the series.”  If it is still possible to refer 
to an excess, that excess “is only a certain displacement of the series.  And a certain 
folding back” or “re-mark – of opposition within the series, or even within its 
dialectic” (104).  Hence writing, in the sense that Derrida uses it here, is necessarily 
implicated “in questions of life and death” (105). 
     It seems evident from this that the translation of a scene in which the dead return 
shares a unique relationship with its subject matter by allegorizing that which it 
conveys.  Derrida suggests that the “functional displacement” that occurs within the 
oppositions of writing does not involve “conceptual identities” so much as 
“differences” and “simulacra” (104).  When the two coincide, however – when 
concepts overlap with or enter into similar structures of displacement as the linguistic 
mechanisms through which they are produced – then we are faced with an additional 
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folding back, a further haunting of oppositional terms.  As I suggested earlier, the 
fundamental disjuncture between the linguistic and cultural contexts of the source 
and translation means that dislocation and transformation is inevitable within the 
translative process.  The degree to which that disjointedness emerges within the 
workings of the translation is contingent upon a multitude of factors affecting the 
receiving culture’s ability to assimilate the language and cultural specificities of the 
source (Heylen 22-23).  In Thyestes, Agamemnon, Octavia, and Oedipus, the way in 
which the haunting of the returned dead figures the haunting of the translation 
substantially heightens the visibility of the folding back of oppositions to expose and 
amplify the uncanniness of their ghosts.  In each translation, we are faced with an 
endless series of oppositions – most pressingly, original and translation, Latin and 
English, past and present, life and death – but the purity and therefore the opposition 
of those terms is subject to a marked displacement and re-inscription.  Like a ghost, 
the text repeats the first time, the first text, the first text’s appearance of the dead, for 
the first time, so that it can neither be separable from, nor synonymous with, the 
original with which it shares its existence.  The returned dead function in opposition 
to the dead who are not returned; to the living; to their formerly living selves; and 
even to their unreturned selves, the selves that they describe as inhabiting the 
underworld in the past or future.  But in entering language through these oppositions, 
they are inscribed with the states that they are not.  Moreover, in English, their 
linguistic terms are inscribed with the Latin that they are not, the more so because 
that is precisely what their existence hinges upon.   
     If we return to my epigraph, we can see that Nuce’s Englished Agrippina both 
haunts, and is haunted by, the ancestor that she claims to be when, “with goastly 
steps” she returns again.  Agrippina announces her entry in the Latin text of Octavia 
with the lines: “Tellure rupta Tartaro gressum extuli. / Stygiam cruenta praeferens 
dextra facem / thalamis scelestis”.
33
   In Fitch’s translation of these lines, the ghost is 
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 The Elizabethans typically consulted a range of manuscripts and the translations are often, 
accordingly, not a direct translation of any one version of a text.  I have examined Fitch’s Latin in 
comparison with sixteenth-century editions and found there to be no significant variations in regard to 
the passages I discuss in this thesis.  I therefore cite Fitch’s Latin throughout.  For a detailed account 
of Heywood’s manuscript usage for Thyestes, see Daalder 83-87.  It appears that Heywood relies 
primarily upon Gryphius’s 1541 edition of Seneca’s tragedies L. Annaei Senecae Cordubensis 
tragoediae septem (Seven Tragedies by Lucius Annaeus Seneca of Cordoba), as do Studley and most 
of the other translators whose work is collected in Newton’s Tenne Tragedies (Daalder 87; Spearing, 
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specific, linear, and categorical in accounting for her (re)arrival: “Bursting through 
the earth I have made my way from Tartarus, bearing a Stygian torch in my bloody 
hand to herald this iniquitous wedding” (571).  Fitch’s version cannot, of course, 
function independently of the transformative dislocation of translation any more than 
that of Nuce, but it offers a valuable point of comparison for how the Latin generates 
a markedly variable reverberation in English in accordance with cultural, 
philosophical, and linguistic variations over time.
34
  In Fitch’s translation, Agrippina 
is markedly somatic, her pathway tangible.  As in the Latin text, she has come, not 
just from Hades but specifically from Tartarus, a reminder of her crimes while alive.  
Emerging from the infernal realm beneath, she has broken through the crust of the 
earth and advanced to stand before us, clutching a Tartarian torch with a “bloody 
hand” in order to illuminate the immoral nuptials of Nero and Poppaea.  The 
phrasing implies a logical and linear sequence of events: the dead Agrippina, having 
traced a physical pathway from the realm of the dead to that of the living, has 
momentarily re-entered the realm of the living.  Agrippina, like death itself, has a 
home, a proper place, distinguished from life more by virtue of space than 
temporality or by distinctions between physical and spiritual matter.  
     Nuce’s translation of these lines is a different affair altogether, transforming a 
fairly standard Senecan ghost that functions within the clearly mapped out spaces of 
the classical afterlife and underworld, into a spectre, a revenant with an uncertain 
relation to the parameters of time and space:    
 
          Through paunch of rivened earth, from Plutos rain  
          With goastly steps, I am returnd again.  
          In writhled wrists that bloud do most desyre,  
          Forguiding wedlock vile, with Stygian fyre (Sig. [Eiiiir]).   
                                                                                                                                          
“Introduction” XII).  Vocht produces a brief but useful comparison between Heywood’s Latin sources 
and identifies Gryphius as Heywood’s principle source also (xxv-xxvi).    
34
 Daalder complains that reliance upon modern editions of the Latin has led to inaccurate criticism of 
Heywood, a point that no doubt extends to critiques of the other translators also (xxxviii-xxxix).  
However, this is a less pressing consideration here, where differences between the two are of 
secondary importance to the primary issue of how the translations draw Seneca’s text into the 
linguistic and cultural environment of the Elizabethans. On this basis, I employ Fitch’s translations 
throughout in order to provide a point of comparison and to illuminate the particularity and cultural 
specificity of the Elizabethan translations.  It is not intended to establish some kind of ahistorical 
standard for how the Latin should be translated.  Unless otherwise noted, Fitch’s translations are very 




This ghost has, not just a bloody hand, but wrists that are “writhled” (“shrivelled” or 
“withered”) and desirous of blood (OED “writhled,” def. 1.).  Wrists in desire of 
blood – the image is at least as suggestive of pale, corpselike or even translucent 
arms as it is of arms that bleed.  It is worth noting that Nuce’s choice of language 
appears progressive - the OED’s earliest example of “writhled” is from Thomas 
Cooper’s Thesaurus linguæ Romanæ et Britannicæ, published in 1565, just one year 
before Nuce’s translation.  The Latin “dextra” becomes the same in English – the 
“hand” – and yet not the same; in fact it is entirely opposed to that with which it 
coincides.  In the following line, “Forguiding wedlock vile, with Stygian fyre”, 
“forguiding” appears entirely original.  The word makes no appearance in the OED 
and I can find no other instance of its written usage within early modern English 
literature.
35
  The impression is of a warning, not just a heralding (as in Fitch’s 
version) but an advance indication of the evils that the wedding is to bring, so that we 
seem guided towards this event at the same time that it is called forth to the present.  
For this ghost, the future is as spectral as the past: the future is present within the 
present – because it is both visible and marked out in advance of itself – and yet 
never to arrive, for she has no more of a place in the mortal future than in the mortal 
past.  The ghost can affect and participate in neither – time is as illusive as her 
withered, bloodless arms. 
     This effect extends also to the ghost’s positioning in relation to the afterlife and 
the present space of the living.  Nuce’s Agrippina makes no dramatic break through 
the “paunch” or bowels of the earth, for although the earth is “rivened,” the unusual 
adjectival form of “riven” renders the split out of time with the ghost’s claiming of 
the present when she states “I am returnd again.”  The earth’s fissures do not quite 
align temporally with the ghost that is “returnd,” marking present within past, past 
within present.  The ghost’s abode is similarly inexact.  Rather than emerging from 
Tartarus or even the more generalized Hades, both of which form an oppositional 
pairing with the mortal world, she lacks a geographical-spiritual abode, identifying 
her spatial origin as that over which the god Pluto rules.  While remaining broadly 
consistent with Seneca’s lines, this is a significant expansion of their sense, for 
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 It is possible that the word is the result of a compositor’s error, but given its curious aptness, it may 
equally be an intentional innovation.  Its uncanny effects are, in any case, unmitigated by the 
uncertainty of its origin. 
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“Pluto’s rain” is as evocative of the dead over whom he reigns or of his divine 
jurisdiction of power as it is of the underworld itself.  Again, the oppositions that 
construct Nuce’s terms fold inwards, exposing each term’s lack of containment.  
With the second line, Agrippina’s ambiguous figure materializes into an “I” whose 
“goastly steps” further distort any sense of linear temporality.  Again, the translation 
duplicates the general sense of the Latin, but the syntax reveals something more: 
“With goastly steps, I am returned”.  The figure is here, its steps are what bring it 
here, but its steps are also spectral, with no past and therefore no end.  Moreover, the 
mode of her passage through the rivened earth remains oddly intangible.  Where 
Seneca has her enter “Tellure rupta” (“bursting through the earth,” as Fitch translates 
it), Nuce has only “Through”.  With no indication as to the nature of her passage, we 
are given the sense of a shifting, unstable ground, a rift that does not divide the 
geographical from the spiritual but rather threatens to collapse the distinction 
between the two.  What sort of steps this spectre takes in order to appear before us is 
a more mysterious matter altogether than in Seneca’s image of the animate dead 
marching from Tartarus to Rome.
36
  This revenant is at odds with itself, less logical 
than its predecessor, more difficult to pin down.   
     The translation, like the time in which its ghost appears, is “out of joint”, its 
inheritance doubly spectral.  The classical ancestor to Nuce’s Aggripina is 
predecessive, past, and other, but it also inhabits her as she stands before her 
audience in immediate, Englished form.  The translation is both inseparable and 
alienated from the original, familiar (to an audience acquainted with the Latin 
original) and yet strange.  Thus, the dead Agrippina verges on the uncanny, not 
because she is dead nor even quite because she is returned, but because she is the 
embodiment of a missed glance.  Her Englished return simultaneously manifests, 
distorts, and destroys her Latin return and in so doing is rendered strange.  What we 
can see at work here is a continual folding back between the oppositions of language 
that works to magnify the similarly structured content of Nuce’s subject matter – a 
process amplified further by the linguistic displacements of translation.  Each term 
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 Nuce’s passage shares a certain similarity here with Miller’s translation, for which the relevant line 
is: “Through the rent earth from Tartarus have I come forth” (459).  However, Miller’s phrasing 
demonstrates a more logical movement through time and space and yields a more explicit sense of 
physical passage through the earth. 
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(whether a particular word or a whole phrase) supplements, and is supplemented by, 
the Latin; each of them is inscribed by its opposite(s) in a way that both displaces it 
and exposes its insufficiencies.   
     Consequently, the text plunges us into the ontological disruption that Derrida 
refers to as “hauntology”: 
 
          Repetition and first time: this is perhaps the question of the event as question  
          of the ghost.  What is a ghost?  What is the effectivity or the presence of a  
          specter, that is, of what seems to remain as ineffective, virtual, insubstantial as  
          a simulacrum?  Is there there, between the thing itself and its simulacrum, an  
          opposition that holds up?  Repetition and first time, but also repetition and last  
          time, since the singularity of any first time, makes of it also a last time.  Each  
          time it is the event itself, a first time is a last time.  Altogether other.  Staging  
          for the end of history.  Let us call it a hauntology. (Specters 10) 
 
This formulation of spectrality applies to writing itself, in that the structural 
hauntings Derrida describes invoke the workings of supplementation.  If the ghost, as 
supplement, repeats the “thing itself,” it does so in a way that accords the thing its 
singularity (in that the ghost is oppositional to, rather than synonymous with, the 
thing) and denies it, by exposing the reliance of the thing upon the supplement that 
both opposes and completes it.  Thus, hauntology describes a repetition by a ghost 
that, in duplicating, replacing, and adding to the “original” figure or event, 
establishes and erodes the singularity of that which it repeats.  As the inside and 
outside of each set of terms arises through their oppositional placement, those terms 
fold back in a fashion that displaces the system of differentiation and sees each 
supposedly complete term haunting the form of the other. 
     This process of identification and displacement is not confined to the mechanisms 
of language: it emerges also through the figuration of the ghost itself.  In Nuce’s 
translation, Agrippina is the spectre of a spectre; her return (as the dead) to the realm 
of the living is a return not only of her formerly mortal self (absent from this play) 
but of the same return in Seneca’s Latin text.  Indeed, her entrance relies upon the 
audience’s knowledge of her Latin predecessor (as authorization of and context for 
the Englished text) and of her (living) role in the historical events preceding the play 
itself.  However, while both ghost and translation function within an opposition that 
supposes a distinction between original and simulacrum, that opposition is shifting 
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and unstable in the face of the singularity of each return.  There is no set of 
boundaries that we can identify in order to combat the uncanniness of the collapsing 
oppositions of  life and death, Latin and English, past and present, nor can we locate 
some form of radical continuity or total dissolution of the distinction between poles 
that might generate new oppositions and thereby re-establish an inside and outside.    
Instead, we are faced with a ghost that, like the workings of language, refuses the 
circumscriptions of her position even as she repeats them.  Agrippina’s return may 
concomitantly be her first appearance (dead or otherwise) within the play but it is 
also her first first appearance in this, Nuce’s Englished version of the play.  It is also, 
of course, her last: “staging for the end of history,” as Derrida calls it.   
     The resulting disjuncture is not only the product of the span of time and cultural 
distance that marks out a gap between Latin and Elizabethan texts.  As Derrida 
makes clear, it is fundamental to the functioning of translation, in that the translation 
cannot access or repeat the original text’s relation to the polylingual systems or 
impurities of the language in which it is written (“Roundtable” 100).  But the 
spectrality of these shifting oppositions is compounded by the calling of the Latin 
dead into English at a moment when the receiving culture is undergoing instability in 
its own frames of reference for the dead.  The translators draw upon a contemporary 
lexicon that is already marked by the (conflicted) terms of contemporary 
understandings of the dead.  Hence, the language in which the underworld is 
constituted in the translations is often markedly Christian, incorporating both 
Protestant and Catholic terminology.  This is not to suggest that their deployment of 
language is a direct reflection of the translator’s individual beliefs or affiliations, 
which ranged from Roman Catholic (in the case of Heywood) to Puritanism (in the 
case of Studley).  Rather, it is that the language system within which the translators 
conceive, interpret, and transform the Latin manuscripts is constitutive of, and 
inseparable from, the contemporary discourses of their theological, sociocultural, and 
political climate.  As a result, the language employed by the translations generates an 
unsettling “citational play” between the classical, Catholic, Protestant, and secular 
understandings that inhabit the structures through which the Senecan world is 
Englished  (Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy” 98).   
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     The resulting transformation of the Latin is by no means neutral in its effects.  
Even in other parts of the translation, this discursive interplay generates significant 
resonances between the Senecan narratives and Christian perspectives to transform 
thematic elements of the source texts.  For instance, Norland points out that Neville 
occasionally infuses Oedipus with “a Christian perspective” so that certain passages 
relating to philosophical and moral problems produce the tone of “an Old Testament 
prayer to a vengeful God” (258).  The translation thereby generates a thematic shift 
as Christianised language and perspectives pervade his classical subject matter.  
When it comes to the underworld, this sense of slippage heightens amidst the 
tensions of shifting Reformation constructions of the afterlife, complicating the 
environment of the classical underworld significantly.  For instance, Neville 
translates a generalized phrase referring to the environment of Hades into a term that 
is Catholic and Latinate at once: where Fitch’s translation of Oedipus refers to the 
terrified dead searching for “hiding places in the shadowed grove” (“pavide latebras 
nemoris umbrosi petunt / animae trementes”), Neville describes them flying out of 
“Limbo lake” (Fitch 70-71; Neville Sig. [Cbiir]).  The phrase “Limbo lake” is only 
just emerging at this time, with Thomas Phaer’s 1558 translation of Virgil’s Aeneid 
possibly being the only earlier instance in writing.
37
  “Limbo” derives from the Latin 
“limbus,” denoting a liminal or border area, and was assimilated into medieval 
English to connote two additional realms to heaven, hell, and purgatory: limbo 
patrum, for patriarchs and prophets, and limbo infantium, for children who died 
before being baptized (OED “limbo,” def. 1.a).  At the same time, it is evocative of 
the similar space to that which exists inside the “portals” of Hades for those who 
have died early (Toynbee 36).  Thus the term “Limbo lake” is striking for its 
negotiation between poles, containing a series of re-marking between oppositions as 
it maps out a kind of intermediate space.  Latin in origin and English in present form, 
it re-presents a geographically non-specific section of Seneca’s underworld through a 
recognisably Christian term; yet at the same time, it remains entrenched within the 
topography of the underground, the lake being evocative of one of Hades’ rivers. 
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 The OED lists Phaer’s usage in The seven first bookes of the Eneidos of Virgill as the earliest 
example of the phrase.  I have been unable to find any other instances in which it has been used before 
Phaer and then Neville (OED “limbo” def. 3).   
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     Other Senecan translators follow suit.  Rather than the “dismal lakes” (“tristes 
lacus”) of the underworld  that Thyestes describes in Seneca’s Agamemnon, 
Studley’s 1566 translation has Thyestes’ ghost declare that it would be better “to 
haunt / the lothsome Limbo lakes” than to remain in the mortal world to which he has 
returned (Fitch 126-27; Studley Sig. [Biv]).  Nuce, Studley’s fellow student at 
Cambridge University, also uses the term in his 1566 translation of Octavia.  Where 
Fitch’s translation has Octavia call upon her dead father to “come forth from the 
shades” – “Emergere umbris” – Nuce draws upon the possible association with water 
in this phrase to have Octavia entreat her father to “steppe forth from Limbo lake” 
(Fitch 526-27; Nuce Sig. [Biiiir]).
38
 Similarly, where the Chorus in Fitch’s version 
describes Agrippina instructing her dead husband to “Raise your eyes from Acheron 
/ and feast them on my punishment” (“Exere vultus Acheronte tuos”) in order to 
celebrate her downfall, Nuce’s Chorus has Agrippina call out “O Claudius now from 
Limbo lake” that he might “Revenge and due correction take” (Fitch 544-45; Nuce 
Sig. [Div]).    
     Undoubtedly, part of the appeal of this phrase is that it lends itself readily to the 
metre and rhyme (all of the phrases occurring at the end of a line) and that it retains a 
clear etymological link to the Latin.  But the emergence of Christian terms within the 
Senecan landscape by no means ends there.  In Fitch’s translation of Agamemnon, 
Cassandra declares “I do not try to placate the gods with any prayer” (“nec ulla 
caelites placo prece”); in Studley’s translation, she refers instead to “the heavenly 
ghostes,” thereby drawing Seneca’s term into a pluralised form of the Christian 
nomenclature for God (Fitch 182-83; Studley Sig. [Ebiiiiv]).  It is common for the 
translators to choose language that evokes the more immediately disturbing 
punishments of the Christian afterlife also.  In Thyestes, where Fitch’s translation of 
the ghost Tantalus shows him describing “the pools and rivers and retreating waters” 
of the underworld (“stagna et amnes et recedentes aquas”), Heywood’s Tantalus 
describes the “pooles and flood[s] of hell”.  Where Seneca’s ghost requests 
permission to retreat “to my prison’s black lair” (“atrum carceris liceat mei / cubile), 
Heywood’s ghost refers to it as a “dungeon darke of hatefull hell” (Fitch 234-35; 
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 Definitions for “emergō” or “emergere” in the Oxford Latin Dictionary include “to come up out of 
the water, emerge,” “to come forth (from confinement, concealment, or sim.)” and “to become 
apparent, come to light” (“emergō,” def. 1, 2, 4). 
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Heywood Sig. [Aiiiv]).  In Thyestes, where Fitch’s translation sees the ghost of 
Tantalus protesting, “has something worse been devised than thirst parched amidst 
water,” (“peius inventum est siti / arente in undis aliquid”), Heywood has his ghost 
ask “is ought found worse / then burning thurst of hell / In lakes alowe?” (Fitch 230-
31; Heywood Sig. A[ir]).  The Englished underworld supplements, and is 
supplemented by, that of Seneca, as the classical dead inhabit an oddly shifting 
ground that is recognisable as Seneca’s underworld and yet embedded within the 
spiritual topography of Christian afterlives.  In doing so, the language of the 
translations not only disturbs the oppositions between source and translation, Latin 
and English, pagan and Christian, but also between Catholic and Protestant 
discourses: for in drawing upon heaven and hell, the translations enter into terms that 
are evocative of both and exclusive to neither.  
     In this polyphonic script, the underworld takes on a peculiar intensity.  The 
classical underworld drawn in Greek and Roman literature is roughly correlative to 
the multiple spaces of the afterlife in Catholic theology.  Hades contains multiple 
spaces, ranging from Elysium (for the chosen few) to Tartarus (for the very wicked) 
and including also a liminal space for those who die very young.
 39
   Rather like 
purgatory, the underworld is not quite a closed space, for it is possible in some 
instances for traffic to occur between the underworld and mortal realms.  In Seneca’s 
Hercules, Vergil’s Georgics, and Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the living make successful 
excursions into the underworld; in numerous plays, including Thyestes, Agamemnon, 
Oedipus, and Octavia, the dead are able to return to the mortal realm temporarily.  
This sense of permeability in the division between the living and the dead mitigates 
somewhat the permanency and threat of death.  It also means that the underworld, 
rather like the varying spaces of the Catholic afterlife, can signify any state ranging 
from terror and torture to eternal bliss, with considerable variations possible as to the 
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 These mythological constructions of the afterlife and the underworld that appear within Greek and 
Roman literature are not representative of pagan and philosophical understandings within the 
populace.  Toynbee observes in Death and Burial in the Roman World that, although Greek concepts 
such as Hell, Limbo, and the Elysian fields entered Roman awareness through the work of Virgil and 
subsequent writers, such ideas generally constituted “poetic” convention rather than genuine belief 
(36-37).  In practice, actual Roman beliefs about the afterlife varied considerably from Epicurean and 
Stoic scepticism as to the existence of a conscious, individual afterlife to a much wider belief in the 
perpetuation of the soul and the belief that the living and the dead might influence one another (34).  
Emily Vermeule provides a useful account of Greek beliefs and their expression in art in Aspects of 
Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry. 
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precise location and characteristics of specific spaces.
40
  But in the changing 
language of Reformation England, in which conceptualizations of the afterlife are 
increasingly drawn towards the Protestant poles of heaven and hell, the underworld 
becomes darker and more of a focal point for fear.  To a Christian audience, a 
classical term for the underworld, such as Hades, has a kind of neutrality in that it 
evokes the safely fictionalized space of mythology.  Where such a term is translated 
into “hell,” the image enters into an altered discursive context in which the original 
terms of reference recede beneath the force of the Christianized terms’ more 
immediately threatening connotations. 
     Such effects are important because they affect not only the audience’s 
understanding of the source text but also the language into which the text now enters.  
According to Benjamin, translation produces a process of supplementation and 
corresponding growth: as translators negotiate between the two languages, they 
contribute to the receiving language in a way that both expands and destabilizes its 
own terms.  Benjamin claims that languages share a “central reciprocal relationship” 
because “a priori and apart from all historical relationships,” they are “interrelated in 
what they want to express.”  The “mode of intention” or formal elements exclude 
those of the other language, but the languages nevertheless “supplement one another 
in their intentions” to express a particular object (74-75, italics are my emphasis).  As 
a useful example, we might take Neville’s translation of the sunrise in the opening 
lines of Oedipus.  Seneca’s lines are “Iam nocte Titan dubius expulsa redit / et nube 
maestus squalida exoritur iubar,” which Fitch translates as “Now darkness is driven 
off, and the Titan returns hesitantly, his beams made gloomy by filthy clouds” (Fitch 
18-19).  Neville translates these lines as “The night is gon and dredful day / begins at 
length to appeare / And Lucifer beset with Clowds, / himself aloft doth reare” (Sig. 
A[ir]).  Here, “Titan” and “Lucifer” exclude one another modally but share the same 
“intended object,” that of the morning sun.  Neville’s choice of the word Lucifer 
supplements the figure of Titan in a process that Benjamin sees as enabling both “the 
maturing process of the original language” and the growth of the language of the 
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 For a more specific account of Catholic conceptions of these spaces, see Marshall, who observes 
that while the basic structure and function of purgatory was generally consistent in the medieval 
Church, “the world of the dead seems to have been at once vivid and vague, a nexus of objectified 






  The jarring transition from Titan (god of the sun) to Lucifer (the 
morning star, but also the fallen archangel or devil) highlights that the process of 
supplementation is marked by the destabilizing effects of linguistic slippage.  
Neville’s choice of the term Lucifer is not inappropriate, exchanging one figuration 
of morning light for another: but since it cannot be isolated from its prominent 
association with the Christian figure of ultimate darkness, its frame of reference is 
modified and extended.  As this slippage draws the original image into an altered 
mode of discourse, it not only replaces but also adds to the original term so that its 
range of signification expands to remarkable effect: for the break of day introduces 
us to a land that has been overtaken by a mysterious evil, altogether befitted by the 
heralding form of Lucifer.   
     Benjamin’s conception of this process pays insufficient attention to the disruption 
inherent within these linguistic substitutions, focusing instead upon dynamic growth.  
He claims that “the task of the translator consists in finding that intended effect 
[Intention] upon the language into which he is translating which produces in it the 
echo of the original.”  A translation differs from a “work of literature” in that it 
exists, not “in the center of the language forest but on the outside facing the wooded 
ridge; it calls into it without entering, aiming at that single spot where the echo is 
able to give, in its own language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one” (77).  
However, Benjamin’s image betrays the disjuncture of the translative act, the 
significance of an echo that returns in an alien mode.  If, as Benjamin suggests, the 
“mode of intention” within a language necessarily excludes that of another language, 
the intention itself cannot achieve universality because it does not exist prior to, or 
outside of, language.  Both languages might “supplement one another in their 
intentions,” as Benjamin suggests, but intention itself – even in the shared desire to 
express the same object – is constituted through the particular conditions of each 
language (75).  The desire for the translation to access the illusory kernel of the 
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 Benjamin views the translative process as such so long as it is the work of a “genuine translator,” 
dispensing from the beginning with “bad translations” which seek only to convey “information” or a 
perceived “‘poetic’” essence (76, 71).  For him, “translatability is an essential quality of certain 
works” that have a “specific significance” (72).  It is these works that play a crucial role in the 
evolution of language, with translation functioning to express “the central reciprocal relationship 
between languages” (74).   I disregard Benjamin’s distinction on the basis that its emphasis upon the 
special translatability of certain works (which rests upon a subjective judgement of individual merit) 
fails to take sufficient account of how his observed relationships between source and translated texts 
must affect translation more widely as a result of the dis/connections between languages. 
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source text does not somehow function prior to, or outside of, the language in which 
he wishes to locate it.  As Benjamin himself acknowledges, the “transfer” into a 
“hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages . . . can 
never be total”.  If the reciprocity of the two languages forges a movement towards a 
“pure language,” the divine ascendancy that we are promised seems little more than a 
spectre, a vision that appears fleetingly amidst the trees but is no more concrete than 
the echo itself (76).      
     Derrida observes precisely this effect in his discussion of French translations of 
Hamlet’s famous line, “the time is out of joint.”  I will explore Derrida’s wider 
treatment of these translations in Chapter 3, but for now it is sufficient to observe 
that his summary of the dislocated relation between Hamlet and its translations has a 
broader applicability: 
 
          the translations themselves are put ‘out of joint.’  However correct and    
          legitimate they may be . . . they are all disadjusted, as it were unjust in the gap  
          that affects them.  This gap is within them, to be sure, because their meanings   
          remain necessarily equivocal; next it is in the relation among them and thus in  
          their multiplicity, and finally or first of all in the irreducible inadequation to  
          the other language and to the stroke of genius of the event that makes the law,  
          to all the virtualities of the original.  The excellence of the translation can do  
          nothing about it.  Worse yet, and this is the whole drama, it can only aggravate   
          or seal the inaccessibility of the other language. (Specters 21) 
 
The echo that returns from the translator’s call into the woods is incomplete, 
disunited, despite the interdependency of the two texts.  As the translation accesses a 
particular element or set of elements of the original line, it must exclude others as it 
produces its own referential play within the structures of the receiving language.  As 
Neville’s translation of the word “Titan” exemplifies, in entering into the unique, 
heteroglossic formulations of the receiving culture’s language, the translation cannot 
avoid alienation from its source or, indeed, from the translations of the same 
material.   
     Derrida relates this formulation back to the status of Hamlet as “a masterpiece,” 
which “moves, by definition, in the manner of a ghost” so that it “inhabits without 
residing, without ever confining itself” to its various translations (20-21).  For him, 
“the stroke of genius . . . the signature of the Thing ‘Shakespeare’” is “to authorize 
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each one of the translations, to make them possible and intelligible without ever 
being reducible to them” (Specters 25).  This quality can scarcely be completely 
confined to the “masterpiece” though, for the inevitable disjunctures within the 
mapping of one language or text to another is a condition of language itself, of the 
calling forth of one text into another locus and therefore another time and context.  
The echo that Benjamin perceives in the woods may return us a translation that is 
evocative of the original, that appears to share a common intention and fosters the 
growth of both languages, but it must inevitably be altered – connected to, but also 
alienated from, its source.  In other words, the disjuncture between the call into the 
“language forest” and the returned reverberation exposes a gap between the linguistic 
mode of intention and the intended object.  Thus, the Englished echo manifests the 
qualities of a ghost, extending beyond the figure of the original to pervade also the 
concepts integral to its return, rendering strange the oppositions through which it 
enters into being.  It becomes alienated even from itself.   
     In the Senecan translations, this porosity of language – the lack of purity in 
seemingly self-contained terms – manifests itself within the broader treatment of the 
dead to incorporate the tensions increasingly associated with the afterlife in 
Elizabethan culture.  Just as the translators move Seneca’s underworld towards the 
Christian poles of heaven and hell, rendering the terms in which the afterlife is 
constructed increasingly fraught, they also draw a heightened instability and 
burgeoning sense of darkness into the forms and imagery associated with the dead.  
Kiefer observes in a more general context that the translators’ intepretation of 
Seneca’s work produces “a world even more precarious and unstable than that of the 
original” and that “in the handling of the theme of change, the translators out-Seneca 
Seneca” (“Seneca Speaks in English” 380).  This is true also of their handling of 
death, which is perfused by the growing unease associated with contemporary 
constructions of death.  Neill explicitly associates the increasingly secularized 
treatment of the dead in the rise of the English tragedy with the culture’s struggle to 
adapt “the psychic economy of an increasingly individualistic society to the stubborn 
facts of mortality,” and the increasingly definitive theological division between the 
living and the dead (30).
42
  It is evident also within these early Elizabethan 
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 For Neill’s overview of these changes, see esp. pp. 15-42. 
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translations as the writers draw the anxieties within evolving cultural understandings 
of death into their re-constructions of Seneca’s pagan dead.   
     In Seneca’s texts, the dead are rather less dead than those within Christian (and 
particularly Protestant) understandings.  They depart from life, to the extent that they 
are no longer alive, but they are neither inanimate nor (in many instances) 
irreversibly absent.  Rather, their absence is marked by a paradoxical sense of 
presence, an impression that their primary distinguishing characteristic is merely that 
they have moved home.  At times, they take on indeterminate form, but often they 
still function as distinct figures or groups.  Like their earlier Roman and Greek 
predecessors, the dead within the underworld are “condemned to a shadowy and 
tenuous condition” but retain a certain specificity, a sense of individual presence 
(Toynbee 35).  In the translations, however, the dead become increasingly uneasy, 
displaced within their home.  In Oedipus when the priest summons the dead King 
from Hades, Fitch translates the dead as “timid spirits” that search for places to hide 
(“pavide latebras nemoris umbrosi petunt / animae trementes”) (Fitch 70-71).  In 
contrast, Neville renders the dead into “shapes and forms” that fly out of “Limbo 
lake” (Sig. [Cbiir]).  It is not clear from this formulation that the spirits are scattering 
in panic or even that they are spirits, other than by deduction – they lack specificity 
to the point that they might be any type of entity or none.  Conversely, in Nuce’s 
Octavia, the dead become more alive but also more disturbing.  In Fitch’s translation, 
Agrippina complains that the memory of her murder troubles her “even amidst the 
dead”  (“manet inter umbras impiae caedis mihi / semper memoria”) (570-71).  In 
Nuce’s translation, Agrippina elaborates: “I alwayes doe remember well beneath, / 
Where piteous, ghostly, crauling souls doe breath, / Th’ unkindly, slaughterous 
déede” (Nuce Sig. [Eiiiiv]).  The dead whom Nuce’s Agrippina invokes are neither 
fully dead nor transformed beyond the flesh.  Universally animate, they are “ghostly” 
and yet with breath, repugnantly both “crauling” and “piteous”.  These are something 
more, something other than the dead of the Latin text.  The distant shady figures of 
Hades are dragged into the light of day to reveal unpalatable qualities that resonate 
disturbingly with the physicality and fragility of the living. 
     A similar disturbance of the dead occurs in Studley’s Medea.  Seneca has Medea 
“invoke the thronging silent dead” (“Comprecor vulgus silentum”) in her pursuit of 
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revenge against her husband (Fitch 408-09).  Studley’s Medea calls out to the 
“Flittring flocks of grislie gostes / that syt in sylent seat” and adds in additional lines 
referring to “wretched wofull wawlyng soules . . . That linked lie with ginglyng 
chaines / on waylyng Limbo shore,” (Medea Sig. [Fiiv]).  The first of Studley’s 
images renders the ghost both more distant and ephemeral in their “flittering flocks” 
and more dreadful, as “grislie ghostes”.  The second draws the dead from their 
previous silence into a state of despair, wailing and jangling their chains.  The latter 
may seem a hackneyed image in the light of the subsequent overuse of loudly 
protesting ghosts with clinking chains in the English tragedy, but in this early 
translation, it is effective as an image that disrupts the form and function of Seneca’s 
dead.  It is worth noting too the slippage within Studley’s terms for the dead.  By the 
mid sixteenth century, the term “ghost” has acquired multiple usages and is 
continuing to evolve rapidly.  While for many centuries, a ghost had signified a 
spirit, a spiritual entity, or soul in a range of contexts, the medieval period saw it 
come to be linked more specifically to the visible apparition of the returned dead 
(OED “ghost,” def. 3.a, 5, 8.a).  It is also, around the time that Studley writes, 
beginning to be used as a descriptor for a physical “corpse,” a usage that the OED 
first identifies as occurring in Sir Geoffrey Fenton’s Certaine Tragicall Discourses 
(published in 1567, just one year after Studley’s text) (def. 9).  While Studley’s use 
of the word “ghosts” is consistent with the Senecan text, then, it is more evocative of 
both visibility and corporeality.  Vague and ill-defined in their “flocks,” they are also 
disturbingly real, manifesting qualities of mortality, and therefore the living, within 
their afterlives.  Ambulatory, somatic, and forceful, these collective groups of the 
dead seem strangely ill at ease with the underworld in their Elizabethan forms.  The 
amplification of their presence through the heightened play between the oppositional 
qualities of the living and the dead produces a discomforting construction of the dead 
that incorporates but also exceeds Seneca’s images. 
     This is evident also in those passages that demonstrate a marked engagement with 
the deadness of the returned dead.  In direct engagements with individual ghosts, the 
dead become particularly animate, but also particularly dead, in the sense that the 
stark biological impact of death upon the physical body is often disconcertingly 
apparent.  When the priest in Seneca’s Oedipus summons Laius’ ghost 
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necromantically, the ghost is blood-soaked and filthy.  Fitch translates the scene thus: 
“Laius reveals his hidden face.  I shudder to speak of it.  He stands caked in the 
blood that poured over his body, with his hair covered in squalid filth, and speaks in 
rage” – “fari horreo. / stetit per artus sanguine effuso horridus, / paedore foedo 
squalidam obtentus comam, / et ore rabido fatur” (Fitch 70-71).  Neville expands 
significantly on this already gruesome scene:   
 
                out at length coms Laius:  
          with fowle and griesly hue.  
          All perst with wounds, I loth to speake 
          with blud quight overgrown: 
          Uncomly drest, in wretched plight, 
          with head styll hangyng down. 
          A Miser ryght as seemd to me,  
          and most of Misers all:  
          Thus in this case, at length he spake,  
          and thus began to call. (Sig. [Cbiir])   
 
His skin has a specific, ghastly pallor; his head hangs down, he appears the epitome 
of a “miser”, a Latinate term that implies a “wretch,” as Spearing notes, but also a 
hoarder of information, a figure who has been loath to appear or to share the 
information that he alone holds (The Elizabethan Translations of Seneca’s Tragedies 
74).   A heightened sense of haunting arises here through the terms in which the 
ghost is constructed.  Neville’s ghost is as cognisant and emotive as its living 
inquisitors.  In its grotesque, corpse-like form and distinctly mortal mannerisms and 
responses, this ghost manifestly erodes the boundary between the living and the dead 
to inscribe the qualities of each within the other. 
     In such examples, we are scarcely witnessing a radical reimagining of Seneca’s 
depictions of the dead.  However, Neville’s extraction of particular elements of the 
source text does produce a significant supplementation, an excess that both 
duplicates and further displaces the figure of the ghost.  Many scholars criticize the 
Elizabethan translators for magnifying this type of grisly imagery.  Rees, for 
instance, observes that Neville seizes upon the “lurid colours” and “horrific features 
of Seneca,” thereby joining the other early translators who “lacked the genius to 
transcend their own failings” (128).  Similarly, in Fated Sky: the Femina Furens in 
62 
 
Shakespeare, M. L. Stapleton observes a repugnant passage in Studley’s Medea to be 
representative of the “rankness” that “represents the stylistic excrescence for which 
commentators condemn Seneca as well as Studley” (47).  But if such “excrescence” 
suggests a displeasing expansion of Seneca’s tendency to dwell on the macabre, it 
also indicates that the horrors of death and disturbance of the relation between the 
living and dead have a particular purchase within Elizabethan frames of reference 
that fosters their expansion.  Neville’s amplification of the effects of death upon the 
animate figure of Laius brings death and the dead into the mortal realm in a way that 
moves them beyond the predictable classical divisions to render them less 
containable and more disruptive.  Thus, as the ghost is forced to speak of a future 
that is both unknown and assured, it evocates the anxieties of the culture into which 
it now enters in addition to the narrative and mythological structures of its Latin 
predecessor.  
     This collapsing of oppositions between the living and the dead becomes still more 
explicit in Studley’s translation of the ghost’s opening lines in Agamemnon.  In the 
opening scene of the play, the ghost of Thyestes announces his return from the 
underworld to expound the tortures of Tartarus, outline the ghastly events that 
preceded his death, and prophesy the bloodbath to come.  Appalled equally by the 
mortal world and the torturous realm below, he is uncertain whether to proceed or 
retreat.  In Fitch’s translation, his return is straightforward and self-centred:  “I leave 
the dark world of infernal Dis and come released from Tartarus’ deep cavern, 
uncertain which abode I hate more: I Thyestes shun those below, and am shunned by 
those above.” (“Opaca linquens Ditis inferni loca / adsum profundo Tartari emissus 
specu, / incertus utras oderim sedes magis: / fugio Thyestes inferos, superos fugo”) 
(Fitch 126-27).  In contrast, Studley’s translation renders strange the mapping of 
territories through its shifting terms:  
 
          Thyestes I, that whether coast  
                  to shun do stand in doubt  
          Thinfernall feendes I flye, the foalke  




In beginning with his own name, the ghost’s phrasing partially internalises the terrain 
so that the "coasts" of life and death lie within, inseparable in their equal abhorrence.  
Moreover, whether intentionally or otherwise, Studley interprets the “fugo” of the 
next line as applying to Thyestes rather than the inhabitants of the upper world: so 
rather than being exiled or driven out by living mortals, he instead chases them.  The 
image is comical, but disconcerting: a figure of death pursuing the living, refusing 
temporal or spatial separation.  Thus, in this version, the ghost’s intrusion within 
mortal territory poses an immediate, physicalized threat to the security of the living. 
     In passages such as these, death looks the same as it does in Seneca’s text at a 
narrative level, and yet not the same, neither fully commensurate with the Latin 
text’s mythological constructions nor isolable from them.  It creeps towards the 
unknown.  Alongside the strangeness of such formulations of the afterlife, the threat 
of death becomes more overt at points in which Elizabethan and classical figurations 
of death coincide.  For the Elizabethans, one of the ways in which the threat of death 
is addressed is through the further development of the medieval personification of 
death.  The figure of Death emerged in medieval visual art forms such as the Dance 
of Death, in which the macabre skeletal figure summons the living to their demise.  
Neill traces a development of this figure during the sixteenth century in which Death 
develops an increasingly marked, distinct persona to become a shadow of the human, 
usurping individual identity as it works to destroy the structures, hierarchies, and 
individuality of the living: 
 
          Death comes to be credited with a personality precisely as dying comes to be  
          felt, more acutely than ever before, as a cancellation of personal identity.  In    
          his rage to un-fashion distinction, this Death takes a wicked pleasure in  
          parodying, through the lively forms of Death the Antic, sardonic jester, grim  
          summoner . . . the vivid self-exhibition of human identity.  Personalized in this  
          way, Death can be conceived as a threatening Other, or a morbid anti-self – the  
          one we are each born to meet, an uncanny companion we carry with us through  
          life, a hidden double who will discover himself at the appointed hour. (Neill 5-  
          8) 
 
According to Neill, one of the purposes that the personification of death serves is to 
see to it that the individual is conquered by a superior opponent rather than fading 
away into a universal nothingness.  Although it is threatening, the figure of Death 
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serves as a focal point for anxiety, a combatant that can at least be known insofar as 
it can be visualized.   
     This figure is common to the Senecan corpus also, but the translators again 
amplify its effects, heightening its threat through exaggerated anthropomorphism.  In 
Oedipus, as the Chorus describes the chaos that both Thebes and the underworld 
have fallen into, they paint a scene in which “Dark Death opens his greedy jaws / 
agape, and unfurls his wings to the full” (“Mors atra avidos oris hiatus / pandit et 
omnes explicat alas”) (Fitch 30-31).  In Neville’s version, Death has not only greed, 
but a baleful, humanized stare and deadly aim: 
 
          Lo see how gredy death on us 
            with scowling eyes doth leare. 
          See see.  Oh Jove how fast he throwes 
            his Darts.  Not one he spares  
          But al confownds.  His thretning force, 
            with stand no Creature dares. (Sig. [Abiiiiv])   
 
Nuce employs a similar personification of death in Octavia where Seneca has little or 
none.  In Fitch’s verison, Octavia’s “heart trembles always – with fear not of death, 
but of villainy” – (“non mortis metu, / sed sceleris”) (Fitch 524-25).  In Nuce’s 
account, it is “Deathes griesly girning face” that Octavia professes not to fear, with 
considerably less credibility in light of the figure’s ghastly countenance (Sig. 
[Biiiv]).  Similarly in a scene in which Death confronts the victims of a shipwreck, 
Fitch’s translation shows death as a figure prowling for his prey: “Before their eyes 
prowls fearsome death, / everyone for himself looks to escape” (“mors ante oculos 
dira vagatur; / quaerit leti sibi quisque fugam”) (544-45).  Nuce’s translation 
expresses much the same predatory behaviour, but renders Death visibly animate, 
diabolical, and violent:  
 
          Then griesly present death doth daunce  
          Before their eyes with pyning chéekes:  
          Whose deadly stroke and heavy chaunce  




This figure of Death is, once again, a direct match for its predecessor but also 
something more.  It is deadlier, more malevolent in its trimuphant dance, its “pyning 
chéekes,” and lethal “stroke.” 
     Such imagery indicates that to anthropomorphize death, to accord it a counter-
identity in opposition to that which it abrogates, is by no means to tame it.  In fact, 
the more death is personified, the darker it becomes.  In a scene in which Medea 
summons the dead, the gods of the dead, and the underworld in her quest for 
revenge, calling out to “the cavernous halls of squalid Death” (“squalidae Mortis 
specus”), Studley summons up a grotesque visage : “O mossye den where deth doth 
couche / his gastly carrayn face” (Fitch 408-09; Studley Sig. [Fiiir]).  The figure of 
death is entirely divorced from any allegorical or moralistic context: it appears only 
to serve Medea’s purposes.  Death seems not only amoral but bordering on evil.  In 
this, it speaks to the substantial anxiety that Neill and Watson observe to emerge 
within Reformation England as the culture struggles to assimilate theological shifts 
with complex social and cultural factors that heighten the threat of death to the 
individual.  Death’s force and inevitability is not new, but its hostility and vividly 
personified malignance is at a peak here.  Thus, the translations perfuse the figure of 
Death along with a range of other aspects of Seneca’s dead with contemporary 
frames of reference for their subject matter.  In the echo of Seneca that emerges in 
English form, Death and the dead become a commingling of the pagan, Christian, 
and secular.  Functioning as both the returned form and simulacra of their Latin 
predecessors, the deathly figurations in these texts simultaneously invoke 
conceptualizations of death that hold particular currency in Elizabethan culture.  
They are products of a linguistic transformation that subtly but clearly draws upon 
contemporary frames of reference for death that include a marked anxiety as to what 
it holds in store for the living.  In manifesting such instabilities within the literary 
traffic between past and (Elizabethan) present, these translations refuse the 
containment or hierarchy often accorded to translative practices.  Instead, they stage 
a haunting that sees the terms of Seneca’s dead invade, and invaded by, those of the 
English into which it now enters.  In so doing, they reveal a form of haunting that is 
to become increasingly overt as the dead of Elizabethan literature invade the space of 







When a man is dead, we ought to commit the dead corps to the grave . . . . There is 
no dead carkase so lothsome as a man is, the which both argueth the necessitie of 
buriall, and how ougly we are in the sight of God, by reason of sinne. 
  
                                                                           (Perkins, A Golden Chaine Sig. [L2v]) 
 
 
after a trauma, the conjuration has to make sure that the dead will not come back: 
quick, do whatever is needed to keep the cadaver localized, in a safe place, 
decomposing right where it was inhumed . . . Quick, a vault to which one keeps the 
keys!”  
 
                                                                                                  (Derrida, Specters 120). 
 
 
Burying the Dead 
     Burial of the dead is supposed to be a swift and permanent arrangement.  The 
resonance between Derrida and Perkins’ perceptions of the injunction to bury – four 
centuries apart – demonstrates the pervasiveness of this imperative within markedly 
different discursive contexts, whilst denying biological decay as its primary 
motivation.
43
   For Perkins, burial constitutes an act of obedience to God: in burying 
the dead, the living affirm their place within the Christian (specifically Calvinist) 
spiritual schema that demands their acquiescence and attention to the isolation of the 
dead.  For Derrida, burial constitutes an attempt within the structures of Western 
metaphysics – in this instance, the political and philosophical discourses that 
endeavour to delimit the inheritance of Marx – to banish the spectre of that which 
cannot be contained through the temporal and spatial strictures of history and 
                                                 
43
 Perkins’ text was originally published in Latin under the title Armilla Aurea in 1590: Hill’s English 
translation of the work was published in 1591. 
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textuality.  In my Introduction, I highlighted Freud’s observation that the uncanny 
often emerges particularly strongly in conjunction with the physical manifestations 
of death that appear to threaten the living, specifically dead bodies and the returned 
dead.  Here, both Perkins and Derrida identify an imperative that invokes precisely 
such a threat, not only to the psychic requirement to contain death but also to the 
theological, philosophical, and linguistic structures through which this emerges.  In 
identifying a common need to disqualify the dead permanently from the present 
space of the living, they signal that such an exclusion requires active enforcement of 
the boundary between the two.  They indicate that the dead cannot be relied upon to 
stay in their place.     
     In suggesting that the uncanny inhabits multiple and seemingly disparate 
discourses while appealing to a central, shared concern regarding the need for burial, 
I wish to draw attention to the way in which the uncanny inhabits language.  
Although Derrida insists that all Freudian “concepts, without exception, belong to the 
history of metaphysics” and “the system of logocentric repression,” the uncanny – a 
concept that has become inextricable from Freud’s writing on the subject – refuses 
the circumscription that this implies (“Freud and the Scene of Writing” 197).  
Derrida’s treatment of metaphysics, philosophy, and language hinges upon the 
breaching of the purity, containment, and opposition of terms in a fashion that 
exposes their indeterminacy and instabilities, thereby destabilizing fundamental 
structures of knowledge.  Thus, deconstruction works to disrupt the purity of terms 
from within to share common ground with the uncanny.  Royle points out that “the 
uncanny is intimately entwined in language, with how we conceive and represent 
what is happening within ourselves, to ourselves, to the world” (The Uncanny 2).  Its 
disruption to epistemological registers, or conscious understandings of what is 
familiar, normal, or possible, identifies its embeddedness within the language and 
therefore the discourses through which such understandings are constituted.   
     If the uncanny is characterized by an indeterminacy that renders its functioning 
difficult to define and locate precisely, it is in part because the uncanny both inhabits 
and exceeds the logocentrism to which Derrida generally confines psychoanalytic 
concepts.  In taking up a position within the slippage and folding back of the 
opposition between familiar and unfamiliar, within a division that is not stable and 
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cannot be grasped, the uncanny erodes the structures through which the purity of 
particular terms is constructed and maintained.  In this, the uncanny bears a special 
relation to death: not simply to the biological event of death but to the problems it 
poses for temporal, spatial, psychic, and linguistic finitude in the presence of excess, 
deferral, and supplementation.  In other words, the uncanny emerges where the 
construct of death simultaneously manifests and also refuses the associated qualities 
of ending and completion.  Where the injunction to bury demands psychic 
(en)closure and the isolation and sanctity of the categories of living and dead, the 
uncanny exposure of the porosity of the boundary between the two pervades the 
language within which those terms are constituted.  The uncanny emerges within the 
spiritual and ontological conceptualizations of the living and the dead as the terms of 
burial and mourning are riven by their own construction. 
     In Chapter One, I drew attention to Derrida’s claim that the “displacement” and 
“folding back” of oppositions within writing are essential to matters concerning “life 
and death” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 104-05).  Derrida argues that there is no simple 
presence of “death” in which the state or idea of life exists independently only to be 
described by the signifier “death”: rather, the generation of the concept as it is 
associated with the term “death” is contingent upon its place within the broader chain 
of terms.  Derrida points out that: 
 
          no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which  
          itself is not simply present.  This interweaving results in each ‘element’ –  
          phoneme or grapheme – being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of  
          the other elements of the chain or system.  This interweaving, this textile, is the     
          text produced only in the transformation of another text.  Nothing, neither  
          among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or  
          absent.  There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces. (Positions  
           23-24) 
 
The differentiations upon which language is founded are therefore crucial in the 
constitution of meaning: but meaning is never simply present or fixed.  If we return 
to my epigraph from Perkins, for example, its conceptual content and theological 
force do not function separately from the linguistic processes of supplementation, 
displacement, and re-mark through which they arise.  The dead are not simply a 
given category to which is assigned the term “dead”: they exist in and through a 
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differential relation to a series of other terms.  The dead is also a “man,” a “corps,” a 
“carkase,” a sinner; therefore, the category arises through a series of implicit 
oppositions to the living, the animate, those whom must bury rather than be buried, 
and God.  But such oppositions emerge only through the play of differences, for the 
living too may be inscribed with almost the same set of terms: a “man,” a corporeal 
body, a sinner.  We can observe no simple category in which the dead constitutes a 
fixed presence defined by static terms or in which it occupies a stable position in 
opposition to the living. 
     Indeed, if we look at the wider passage from which this extract is taken, Perkins 
renders this shifting process of differentiation increasingly transparent as he 
furnishes a numbered list of theologically-driven imperatives in support of the need 
to commit the “dead corps to the grave”.
  
The list may be condensed as follows: 
    
1. “The instinct of Nature it selfe.” 
2. “The examples of the Patriarkes, and other holy personages.” 
3. “The Lordes owne approbation of buriall, in that he numbreth it amongst 
his benefites.  For the want thereof is a curse.” 
4. “There is no dead carkase so lothsome as a man is, the which both argueth 
the necessitie of burial, and how ougly we are in the sight of God, by 
reason of sinne.” 
5. “The bodie must rise againe out of the earth, that it may be made a 
perpetuall mansion house for the soule to dwell in.” 
6. “The bodies of the faithfull are the temples of the holy Ghost, and therefore 
must rise againe to glory.” 
7. “Buriall is a testimonie of the love, and reverence we beare to the 
deceased.” (Sig. [L2v]) 
 
In this series, the categories of the dead and burial are inscribed and re-inscribed 
within a shifting framework of formulations that repeatedly disturbs the stability of 
its own terms.  We begin with an appeal to nature, in which the burial of the dead is 
required through a kind of natural law.  This places the living and the dead into a 
relation in which both function within nature (as burial of the dead situates them in 
accordance with its dictates) – or both function outside of, or in contravention to, 
nature.  In order to belong within this category, the living are dependent upon their 
natural adherence to proper treatment of the dead.  Yet Perkins’ inclusion of the point 
suggests that it is necessary to teach, or at least reinforce, this “instinct” in order to 
ensure that the living understand how to occupy this place.  At the same time, the 
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place of the dead within nature is fluid, depending as it does not upon the state of 
death but on the actions of the presently living. 
     Perkins then moves on to the example set by spiritual leaders and God’s guidance.  
What has just been inscribed within nature is now reformulated within spiritual law.  
Whether or not the living possess the natural instinct to bury the dead, they must do 
so in order to operate within God’s law, “for the want thereof is a curse.”  In the 
biblical example Perkins cites from Jeremiah 22.19, God threatens to cast the king 
Jehojakim out of Jerusalem and leave his corpse unburied (Sig. [L2v]).  The lack of 
burial is the visitation of a curse: it is a punishment to be inflicted upon the dead by 
God, although the point is more generally applicable to the actions of the living.  (A 
similar curse is called upon in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, in which Tamora is 
denied burial: “No funerall rite, nor man in mourning weede, / No mournefull bell 
shall ring her buriall / But throw her forth to beasts and birds [of] pray” [K4v].)   In 
Perkins’ imperative, however, the absence of burial is analogous with the curse: the 
treatment of the corpse determines the dead’s place within God’s law.  What it is to 
be dead hinges upon whether or not one is buried.   
     In the fourth point, the dead are localized again to the individual, physicalized 
form of the repulsive “carcase,” offensive to the eyes of both the living and God.  
Here, the need for burial emerges as a means to dispel the horror of the physical 
corpse, so that the dead are marked by their difference from the non-repugnant 
bodies of the living.  But a slippage promptly emerges within the subsequent linking 
of the corpse’s gruesomeness to the sins of the living.  The dead body is now marked 
by those sins in a way that the living – who are not to be buried – are not.  The 
spiritual state of those who are alive is re-marked within the physical state of the 
dead.  Moreover, their sight, to which Perkins’ image of the corpse appeals, is 
analogous with “the sight of God” as He views the inscription of sin within the dead.  
Therefore, the perspective of the living is momentarily inseparable from that of God 
at the precise moment that they view (or at least imagine) the repellent reification of 
their inner spiritual state. 
     Perkins’ following two points proceed to mark death with a series of reversals of 
that which he has already established.  Not only is the body’s burial temporary 
because it must rise again, but the body is also sacred.  It is the eternal dwelling 
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house of the soul; and for the faithful, at least, the body is to be celebrated as the 
Holy Ghost’s temple and ultimately resurrected.  The physical encasement rendered 
so repugnant in his previous point is also the locus for the spirit of both individual 
and God.  For Perkins, of course, the point is one of temporal spiritual progression: 
the corruption of the mortal realm gives way to the restoration offered within the 
spiritual realm by way of the grace of God.   This is part of what Zimmerman 
describes as a movement by Protestant reformers to counteract “the problem of 
transfiguration” by rendering the corpse “axiomatically dead,” thereby “hardening 
the distinction between material and spiritual” (8).  For my purposes, what is 
significant is that the series of arguments he deploys around the central compulsion 
for burial shows the repeated inscription and re-inscription of oppositional terms 
within one another.  What must be buried because of its manifestation of mortal 
corruption must equally be buried because of its functioning as a spiritual temple and 
its role in spiritual perpetuity.  The dead must be excluded because the living contain 
both what is corruptible and eternal: what is sinful and sacred.  Finally, we are told 
that burial is an act of “love, and reverence,” so that the exclusion functions as a 
manifestation of inclusion: the prohibition of the dead fosters a relationship with the 
group that, under Protestant teachings, is no longer available to the living. 
     This remarkable series thus exemplifies, through conceptual as well as linguistic 
instability, both the imperative to contain the categories and opposition of life and 
death and the impossibility of doing so.  At the same time, the slippage that emerges 
within this extract is inseparable from the concerns and terms of psychoanalysis.  
Perkins seeks to differentiate the inevitable corruption of the mortal subject from the 
purified form of the faithful on the day of resurrection, but in order to do so, he must 
negotiate the problematic continuity of the physical body’s role in this 
metamorphosis.  The burial of the corpse achieves this in ways that mere disposal 
cannot.  Committed to the ground, the body remains reassuringly locatable and 
(perceptually) intact, while the transition from decay to spiritual re-birth is smoothed 
by the cadaver’s safe removal from view.  Whilst his purpose is ostensibly 
theological, he repeatedly calls upon evidence or justifications that testify to the 
serving of psychological compulsion.  The argument that burial of the dead is 
important to their spiritual future at the time of resurrection functions to counter the 
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horror of dissolution with a physicalized reversal that links reassuringly to the 
perpetuity of the soul.  And while he offers natural instinct, historical precedent, 
respect for the dead, horror of the dead, and the future of the dead (and therefore of 
the living) as injunctions to bury, all of these point to a central need to remove the 
dead at once, to separate the dead from the living decisively and to contain them 
permanently in an isolable space.   
     Such emphasis upon particular ceremonial rites renders the physical act of burial 
secondary to its metaphoricity.  Disposing of the dead might theoretically be as well 
accomplished by any other mode of formal severance between the living and the 
dead, by cremation or “burial” at sea or ritual dissection.  The advantage of physical 
interment is that it visibly and securely contains the dead whilst keeping them safely 
out of view.  To fill in a grave with dirt or to seal a tomb is to provide a substantial 
physical barrier between the living and the dead that cannot be breached without 
visible evidence of the fact: to occlude the dead and visibly to affirm that occlusion.  
What matters most, though, is the completion of culturally accepted rituals that say, 
when carried out properly and completely, “it is done.  The deceased has 
permanently departed and will have no more business with (the) living.”  In this, 
Perkins occupies common ground with the period’s dramatists, who frequently 
appeal to the same compulsion in their treatment of death.
44
  In the closing moments 
of  Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, for instance, Octavius’s desire for Brutus to be 
given a formal burial begins with an assertion of respect for the dead, but culminates 
in identifying the benefit to the living: 
 
          According to his Vertue, let us use him  
          Withall Respect, and Rites of Buriall. 
          Within my Tent his bones to night shall ly,  
          Most like a Souldier ordered Honourably:  
          So call the Field to rest, and let’s away, 
          To part the glories of this happy day. (3.130  
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 The compulsion to bury the dead has a long history and many accounts of ghost sightings from the 
medieval period demonstrate a similar agenda.  Marshall provides a useful overview of this, pointing 
out that “if there is any consistent narrative” that emerges within later medieval ghost stories, “it is not 
one about maintaining contact between the living and the dead, but about ensuring the finality of their 
separation” (Beliefs and the Dead 17).  His research suggests that the Catholic “requirement to 
remember the dead” and associated intercessory practices did not signal any common desire to come 




The point here is not personal grief, but the need for (en)closure, division and 
separation.  Like Perkins, Octavius attempts to eliminate the threat of contamination 
between the dead and the living through the determination of a forthcoming burial, 
and thereby to liberate the living from the dead.  In effect, he acts to prevent the 
problem that Macbeth encounters when he is faced with the dead Banquo.  Unable to 
carry out direct action, Macbeth can only attempt to dispel the presence of the dead 
by issuing an instruction for Banquo to complete his burial himself: “Avant, and quit 
my sight, let the earth hide thee” (Shakespeare, Macbeth 3.142).  Unfortunately for 
Macbeth, the dead are not inclined to bury themselves. 
     The act, not merely of disposal, but of ceremonially committing “the dead corps 
to the grave” in accordance with a precise rationale is, in Derridean terms, an attempt 
“to conjure away” the revenant.  As in my epigraph, Derrida frames such conjuration 
as a practice of containment.  It is a response to the fear that “the cadaver is perhaps 
not as dead, as simply dead as the conjuration tries to delude us into believing” (20).  
Thus, such imperatives mark the instability of their own terms, for in insisting 
stringently upon the correct way in which to occlude the dead from the living, they 
reveal that the two categories are not pure terms.  If the dead must be subject to a 
further operation in order to ensure that they do not disrupt the space occupied by the 
living, then neither term absolutely excludes the other.  The frame of reference by 
which the states of life and death are understood is rendered unstable.  This threat to 
the stability of these terms within the chain of signification and within specific 
discourses equally poses a threat to the project of processing death psychically.  To 
exclude death from the space of the living requires conclusive separation between the 
two.  Failure in that task leaves the dead other beyond the grasp of the living subject 
and therefore impossible to restrain or control.  In his discussion of Hamlet, Derrida 
points out that the process of mourning (which incorporates the wider burial of that 
which is supposed to be dead, not only the instance of individual, personal grief) 
“consists always in attempting to ontologize remains . . . . all ontologization, all 
semanticization – philosophical, hermeneutical, or psychoanalytical – finds itself 





          who and where, to know whose body it really is and what place it occupies –  
          for it must stay in its place. . . . Nothing could be worse, for the work of  
          mourning, than confusion or doubt: one has to know who is buried where – and  
          it is necessary (to know – to make certain) that, in what remains of him, he  
          remain there.  Let him stay there and move no more!” (Specters 9)   
 
     Townshend reads this passage from Derrida as outlining that “mourning in the 
West is contingent upon the interrelated functions of knowledge and truth,” thus 
stimulating the intense scrutiny concerning the matter of Old Hamlet’s death (and 
afterlife) in Hamlet (73-74).  In both the play and Derrida’s explication, however, the 
search for “truth” – or ontological classification – is a means to achieve the more 
fundamental task of stabilizing the position of the dead in relation to the living.  To 
remove the “lothsome” dead from sight is to lighten (necessarily) the process of 
mourning.  It is for this reason that Gertrude instructs Hamlet “Doe not for ever with 
thy vailed lids / Seeke for thy noble Father in the dust” and Claudius insists he must 
“throw to earth / This unprevailing woe” (Sig. [B4v - C1r]).  Although Gertrude’s 
part in this appears less sinister than Claudius, whose self-serving motives “are 
lightly concealed under the thin veil of power administering benevolent correction,” 
both require Hamlet to accept fully Old Hamlet’s burial in order to liberate 
themselves from the effects of the dead King’s lingering presence (Stein 228).  As 
Bridget Lyons highlights in Voices of Melancholy: Studies in Literary Treatments of 
Melancholy in Renaissance England, Gertrude and Claudius appeal to the principle 
commonly expressed within early modern treatises concerning the emotions that 
construe “excessive grief” as “an impious unwillingness to accept God’s law” and 
require it to be checked by “reason” (8).  In so doing, they invoke the same 
instruction that Perkins issues following his outline of burial practice: “Concerning 
the living, they must see that . . . Their mourning be moderate” (Sig. L3[r]).  Let the 
past be buried and then let it bother the living no more.        
     I will examine mourning in more depth a little later, but for now it affords an 
important entry into the way in which breaches of life and death equally involve the 
taxonomical structures and processes of language and the psyche.  In the texts 
discussed thus far, the formal rites of funeral have been indissociable from the 
interment of the physical body, so that the term “burial” generally conflates the two.  
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The discursive construction of burial is inseparable from the process of banishing the 
dead from the psychic and physical space of the living.  It is no coincidence that both 
the principle and language of burial have gained a particular purchase within the 
psychoanalytic framework of repression, most obviously emerging in the phrase “to 
bury one’s feelings.”  To bury is, in the most literal sense, to repress: “to control or 
keep in check,” “restrain,” or “put down” something that is potentially troublesome 
(OED “repress,” def. 3.a, 2.a, 1.a,).  This process is analogous with Freud’s 
conceptualization of repression within the psyche, which broadly involves “turning 
something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious” (“Repression” 
147).  In repression, an instinct arises, generating an idea or affect that is prohibited 
from passing into the conscious in order to attain the pleasure of satisfaction because 
to do so would generate a proportionately greater degree of discomfort (146-48, 
152).  The repression of an instinct therefore coincides with the burial of the dead in 
working to prohibit permanently the return of that which threatens or disturbs the 
conscious: indeed, the burial of the dead appears to operate as a physical register of 
this process.  
     Two important points arise here.  Firstly, the process of repression requires an 
ongoing investment.  Repression does not function as though “some living thing has 
been killed and from that time onward is dead”.  Rather, the unconscious will 
continue to endeavour to push the repressed material into the consciousness and, 
accordingly, “the maintenance of a repression involves an uninterrupted expenditure 
of force” (151).  Secondly, the repressed instinct may actually continue to thrive in 
the unconscious.  Indeed, “the instinctual representative develops with less 
interference and more profusely if it is withdrawn by repression from conscious 
influence.  It proliferates in the dark, as it were” (149).  It is this to which Perkins’ 
disgust at the ugliness of the corpse speaks, the need to bury that which appals when 
in conscious view.  Full and final burial would promise to cheat both processes by 
permanently excluding the dead – and therefore, death – once and for all.  In the 
event of its failure, what will emerge from the dark of the tomb promises to be all the 
more horrifying for having been removed from conscious view and left to fester in 
the depths of the unconscious.    
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     In this, we can see part of the foundation for Freud’s claim that the uncanny is 
often experienced “in the highest degree in relation to . . . the dead, and to spirits and 
ghosts” (“The Uncanny” 241).  The uncanny relates to a failure in the division 
between conscious and unconscious because it “can be traced back without exception 
to something familiar that has been repressed” (247).  The return of the dead, then, 
involves a double movement in which the re-emergence of that which is repressed is 
made manifest in physicalized as well as psychic form, so that the seemingly 
external, material world that the individual inhabits becomes inseparable from the 
internal processes of the psyche.  That which bursts forth from the dark erodes any 
firm division between the inner and outer worlds.  Here, we may be reminded of 
Derrida’s analysis of reading in which the fundamental metaphysical distinction 
between inside and outside is breached through a process of “displacement” and the 
folding back of oppositional terms (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 104).  If the dead breach the 
barrier of death or repression to return to the consciousness of the living, their threat 
to the conscious must occur through the linguistic structures that enabled the thinking 
of their burial.  In other words, the threat that the returned dead pose to the division 
between (psychic) inside and (environmental) outside occurs through a linguistic 
operation in which these categories are exposed as impure, subject to slippage and 
reciprocal repetition, as that which was formulated as “outside” pervades the inside 
and vice versa. 
     At this point, it remains unclear as to why it is essential that the dead should be so 
thoroughly banished in the first instance though, or precisely what the threat is that 
they pose.  In Freud’s estimation, this points to a universal, primal fear of death.  
Suggesting that almost everyone has the thought process of “savages” when it comes 
to death, he argues that “no human being really grasps it, and our unconscious has as 
little use now as it ever had for the idea of its own mortality.”  Hence “the primitive 
fear of the dead is . . . always ready to come to the surface on any provocation” (“The 
Uncanny” 242).  Freud thereby postulates that the human unconscious possesses a 
fundamental inability to accommodate its own demise through the physical process 
of death.  This proposition is problematic in its transcultural and transhistorical 
assumptions, not least because he claims that this universal fear is inevitably 
repressed by “all supposedly educated people”.  This modern elite, he insists, have 
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“ceased to believe officially that the dead can become visible as spirits,” mentally 
distanced themselves from apparent sightings, and adopted an increasingly rational 
and “unambiguous feeling of piety” in relation to “their dead” (242-43).  Death, by 
this logic, is fundamentally incomprehensible and therefore universally frightening.  
Irrespective of rational dismissals of its threat, fear of death – which is at least partly 
fear of the unknown – persists within the unconscious.  In regard to the dead 
themselves, Freud speculates that “most likely our fear still implies the old belief that 
the dead man becomes the enemy of his survivor and seeks to carry him off to share 
his new life with him” (242).  It is a fraught proposition.  The polarisation of the 
living and the dead is correlative to a polarisation of life (which is coded as ‘good’) 
and death (which is coded as ‘bad’).  But the threat of the dead man lies in his failure 
to die sufficiently.  We are given to understand that he lives on; that his threatened 
return is an act of enmity; that the shared (after)life he attempts to draw us toward is 
fundamentally frightening, irrespective of conscious belief in its content.   
     Despite its flaws, Freud’s speculation as to a kind of instinctive fear of the dead 
man dragging off the living is useful in that it suggests that death functions as a 
contaminant, a pathogen introduced through the vector of the dead: indeed, 
Zimmerman identifies this as a specific concern within early modern “popular 
culture” (9).  The threat of the dead lies in their failure to remain safely isolated from 
the living so that death remains inseparable from life, the boundary between the two 
dangerously permeable.  We might add to this that the location, construction and 
defence of such a boundary is specific to the cultural context and discourses through 
which death is formulated and understood.  In Catholic constructions of the afterlife, 
the dead have a legitimate means to return in certain instances and the living have 
means to influence the state of the dead.  The dead are still firmly buried – they are 
sent on their way with formal ritual and ceremony, they are never coincidental with 
the living, and they are ultimately consigned permanently to a removed spiritual 
locus.  But what is required to keep them in their place and prevent them from posing 
a threat appears less forceful than in Protestant constructions of the afterlife, in which 
the dead must be isolated at the moment of death.
45
  Hence we find Calvin railing 
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 Greenblatt’s Hamlet in Purgatory provides a useful survey of a number of theological writings and 
other responses to the doctrine of purgatory, including ghost stories of pivotal importance to Catholic 
conceptions of the afterlife – see especially Chapters Two and Three.  Newton also outlines a range of 
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against Catholic intercessory practices in his dismissal of ghosts as the souls of the 
dead.  Having established that “dead mens ghosts, have bin but sleights of satan,” he 
insists that “men have invented service for the dead in the Popedome, that was 
nothing els but meere witcherie . . . . And all they that have their devotion after that 
fashion to pray for the dead, are witches and sorcerers” (671).  For Calvin, as for 
Lavater and the English reformers, there is no room for middle ground or for 
interaction across the dividing line between life and death.  Protestantism is 
“committed to an unremittingly binary construction of the other world,” insisting 
upon a “stark polarity of two places in the next life” rather than the five locations of 
the Catholic afterlife (Beliefs and the Dead 193, 189).   
     Such polarity, however, must require total isolation of each category in order to 
function.  In this respect, the process instituted by reformers such as Calvin and 
Lavater resembles Freud’s conceptualization of repression, which “demands a 
persistent expenditure of force” to maintain (“Repression” 151).  The more rigidly 
the categories of life and death are opposed and the firmer the boundary is between 
them, the more stringently the border must be policed in order to prevent cross-
contamination.  In Reformation England, therefore, there is fertile ground for the 
emergence of the uncanny within literary treatments of the returned dead, as the 
Protestant reformulation of the relation between the living and the dead renders the 
failure of burial increasingly disturbing.  Where this need is not serviced, the 
opposition between the two falls under serious strain.  In Hamlet, Laertes is so 
unable to accept the priest’s abbreviation of Ophelia’s funeral rites when she is 
excluded from burial in consecrated ground that his protest takes on the form of an 
alternative service: “Lay her i’ th’ earth, / And from her faire and unpolluted flesh / 
May Violets spring” (Sig. [M4r]).  He then throws himself into the grave to request 
the fullest completion of the ceremony that he can imagine: “Now pile your dust 
upon the quicke and dead, / Till of this flat a mountaine you have made” (Sig. 
[M4v]).  The absence of proper rites render Laertes so unable to disengage from the 
dead that he momentarily consigns himself to joining her in the grave, the living and 
dead merged together.   
                                                                                                                                          
theological interpretations of apparitions in the early modern period in “Reading Ghosts: Early 
Modern Interpretations of Apparitions.” 
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     Greenblatt argues that the funeral demanded by Laertes seems more Catholic than 
Protestant in its “ringing of bells and attendant ceremonies” and that it is suggestive 
of the intercessory “assistance given to the dead by the living” in Catholic practice 
(Hamlet in Purgatory 246).  In this, he elides consideration of the persistence of 
ritualized funeral practices amongst the English population even as Protestantism 
became widespread, a problem that indicated not only the perseverance of some 
elements of Catholic belief but also the protection of “social custom” (Marshall, 
Beliefs and the Dead 127-28).  More importantly, he misses the point that, amidst the 
uncertain and shifting glimpses of a theological basis for the play’s treatment of the 
dead, the vagueness of the foundations for belief isolates central points of anxiety by 
prohibiting them from incorporation into a familiar system.  Irrespective of the 
precise nature of his religious understandings, Laertes’ problem is that he can do no 
more to secure Ophelia’s proper burial when this is essential to mourning and (in 
keeping with both Catholic and Protestant beliefs) to sending her safely on her 
journey into the afterlife.     
     Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Laertes’ outrage focuses upon Ophelia’s 
exclusion from the Christian order described by Perkins, in which Ophelia should be 
appropriately buried in order to meet the requirements of nature and indeed of God.  
Hence his protest that Ophelia is more worthy of Christian inclusion than the 
clergyman who denies her burial: “I tell thee churlish Priest, / A ministering Angell 
shall my sister be / When thou lyest howling” (Sig. [M4r]).  In this, he shares 
common ground with Martha in Chettle’s The Tragedy of Hoffman.  When Martha is 
given news of her son’s earlier murder, she mourns his exclusion from Christian 
burial rites as an inclusion with those who are destined for hell: 
  
          Thou in thy end wert rob'd of Funerall rites,  
          None sung thy requiem, noe friend clos'd thine eyes,  
          Nor layd the hallowed earth vpon thy lips,  
          Thou wert not houseled, neither did the bells ring 
          Blessed peales, nor towle thy funerall knell, 
          Thou w[en]tst to death, as those that sinke to hell” (Sig. I2[r]).  
      
Thus, the additional grief or anger generated by the failure to bury is linked to the 
failure to exclude the dead individual, not just from the living, but also from the 
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damned.  The dead must be isolated from the living; but equally, those of the dead 
who are to reach heaven must be isolated from those who are not.   
     Here we see once again a desire to ontologize the dead, to ensure that the burial 
enables the living to perceive them as safely delivered into the specific space they are 
to occupy in the afterlife.  This suggests, in part, an ongoing investment in the 
wellbeing of the departed, evoking Catholic beliefs in practices such as intercession.  
It also resonates with both folk beliefs and classical depictions of the afterlife in 
which burial is essential for the process of passing into the afterlife, as in The 
Spanish Tragedy, in which Andrea’s ghost complains that “churlish Charon” refused 
to ferry him across the Acheron until “My funerals and obsequies were done” (Sig. 
A2[r]).
46
  At the same time, it testifies to the importance of recognisably banishing 
the deceased to a contained space in order for the living to proceed with the business 
of being alive. 
     Accordingly, when the dead fail to be as dead as they should be – when they 
remain literally unburied and/or when their spirit returns to the mortal plane – they 
often pose a direct threat to the existence of the living.  In The Misfortunes of Arthur, 
King Arthur attempts to manipulate this as a means to execute revenge.  Facing 
imminent death, Arthur declares a wish to remain unburied because he perceives that 
a failure to be publicly dead will punish the living through the continuation of his 
vengeful presence: 
 
          No grave I neéde (O Fates) nor buriall rights 
          Nor stately hearce, nor tombe with haughty toppe: 
          But let my Carkasse lurke: yea, let my death  
          Be ay unknowen, so that in every Coast  
          I still be feard, and lookt for euery houre. (Sig. F4[r]) 
 
The need for an explicit, visible haunting is dispensed with here.  Without burial, the 
dead man will never quite be dead: he can haunt the living through the mere 
perception of his continued presence.  Martha exploits this threat in a more direct 
fashion in The Tragedy of Hoffman.  Instead of ensuring her son’s immediate burial 
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 Neill associates the performance of such practices in Renaissance tragedies not only with 
Catholicism but also “the ancient pagan superstition that happiness beyond the grave was somehow 
contingent upon proper disposal and preservation of one’s mortal remains” (265). 
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when she discovers that his bones have been left strung up from a tree, she moves to 
utilize his lingering presence, saying: “Let them hang a while / Hope of revenge in 
wrath doth make mee smile” (Sig. [I3v]).  For her, burial is now to be enacted 
through the completion of revenge: and the skeleton’s lingering presence – which 
serves “as a spur to her own revenge” – subsequently serves in the entrapment and 
execution of its own killer, Clois Hoffman (Spinrad 243).  The death itself does not 
occur onstage: instead, the burning crown that was used to execute Otho is brought 
forth in readiness for use upon Hoffman immediately prior to the play’s ending.
47
  
With the generation of yet another corpse through the same method of execution, 
death increasingly functions as a contaminant.  It is as though the original skeleton of 
Hoffman’s father has somehow proliferated, so that its unnatural presence calls forth 
the living into precisely the same state as itself.  As Spinrad comments, “we may 
begin to wonder whether we will now see three skeletons hanging from the tree.  We 
can barely see the forest for the bones” (243).  
     In its piling up of corpses within the space of the living, The Tragedy of Hoffman 
draws upon the principle that the unnatural abridgement of a life is a bar to full and 
final burial.  This is a common preoccupation of tragedies, in which the dead often 
retain what should have been their rightful presence amongst the living.  The 
measures that it takes to bury the dead in such circumstances are substantially 
greater, often requiring the additional closure provided by justice or revenge, and 
generating supernatural disruption where this is not achieved.  In Julius Caesar, 
Antony’s initial inability to put Caesar to rest properly causes him to envision the 
proliferation of further, horrifyingly vocal corpses, declaring “this foule deede, shall 
smell above the earth / With Carrion men, groaning for Buriall” (3.120).  This scene 
echoes a more literal profusion of unburied carcases in Neville’s translation of 
Oedipus.  With Oedipus’s inadvertent slaying of his father having already generated 
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 J. D. Jowett argues in the Nottingham edition of the play that the use of the name “Otho” appears to 
be a substitution for the name Charles and would have likely been made in the 1631 edition in order to 
avoid the political implications of a Prince Charles being executed in the first scene ([75]).  However, 
the substitution is not consistent and in some instances the text still refers to “Charles.”  As the 
majority of references to the character use the name “Otho” in this, the earliest extant copy of the play, 
I retain this name throughout in order to remain as consistent as possible with the text.  As for the 
burning crown, this gruesome weapon was sometimes used as a method of political execution in early 
modern Europe.  For more on this, see Paul Browne’s “A Source for the Burning Crown in Henry 




the bizarre disordering of the natural world, Neville adds material that ties a more 
widespread failure of burial to a string of gruesome, unnatural events: “The corses in 
the streates do lye / and grave on grave is made, / But all in vayne, for nought it boots 
/ the plage cannot be stayed” (Sig. [Abiiir]).  The hordes die in the street so rapidly 
that the living cannot keep pace with the burials, physically commingling the living 
with the dead and escalating the “strainge sights and signes” that are pervading the 
land (Sig. [Abiiir]).  The horror can only be brought to an end with the self-imposed 
exile of Oedipus, thereby formalizing the expulsion of the individual who catalysed 
these events through his role in prematurely ending his father’s life.
48
   
     Such scenes manifest the irruption of that which is supposed to remain buried as a 
contamination of the living and of life.  As the dead pervade the space of the living, 
they appear as that which Freud describes as proliferating in the dark, the return of 
the repressed that the living have failed to banish.  The ontological norms of these 
texts cannot accommodate these figures; they disturb the living because they have no 
home, no place within the texts’ ordering of the world.  Worse still, they have no 
place within the pure space of the “living,” – a term that functions through its 
exclusion of, and differentiation from, the dead – and yet here they are.  In their re-
emergence from the dark, they haunt the very terms of their own construction.  They 
are dead because they were once living, once occupying the state from which they 
are now, by definition, excluded.  But equally, the dead have never occupied the state 
of living, because they are always dead, always arriving before us as the dead now, 
for the first and only time.  Hence, they mark and re-mark the very state against 
which they are defined, and in doing so, pose a threat to the living as a natural and 
pure category: a threat that the living must perpetually work to contain.  
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 The linking of Oedipus’s crimes – killing his father and taking his mother as a wife – to the 
supernatural disruption and plague in Thebes is not absolute in Seneca’s version, in which the Chorus 
in the third act suggests that the cause may be the “ancient anger / of the gods” with Thebes (“veteres 
deum / irae” (Fitch 78-79).  However, Neville transforms this Chorus to blame the matter upon fate 
instead, emphasizing the seeming randomness of this affliction of punishment upon a man who has 
led a “carefull lyfe” (Dii[r]).  In both instances, the Chorus complicates, without overriding, the 




The Return from Within 
     A little earlier, I suggested that the rigidity of the Protestant boundary between the 
living and the dead that prohibits any contact between the two categories requires 
particularly careful attention in order to safeguard their mutual exclusivity.  The 
more strict are  the criteria for defining the boundaries between each term, the more 
difficult they become to preserve and defend.  The means by which theologians 
address this issue is often to establish detailed structures for the life and afterlife in a 
bid to define systematically the order through which the living and the dead function.  
Lavater’s Of Ghostes and Spirites exemplifies this, offering up a lengthy series of 
arguments designed to organize the spiritual space of the dead and thereby isolate it 
entirely from the living.  The ordering of death within time plays a crucial part in 
this, establishing a temporal divide that reinforces the point of separation between the 
living and the dead.  Death is avowedly unpredictable.  Lavater warns us of this 
when he observes that, upon seeing an image that they perceive to be their own soul, 
many people will be “verily persuaded, that except they dye shortlie after they haue 
séene them selves, they shall live a very great time after. But these things are 
superstitious. Let every man so prepare him selfe, as if he shoulde dye to morrowe” 
(79).  While we cannot know the point in time at which death will arrive, that 
unpredictability is embedded in time as the measure by which it is judged.  An 
“untimely death,” such as the Chorus attributes to Arthur in The Misfortunes of 
Arthur, does not function outside of time at all, but rather arrives at a seemingly 
premature point within a linear schema (44).  This does not always reflect temporal 
chaos or a-temporality, but often that the ordering of events within time is subject to 
divine, rather than human, control.  As Cicero puts it in Kyd’s translation of 
Cornelia, “Death’s alwaies ready, and our time is knowne / To be at heavens dispose, 
and not our owne” (Sig. [C3v]).   
     Thus, we cannot know the moment at which death will come, but we do know 
that this moment is a clear determinant of who is living and who is dead.  Moreover, 
this division is reinforced by events immediately after death.  Lavater tells us that: 
 
          the soules of the faithfull are taken up into eternall joy: and the soules of the  
          unfaithfull assoone as they are departed from their bodies are condemned to  
          perpetual torment. And that this is done streightway after death, may be  
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          perceyved by the words that Christ spake to the theefe on the crosse, when he  
          hoong on his right hand: This day shalt thou be [with] me in paradise (115).   
 
Here, Lavater embeds the physical and spiritual transformation of death firmly 
within a temporal schema.  If death’s arrival generates an “after(life)” in which 
certain post-mortem spiritual events rapidly take place, it also creates a “before”.  
That is to say, life is rendered discernible as a separate state from death by its 
predecession of death within linear time.  This differentiation is crucial to Lavater’s 
wider point, which is that the dead do not return: “the soules both of the faithfull and 
unfaithful . . . do not returne thence into the earth before the day of the last 
judgement” (115).  Death is a one-way journey.
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     This temporal organisation of death is accompanied, in Lavater’s work and 
elsewhere, by an insistence upon the clear, topographical structure of spiritual space.  
Marshall’s work points out that the medieval division of the afterlife into distinct 
spaces dissipates in the later sixteenth century as Protestant theologians endeavour 
“to dissociate themselves irrevocably from the typologies and language of pre-
Reformation ‘geographies of the afterlife’, in particular from the notion of a ‘third 
place,’ Purgatory” (“The Map of God’s Word,” 111).  This is evident, for instance, in 
Lavater’s repeated assertions that there is “no third place in which soules should be 
delivered, as it were out of prison” (118).  However, whilst this impulse is clear in 
the abundance of Elizabethan literature that lays siege to the notion of purgatory, the 
transition, as Marshall concedes, is by no means absolute.  Amidst growing 
theological debate as to the plausibility or desirability of determining specific 
geographical loci or physical spaces for heaven and hell, both terms continue to 
function as spiritual destinations to which the dead travel and in which they take up 
occupancy (Beliefs and the Dead 192-94).  Hence, neither heaven nor hell can 
function outside of spatial frameworks.  If Lavater is adamant in his denial of the 
third place, he is no less certain about the allocation of souls to the other two places.  
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 It should be noted that time lends itself equally well to oppositional constructions of the afterlife 
and can even add the semblance of veracity to ghost stories.  Eyriak Schlichtenberger’s 1580 
publication of A Prophecie Uttered By the Daughter of an Honest Countrey Man exemplifies this in 
its account of a German ghost story in which a dead girl returns.  It gives an exceptionally detailed 
account of the time, ordering, and duration of numerous events, including the time of death, the time 
of burial, and the number of hours until the ghost’s return.  In doing so, it lends the story an air of 
authenticity by locating the ghost’s movements within the familiar and logical progression of time. 
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The dead do not vaguely drift into an afterlife but instead are promptly assigned 
specific locations: “the soules of men, as soone as they departe from the bodies, do 
ascende up into heauen if they were godly” and “descende into hell if they were 
wicked and faithlesse” (118).   
     Thus, an intersection between time and space provides the point at which the 
partitioning occurs between the living and the dead.  In outlining various (and at 
times conflicting) Catholic allocations of space, Lavater pays particular attention to 
the notion that “certaine, yea before the day of Judgement, are permitted to come out 
of hell . . . for a season, for the instructing and terrifying of the lyving” and that “the 
soules which be in euerlasting joye, or in Purgatorie, do often appeare . . . . partely 
for the comfort and warning of the living, and partly to pray aide of them” (104-05).  
For him, such movement is impossible because the locus of the soul links 
schematically to linear time through the immediate placement of souls after death.  
Based upon both “the scriptures” and “the writings of the auncient fathers,” he 
argues “that the soules of the faithful are saved, and that the soules of the 
unbeleevers are damned immediatly without delay, and therefore there is no 
Purgatorie” (156).  There is no interim time or space from which they might stage an 
incursion back to the realm of the living and no possibility of switching locations 
after death.   
     In the theatre, the intense imagery offered by the binary topography of the 
afterlife provides exceptional dramatic fodder, irrespective of the often vague 
spiritual order at work within the terms of the play.  Macbeth calls upon the 
Protestant opposition of spiritual destinations as he predicts that the chiming bell 
summons Duncan “to Heaven, or to Hell” (Macbeth 3.136).  In The Tragedy of 
Hoffman, the mourning Lodowick renders this more heavily visual by including 
direction in the polarization of the two terms: “Hee that lifts us to Heaven keepe thee 
from Hell” (Sig. [E3r]). William Falbecke’s addition published at the end of Hugh’s 
The Misfortunes of Arthur imagines the topography of the afterlife literally in 
diagrammatic form, having Arthur’s furious ghost declare “Before the conscience of 
Gueneuora / The map of hell shall hang” (Sig. G[ir]).  Even in Doctor Faustus, 
where Mephistopheles offers up the argument that hell is no more than a state of 
being –  informing Faustus, “Why this is hel, nor am I out of it” – such geographies 
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are crucial.  By the end of the play, Faustus is physically dragged down by devils in 
order for his soul “to be plagde in hel,” a movement that is amplified in performance 
through the devils’ physical movement upwards and downwards through the 
trapdoor of the Elizabethan stage (Sig. [B2v], [F2v]).   
     As such examples suggest, the dramatic (and theological) force of this rigid 
spatial divide is that it provides a clear and distinct order for the dead that can be 
readily visualized.  The living occupy the mortal plane; the dead occupy either 
heaven or hell.  In determining that there is no overlap between the places inhabited 
by the living and the dead, this paradigmatic arrangement can brook no challenge.  
This is also its weakness.  It cannot accommodate the breaching of these boundaries, 
yet nor can it prevent them.  This is a problem at the outset in terms of the 
“metaphysics” of presence.  Through a reformulation of Zeno’s arrow paradox, 
Culler shows that, if “reality is what is present at any given instant,” presence is 
dependent upon a complex set of relations within time and space.  In Culler’s 
example, a flying arrow is present “in a particular spot” at any moment in time and is 
therefore always static at that moment.   Although we logically perceive it to be in 
constant motion throughout its flight, “its motion is never present at any moment of 
presence.”  Thus, the “presence of motion” can only be conceptualized if “every 
instant is already marked with the traces of the past and future.  Motion can be 
present . . . only if the present instant is not something given but a product of the 
relations between past and future” so that “the instant is already divided within itself, 
inhabited by the nonpresent (94).  The opposition between presence and absence here 
is exposed as illusory: in order for the arrow to be present, it must contain the 
properties of its supposed opposite, absence (95).  As Culler observes, this 
demonstrates “the difficulties of a system based on presence,” for “the present instant 
can serve as ground only insofar as it is not a pure and autonomous given.  If motion 
is to be present, presence must already be marked by difference and deferral” (94-
95). 
     The division of the dead into heaven and hell is subject to much the same 
difficulties, insofar as it similarly problematizes the presence of the soul within time 
and space.  For theologians such as Lavater, the dead are irrefutably and permanently 
absent (in opposition to the presence of the living) based on their immediate 
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movement after death to the location of either heaven or hell.  Although this 
transition is virtually instantaneous, it must involve movement of sorts because it is 
temporally based: it marks the point at which the individual’s life becomes the past, 
and their death and afterlife become the present and future.  Thus, as the dead 
individual’s soul moves towards heaven or hell, there is a moment or perhaps a series 
of moments in which they are neither living nor situated at their final destination.  At 
this moment, the soul is inhabiting neither life, nor heaven or hell; yet there is no 
other place.  The soul in transition is instead present on the basis of its temporal and 
spatial relation to where it is heading (its future) and where it has been (its past).  
Moreover, at the very moment of death, as the individual passes from life to death, a 
similar problem occurs.  Straddling the border between life and death, the soul’s 
existence functions in a complex relation with the past (life) and future (afterlife), 
whilst it fails to manifest either state in full or in isolation. Neither fully living nor 
fully dead, the individual’s present state is divided, inhabited by both life and death.   
     At the outset, then, Lavater’s terms are subject to a haunting.  While he works to 
evacuate the presence of the dead from the space of the living, the isolation and 
polarisation of each of the two categories is riven by their dependence upon, and 
manifestation within, each other.  In addition, Lavater is forced to reconcile his 
argument that souls are immediately directed towards heaven or hell after the 
moment of death with the Protestant belief that, after death, the soul (and body) of 
the dead must wait for an interim period until the day of judgement.  In this, he is 
entering into a wider debate amongst Reformation theologians regarding the 
Lutheran teaching that a dead person’s soul sleeps until the final judgement.
50
  
Lavater remains adamant that the dead are permanently removed from the living, 
asserting that “soules immediatly upon their departure from their body, are caried 
unto a certein place, whence they cannot of themselves returne, but néeds must wait 
there for that terrible daye of judgement” (121).  However, the “certein place” is 
entirely uncertain in either its location or nature.  It is clear that it is a spot 
segregated from the mortal sphere, but his otherwise specific topography of the 
afterlife dissipates into a vague gesture towards an indeterminate location.  
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 Marshall notes that this notion was eventually discarded, in part “because it seemed to revive in 
Reformed theology the notion of a third place in the next life” (“The Map of God’s Word” 117).  For 
a more detailed account of this theological problem, see Marshall’s Beliefs and the Dead, 220-231. 
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Elsewhere, Lavater endeavours to negotiate between the two positions.  In his 
summary of Augustine’s writings on the topic, he asserts that “the soules of the godly 
so soone as they be severed from their bodies be in rest, and the soules of the wicked 
in torment, untill the bodies of the one bée raysed unto lyfe, and the other unto 
everlastyng deathe” (116).  Here, the qualities of the post-death experience modulate 
into place-holders, with “rest” and “torment” constituting metaphysical spaces that 
lie between mortality, heaven, and hell whilst remaining oddly linked to the (buried) 
corpse within which the spirit will one day resume its place.   
     Lavater faces a similar problem in assimilating biblical accounts of resurrection of 
the dead into his core argument that the dead do not return, another prominent 
difficulty facing Reformation theologians.  The principle that Lavater follows is not 
that God could not make the dead return but that he does not.  In response to his 
Catholic opponents, Lavater argues that “al things are possible unto God,” including 
the act of bringing “soules out of heauen or hel” in order to aid the living: but “no 
text or example is found in holy scripture, that ever any soules came from the dead, 
which did so scoole and warn men: or that the faithful learned or sought to 
understande any thing of the soules deceassed” (124).  He then turns to address the 
much-cited case of Lazarus, who is restored to life after four days of death in Chapter 
11 of the Book of John.  This resurrection poses a particular problem in regard to the 
location of the soul during the four days of Lazarus’s death: purgatory is an obvious, 
but theologically unacceptable site, a recall of the soul from hell is “inconceivable,” 
and for Christ to have dragged the soul “from the enjoyment of eternal bliss in 
Heaven would seem an act of injustice” (Marshall, “The Map of God’s Word” 122).  
According to Marshall, a number of theologians eventually dismiss it as one of those 
divine secrets that are best left to God.   Lavater characteristically obfuscates the 
issue instead by reuniting the soul with the body.  He argues that “Lazarus soule did 
not only appeare, but he came againe both in bodie and soule,” as “a sure token, of 
our true resurrection, which shall be in the last day . . . . You shal never read that 
either Lazarus, or any other have told wher[e] they were while they were deade, or 
what kynde of being there is in the other world, for these things are not to be learned 
and knowen of the dead, but out of the word of God” (146).  Lazarus’s return thereby 
functions as something of a preview, a promise of the resurrection yet to come for all 
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of the dead.  He may have returned from the dead, but he does not bring death with 
him: the secrets of death remain behind, isolated within the spiritual realm that exists 
beyond the view of mortal eyes.  We are to distinguish him from the traditional (and 
deceptive) figure of the ghost by the corporeality of his presence.   
     As further evidence of this, Lavater describes the opening of graves in Chapter 27 
of the Book of Matthew:  
 
          many dead bodies did arise, and appeared to many at Hierusalem. The soules  
          of the dead did not only appeare, neither did they warne the living, or  
          commaund them to do this or that for the deads sake, to wit, either to pray for  
          them, or to go on pilgrimage to saints . . . . But the dead with their souls and  
          bodies togither, came into the earth: for héerby god would shew, that he by his  
          death hath overcom and destroyed death to the faithful, and that at the last day  
          their soules and bodies shall be knit togither, and live with God for ever. (147)   
 
In both accounts, the reappearance of the dead does not signify that the souls of the 
dead are able to make return appearances.  Rather, it constitutes a miraculous 
reversal in which the dead return to life in both body and soul so that the linear 
timeline governing the usual order of death is momentarily reversed through 
supernatural means.  That is to say, in what is essentially a preview of the eternal life 
promised to the faithful, the dead cease to be dead at all.  They were dead, but in 
order to demonstrate the future for the faithful, they are now again living.  What they 
are not, is the ambulatory dead invading the terrain of the living. 
     The emphasis that Lavater places upon the absence of contact between the living 
and the dead in these examples is of considerable importance.  Direct communication 
between the living and the dead has a long history within classical, Catholic, and folk 
traditions, often occurring, as Lavater’s argument suggests, when the dead have 
unfinished business or are sent to provide the living with assistance of some kind.
51
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 Marshall notes certain changes in the function of ghosts during and after the Reformation, with 
ghosts taking an increased interest in worldly matters such as “identifying murderers, and enforcing 
the performance of wills,” thereby reminding survivors “of their obligations towards dead ancestors” 
(“Old Mother Leakey” 96).  Earlier Catholic ghosts had sometimes behaved similarly but also 
returned for more directly spiritual purposes such as confessing and receiving absolution (Thomas 
713).  In a variety of contexts, medieval ghosts were in any case able to expose some of the tortures of 
the afterlife in order to act as moral examplars.  For more on this, see Schmitt’s Ghosts in the Middle 
Ages, esp. pp. 125, 171, Andrew Joynes’ Medieval Ghost Stories, p. 35, and Marshall’s Beliefs and 
the Dead, p. 16.  This is dramatized in pseudo-classical form in The Spanish Tragedy, in which 
Andrea’s ghost tells us that in the underworld he “saw more sights then thousand tongues can tell, / Or 
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These earlier ghosts are often free to elaborate upon the secrets of the afterlife, but 
some Elizabethan ghosts become increasingly reticent, in keeping with Reformation 
theologians’ insistence that the dead cannot advise the living of their experiences.  A 
prominent example occurs in Hamlet, when the ghost hints at the dark secrets of the 
afterlife but refuses to expand upon the details: “but that I am forbid / To tell the 
secrets of my prison house, / I could a tale unfolde whose lightest word / Would 
harrow up thy soule” (Sig. [D2v]).  Although Pearlman argues that “such an 
interdiction is nowhere else on record” and that the ghost’s prohibition from 
speaking is “simply Shakespeare’s bold pretext” for avoiding the traditional account 
of the ghost’s origins, this is in fact an inversion of the Protestant proscription of 
speaking to the dead (76).  Since Hamlet cannot resist enquiring into the matter, Old 
Hamlet withholds the information instead.  The soul, according to Lavater, is 
imperilled by any venture towards eliciting such information.  He insists that “God 
hath precisely forbidden, that we shoulde learne and searche out any thing of the 
dead” because “He alone woulde be taken for our sufficient schoolemaster” (126).  
Rather like the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the Garden of Eden, the dead 
represent a source of forbidden insight.  Having died, they possess knowledge that 
the living may not access.   
     Here again, Lavater’s methodical attempts to isolate and bury the dead are 
founded upon the opposition and isolation of terms that are unavoidably subject to 
structural inconsistencies, fractures, and repetitions.  Lavater has already made it 
clear that there is no possibility that the living may interact with the dead.  He claims 
that the injunction is to ensure that the living seek only God’s word for insight in 
order to avoid the lure of false information from dubious sources (spiritual or 
human).  However, he repeatedly specifies that we must not seek this dangerous 
information from the “dead”: an event that is not possible, if, as he frequently claims, 
they do not return to the mortal realm (124-26).  If the faithful understand this 
principle, no contact with the dead is plausible and any evidence to the contrary 
should be readily identifiable as an illusion.  The injunction functions as a means to 
establish a boundary between the living and the dead that may not be crossed: but the 
                                                                                                                                          




prohibition of speaking with the dead is pervaded by the channel of contact between 
the two categories that it seeks to eliminate. 
     Thus, as Lavater works to disrupt any sense of continuity or overlap between the 
states of life and death and thereby to render the figure of the ghost redundant, his 
argument progressively throws up more spectres than it suppresses.  Whilst 
instructing his audience that we must not “conjure” spirits “to tell us the truth,” he 
endeavours to conjure the dead away entirely.  At this point, Derrida’s observation 
about the imperative to bury can again be recalled: “the conjuration has to make sure 
that the dead will not come back: quick, do whatever is needed to keep the cadaver 
localized, in a safe place, decomposing right where it was inhumed . . . . Quick, a 
vault to which one keeps the keys!” (Specters 120).  The difficulty for Lavater in 
keeping this particular vault locked is that the dead have a troubling habit of ignoring 
barriers erected by the living.   For him, historical images of the wandering dead 
appear disturbingly chaotic, persisting in a plethora of theologies and cultures despite 
their apparent contradiction of God’s word.  As Marshall observes in regard to the 
wider persistence of ghost beliefs, the dead increasingly appear as “illegal 
immigrants across a border that was supposed to remain sealed and impermeable 
until the end of time” (Beliefs and the Dead 264).  The failure of the dead to stay in 
their place is indicative, not of an actual supernatural phenomenon, but of a dual 
disorder, a (mistaken) dis-ordering of God’s collocation of mortality, death, and the 
afterlife, and a corresponding spiritual dysfunction amongst the populace.   
     Yet Lavater’s accounts of such disorder demonstrate functional resemblances to 
his elaboration of the “truth,” highlighting in both cases the imperative to lay the 
dead to rest properly and then leave them be.  For instance, he conducts a survey of 
“Heathen” cultures that believe that “Soules should stray continually abroade” if the 
dead are not properly buried, ranging from philosophical and theological writings to 
literature and mythology.  He refers us to Plato’s opinion that “base and viler soules, 
that are defiled with the pleasures and lustes of the body” stalk the earth, appearing 
as ghosts and to the “Heathen” belief that “Soules should stray continually abroade 
before they founde rest, unlesse the bodies from which they were severed, were 
rightly buried in the earth” (98-99).  He cites examples from Homer’s Iliad such as 
Hector, who requests Achilles to return his body to his parents for burial and 
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Patroclus, who appears after his death in a vision to Achilles in order to ask that he 
“bestowe uppon him all funeral solemnities” (99).  Then he moves on to a range of 
historical Catholic writings that describe various contexts for the return of spirits and 
how they may be laid to rest.   
     Such examples ostensibly contribute to Lavater’s painting of a broad historical 
backdrop of cultures who have understood the afterlife incorrectly, against which he 
might contrast the true (Protestant) teachings of the Bible.  At the same time, though, 
they resonate disconcertingly with the accounts he provides of purportedly accurate 
events.  For the sake of reviewing all of the evidence thoroughly, Lavater devotes a 
number of chapters to providing evidence “that spirits do often appeare, and many 
straunge and marvellous things do sundry times chaunce,” reciting a wide variety of 
apparently credible accounts in which apparitions of the dead have appeared to the 
living (53).  In these examples, he presents ghost sightings that are ostensibly 
genuine in contrast with the numerous instances of illusion, deception, and fraud that 
he cites elsewhere.  Often, he provides explanations as to the nature of these genuine 
sightings: they might be angels or “good Spirites, whiche appeare unto menne, 
warnyng, and defendyng them” or, more frequently, “evyll Spyrites” who God 
allows to test the “faith and pacience”of the faithful and to “chasten” those who are 
“infidels” and encourage “true repentaunce” (175-77).    
     However, in many of these accounts the ghosts in question do not overtly fit into 
either category.  Instead, they seem primarily to demonstrate the importance of a 
proper burial in laying the dead to rest.   In a chapter entitled “A proofe out of the 
Gentiles histories, that Spirits and ghosts do often times appeare,” Lavater recounts a 
story in which a house is haunted by “an image or shape, as it were an olde man, 
leane and lothsome to beholde, with a long beard and staring haire: on his legs he had 
fetters, and in his hands caryed chaines which he always ratled togither.”  After a 
brief interaction with the ghost, a man requests that the authorities dig up a site to 
which the ghost had guided him, “whiche doone, they fynde boanes wrapped and 
tyed in chaynes”.  Subsequently, “those boanes béeing gathered togither, were 
buryed solemnely: The house, after they were orderly layde in the grounde, was ever 
after cleare of all suche ghostes” (58-59).  It is difficult to interpret such a ghost as 
anything other than the spirit of the dead man whose bones lay in the ground, and 
93 
 
Lavater makes no attempt to direct us otherwise.  This story exemplifies the wider 
problem that Lavater faces: the more he tries to summon evidence for the need to 
banish the dead, the more he calls them forth.  His injunction to bury becomes a 
conjuration in multiple senses.   
     Derrida identifies two relevant meanings for the term “conjuration” as well as a 
third for the related term “conjurement,” all of which are directly relevant here.  
Firstly, conjuration denotes “the conspiracy (Vershwörung in German) of those who 
promise solemnly, sometimes secretly, by swearing together an oath (Schwur) to 
struggle against a superior power” (Specters 50).  Lavater’s text endeavours to 
achieve precisely such a conjuration, to call the reader into a pact that seeks the death 
of death.  The faithful reader – the reader who reads well – is to understand that 
Christ will “come again in the latter day, to raise up the dead bodies, to glorifie them, 
and  to carrie them with him, into eternal blisse” (146).  All they must do to banish 
the spectre of death is to swear, to subscribe to the Protestant doctrine that will see 
them live forever.  To do away with the spectre of death though, one must also 
remove its evidence – more specifically, the dead.   
     In effect, this requires a “conjurement,” an act of “magical exorcism that . . . tends 
to expulse the evil spirit which would have been called up or convoked” (Derrida, 
Specters 58).  The struggle to fulfil the oath requires the expulsion of the dead, which 
Lavater endeavours to achieve through imposing order upon them – sealing them off 
from the living in time and space.  The living who have sworn to the oath must 
participate in this.  They must bury the dead properly and disallow their return.  If 
faced with an apparition, they must not doubt that burial.  They must not speak to it, 
nor endeavour to drive it away physically or through rituals, “cursing,” or “banning”: 
for it is not the dead but rather another form of spirit, which can only be dispelled 
through “the sword of the [Holy] Spirit” (Lavater 215).  The act thus fulfils the 
criteria of magic, not in the sense of an exercise of magical power on the part of an 
individual, but in the sense of an entry into a supernatural event through a particular 
ritualized set of behaviours.  It fits precisely into what Derrida describes as an 
“attempt both to destroy and to disavow a malignant, demonized, diabolized force, 
most often an evil-doing spirit, a specter, a kind of ghost who comes back or who 
still risks coming back post mortem” (59).  The man in Lavater’s story of the ghost in 
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chains participates in this fully, driving the ghost away, not by his own endeavours, 
but by ensuring that the corpse to which the ghost leads him receives a proper and 
“orderly” burial.  The ghost’s subsequent disappearance is effectively the 
disappearance of the spectre of death; a proper reward for one who has obeyed the 
injunction to bury. 
     But in drawing upon this properly enacted burial, Lavater creates a paradox.  His 
injunction to bury requires the action of proper rites followed by active inaction: 
effectively, a stuffing of the contents of death into a coffin and sitting firmly on the 
lid thereafter.  The difficulty is that, in order to outline this conjuration, Lavater’s 
text simultaneously summons the dead, thereby carrying out a further conjuration.  
The old man can only lay the ghost to rest by following the proper protocol for full 
and final burial, but the story thereby contradicts the most crucial point of all, which 
is that the dead cannot return in the first instance.  As Derrida’s definition for 
“conjurement” suggests, in order for something to be conjured away, it must first be 
“called up or convoked”.  It is perhaps inevitable then that Lavater’s conjuration 
must also involve the further signification that Derrida notes for “conjuration,” “the 
magical incantation destined to evoke, to bring forth with the voice, to convoke a 
charm or a spirit” (Specters 50).  It is necessary to bury in order to remove the dead 
permanently from the space of the living but this imperative is therefore marked by 
the possibility of the dead’s return.  Thus the text becomes the very site of the 
spectrality that it seeks to banish.  Lavater endeavours to position the prohibition of 
the dead as an external actuality, a state of spiritual and physical affairs that he is 
merely relaying.  But as Derrida points out, “conjuration . . . makes come, by 
definition, what is not there at the present moment of the appeal.  This voice does not 
describe, what it says certifies nothing; its words cause something to happen” 
(Specters 50).  The dead are nothing but absent until Lavater calls them forth; and the 
harder he tries to lay these ghosts to rest by elaborating upon the impossibilities of 
their existence, the more of them he summons.  His text manifests precisely the 
phenomena it endeavours to destroy.   
     Of course, Lavater’s conjuration ideally seeks its own end.  Derrida observes that 
“a conjuration . . . is first of all an alliance . . . a plot or a conspiracy.  It is a matter of 
neutralizing a hegemony or overturning some power” (58).  If the oath is successful, 
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if the text successfully conjures away the spectre of death by divorcing the “spirites,” 
“straunge sightes,” and “straunge and marvellous things” that are often mistaken for 
the returned dead, the conjuration is complete (Lavater 9).  But Of Ghostes and 
Spirites fails in this project, in part because it leaves no means by which the spectres 
it conjures may be assimilated into the framework of burial.  Freud points out that the 
repetition begins to move into the uncanny where it emerges without intention, 
compulsively appearing in a way that engenders the sense “of something fateful and 
inescapable” (“The Uncanny” 237).  Lavater encounters precisely this problem as his 
attempts to deny the presence of spectres instead seems to secure their proliferation, 
emerging again and again within the most stringent arguments.  The harder he tries to 
banish the dead, the more apparent it becomes that the dead cannot leave; death 
cannot be isolated from the sphere of the living.  If the faithful are required to swear 
in order to banish death, it is because, like those who are “infidells,” they too must 
die; and they must do so before living forever.  Death may be overcome at a future 
date, on the final day, but it may not be avoided by the living; nor may it be 
experienced by the living, for at the moment of experience, they are no longer alive.  
In tracing the spectrality that emerges through the language of the injunction to bury, 
we therefore arrive on the threshold of the psyche, the site at which death and the 
dead are accommodated and at which the failure to accommodate them moves us 
further into the realm of the uncanny. 
 
Mourning and Melancholy 
     The haunting of the terms in Lavater’s attempt to separate the living from the 
dead brings into view the problem of death as an event that can neither be contained 
nor known.  If we return to Freud’s claims that the unconscious is unable to 
comprehend the concept of its own death and that fear of the dead is a “primitive 
feeling” perpetually ready to arise, we may now find that it is more useful in its 
gesture towards the menace of death’s opacity.  In “Fiction and its Phantoms,” 
Cixous expands upon Freud’s outline of death, arguing: 
 
          Our unconscious makes no place for the representation of our mortality.  As an  
          impossible representation, death is that which mimes, by this very  
          impossibility, the reality of death.  It goes even further.  That which signifies  
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          without that which is signified.  What is an absolute secret, something  
          absolutely new and which should remain hidden, because it has shown itself to  
          me, is the fact that I am dead; only the dead know the secret of death.  Death  
          will recognize us, but we shall not recognize it. (543) 
 
Here, death begins to seem like an alien piece of theatre that embodies its own 
incomprehensibility, unable to transmit meaning to the viewing mortal audience but 
thereby enacting its own relationship to that audience.  In so doing, it exposes 
something additional, something disturbing.  As the watching audience, we may not 
be able to comprehend what we see, but we see nevertheless; we see that what is 
enacted is strange and unassimilable but also interior; and we see that the 
incomprehensible, frighteningly, comprehends us.  This is what Derrida describes as 
the visor effect.  Like Old Hamlet’s ghost, “this Thing . . . looks at us and sees us not 
see it even when it is there” (Specters 6).  Death’s visibility lies not in any form of 
transparency, but in its gaze: we know it is there because we know that it knows us: 
more than that, it constitutes us.  We are reminded of this at every turn, at every 
death in which we discover that another mortal being knows – has known all along – 
how to yield to the end of (its) time.  The living self can never achieve the 
containment necessary to exclude that through which it is constituted.   
     This sense of an illicit information exchange that escapes understanding and yet 
pervades the unconscious speaks of an intrusion and simultaneously a sense of being 
drawn out.  If “only the dead know the secret of death,” that secret should remain 
veiled, relegated to a future that is hidden from the living who are always here and 
now.  This is why the imperative to bury functions irrespectively of whether the dead 
other is a loved one or a complete stranger: without mourning – without burial – his 
dead presence brings forth the spectral presence of death, not as an external fact but 
as something that lurks within.  While biological death is always deferred, always 
located within an indefinable space and indeterminate future, metaphysical death is 
less easily contained.  If it is a condition of mortal life that it must ultimately reach 
an end, then death inscribes itself within the very act of living and it is this to which 
the dead speak.  As Derrida suggests more generally in regard to the spectre, “this 
spectral someone other looks at us, we feel ourselves being looked at by it, outside of 
any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part” (6).  The purpose of 
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burial begins to crystallize.  The dead are abhorrent because they are never dead 
enough; never so dead that they are not a threat to the territory of the living, never so 
firmly relegated to the past that they do not threaten to bring the future (death) into 
the present.  Death is the one future event that is assured, but as such, it cannot do 
otherwise than stake a claim upon the present, even if it does so as the signifier of an 
absence that cannot be read.  At the same time, since death is always deferred – 
because for the living, it has never yet arrived – it must infuse the present with a 
future that does not yet exist.   
    Just as this renders the imperative to bury essential in order to isolate the state of 
death from living, it also prohibits it from achieving this aim.  On this problem, 
Derrida suggests that:  
 
          the dead have never buried anyone.  Nor have the living who were not also    
          mortals, that is, who properly bear within themselves, that is, outside  
          themselves, and before themselves, the impossible possibility of their death.  It  
          will always be necessary that still living mortals bury the already dead living.   
          The dead have never buried anyone, but neither have the living, the living who  
          would be only living, the immortal living.  The gods never bury anyone.   
          Neither the dead as such, nor the living as such have ever put anyone in the  
          ground. (Specters, 143) 
   
The living are always already dead but not yet privy to the secret of death.  They are 
inscribed with the mark of their (future) death, an inscription that is reified through 
the figure of the corpse.  Hence, burial always has more than one subject.  The living 
bury not only the dead but also their own futures; but because the spectre of that 
future is so thoroughly present, no amount of burial will banish it.  What is supposed 
to accompany the corpse into the grave to be hidden thereafter is the dead within: the 
(present) future to which the dead attest.  Death is no respecter of temporal 
constraints though: it cannot be relegated to the past if it remains, unknown and yet 
ubiquitous, within the present and future. 
     In finding that burial relates as much to the dead within as without, we return to 
the issue raised earlier regarding the act of burial as a task that is essential to the 
project of mourning.  More specifically, it plays a role in the “introjection” of 
mourning.  This is a process that   and Torok describe as a “casting inside,” in which 
the ego “partially” identifies with the object it has interiorized, thereby rendering it 
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“possible both to wait while readjusting the internal economy and to redistribute 
one’s investments” (127, 111).  They define introjection as “the process of including 
the Unconscious in the ego through objectal contacts,” so that it results in expansion, 
“broadening and enriching the ego”.  This is because it does not simply involve the 
introjection of the “object” but of “the sum total of the drives, and their vicissitudes 
as occasioned and mediated by the object” (113).
52
  Subsequently, this “puts an end 
to objectal dependency,” or, as Freud puts it, the withdrawal of the “libido . . . from 
its attachments to that object” (Abraham and Torok 114; Freud “Mourning and 
Melancholy” 244).  It is, as Alexander Welsh observes, a paradoxical process of 
“remembering in order to forget” (“The Task of Hamlet” 484). (This calls to mind 
the grieving Antony in Julius Caesar, who declares during his eulogy: “My heart is 
in the Coffin there with Caesar, / And I must pawse, till it come backe to me” 
(3.121).)  The process of mourning through introjection is subject to a kind of 
“reality-testing,” as Freud terms it, for the attachments to the object and the liberation 
of the ego are only achieved through acceptance of “reality” as the subject 
progressively grasps that the lost “object no longer exists” (“The Uncanny” 249; 
“Mourning and Melancholia” 244, 255).  The ego, driven more strongly by the need 
to survive than to maintain its attachments to that which has been lost, responds by 
progressively severing those attachments (255).  In this equation, we might consider 
burial to be a means of instituting “reality”: full and final burial promises to render 
the dead fully and finally dead, providing a concrete proof of the fact in order to 
enable successful mourning.   
     However, the completion of mourning is not as simple as this might suggest.  
Derrida suggests a distinction between “possible” and “impossible” mourning.  In 
possible mourning, which modifies Freud’s formulation, we “interiorize within us 
the image, idol, or ideal of the other who is dead” (“Mnemosyne” 6).  In this event, 
the “interiorizing idealization takes in itself or upon itself the body and voice of the 
other, the other’s visage and person, ideally and quasi-literally devouring them” (34).  
This does not suggest that the other lives on within us (for “the other is dead and 
nothing can save him from this death, nor can anyone save us from it”) or that this 
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The Shell and the Kernel, esp. pp. 110-16.   
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process can be reduced to “a narcissistic fantasy in a subjectivity that is closed upon 
itself” (21-22).  The other is “already installed in the narcissistic structure” through 
the marking out of the “self,” so that “the being ‘in us’ of bereaved memory becomes 
the coming of the other . . . . And even, however terrifying this thought may be, the 
first coming of the other” (22).  Thus, mourning concerns a reciprocity between 
subject and object, self and the dead.  After death, the friend or object no longer 
exists: “he lives only in us.  But we are never ourselves, and between us, identical to 
us, a ‘self’ is never in itself or identical to itself.  This specular reflection never 
closes on itself; it does not appear before this possibility of mourning” (28).  Thus 
Derrida perceives that the self that mourns does not exist prior to, or externally from, 
the dead, but instead is constituted through the act of mourning; hence his famous 
statement, “I mourn therefore I am” (Points 321). 
     We may think here of Cixous’s comment, “to begin (writing, living) we must 
have death.  I like the dead, they are the doorkeepers who while closing one side 
‘give’ way to the other” (Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing 7).  The division 
between life and death is generative.  In Cryptomimesis, Jodey Castricano helpfully 
expands upon Cixous’s observation with the interpretation of “the other being the 
dead in us, in whose memory we live and by whose death – or at least by the 
possibility of whose death – the ‘within me’ or ‘within us’ becomes possible.  This 
spacing is what the dead ‘give’” (3).  As we recognise absence, there must also be 
presence; for the dead to draw forth the dead within us, this can only be discernible 
alongside space for the living.  The future secret that the dead hold now, the secret 
that recognises the living and worse still, resonates within, is part of what creates a 
space for “within” to exist.  “I have that within which passes showe,” says Hamlet, 
“These but the trappings and the suites of woe” (Sig. [B4v]).  Sarah Beckwith 
remarks in “Stephen Greenblatt’s Hamlet and the Forms of Oblivion” that this 
complaint is “less a claim about an unreachable inner self than a complaint against 
the failure of phony ritual to incorporate particular sadnesses” (274).  However, we 
should not separate the two quite so readily.  Hamlet refers to mourning as an inner 
enactment, in contrast to the semblance of mourning visible from the outside, but at 
the same time, “that within” – his experience of mourning – is not only what is 
contained but also what is constitutive of “within.”  There is no inner Hamlet that 
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exists anteriorly to the mourning of the dead within.  The fact that, for the audience, 
there is no Hamlet that exists prior to the mourning of the dead father (for the 
mourning Hamlet is the only Hamlet we see from beginning to end of the play), 
provides a specific, transparent performance of this entrance into being.   
     Where a haunting occurs, it not only disrupts “possible” mourning of the living 
through the intrusion of the dead, but also the space of the dead themselves.  In the 
original Latin version of Octavia, Agrippina asks at the end of her soliloquy, “why 
am I slow to hide my face in Tartarus, I who blight my kin as stepmother, wife and 
mother?” (“quid tegere cesso Tartaro vultus meos, / noverca coniunx mater infelix 
meis?”) (Fitch 574-75).  Having lingered, she is preparing to depart the mortal sphere 
in which she has functioned in specific, gender-delineated roles.  In Nuce’s 
translation, Agrippina instead asks: “why ceasse I, with Hell to hide my face, / Wyfe, 
stepdame, mother dire, in my life space[?]” (Sig. [Fiv]).  Her “life space” is 
seemingly the space in which Agrippina was once “wfye, stepdame, mother dire” – 
the space in which she lived.  But here she is now, she is not presently hiding her 
face in hell and her space is no more a relic of the past than her function as the 
murdered mother.  Here, the spacing given by the dead for the dead to live within 
and for the self to emerge is given by the dead to the dead.  Agrippina’s burial has 
failed utterly.  Where the living carry death within and before their selves, the dead 
Agrippina refuses to relinquish the self, to be buried and thereby “‘give’ way to the 
other” (Cixous, Three Steps 7).  In functioning as a spectre, she carries the space of 
her (past) life into the presence of her death so that her return erodes the division 
between the two. 
     Agrippina is haunted herself by the function of memory, her continuing 
remembrance of her living self.  She mourns, as the living do, that which cannot be 
grasped or retrieved.  Derrida points out that memory is essential to the process of 
mourning, because it is all that remains when “nothing is coming or to come, from 
the other to the present” (“Mnemosyne” 33).  But memory is also contingent upon 
mourning: 
 
          This terrible solitude which is mine or ours at the death of the other is what  
          constitutes that relationship to self which we call ‘me,’ ‘us,’ ‘between us,’  
          ‘subjectivity,’ ‘intersubjectivity,’ ‘memory.’  The possibility of death  
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          ‘happens,’ so to speak, ‘before’ these different instances, and makes them  
          possible.  Or, more precisely, the possibility of the death of the other as mine  
          or ours in-forms any relation to the other and the finitude of memory.   
               We weep precisely over what happens to us when everything is entrusted to  
          the sole memory that is ‘in me’ or ‘in us.’  But we must also recall, in another  
          turn of memory, that the ‘within me’ and the ‘within us’ do not arise or appear  
          before this terrible experience.  Or at least not before its possibility, actually  
          felt and inscribed in us, signed. (“Mnemosyne” 33)   
 
Memory is rendered solely our own domain, for death marks the cessation of input 
from the dead, but memory does not precede the possibility of death any more than 
the self does: “we know, we knew, we remember – before the death of the loved one 
– that being-in-me or being-in-us is constituted out of the possibility of mourning. . . 
. we begin by recalling this to ourselves: we come to ourselves through this memory 
of possible mourning” (34).   As Hamlet observes and Derrida so often repeats, “the 
time is out of joint” (Spectres 20).  We are faced with the logic of “hauntology,” as 
the possibility of a teleological or linear account of the self’s emergence is subsumed 
by the ceaseless and a-temporal relationships between death, memory, self, and 
other.  The other that we mourn moves as a spectre, the figure whose absence, before 
it occurs, has already entered within to create the space for the “us” to register and 
remember its absence.  There is no “before” here, nor any “after”: there is only, 
always, the paradoxical departure and entry of the dead other that produces the 
simultaneous identification with, and differentiation from, the emergent self.   
     Derrida thus finds a second approach to mourning that diverges from that 
established by Freud and refuses the accomplishment of interiorization.  He asks: 
 
          Is the most distressing . . . infidelity that of a possible mourning which would   
          interiorize within us the image, idol, or ideal of the other who is dead and lives  
          only in us?  Or is it that of the impossible mourning, which, leaving the other  
          his alterity, respecting thus his infinite remove, either refuses to take or is  
          incapable of taking the other within oneself, as in the tomb or the vault of  
          some narcissism?” (Mnemosyne 6). 
 
 This process of “impossible mourning” functions in stark contrast to the 
psychoanalytic understanding of mourning through incorporation or introjection.  
Townshend observes that it “succeeds in the very failure of internalization, that is, in 
102 
 
the respectful acknowledgment of the insurmountable otherness of the dead” (94).  It 
is impossible because without the interiorization of mourning, there is no self from 
which to distinguish the alterity of the other.  As Sean Gaston puts it in The 
Impossible Mourning of Jacques Derrida, “mourning is impossible, and for us most 
of all.  The ‘trace of the other’, the other who has died and that remains other, is at 
once inside and outside of us, marking a gap that moves in ‘us’, as ‘us’ – the living 
who sign our name” (122).  We can neither fully exclude nor fully interiorize the 
dead other whose mourning is generative of “us,” nor erase the gap within.  
Therefore, impossible mourning encompasses the exposure of the spectral, the 
inevitability of burial’s failure. 
     At the opposite extreme of this distancing, burial is enacted internally.  Earlier, I 
quoted Derrida’s assertion that mourning requires always the ontologization of 
“remains” in order to identify and affix – to bury, properly – the lost object (Specters 
9).  In impossible mourning, the burial occurs, not through internalization but 
through interment at a distance, the establishment of permanent remove between the 
living and the mourned, even though a spectral relationship persists.  In melancholia, 
in which mourning fails, the other is consumed in a process that focuses upon 
incorporation rather than introjection.  Freud suggests that this incorporation 
combines the interiorization of mourning with the regression to “original 
narcissism,” so that it manifests a connection with “the oral or cannibalistic phase of 
libidinal development” (“Mourning and Melancholia” 249).  The result, as Abraham 
and Torok describe it, is the construction of “a secret tomb inside the subject,” the 
“swallowing” of “that which has been lost, as if it were some kind of thing” (130, 
126).  As a consequence of the refusal of mourning, we refuse “to reclaim as our own 
the part of ourselves that we placed in what we lost,” or to accept “the full import of 
the loss” (127).  Reformed through the subject’s memory, “the objectal correlative of 
loss is buried alive in the crypt as a full-fledged person” (130).  Freud describes the 
resulting depression, inhibition, and masochism of melancholia as a movement from 
the conscious loss that is suffered in mourning to one that is unconscious (“Mourning 
and Melancholia” 245).  Unlike in mourning, the ego cannot be liberated to form a 
new libidinal connection with a different “object”: instead, the withdrawal of the 
psychic libido from the object leads to a narcissistic withdrawal into the ego itself, so 
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that “an identification of the ego with the abandoned object” arises.  As a result, the 
“object-loss” morphs into “ego-loss,” leaving the ego “poor and empty” (249-250, 
246).   
     This failure of mourning is, of course, the problem that pervades Hamlet so 
markedly, and indeed, Freud cites Hamlet as exemplifying the antipathy towards 
himself and others that is characteristic of melancholia (246).  Numerous critics have 
addressed Hamlet as a text in which mourning is both pervasive and unsuccessful.
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Townshend usefully summarizes the core of the problem when he observes that 
Hamlet “is marked by a profound inadequacy where matters of ritualized grief are 
concerned,” pointing in particular to Claudius and Gertrude’s inappropriate 
responses as leaders and their attempts to force Hamlet to cease mourning at all.  
Townshend interprets such scenes as “severe proscriptions against the thorough 
mourning of the dead” (75).  This is in keeping with Greenblatt’s reading of the 
problem, which links the disruption of burial rituals to the unease generated through 
the abolition of purgatory (Hamlet in Purgatory 246).  However, we might further 
clarify these scenes as reactions to such proscriptions, the failure of burial and 
concomitant disruption to mourning being responsible, as it were, for the subsequent 
upheaval and string of deaths.  The prohibition or incompletion of mourning, if the 
events of Hamlet are any measure, is not to be recommended.   
     For my purposes, it is most significant that Hamlet’s melancholia bears a direct 
relationship to the presence of the ghost.  As Watson observes, “Hamlet attempts to 
sustain his father’s existence by identifying with him, even if that means joining him 
in death”: hence his wish “not to be”.  In his grim state of mourning before the ghost 
appears, with his “closed or staring eyes” and his desire to be “out of the sun and into 
his grave,” Hamlet effectively endeavours to conjure “the dead man into presence, 
with all his absentness intact” (80).  In a sense, this reading resonates with 
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 The list of critical readings in regard to Hamlet’s melancholy is extensive, but earlier examples -
include A. C. Bradley’s Shakespearean Tragedy (esp. pp. 117-25) and Lawrence Babb’s The 
Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580-1642.  The latter 
describes Hamlet’s “moody unsociability, “satirical outbursts,” “self-castigations,” and tendency to 
overthink as primary symptoms of his manifestation of a melancholic condition as Elizabethans 
understood it (107-08).  In a related vein, Lyons devotes a chapter to the problem, identifying ways in 
which Hamlet performs a series of “melancholy roles” in keeping with contemporary understandings 
of the condition (80).  In “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” Jacques Lacan conducts 
a psychoanalytic investigation into the connection between the failure of mourning and structures of 
desire in Hamlet, arguing that “from one end of Hamlet to another, all anyone talks about is 
mourning” (39).      
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Renaissance understandings of the power of melancholy to stimulate the appearance 
of an apparition.  In his classic treatise The Anatomy of Melancholy, which draws on 
a range of theological and philosophical sources, Robert Burton claims that the 
“Divell” may influence the “Phantasie” by “mediation of humours” and perhaps 
even induce the “humour of melancholy”: hence melancholy is known also as 
“Balneum Diaboli, the Divels Bath”.  At the same time, he draws upon the writings 
of Agrippa and Lavater to suggest that where melancholy of any origin is present, it 
“invites the Divell to it” so that “Melancholy persons are most subject to diabolicall 
temptations, and illusions, and most apt to entertaine them” (Sig. [E2v] – E3[r]).
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This common belief suggests that Hamlet’s vision bears a link to his melancholic 
state through an oddly circular pattern that denies any origin within the parameters of 
the play.  The melancholic Hamlet is more inclined to see an apparition as the result 
of his psychological state.  The apparition that he sees, if we employ this Protestant 
perspective, is likely to be the work of the devil, which then, in turn, further increases 
the severity of Hamlet’s “humour.”  But while his melancholy appears both to 
summon, and to be aggravated by, the appearance of the ghost, it extends beyond his 
own vision to incorporate that of his companions as well; indeed they see this vision 
well before he does, despite none of them appearing to suffer from any similar sort of 
complaint.  The ghost bears a direct relationship to Hamlet’s melancholic state, but in 
a way that defies a causal link between the two, or any firm assimilation into the 
possibility that it is solely the devil’s work.   
     Of course, refused or failed burial often leads to haunting and the generation of 
the uncanny.  Townshend observes that “psychoanalysis is at its most Gothic when 
pathologies of mourning are at stake,” for “ghosts, spectres, tombs and crypts are the 
foreseeable consequences of failed acts of grief” (93).  As Abraham and Torok put it, 
“sometimes in the dead of the night, when libidinal fulfillments have their way, the 
ghost of the crypt comes back to haunt the cemetery guard” (130).  Where the 
melancholic buries the object in a form of psychic entombment, as Abraham and 
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 Burton’s text was published in 1621.  Another important source of early modern understandings of 
melancholy is Timothie Bright’s A Treatise of Melancholy, which was published in 1586.  Angus 
Gowland’s “The Problem of Early Modern Melancholy” provides a substantial survey of early 
modern understandings of melancholy and their evolution across the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, including a brief look at the relationship between melancholy and visual hallucinations or 
illusions.  See esp. pp. 92-93. 
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Torok describe, this act seems inevitably to invite the moment when that which has 
lain buried and proliferating in the dark can remain hidden no longer (136).  The 
already spectral relation between the living and the dead requires little to burst into 
view.  Claudius acknowledges that Hamlet is not mad but worries instead that: 
 
                                there’s something in his soule  
          Ore which his melancholy sits on brood,  
          And I doe doubt, the hatch and the disclose  
          Will be some danger” (Sig. [G3v]).  
 
Although Claudius’s concern is undoubtedly for the material consequences that 
might arise from Hamlet’s melancholy, his phrasing oddly reflects Hamlet’s inner 
harbouring of his dead father’s ghost.  While Old Hamlet’s unburied form remains 
out there, itinerant, visible as an external, corporeal form, Hamlet has no possibility 
of mourning successfully.  Abraham and Torok suggest that “as long as the crypt 
holds, there is no melancholia.  It erupts when the walls are shaken,” as, for example, 
when the spectre of Old Hamlet emerges (136).  Prior to this, Hamlet merely seems 
gloomy and sullen.  After the ghost’s emergence, his melancholia erupts into public 
performance.  Faced with the shock of the ghost’s revelations, the discovery that 
Denmark is “rotten,” and his emotional isolation, his mourning turns to ineffectual, 
endless melancholia and a pursuit of revenge that seems to merge his own 
subjectivity as the bereft son with the wronged husband and King (Sig. D2[r]).  The 
entombment is clear: “Never to speake of this that you haue seene / Sweare by my 
sword” he demands of his companions, that the dead King may thereby be repressed 
(Sig. [D4v]).  The identification between the two is at this moment complete, as they 
act of one accord.  As Old Hamlet instantly repeats the demand – “Sweare by his 
sword” – Hamlet responds enigmatically with “Well sayd olde Mole, can’st worke [i’ 
th’] earth so fast, / A worthy Pioner” (Sig. [D4v]).  They seem as one in the work of 
burial. 
     But it is a burial that, rather than putting the dead to rest, will only serve to 
proliferate the threat of the dead as it lies within the dark, waiting, as Claudius fears, 
to re-emerge and stake its claim upon the living.  Claudius cannot see death, cannot 
see the ghost or view directly the threat, but he seems to sense that death can see him.  
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He senses it in a way that Gertrude does not, because although her hasty marriage to 
her dead husband’s brother is morally dubious, Claudius is the murderer.  
Responsible for the improper abridgement of Old Hamlet’s life, he is primarily 
responsible for the consequent failure of the burial. This often manifests itself within 
popular and literary accounts of the return of murder victims, as the pagan belief that 
“the soules of those which are slayne, do pursue their murtherers” persists during the 
Reformation (Lavater 100).  Burial of the murdered is difficult to achieve because in 
such cases the dead have a particular reason to remain.  In terms of social history, 
this is one of a number of situations in which the dead return because they have a 
public function to fulfil such as the institution of justice (Thomas 713).
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  In terms of 
psychoanalysis, it is also a logical product of the disruption of burial and mourning.  
Lacan argues that rituals are essential to the process of mourning because they 
produce “some mediation of the gap” that it generates (40).  Given that popular 
ghostlore produces “ghosts and specters in the gap left by the omission of the 
significant rite,” it is unsurprising that a ghost should emerge in Hamlet when, 
throughout the play, “the rites” of the dead are “cut short and performed in secret” 
(39-40).  The lack of a psychological seal through the process of detachment 
translates into the disintegration of burial itself. 
     Whom the ghost haunts in such circumstances is particular to the terms of the text 
and the relations of the characters to the dead.  In Hamlet, it is the melancholic son 
who is haunted most directly, although in internalizing the dead father so radically, it 
is he who then haunts Claudius.  As Greenblatt suggests in response to Hamlet’s 
declaration near the end, “I am dead,” Hamlet becomes oddly resonant with the 
ghost, as though Old Hamlet’s “spirit . . . has been incorporated by his son” 
(Shakespeare Sig. O[1r]; Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory 229).    The failure of 
mourning affects, not only the psychic space of the living, but the very division 
between self and other.  In Julius Caesar, the dead Caesar appears, not to Antony – 
who has subsequently staged an extended burial and topped it with an incitement to 
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revenge – but to Brutus, for whom the closure of Caesar’s life is impossible because 
of his participation in Caesar’s untimely end.  Brutus’s role in Caesar’s murder 
effectively inscribes his presence within Caesar’s early death.  Hence, Brutus is 
inevitably haunted in turn by the marking of Caesar’s death within his own life.   
     This is a matter of more than mere psychological projection.  The ghost who 
appears only to a single onlooker is common within Elizabethan spectrology and 
manifests, not merely guilt or unfinished business, but an inability for the living to 
claim a space, a self, free of the dead.  It is not simply the projection of an inner state 
upon the external world, but rather the erasure of the division between the two so that 
the appearance of the ghost both signifies and catalyses a breaking down of causal 
connections within time and space.  Where the spectre appears, the basic 
organisations necessary to determine ontological status – the linear temporality of 
genesis, the spatial and metaphysical distinctions between spiritual, material, and 
psychological planes, and the distinction between self and other – are already 
buckling under the strain. 
     Where mourning turns to melancholy and the burial becomes radically 
internalized, this process appears almost inevitable.  Abraham and Torok argue that 
melancholia does not automatically arise from the failure of mourning but is further a 
product of suppressing the expression of loss or the nature of the pleasures obtained 
from that object – the swallowing of one’s words accompanies the swallowing of the 
lost object (130).  Thus incorporation involves a suppression of the subject’s 
relationship to the object: where “a shameful secret is the love object’s doing and 
when that object also functions for the subject as an ego ideal,” the “object’s secret . . 
. needs to be kept, his shame covered up” (131).  Crucially, those in this condition 
must “undermine anyone who would shame” their “ideal object” in order to preserve 
it (132).  This principle resonates remarkably with the problem of Hamlet’s 
mourning.  Townshend argues that Hamlet’s inability to mourn seems to suggest that 
this is not the primary factor in generating the return of his father’s spectre, 
particularly as Hamlet himself implies that the cause is Claudius having murdered his 
father without giving him opportunity to repent, “Withall his crimes br[oa]d blowne, 
as flush as May” (Shakespeare Sig. [I1v]).  Furthermore, others in the play who are 
not accorded proper mourning or burial – particularly Polonius – do not return 
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(Townshend 96 n.15).  However, it is significant that Hamlet’s pursuit of revenge 
aims to punish those responsible for degrading the idealized father with whom he 
now identifies so closely.  It is not sufficient to attack only the murderer.  Gertrude 
too must be punished for exchanging Old Hamlet, with his “Hiperions curles,” “eye 
like Mars,” and “a forme indeed / Where every God did seeme to set his seale / To 
give the world assurance of a man” for the “mildewed eare” that is Claudius; and 
Polonius is rendered expendable as a “rash, intruding foole” (Shakespeare Sig. [I2v]-
[I3r]).  Hamlet can only preserve the ideal father through a vendetta against those 
who play a role in preserving (even post-mortem) his mortal sins and his shame.  Old 
Hamlet’s return becomes both the product of, and catalyst for, Hamlet’s need to 
protect the integrity of the father-object he carries within. 
     A similar problem occurs in Chettle’s The Tragedy of Hoffman.  Unlike Hamlet, 
this play has no ghost, but one emerges nevertheless as Clois Hoffman’s melancholia 
transforms the corpse of his dead father into a spectre that presides horribly, as Duke 
Pesta describes it, “over every scene in the play” (“Articulating Skeletons: Hamlet, 
Hoffman, and the Anatomical Graveyard” 27).  The resonances between this play and 
Hamlet are substantial in this respect, with each son’s pursuit of revenge fuelled by a 
melancholic attachment to the father who cannot be buried.
56
  Like Hamlet, 
Hoffman’s inability to mourn successfully appears linked to the supposedly wrongful 
abridgement of his father’s life.  As such, it is one of a string of Elizabethan plays in 
which “madmen” are “crazed by grief” in a fashion that would have been understood 
to be the manifestation of a generalized “melancholy madness” (Babb 113-14).  
Hoffman considers that his father had served the state faithfully before being be 
forced into exile and piracy when unfairly named “A proscript out law for a little 
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 As the earliest published version of The Tragedy of Hoffman is from 1631, it is uncertain as to 
whether the resonances between this play and Hamlet were all present at the outset or to what extent 
one or both of the playwrights might have drawn upon each other’s work.  Some similarities may well 
be due to the influence of the earlier lost play, the Ur-Hamlet.  The Tragedy of Hoffman appears to 
have been entered into the Stationers’ Register in 1602 (although the titling is not absolutely clear) 
and according to the work of Nicolaus Delius, was probably completed at around the same time as the 
first quarto of Hamlet (Thorndike 135, 181-82).  Some scholarship suggests that Chettle’s play may 
have functioned as a rival production to earlier versions of Hamlet and any interrelationship may well 
have been present in the first instance (see Ashley Thorndike’s “The Relation of Hamlet to 
Contemporary Revenge Plays” 135, 181-82).  Thorndike voices a typical prejudice in assuming that 
Shakespeare could not have drawn at all from the work of Chettle the “hack writer,” and concludes 
that any similarities between the two plays are primarily reflective of their both belonging to the 
revenge tragedy genre (182).  In this, however, Thorndike does not sufficiently consider the precise 
nature of the relationship between son and dead father.   
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debt,” (Chettle Sig. [B3r]).  Unlike Hamlet, Hoffman’s perspective here is in 
considerable doubt.  While critics such as Browne accept this claim at face value, 
Hoffman is by no means an impartial witness and we are given little in the way of 
independent corroboration: hence, as Spinrad observes, it remains uncertain as to 
whether the father was killed “justly or unjustly” (Browne 298; Spinrad 242).  Otho, 
the son of the Duke who is implicated in the elder Hoffman’s execution, admits to 
“new doubts” about his crimes: but given that he says this as an enraged Clois 
Hoffman calls for a murder weapon (the “burning crown”), he may quite well be 
concerned only with self-preservation (Sig. [B3v]).   On the principle that the apple 
does not fall far from the tree, we may well suspect that Hoffman’s father was guilty 
and that Hoffman’s revenge campaign is therefore an expression of inherited 
criminality, whether he is aware of it or not.  Whichever is the case though, Hoffman 
quite certainly considers himself to function in the same role as Hamlet, avenging the 
wrongful murder of an innocent father.   
     And if an explicit, externally imposed paternal call to revenge is absent, it is 
sufficiently implicit to evoke a discernible, if shadowy presence: inanimate though 
the skeleton may be, its fixity does nothing to prevent its “pretious twines of light” 
from watching Hoffman’s every move throughout the play (Sig. [B3v]).  Indeed, 
Hoffman is so unable to relinquish his attachment to his father that he seeks to 
preserve his presence through retention of the corpse.  Having initially been forced to 
pass a vow “never to steale / My fathers fleshles bones from that base tree” (the 
gallows) in order to secure his release from a dungeon, he subsequently swears 
instead that “I never would release them from those chaines / Never intombe them, 
but immediately / Remove them from that gallowes to a tree” – the tree from which 
they now hang before the audience (Sig. [B3v]).
57
  Pesta suggests that the action 
turns the skeleton into “the metaphysical terrors associated with unburied bodies,” 
constituting “a monstrous impiety against the sanctity of the human body”.  He also 
identifies the event as “a grotesque parody and violation of the relationship between 
father and son” as well as an “act of anatomical reconstruction” that links to an 
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 Hoffman’s second vow takes place after a woman in a position of power (probably Martha, the 
Duchess of Luningberg) requests that he is released from the first vow as an act of mercy.  Chettle’s 
phrasing renders it unclear as to whether the second vow is solicited from him in return or whether 
Hoffman chooses it of his own will.  In either case, the act of preserving rather than burying the body 
plays a crucial role in the enactment of Hoffman’s melancholic attachment to the father.  
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ongoing positioning of Hoffman as a kind of metaphorical “anatomist” (28).  I would 
add that this radical breaching of the injunction to burial is a means of avoiding the 
severing of ties between father and son through their physicalized preservation.  The 
failure to mourn fully is reified in the enduring relation between living son and dead 
father but thereby becomes a morbid physical expression of the collapsing of 
distinction between the living and the dead. 
     Like Hamlet, Hoffman is unable to stand the damage done to the integrity of his 
dead father through his execution, an event that Hoffman considers to have been 
utterly unjust.  Spinrad argues that “by manipulating the symbols of death,” the 
play’s “characters create the illusion that they are in control of death” but “deny their 
own human response to it” – hence the lack of proper emotional responses such as 
empathy, mourning, or “consolation” in the play (243).  However, this denial equally 
suggests an excess of attachment, an inability to mourn properly that transforms 
individual grief into a campaign of revenge that enables escape from, rather than 
completion of, the release of the dead through the process of mourning.  From the 
very beginning, Hoffman’s rhetoric manifests the inner burial of the melancholic. His 
absolute identification with his father appears linked to the rhetorical question 
Hoffman poses to his co-conspirator Lorrique:  
 
          Could duty and thy love so different prove,  
          Not to avenge his death whose better part  
          Was thine, thou his, when he fell part of thee  
           Fell with him each drop, being part thine owne” (Sig. B2[r]).   
 
For Hoffman, the enduring attachment to his father is so intense that he effaces the 
distinction between the two of them.  The inheritance that sees them share mutual 
characteristics – the “better part,” the “drop” of blood – is transmuted into singular 
identification.  While leaving his father’s body on display, gruesomely present as the 
unburied dead other, Hoffman proceeds with the utter entombment of his father, his 
self not only marked by, but actually inseparable from, that which he incorporates 
within.  He makes this explicit when he declares: “He was my father, my hart still 
bleeds / Nor can my wounds be stopt, till an incision, / I’ve made to bury my dead 
father in” (Sig. B2[r]).  Pesta links Hoffman’s interment of “his father’s memory at 
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the essential centre of his own being,” to the period’s understanding of anatomization 
and dissection as a process that refers to “the mysterious centre . . . deep within the 
fabric of the human body” (28).  It is also a more direct psychological process 
though, in which the inner entombment is inseparable, not only from the father’s 
memory, but also from his lingering remains.  For Hoffman, leaving the father 
unburied constitutes a refusal of mourning that leaves him unable to grieve or to 
accept his father’s alterity: with the only burial taking place interiorly, he is left with 
no conscious capacity to do other than pursue revenge for what has been taken, not 
from his father, but from himself.  The unburied dead man becomes a spectre whose 
presence is felt at every turn, as he haunts both Hoffman and his victims.  
     Thus, The Tragedy of Hoffman exploits a problem of mourning that sends the 
standard narrative of the revenge tragedy and the stock figure of the ghost into the 
realm of the uncanny.  In this, it resonates oddly with similar disturbances in earlier 
works such as the Senecan translations.  In one of the most gruesome episodes of the 
translations, Studley’s rendition of Agamemnon expands Thyestes’ inadvertent act of 
cannibalism into a monstrous reification of the live burial that takes place in failed 
mourning.  In Fitch’s translation of Agamemnon, Thyestes’ ghost confesses to his 
pre-mortem crime thus: “I Thyestes shall outdo them all by my crimes.  Could I be 
outdone by my brother, when filled with three children buried within me?  I have 
devoured my own flesh and blood!” (“vincam Thyestes sceleribus cunctos meis. / a 
fratre vincar, liberis plenus tribus / in me sepultis?  viscera exedi mea.”) (128-29).  
Studley’s Thyestes, in contrast, concedes his brother to be the greater villain only 
reluctantly and then launches into an appallingly detailed account of his own crime:   
 
          Thyestes I in dryrye dedes 
                 wyll far surmount the rest,  
          Yet to my brother yeld I (though 
                 I gorged my blooddye brest, 
          And stuffed have my pawmpred panche 
                 even wyth my chyldren three, 
          That crammedly with in my rybbes, 
                 and have theyr tombe in mee, 
          The bowels of my swalowed babes, 




     The relish with which the ghost recounts this cannibalisation of his own flesh and 
blood disturbs any sense that this appearance might allow him to rest.  His 
physicalized presence onstage and his account of the misdeed are quite at home 
within the classical tradition; but his grotesque description of the consumption of his 
children, with their corpses squashed up against his ribcage, their innards 
“devowred” by the appetite of an all-consuming father, fixes the crime within a very 
real, disturbingly corporeal present.  The act of eating, the gorging of himself, takes 
place in the past tense, but the explicit positioning of the children’s corpses within 
Thyestes’ abdomen, phrased in the present tense, renders them all but visibly present 
onstage.   
     Thyestes’ past crime is always, immediately now, the evidence and consequences 
of his actions permanently inscribed within the body that reifies his presence post-
mortem.  His account of his crime transforms the interiorization of mourning into a 
mechanical process, a physical consumption of the other that swallows them whole 
and inscribes them – in a bizarrely somatic fashion – within the self who stands 
identifying himself as “Thyestes I.”  Thus we see the children of Seneca’s Thyestes 
entombed within a ghost that is now itself interiorized within the Englished figure 
before us, this “I” who proclaims its self present and full of death.  Thyestes’ account 
is another conjuration: the burial of Thyestes’ “chyldren three” within his own dead 
body has not repressed them, removed them from view or rendered them inert by 
confining them to a safely isolated place.  On the contrary, their “tombe” is precisely 
what renders them present and almost visible, conjured forth into the present by the 
corruption of the burial process. 
     This passage reifies the process of “faithful interiorization” that Derrida 
questions, in which mourning “makes the other a part of us, between us – and then 
the other no longer quite seems to be the other, because we grieve for him and bear 
him in us, like an unborn child, like a future” (“Mnemosyne” 35).  At the same time, 
it attests to the impossibility of this process, for as Thyestes proclaims his 
consumption of his children, they remain utterly other – horrifying because their 
burial preserves, rather than assimilates, their dead bodies.  Thus, Studley’s 
translation manifests, in graphic visual form, the menace of the failure of mourning 
and burial.  Like other texts of its period in which the figure of the ghost moves 
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towards the uncanniness of the spectre, it exposes the impurity of the terms of life 
and death.  It exposes the instability of the oppositions through which the living and 
dead are understood as they increasingly inhabit one another in contravention of all 
injunctions to the contrary.  And where assimilation of the present dead becomes 
impossible, it suggests the readiness of that which is suppressed to return from the 
dark with renewed potency.  The more vigorously the space of the living is defended, 
the more disturbing the presence of these spectres becomes.  No burial vault can 
really be sealed hermetically and permanently, it seems, although it appears integral 
to the project of living that the attempt is made.  What emerges from the darkness of 
the leaking tomb is troubling, not for what it says about the dead, but for its 
revelations about the inner space of the living subjects that form, not only the text’s 







The Hauntings of Inheritance 
 
 
The trace of remembrance 
     In the fifth scene of Hamlet’s first act, Hamlet swears to remember his father.  
More precisely, for they are not quite the same, he swears to remember his father’s 
ghost.  As the spectre of Old Hamlet disappears with the parting directive “Adiew, 
adiew, adiew, remember me,” his son replies: 
 
                                                remember thee, 
          I thou poore Ghost whiles memory holds a seate 
          In this distracted globe, remember thee, 
          Yea, from the table of my memory 
          Ile wipe away all triviall fond records, 
          All sawes of books, all formes, all pressures past 
          That youth and observation coppied there, 
          And thy commandement all alone shall live, 
          Within the booke and volume of my braine 
          Unmixt with baser matter (Sig. [D3v])  
 
But how is one to remember a ghost, to recall it from the past in order to bear it in 
mind, and in the present mind, when its very existence is disruptive of the temporal 
divisions that this instruction seeks to bridge?  The so-called madness that afflicts 
Hamlet subsequent to this promise attests to the impossibility of this vow.  In order 
to remember, to carry with him the ghost and all that it calls forth, he perceives that 
he must expunge his memory.  He can remember the ghost only while “memory 
holds a seate,” but memory is also a “table” that catalogues the “sawes” – wisdom, 
maxims, and information – of books; and that table is to be cleared of everything in 
order that the ghost’s “commandement all alone shall live” (OED def. “saw”).  The 
table is now an almost-blank page, a space with only one inscription: the ghost’s 
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parting directive to “remember me” (Sig. [D3v]).
58
   Emptied of all means by which 
he might interpret the ghost’s existence, Hamlet promises to remember that which 
erases his capacity for understanding. 
     Hamlet’s vow poses the problem of what it might mean to follow such an 
imperative when the “me” to be remembered manifests absence at its core before it 
has departed.  The passage is a key moment in Hamlet’s incorporation of his father 
as well as a critical event in determining the course of his revenge thereafter.  
Greenblatt observes in a generalized way that the repetition of Hamlet’s incredulous 
response – “remember thee?” – highlights the “absurdity” of the ghost’s “spectral 
command,” since it is scarcely likely that Hamlet will forget what he has witnessed  
(Hamlet in Purgatory 207).  Attention to what a “spectral command” might mean, 
however, raises important issues in regard to its perlocutionary effect.  The command 
of a spectre to “remember me” cannot produce the same effect as an identical 
command from a living mortal because the signifier “me” alters radically in 
accordance with the ontological state of the speaker.  Hamlet might indeed have no 
choice but to remember, but this does nothing to resolve the problem of what it might 
mean to do so when he commits to internalizing the figuration of a gap, the spectre 
that both perpetuates and evacuates the presence of the father. 
     Richard Kearney comes closer to identifying the problem in “Spectres of 
Hamlet,” where he observes the commandment to “remember thee” to be impossible 
because if the nature of the spectre is uncertain, so too is the commandment.  
Kearney argues that the ghost is neither suggesting that Hamlet celebrate his father’s 
past life nor that he must remember the detailed revelation of his murder, but rather 
his obscured account of his spectral origin (158-59).  For Kearney, “the very secret 
that the father is bidding his son to remember is a ‘tale’ that the father is actually 
forbidden to tell.”  Even though the ghost is “forbid / To tell the secrets of my prison 
house,” it is this – the unspoken tale of his locus within death – that he calls upon 
Hamlet to remember and that subsequently induces the prince’s “crisis of narrative 
memory” (Shakespeare Sig. [D2v]; Kearney 159).  Although it is by no means clear 
that this is in fact what the ghost means when he says “remember me” (for he has 
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 For detailed consideration of the significance of, and historical context for, Hamlet’s choice of a 
“table” as an aid to memory, see Stallybrass, Chartier, Mowery, and Wolfe’s “Hamlet’s Tables and 
the Technologies of Writing in Renaissance England,” esp. pp. 414-19.   
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said a good deal upon different matters in the interim), Kearney is correct in that this 
is an effect of the ghost’s command.  Nothing whatsoever can be remembered about 
the ghost without also remembering its problematic post-death journey and 
paradoxical state of being, neither of which is resolved.  Such problematization of the 
ghost’s command draws attention to the difficulties raised when the speaking subject 
is also a spectral object.   
     A number of critics have responded to this problem by construing the ghost as a 
product of the imagination or memory alone.  This circumvents the issue of what the 
ghost’s command signifies and does by channelling it through Hamlet’s psyche.  For 
instance, Welsh construes Hamlet’s response to the ghost as a desire to surrender “all 
but the memory of his father and his discovery that the world . . . is a place of 
cheating and deception.”  Hence, instead of establishing “as his ‘Word’ . . . the 
ghost’s imperative ‘Revenge,” he instead internalizes the instruction to remember 
(485).  Going one step further, Greenblatt asserts that the apparition “is not physical 
reality” (a decidedly problematic concept in this context) but is instead an “embodied 
memory” (Hamlet in Purgatory 212).  Such a reading eschews the effect of the 
ghost’s physical presence onstage.   Whilst the onlookers may read the apparition 
through their recollections of the living King and, indeed, of his death, the ghost 
functions nevertheless as an independent entity onstage, and Greenblatt 
contradictorily treats it as such at other points in his interpretation.  Insofar as the 
ghost has autonomy, agency, and physical form, it cannot be the product of memory 
alone.   
     Garber provides a more accurate summary of the problem when she describes the 
ghost as “a memory trace . . . the sign of something missing, something omitted, 
something undone.  It is itself at once a question, and the sign of putting things in 
question.”  It is also, she observes “a cultural marker of absence, a reminder of loss” 
(129-30).  In this psychoanalytic reading, there is no firm divide between the ghost’s 
presence, Hamlet’s mind, or the cultural conditions through which the loss is 
understood.  The ghost manifests some kind of gap, uncertainty, or instability, but is 
not confined to the production of those problems alone.  We might add to this that 
the ghost not only troubles but actually exceeds the principle of memory that implies 
a retrieval or preservation of the past (event) within the present (recollection and 
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representation).  Aristotle accounts for this aspect of memory when he suggests that 
“the present is object only of perception, and the future, of expectation, but the object 
of memory is the past.  All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed” (“On 
Memory” 714).  Drawing upon much the same principle, Michelle O’Callaghan has 
recently argued in “Dreaming the Dead: Ghost and History in the Early Seventeenth 
Century” that ghosts function as “a device for addressing anxieties concerning 
memory, in particular, the failure to memorialise the dead” (83).  She suggests that 
the ghost’s troubling of the relation between past and present problematizes the 
continuity and “cultural transmission” between the two.  The ghost can only maintain 
a role within the mortal world “through the agents and agency of memory,” but its 
lack of independence – its lack of total presence in the present – thereby undermines 
“the ability of the past to speak purposefully to the present”.    
     O’Callaghan’s wider point is that, while ghosts disturb “linear temporality,” they 
simultaneously disturb their own disruption – they embody “death . . . by introducing 
processes of decay” (83).  But this seeming reinstatement of the finitude of physical 
mortification by no means allows us to reduce their destabilization of time to an issue 
of personal memory and the comprehension of history alone.  Old Hamlet’s ghost 
goes much further than this in refusing distinctions between phases of time and the 
perception of presence or absence.  If the ghost is considered only as a figuration of 
the living King, its statement might be taken to request the remembrance of the “me” 
who was formerly living, or rather the externally perceptible manifestations or 
productions of that self.  To remember the mortal Old Hamlet might mean to 
remember his deeds as King, warrior, father, or husband; to remember his physical 
form or his speech; to remember his “valiant” leadership in battle or his “foule 
crimes” (although it is only the ghost itself who appears aware of the latter) (Sig. 
B[2r], [D2v]).  When the spectrality of the ghost is taken into account, however – 
when we consider that the ghost coincides with both the living entity and the dead 
other whilst being synonymous with neither – these configurations of self are both 
subjoined and split asunder.  The figure who issues the commandment to “remember 
me” is no longer the same “me” as the living King: yet nor is he anyone else.  While 
the various aspects of the living King function as remembered relics of his living 
self, they equally function as relics of a dead self.  The commandment to remember 
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is contingent upon the fact that the figure who speaks – and must be present in order 
to speak – requires remembrance because he is dead and therefore absent.   
     Moreover, the “me” whom Hamlet is to remember is now marked by the 
experience(s) of death: the coursing of Claudius’s poison like “quicksilver . . . 
through / The naturall gates and [al]lies of the body”; the experience of betrayal and 
posthumous desire for revenge; the “tale” of the afterlife “whose lightest word / 
Would harrow up thy soule” and “freeze thy young blood”; the knowledge of what it 
is to remember, rather than merely be, living (Sig. D3[r], [D2v]).  These additions 
mark out the ghost as the supplement of the living Old Hamlet.  Garber observes that 
the functions of the supplement characterise Shakespeare’s ghosts generally, forming 
“the source of their power, and their danger.”  Where a ghost becomes uncanny is 
where we see its “manifestation as a sign of potential proliferation or plurality” and 
its exposure both “of the loss of the original” and its erosion of “the concept of 
origin” (15).  This is particularly true of Old Hamlet.  Although partially assimilated 
into the framework of the Catholic doctrine of purgatory through his oblique 
reference to a “certaine tearme” in which his sins “Are burnt and purg’d away,” Old 
Hamlet’s ghost functions to succeed the living King and to add to the sum of his 
presence whilst refusing either the separation or duplication between the two (Sig.  
[D2v]).  The ghost replaces the mortal King, both in the sense that he succeeds the 
living King chronologically (where the mortal King formerly stood in the past, the 
ghost visibly stands in the present) and in that he takes his place (occupying the same 
self, memory, agency, and rights as the mortal King).  The ghost is “like the King” 
we are told repeatedly, but with the additional transformative experiences of betrayal, 
death, and the afterlife (Sig. [B1v]).  What ends the King’s life completes it and 
therefore appears to complete him since prior to his death he has not yet undergone 
the supplementary effects of the ending of his life.  At the same time, this 
supplementarity renders the ghost spectral because it exposes absence within a 
presence, the breaching of the anterior term’s integrity, and the corresponding 
disruption of isolable categories.   
     Looking at the spectre of Old Hamlet from this perspective, we might observe two 
key functions.  Firstly, the ghost’s supplementarity testifies to an inherent deficit 
within its anterior sign, that of the living Old Hamlet.  What is forwarded as the 
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originary presence – the being of the King – is not a self-contained, positive term but 
rather one that is characterized by a deficit and is therefore contingent upon 
supplementation.
59
  The mortal King is what he is in life in part because of what he is 
in death: death is integral to his living being.  This is true not only in a general sense 
– a linguistic reflection of the psychoanalytic paradigm in which the dead lies within 
– but also within the specific context of the play’s narrative structure.  The living 
King is only introduced to the audience subsequent to his death: he becomes familiar 
to us through the combination of memories (his own and that of other characters) and 
his post-mortem appearances.  Our conceptualization of his living self is therefore 
inscribed with the knowledge of his death – not just the fact of his death but its 
experience, its causes, its consequences, and its lingering presence.  This 
supplementation leads to a radically shifting territory that has none of the certainty of 
a middle ground.  Neither his life nor death, his status as the living nor the dead, 
reaches a full and final measure of presence but rather manifests a spectral existence 
in which each is characterised always by further absence, further presence, and 
always deferral.  Secondly, and consequently, the ghost’s instruction to remember is, 
at the outset, troubled by the fact that the “me” who issues it is not identical with 
itself.  The command is riven, at odds with the purported unity of its own directive.  
This instruction to Hamlet therefore becomes spectral, not because of the mere fact 
of being issued by a spectre, but because its object – and therefore its action – is 
riddled with spectral contradictions.   
     But there is something more here that generates a sense of unease, a sense of the 
missed glance or missed communication that is rendered more unsettling by its own 
inevitability.  Faced with an impossible spectral commandment, Hamlet returns an 
infinitesimally altered pledge.  In the midst of swearing to remember the ghost, it is 
the “commandment” that he promises to preserve in solitude: twice he reflexively 
repeats the ghost’s instruction back to him (“remember thee”) and then he declares it 
is “thy commandement all alone that shall live” within his memory.  A gap opens 
before us.  To inscribe the commandment “remember me” within one’s memory, to 
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 This is not to suggest that the ghost is now a complete presence, its signification and limits 
established and fixed: rather, its function as supplement is specific to the particular relationship 
between these two particular figures.  It therefore neither defines nor limits the ways in which they 
might function in other figurations or in relation to other terms for, as Garber observes, Old Hamlet’s 
ghost might equally be considered the supplement to Hamlet, Claudius, Denmark, and so on  (15). 
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preserve that alone in the almost-blank space, is not quite the same thing as to 
inscribe the ghost/father.  It is not even the same thing as to inscribe the incitement to 
revenge.  As Welsh argues, “revenge” is “a function of mourning” in this play (482).  
In swearing to remember, he is of course consigned to revenge because the “me” to 
whom he has sworn is now marked by its summons.  That is to say, with the ghost 
having returned because the murder has unnaturally “Cut off” his life, his presence is 
now indelibly marked by, and a manifestation of, the need for closure through 
revenge.  Remembrance of the ghost is therefore contiguous with remembrance of 
the crime and the ghost’s call to “beare it not”( Sig. D3[r]).   
     However, the phrasing of Hamlet’s vow also does something further.  In Memory 
and Forgetting in English Renaissance Drama: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Webster, 
Garrett Sullivan Jr. links Hamlet’s compulsion to remember with his performed 
identity, pointing out that “the ‘I’ that swears performs an act that is built upon the 
previous erasure of Hamlet’s memory” (13).  In swearing to expunge his memory 
and endeavouring “to reconstitute himself in terms of remembering the Ghost and his 
commands,” Hamlet works to perform his role as “the Ghost’s remembrancer” – a 
role integral to his identity as the ghost’s son and revenger – in a way that is 
inseparable from the act of erasure (13).  Subsequently, he does not forget, but nor 
can he remember, insofar as he “cannot become identical to the self generated and 
presupposed through the Ghost’s call to remember” (14).  In swearing to remember, 
Hamlet adopts the identity of the remembering and revenging son but his “selfhood 
is not formed in untroubled accordance” with the ghost’s demand and its 
implications, especially the call to vengeance.  Sullivan suggests that this is because 
Hamlet’s “subjectivity” arises through Hamlet’s compulsion to forget, not in the 
sense of a loss of memory but as an active pursuit of compulsions that are other than 
those that fulfil the criteria of remembrance (14). 
     It seems to me, however, that Hamlet’s selfhood after the injunction to remember 
is marked by another, more corrosive effect.  Jonathan Goldberg observes in Voice 
Terminal Echo that “for the memory to be supplemented, it must also be supplanted.”  
For Hamlet, the mind “is a book. . . a scene of writing” that is “staged with the ghost 
in this scene of inscription” (98-99).  The relation between the two, crucially, links 
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the problem of Hamlet’s interiority and identity to the inseparability of ghost from 
son: 
 
          Hamlet’s divided identity – and with it his delays and deferrals, his resistance  
          to the ghostly plot, his inability to act and his compulsions to repeat – are the  
          result of his identification with his father’s words.  It is identification that splits 
          Hamlet.  The depth of his interiority is his foldedness within a text that enfolds  
          him and which cannot be unfolded. . . . Thus Hamlet ends the scene of writing,     
          and his reiteration of his father’s word as his own follows that inscription. (99) 
 
In staging the inscription in a way that not only internalizes it but actually substitutes 
it for his own memory, Hamlet’s conscious merging with the words of the ghost 
erases the margins that might mark his own being as separate, individual, or 
contained to encompass them instead within the mystery of the ghost.  Yet he is 
neither synonymous with the ghost nor in command of the mystery that it offers up 
for him to write upon his own mind.  He cannot now function in conjunction with, or 
independently from, the spectre or its effects.   
     In committing to replacing the contents of his memory with the ghost’s 
“commandement all alone,” Hamlet promises to engrave within his memory the 
inscription of a trace and thereby to live within, beside, and through this alone.  But 
this is a commitment to the trace of a trace that installs death within the very centre 
of life.  It is a trace that, above all, erases the possibility of taxonomizing life and 
death separately and thereby troubles the very possibility of being.  It is not the 
ghost’s perpetual presence that will mark Hamlet’s memory thereafter, nor any other 
form of his father’s presence, living or dead.  Indeed, remembrance paradoxically 
becomes the only means by which the ghost may be conjured away: and there is 
nothing that the melancholic Hamlet requires quite so much as this conjuration.  
While his incorporation of the dead father may demand the preservation of the other 
within, this is an impossible state to maintain when the dead other persists in a public 
parade of its alterity.  Hence Hamlet’s actions thereafter ostensibly endeavour to 
silence the ghost, as he concludes his pact with Marcellus and Horatio with the 
instruction to the ghost: “Rest, rest, perturbed spirit” (Sig. [D4v]).  It is worth noting 
at this point a direct link between writing and melancholia in early modern thought: 
Engel points out that “according to popular views on imagination as the melancholy 
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breeding ground of ‘idle thoughts and fantasies,’ monstrous textual scions reflected 
and were caused by melancholy.”  In addition to the influence of Saturn and the 
“dark humour” that affected the inner being, “idleness took care of the rest – for 
writing was the prerogative of the melancholy man.”  In this respect, “writing of 
melancholy” was both “poison” and “remedy” (Mapping Mortality 116-17).
60
  When 
Hamlet writes the trace of remembrance across his mind, then, it becomes both the 
product of, and catalyst for, the perpetuation of his melancholy.  His writing is both 
the means to cure the lingering presence of the ghost and that which prohibits its own 
success. 
     The inscription of the commandment or the trace of Old Hamlet compounds the 
indeterminacy of the figure of the ghost.  If that figure is not the manifestation of an 
absolute presence, then the same is true of the living King, the dead King, and the 
commandment to remember itself.  I mentioned in Chapter Two that Derrida 
observes that “no element can function as a sign without relating to another element 
which itself is not simply present.”  Therefore, “nothing, either in the elements or in 
the system, is anywhere simply present or absent.  There are only, everywhere, 
differences and traces of traces,” or what Culler describes as a “structure of infinite 
referral in which there are only traces” (Positions 23-24; Culler 99).  Hamlet’s 
remembrance is contingent upon a spectral manifestation of this structure of shifting 
signifiers.  Garber argues that while Hamlet “claims to record” the ghost’s 
commandment, this act is analogous to Moses’ recording of God’s commandments in 
Exodus, in which Moses is compelled to register God’s words in the absence of a 
visual presence.  With the first carved tablets broken, God creates a second copy so 
that the founding Law for the Israelites “is a copy and a substitution” (152).  For 
Garber, Hamlet’s inscription of the ghost’s “commandment” similarly exhibits “the 
operation of substitution . . . through erasure, the inscription on the tables of ‘thy 
commandment,’ which is – to revenge? to remember? to do the one through the 
agency of the other?” (152).  This act of “ghost writing” is the reproduction of a text 
that is “already a copy, a substitution, a revision of an original that does not show its 
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face” (153).  Garber draws no conclusion as to what the commandment governs 
precisely, leaving its function uncertain.  However, its influence upon and presence 
within subsequent events demonstrates that its function is in fact crucial to the 
haunting of Hamlet (153).  The inscription of the trace marks Hamlet’s memory with 
a series of disjunctive properties that are simultaneously analogous and at odds with 
his external world.  The “copy” to which Garber refers is by no means a simple 
command or even a relic; it constitutes a trace of something that is both present and 
departed.   
     In order to follow the effect of that trace on Hamlet’s memory subsequent to the 
ghost’s departure, it is therefore necessary to consider the functioning of the trace.
61
  
Here, Gaston’s work is particularly helpful.  In response to Hegel’s call for a 
philosophy that begins with “the aim of the whole” in order to avoid an approach in 
which “‘the wood is not seen for the trees’,” Gaston outlines an alternative in which 
the trees (and therefore wood) become in-isolable from the logic of the trace.
62
  He 
observes, “neither a part nor a whole and the possibility of the part-whole relation, 
the trace resists all induction and deduction.  A philosophy of the gaps between the 
trees, of traces, would be an in-de-duction that can never complete itself: ‘the trace as 
gap [la trace comme écart]’” (25).  (Here we may be reminded of Benjamin’s image 
of translation, calling into the trees of the “language forest” and receiving in return 
an alien echo that is neither part nor whole of the original text, nor pure divergence 
either [77].)  The gaps between the trees in this paradigm are, of course, as 
fundamental to the existence of the trees (and therefore the wood) as the trees 
themselves: one is not perceptible, indeed does not exist, without the other.  That is 
to say, the gaps are neither wood nor trees but a condition of the possibility of both 
and of the relation between the two.   
     Gaston builds upon Derrida’s argument that if signification is made possible only 
by the existence of the unbridgeable gap (as Husserl argues), it is with the specific 
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proviso that the gap can “be put to work” (Gaston 6).
63
  Drawing also upon Marc 
Bloch’s elucidation of the trace in The Historian’s Craft, Gaston observes that where 
a phenomenon leaves behind a discernible, historical mark, “this mark is at once 
visible” and “the remainder of a phenomena that has become invisible . . . impossible 
to grasp, to catch”.  This mark or “trace” is “always somewhere between the past and 
the present” as the result of “an irreducible ‘gap [lacune]’” that prohibits its fixed 
occupation of either one (26).  The trace, as Royle puts it, is therefore a “phantom 
effect” or “the revenant at the origin,” by virtue of the paradox that origin ceases to 
have a place here (The Uncanny 281).  The presence of the trace is essential to 
signification but, like a ghost, it disrupts or displaces the taxonomical fixity that 
signification purports to convey, refusing the fixity of presence within time and 
space.  When Hamlet swears to remember the ghost’s commandment “remember 
me,” he swears to inscribe upon his memory what is already the trace of a trace.  The 
commandment functions as a verbal score that the ghost leaves behind, hanging in 
the air after his exit: Hamlet repeats the command verbatim (“remember me”) as well 
as reciting it reflexively (“remember thee”) twice more in his soliloquy following the 
ghost’s exit.  No longer visible onstage, the ghost’s presence therefore lingers 
through a phrase that is meaningful solely within the context of the ghost’s absence 
and its past: but the past to which this gestures is in itself subject to the same slippage 
in relation to the figures of the living and dead King.   
     Thus, the phrase that is so remarkable in its impact upon Hamlet is the trace of the 
already spectral trace of the mortal King.  The ghost is what constitutes the King 
within the onstage narrative whilst testifying to an unbridgeable gap.  The trace, then, 
is integral to the ghost’s function as the living King’s supplement.  Old Hamlet has 
no prior claim to a place within the play: his life and death both precede its events.  
Some form of aftermath is inevitable given the recentness of his demise, but a trace 
that is both visible and integral to the course of events is quite another thing.  The 
apparition functions as a visual remnant of both the living King (stalking across the 
stage, covered “from top to toe” in the King’s former battle armour) and the dead 
King, whose deadness is a necessary condition of the ghost’s appearance.  The figure 
is neither of these things – neither the living nor the dead King, who must, after all, 
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be mouldering in his grave – and yet within the confines of the play, it is what 
renders both states immediately discernible.  Zimmerman goes so far as to state 
explicitly that the figure beneath the armour is “a corpse” although this places a 
somewhat excessive emphasis upon the figure’s corporeality: the power of the 
armour lies in the way that it denies certainty as to what lies beneath.  As she 
acknowledges herself, although the ghost reports his skin to have been horrifyingly 
corrupted by the poisoning, none of his witnesses mention that the face, “visible 
inside the raised beaver,” is “crusted over or corrupted” (183, 187).  At the same 
time, she locates the ghost’s power within “its indeterminate status, its half-life half-
death . . . literally figured as a contradiction: steel exterior vs. ‘no/thing’, an outside 
enclosing and containing an unviewable inside” (183).  For Zimmerman, the main 
point is that Hamlet cannot reconcile “the tension between what he can view and 
what he cannot and dare not view, the corpse evoked by the ghost’s own narrative” 
so that “the ghost’s two avatars” (the idealised “demi-god” and walking dead) “seem 
at once inextricable and incompatible” (187).  For us as an audience, this slippage is 
no less unsettling.  The ghost functions as the totality of both living and dead states 
but at the same time exceeds that totality by functioning between and beyond them.  
This is true in terms of its form (visible, corporeal, yet insubstantial), its spiritual 
state (neither belonging to nor divorced from the mortal body and the realm of the 
living), its functioning between past and present, and – crucially – its role in the 
play’s events.   
     When the ghost then leaves an additional trace – “remember me” – it thereby 
perpetuates all that has passed whilst rendering that past a present and future 
imperative.  In vowing to inscribe this trace upon his memory at the expense of all 
else, Hamlet subscribes to, and immerses himself within, its spectral illogic.  He 
vows to be governed thereafter by a trace that prohibits even the illusion of breaking 
from the past, of the living functioning independently of the dead.  This trace 
prohibits the completion of mourning by exposing that the living cannot be isolable 
from the dead, or the dead from the living.  In disrupting the linear functioning of 
time, it prohibits a linear progression in plot, so that Hamlet is no more able to 
pursue a logical, timely execution of justice than he can correct the temporal breach 
that sees his father return.  This is a problem to which I will return a little later, but 
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for now it is sufficient to note that if the trace prohibits the clear organization of time 
and space, it prohibits the ordering that is possible only through such organization.  
And if, instead of remembering the ghost, Hamlet instead remembers its command as 
a trace of its presence, then it is not the figure of the ghost or the purpose of its 
agenda that he bears with him as he proceeds.  Rather, in remembering the singular, 
stark phrase “remember me”, in agreeing to be governed by the trace of a trace, he 
subscribes to a position in which the endless “play of differences” or system of 
“syntheses and referrals” denies him the clarity necessary to perceive a beginning or 
end, or to proceed logically between the two (Derrida, Positions 23). 
     Hamlet’s subsequent chaotic descent into unfocused aggression, illogic, 
distraction, and ineptitude makes considerably more sense when considered in light 
of this.  The issue of this ‘madness’ has stimulated intensive debate amongst 
Shakespeare’s critics.  Garber argues that the ghost’s two requests – for Hamlet “to 
remember and to revenge” – are not only disparate but “functionally at odds.”  As 
Hamlet remembers obsessively the ghost’s directive, he becomes inevitably “trapped 
in a round of obsessive speculation,” with the result that the introspective and static 
process of remembrance prohibits the action of revenge for which it calls.  “What 
Hamlet needs to do,” insists Garber, “is not to remember, but to forget” (154).  In 
terms of fulfilling his quest for revenge, this may well be true, although it is also 
impossible in that forgetting would erase the imperative to revenge.  But at the point 
of swearing, what Hamlet should do in an ideal world, in a world in which it is 
possible to encounter a ghost and continue upon one’s way in a rational, productive, 
and linear fashion, becomes a distant, isolated fantasy rather than a viable road not 
taken.  Having willingly emptied himself of all but this trace, he can no more choose 
to evade its effects than he can turn back time: and linear progression through time 
has ceased to have application here.  As Hamlet so famously complains, “the time is 
out of joynt” (Sig. E[1r]).   
     Frederick Nietzsche observes in The Birth of Tragedy that Hamlet’s cursed 
mission, his failure to carry out revenge is not the result of excessive reflection 
arising from too many “possibilities” (as so many critics claim), but rather his 
“insight into the terrible truth, which outweighs every motive for action” (40).  As 
Prendergast rephrases it, Hamlet’s problem is not “that he thinks too much, but that 
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he thinks too well. . . . the sheer lucidity of his thinking corrodes the ground of all 
possible action in a world dominated by an instrumental logic of ends and means” 
(“Derrida’s Hamlet” 44-45).  Nietzsche finds Hamlet similar to “Dionysiac man” in 
this respect, for both have discovered that they are powerless “to change the eternal 
essence of things,” and accordingly find it ludicrous that they should be required to 
restore the world to order.  Hamlet rejects “existence . . . along with its treacherous 
reflection in the gods or in some immortal Beyond.  Once truth has been seen, the 
consciousness of it prompts man to see only what is terrible or absurd in existence 
wherever he looks” (40).  Perhaps for “truth” we might better substitute death: not 
death as Hamlet formerly knows it when he bemoans God’s prohibition of “seal[f] 
slaughter” and can put a time to his mourning for the father who is “two months 
dead,” but rather the death of death, of its embeddedness within time and its 
corresponding ordering of life (Sig. [C1r-v]).  To repeat Derrida’s claim, “nothing 
could be worse, for the work of mourning, than confusion or doubt” (Specters 9).  To 
mourn, to introject the other, to bury the dead in order to proceed with the business 
of living, order is requisite.  Once Hamlet has seen death function outside of 
temporal and spatial constraints, he can no longer proceed as though living is not 
subject to the same dissolution of boundaries.  In other words, if his 
conceptualization of life and death is dependent upon their ordering within time, it is 
impossible to comprehend either in the midst of the spectral or to pursue a logical or 
linear course of action thereafter.   
     It is this disorder and disordering of time that corrupts Hamlet’s future and that he 
must address in choosing his inheritance.  Hamlet’s full complaint in the wake of the 
ghost’s departure is “The time is out of joynt, ô cursed spight / That ever I was borne 
to set it right” (Sig. E[ir]).  Derrida notes that Hamlet “opposes the being ‘out of 
joint’ of time to its being-right, in the right or the straight path of that which walks 
upright.  He even curses the fate that would have caused him to be born to set right a 
time that walks crooked.  He curses the destiny that would precisely have destined 
him, Hamlet, to do justice, to put things back in order” (Specters 23).  Derrida argues 
that it is not “so much the corruption of the age” that Hamlet curses, as the “unjust 
effect of the disorder,” the requirement that Hamlet becomes responsible for putting 
“a dislocated time back on its hinges,” through the process of retribution and the 
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restoration of justice.  Hence Hamlet curses his own “mission: to do justice to a de-
mission of time,” and thereby puts himself “‘out of joint’” (23).  Hamlet’s curse 
scarcely functions as the originary or causal root of his problem: indeed, the curse, 
along with the mission itself, arises out of the absence of a start, the destruction of 
origination or of ending, the collapse of intermediate or intermediary structures.  But 
his curse harks back to his inscription of the ghost’s commandment to “remember 
me”.  He has already sworn to wipe his memory clear, to erase his understanding of 
anything other than the ghost’s injunction to remember and therefore to avenge, to 
reinstate order, to restore the possibility of logic, ending (burial), and time.  Now, he 
inscribes anew, not erasing but rather overwriting the first so that the inscription to 
remember and to do nothing but remember becomes indistinguishable and 
inextricable from the cursing of the same.      
     Hamlet’s problem is shared in many respects by The Tragedy of Hoffman’s 
protagonist, whose failure to bury his father or to mourn is both marked and 
perpetuated by his father’s trace within his memory.  Hamlet initially mopes about 
with an inward grief that surpasses “the trappings and the suites of woe” but is ready 
“with wings as swift / As meditation” to “sweepe to my revenge” when Old Hamlet’s 
ghost asserts that if Hamlet “did’st ever thy dear father love” he will “revenge his 
foule, and most unnaturall murther” (Sig. [B4v]; [D2v]).  In the opening scene of 
Hoffman, the grieving Clois Hoffman appears in the midst of precisely the same 
transformation as he casts off his melancholia in order to swear that he will punish 
his father’s killers: 
 
          Hence Clouds of melancholy  
          Ile be no longer subject to your s[ch]ismes,  
          But thou deare soule, whose nerves and artires  
          In dead resoundings summon up revenge,  
          And thou shalt hate, be but appeas’d sweete hearse  
          The dead remembrance of my living father (Sig. B[1r]). 
 
With this, he throws open a curtain to expose Hans Hoffman’s corpse suspended 
from a tree.   
     Having considered Hamlet’s promise to erase his memory in favour of his father’s 
commandment, we might immediately see that Hoffman aims here to achieve 
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something similar.  He will “no longer be subject” to the “Clouds of melancholy” but 
instead will turn himself over to the dead “deare soule” whom he seeks to appease 
(Sig. B[1r]).  By “melancholy,” he does not of course refer directly to melancholy as 
we now understand it in the wake of Freudian theory, but rather a more generalized 
emotional disturbance that appears most likely to imply enduring grief and, it 
appears, a similar inertia to that which Hamlet experiences prior to his sighting of his 
father’s ghost.
64
  Hoffman’s specific reference to “schisms” is crucial.  It is not just a 
sense of general melancholy that Hoffman attempts to cast off, but an associated 
rupture or cleft of some kind.  The phrase is evocative of the internal division 
produced through the walling off of the incorporated father but perhaps speaks more 
immediately of the emotional disruption he experiences in response to his 
melancholia.  His incorporation of the father has isolated him from the external 
world at the same time that it has damaged his interior being and rendered him inert.  
In refusing to bury the body physically, he has sworn to refuse to allow an end to his 
father’s death or its perceived injustice.  He has turned himself over to the trace of 
his father’s memory.  Now, like Hamlet, he endeavours to reinscribe his memory 
with another trace, writing over his melancholic inertia with the corpse’s silent 
summons to revenge. 
     Again, the call to revenge is implicit within the act of remembrance.  What 
summons Hoffman to revenge are the decaying tissues of the body, or more 
specifically, its “dead resoundings”.  The verb “resound” means “to ring or re-echo,” 
suggesting both origin and reflection – but of what? (OED def. 1).  It is not a sound 
to which Hoffman refers, but some other kind of resonance, one that can only occur 
in the relation between Hoffman’s memory and the corpse.  A body is just a body: in 
fact, the subsequent revelation that Hoffman removed the “bare anatomy” or “naked 
bones” from the gallows indicates that this particular body is little more than a 
skeleton (Sig. [B3v]). The skeleton should perhaps signify little else than the 
physical remnants of the living man.  Indeed, in this state of decay, it should be 
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buried and have comparatively little to signify at all.  However, its visible and 
physically elevated presence and its silent interaction with the fraught Hoffman 
renders it something more, something that is manifest within Hoffman’s oscillation 
between nomenclatures.  In the space of four lines, he variously refers to it as a 
“hearse” (or corpse), a “deare soule,” and “the dead remembrance” of his father (Sig. 
B[1r]).  The last of these is particularly complex, for remembrance may signify, 
amongst other things, “a memorial,” “reminder,” or “keepsake,” a “memory or 
recollection,” a “record” or “memorandum,” and – notably – in a rare definition for 
which Shakespeare’s Henry V is the OED’s only recorded example, “a memorial 
inscription” (OED defs. 9,1, 11, 9.d).
 65
  Thus a remembrance may be artifact or 
inheritance, physical monument or psychological recollection, relic of the past or 
present reminder.  In the context in which Hoffman uses the term, it invokes all of 
these functions.  It implies that the dead body functions as an artifact, a memorial to 
the previously living man, and the decaying legacy of the living man, along with the 
revenge it silently incites.  Given the nature of its presence and Hoffman’s attribution 
to it of the ability to hate and to be appeased, it equally appears to constitute an 
actual continuance, the persistent presence of the elder Hoffman in deathly 
perpetuity.  At the same time, it evokes the image of Hoffman’s memory of the 
“living father” transferred to, or reified within, the figure of the corpse.         
     The past and the present seem to collapse in upon one another here in an 
increasingly spectral fashion because of the impossibility of extricating a singular 
sign, a means of fixing the type of “remembrance” that the dead Hoffman is.  There 
is no means of containing either the living father or the dead father within the past; 
consequently, there is no means of distinguishing fully between the two, nor of 
isolating them from the present, which, by rights, should be occupied only by the 
presently living.  This effect is amplified further by the dead man’s “resoundings,” 
which heighten the effect of a signification without origin, a repetition and resonance 
between Hoffman and corpse that cannot be fixed, located, or contained.  Hoffman 
does not have the problem that Hamlet has in taking instructions quite literally from 
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a ghost, but his problem is almost precisely the same in respect to the inscription of 
the paternal trace.  Derrida points out that we cannot carry the dead with us: “the one 
who looks at us in us – and for whom we are – is no longer; he is completely other, 
infinitely other, as he has always been,” with death merely heightening the visibility 
of “this infinite alterity” (The Work of Mourning 161).  While Hoffman introjects his 
father, the corpse reminds us that his father has in fact ceased to be, and that he has 
ceased to be externally to Hoffman’s carrying of his remembrance.  Hoffman can no 
longer “be” through the appropriation of his father’s gaze, through the seemingly 
unbreakable link of blood between them, because the father has announced his 
alterity through his departure.  Paradoxically, as the father yet remains, his trace 
within Hoffman’s memory preserved and reflected in the material object of the 
skeleton, his separation from the dead other can neither be nullified nor completed. 
     Thus Hoffman’s preservation of his father’s trace draws him into the same 
problem of temporal disruption as that which Hamlet faces in his vow to remember.  
Their respective failures to mourn and determination to remember corrupt time in a 
way that not only draws the past space of the dead uncomfortably into the present of 
the living but problematizes the very divisions that enable such distinctions to be 
made.  In so doing, they also disturb the distinctions between the individual “beings” 
of father and son.  As the failure of mourning leaves the dead circulating – both 
buried inside the melancholic offspring and retaining a visible, physicalized presence 
of their own – the possibility of an autonomous or independent state of being for the 
sons never emerges.  Instead, with the time utterly “out of joint,” both Hamlet and 
Hoffman embark on a mission to seek justice for the premature deaths of the fathers 
who, in failing to depart, have already cursed the ordering of space, of time, and of 
being, that they seek to restore. 
 
Dis/Inheritance in time 
     In the disorder that engulfs Hamlet and Hoffman subsequent to their 
internalization of the paternal trace, it becomes evident that an issue of inheritance is 
at stake.  It is no coincidence that the filial relationship is the source of temporal 
disruption.  A focus upon familial relationships is, of course, a common element in 
Renaissance plays involving ghosts, not least because their classical predecessors 
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often produce ghosts as a result of intra-family murders.  From classical translations 
such as Agamemnon and Octavia to tragedies and history plays such as Hamlet, 
Richard III and The Revenger’s Tragedy, the murders of family members produce a 
disjuncture within the relation between inheritance and time that is focalized through 
the figure of the ghost.  This is not to suggest that the manifestation of disrupted 
inheritance is driven by biological imperatives or has an integral association with the 
social or cultural bonds of the family.  Rather, I would suggest that gaps and 
disjunctures within the structures of inheritance are at once more apparent and more 
assimilable when exposed within the structurally familiar relations of the family.  
Hence, they play out with particular vigour in revenge tragedies such as Hamlet and 
The Tragedy of Hoffman, where the legacy at stake expands from the usual structures 
of biological, material, and social inheritance to include the unassimilable 
psychological inheritance of untimely death and the imperative to revenge. 
     In order to trace out the (dis)connections between inheritance and time in these 
plays, it is necessary to consider what precisely it might mean to inherit and to inherit 
in time.  We are accustomed to thinking of inheritance as a linear event, something 
that exists – whole and intact – at an anterior point in time and at a subsequent 
moment passes on to new ownership, possession, or stewardship.  However, Derrida 
argues that inheritance is characterized by “radical and necessary heterogeneity”.  
Marked by “difference without opposition,” an inheritance is neither solitary nor 
aggregate: “its presumed unity, if there is one, can consist only in the injunction to 
reaffirm by choosing.  ‘One must’ means one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort 
out several different possibles that inhabit the same injunction.  And inhabit it in a 
contradictory fashion around a secret” (Specters of Marx 18).  Inheritance is 
therefore marked out by limits in what may be carried forward in time and is also 
disruptive of time in its refusal to function wholly – to be definable, consistent, and 
fully present – through a linear passage in time: 
 
          One always inherits from a secret – which says ‘read me, will you ever be able  
          to do so?’  The critical choice called for by any reaffirmation of the inheritance  
          is also, like memory itself, the condition of finitude.  The infinite does not  
          inherit, it does not inherit (from) itself.  The injunction itself (it always says  
          ‘choose and decide from among what you inherit’) can only be one by dividing  
          itself, tearing itself apart, differing/deferring itself, by speaking at the same  
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          time several times – and in several voices. (Specters 18) 
 
     Geoffrey Bennington describes this formulation as characteristic of the Derridean 
structure in which “the necessary possibility of infidelity to the tradition is a positive 
condition of the chance of being faithful to it – implying that fidelity is always 
marked by, or tormented by, infidelity.”  This means that “what might look like a 
negative contingency” that might trouble “the ideal purity of an event” becomes 
incorporated into that event’s delineation “as a condition of possibility which is 
simultaneously the condition of the a priori impossibility of the event’s ever 
achieving that ideal purity” (Interrupting Derrida 139).  Inherent to the 
conceptualization of inheritance as a process of transmission between predecessor 
and heir is the possibility of its failure or corruption, whether in the transmission (the 
process of handing on) or the article of inheritance.  Pure inheritance – the notion of 
an incorruptible conveyance of an uncontaminable object or matter – is at most an 
illusion: its existence is conditional upon the destruction of pure origin.  As 
Bennington puts it, “an inheritance that was always completely faithful would not 
inherit from the earlier moment” at all, but function instead as its “causal outcome” 
(139). 
     Thus, the structure of inheritance in Derridean thought bears a paradigmatic 
correlation to the supplement, in that it traces a process in which the anterior term or 
event cannot function in isolation from its heir and therefore corrupts the integrity of 
both as well as the seeming linearity of succession.  It is worth pausing to consider 
the issues that this raises in relation to the spectre of the dead father.  If the father’s 
skeleton occupies the role of a spectre without being a ghost at all, this is in part 
related to its function as the dead father’s supplement.  The corpse takes the place of 
the living man whilst modifying it, adding to it the qualifiers of execution, death, and 
(in Hoffman’s eyes) victimization.  As in Hamlet, the living father is given a 
presence in the play and made discernible as an influential force only through his 
presence in death; and his living self is only perceptible through the lens of his death.  
The body is also the supplement of Hoffman, for at the end of the play, Hoffman is 
executed in the same fashion and by the same people as his father.  Thus the skeleton 
constitutes the reification of the death that already lies within him and that will 
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manifest itself in the mirrored execution at the end of the play.  Hoffman is marked, 
characterized, and rendered deficient by that which succeeds him in advance, the 
dead man who is made so by a burning crown at the behest of the Luningberg family.   
     If Hoffman’s inheritance of his father’s death manifests itself prior to its own 
occurrence, dogging his steps throughout the play, it subverts the seeming linearity 
of events from the point of the father’s death to that of the son.  The supplement of 
the corpse refuses the sequential unfolding of events within time in a logical, causal 
fashion because the future haunts in advance of its own arrival.  I will return to this 
problem a little later, but it is sufficient to note for now that this problem of the 
supplement’s disruption of time must inevitably function as a problem of inheritance 
also.  Hoffman’s future cannot be isolated from the past or present because his future 
death manifests itself in advance through the presence (the figure of the corpse) of an 
identical, past event (the execution of the father).  To put it another way, the past that 
continues to manifest itself through the corpse simultaneously manifests a future 
event that is not yet here. In this collapsing series of oppositions between past and 
future, father and son, life and death, inheritance (and the inheritance of death in 
particular) functions as something other than a simple transmission from father to 
son and from past to present.  Instead, it becomes subject to the ruptures, 
incompletion, and contamination that characterizes the temporal schema within 
which it operates.  The destruction of the oppositional force between the 
supplementary terms proclaims the impossibility of inheriting in full and in time.  It 
is possible to locate strands of inheritance, but never to weave them fully into a line 
with a fixed content, a beginning, and an end. 
     As in the case of Hamlet, this problem of inheritance and the associated spectral 
relation between father and son is what generates the imperative to revenge but also 
prohibits its success.  Derrida suggests that mourning requires “getting over our 
mourning, by getting over, by ourselves, the mourning of ourselves” and “our 
autonomy, of everything that would make us the measure of ourselves” (The Work of 
Mourning 161).  Hoffman’s remembrance cannot really carry either the dead or the 
living father, but in preserving the trace of both, it ensures that he can neither 
eliminate nor solidify the boundary between his father and his self.  In order to move 
forward, to execute revenge thoroughly and in linear fashion, Hoffman must function 
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autonomously in the absence of the father.  He cannot achieve this because the 
imperative to revenge is that which exposes the absence of autonomy: the 
dependence of his being upon the relation to the father and, in particular, upon the 
unsuccessful mourning of his father.  He cannot therefore separate his own 
functioning in the present and the future from the past that he carries with him as he 
seeks a point of departure in casting off his melancholy.  Thus, whilst Hoffman 
insists upon becoming “subject” to his father’s “remembrance,” he commits himself 
to the irreducible set of possibilities – the spectral illogic – with which it comes.  
Trapped by the static but repetitive trace of his father, he is doomed to failure and 
disintegration. 
     In its comparatively simple form, The Tragedy of Hoffman thus mirrors the 
problems of inheritance that plague Hamlet after his meeting with his dead father.  
Hamlet cannot seize upon the ghost’s command to remember and simply depart with 
it because the inheritance of the spectre’s cause is in itself spectral.  As Richard 
Halpern observes in “An Impure History of Ghosts,” the ghost “serves Derrida well 
as symbol of what it means to inherit” because it highlights the problems rather than 
the idealization of inheritance: “Hamlet’s father does not return as a comforting 
spirit; he haunts his son, unnerves him, returns at unexpected and ominous intervals” 
(41).  In order to inherit, Hamlet must choose, interpreting what it is that the ghost is 
and what it offers or demands from him; but in doing so, he must make that selection 
from that which is neither whole nor wholly transparent.  The ghost is itself a secret, 
the manifestation of the secrets that it carries and is “forbid / To tell” (Sig. [D2v]).  
Old Hamlet cannot simply pass a hereditary baton to his son and have him depart 
with it, although certainly this appears to be his motive when he reveals his brother’s 
crime and instructs him to “Revenge his foule, and most unnaturall murther” and 
subsequently to “remember me” (Sig. [D2v], [D3v]).  Halpern comments that the 
ghost passes on “what is at once entreaty and malediction, a plea for assistance and a 
murderous law,” so that it is “no wonder his apparition disorients Hamlet” (41).  We 
might add to this that the very concept of passing is put asunder by the disruption of 
time, whether it is passing on through death, passing over a legacy, passing the past 
(and leaving it behind) through the process of mourning, or even passing away out of 
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sight, as when the ghost’s onlookers have difficulty in determining whether the ghost 
is present or departed: 
 
          BARNARDO.  Tis heere. 
          HORATIO.  Tis heere. 
          MARCELLUS.  Tis gone. (Sig. [B3r]) 
 
     It is small wonder that it is never really clear whether the ubiquitous ghost is here 
or gone; there is such a proliferation of possibilities generated through the spectral 
figure that it can only produce entrapment, a sense that the multiplicity of discordant 
options and passings must bring Hamlet to the point of utter stasis.  What Hamlet 
faces is a question of what inheritance might mean in the absence of linearity and 
singularity.  How to inherit from the dead father who is not departed?  How to inherit 
his recollections, his history, his agenda – to assimilate them, to mourn, to inscribe 
them in memory and move on – when they do not function as a unified collective or 
even as a series of isolable elements but rather as opaque “possibilities” that cluster 
around the spectral form that marks the dead King’s absence?   
     Although the list of wrongs that Hamlet’s inherited act of revenge is supposed to 
put right is extensive – purifying the “royall bed of Denmarke,” punishing Claudius, 
and putting the suffering ghost to rest, to name a few – the accompanying request for 
remembrance exposes the irreducible gaps that mark out this legacy (Sig. [D3v]).  
When Old Hamlet incites his son to “remember me,” a second cluster of inheritances 
appears from which Hamlet is to draw in conjunction with the first.  To remember is 
to remember, not merely the father but the supplement; the Old Hamlet who is the 
wronged father, the wronged husband, the betrayed brother, and the events that the 
ghost carries with it – the fleeting glimpse into the afterlife, with its “sulphrus and 
tormenting flames” (Sig. D2[r]).  When Hamlet declares he is “bound to hear” his 
dead father’s story, the ghost replies “So art thou to revenge, when thou shalt heare” 
(Sig. [D2v]).”  In hearing the call to revenge, Hamlet is to inherit revenge.  But a 
simple transmission of the call to revenge is not possible.  Hamlet is to choose 
blindly from a host of accompanying but disunified possibilities that undo the very 
fabric of his world: but to choose something else – to dismiss the ghost as a vision, 
for example – is unimaginable.  And no matter which of these legacies Hamlet 
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selects, their inhabitation of the injunction to “remember me” does not render it 
unequivocal because the “me” remains unfathomable.  The living father, the dead 
father, and the ghost all lay behind that “me” but cannot be distilled to a single entity, 
nor even an amalgamation.  Hamlet is to remember, and to be bound to revenge by, a 
secret – the secret of the gap between the inscription of the injunction (“thy 
commandement all alone”) and that which it names – but in pursuing revenge, he is 
bound, like Hoffman, to enter further into the burgeoning incoherence within 
structures of time, life, death, self, and kingdom from which he inherits.  He binds 
himself also to mirroring the fate of his father: to be poisoned at the instigation of the 
man who first put time asunder. 
     For Derrida, the inheritance of the phrase “the time is out of joint” in French 
translations of Hamlet manifests much the same problematization of the relationship 
between inheritance and time.  These translations hint at the multitude of 
implications inherent within the intractable originary phrase in a way that 
simultaneously enacts the disjointedness of which Hamlet complains.  The first two – 
“time is off its hinges” (“le temps est hors de ses gonds”) and “time is broken down, 
unhinged, out of sorts” (“le temps est détraqué”) – suggest between them that time 
has been rendered dysfunctional, misadjusted, defective.  Time has given up the 
ghost, in both senses of the phrase.  The third translation, “the world is upside down” 
(“le monde est à l’envers”), elides the derangement of time and renders it spatial 
instead  (Specters 22).  In replacing “time” with “the world,” this translation draws 
Hamlet’s complaint into a more explicit statement of one of its consequences.  With 
time disrupted, Hamlet’s world is incomprehensible, immune to logical structure.  
Derrida observes that “de travers” (“askew”) may be a more accurate choice than “à 
l’envers” but the inversion implied by the latter is peculiarly appropriate, for 
inversion is a pervasive force throughout the play.  It is manifest within the figure of 
the ghost that lurks above the king buried in the earth beneath; in Claudius’s rise to 
power at the expense of the fall and death of his brother; in Hamlet’s transformation 
from the role of humble son to his mother’s moral steward.   
     The fourth, and least direct of the translations, “this age is dishonored” (“cette 
époque est déshonorée”) removes any direct sense of disordered time to identify its 
consequences in more specific fashion.  With time unhinged, the “age” is rendered 
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dysfunctional.  Derrida observes a tradition at work here which ascribes an “ethical 
or political meaning” to the disjointedness that might denote the “corruption of the 
city, the dissolution or perversion of customs” because “it is easy to go from 
disadjusted to unjust” (22).  It implies that propriety cannot be maintained in the 
absence of order, and particularly temporal order; hence, there is an inherent 
legitimacy or equity bestowed upon events which unfold properly within linear time 
and, accordingly, an illegitimacy or impropriety within the vacancy created by time’s 
structural dissolution.  Further, “the perversion of that which, out of joint, does not 
work well, does not walk straight, or goes askew . . . can easily be seen to oppose 
itself as does the oblique, twisted, wrong, and crooked to the good direction of that 
which goes right, straight, to the spirit of that which orients or founds the law [le 
droit]” (23).  Again, inversion appears, a disjointing that turns that which is right and 
rightly structured upside down so that it remains present and simultaneously 
manifests its opposite.   
     As Bennington points out, the problem of translation outlined by Derrida is 
exacerbated when his work (and these passages specifically) are retranslated into 
English: but this is, if anything, helpful in that it exposes “the out-of-jointness of 
English itself with respect to itself”.  The double translations “stand for and provoke 
different possibilities of reading the English” as “the expression ‘out of joint’ itself” 
becomes “out of joint with itself” (135).  Considered together, these extracts usefully 
point to the spectrality at the centre of Hamlet’s declaration that “the time is out of 
joint,” enacting a sample of the claims it puts forth whilst demonstrating its 
irreducibility to a core demand.   Hence, while the translations are not arbitrary, their 
internal organization does not prohibit a simultaneous disorganization “through the 
very effect of the specter, because of the Cause that is called the original and that, 
like all ghosts, addresses same-ly disparate demands, which are more than 
contradictory” (Specters 21).  To put it another way, the ‘original’ Hamlet’s 
declaration that “the time is out of joint” is in itself riven, neither one with itself nor 
at odds with itself but illimitable and therefore indefinable in its call(s) to the spectral 
something that has put things asunder.  In Untimely Matter in the Time of 
Shakespeare, Jonathan Gil Harris suggests that Derrida focuses too strongly on the 
French translations and on “time” or “temps,” arguing that the line would “have had 
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a more insistently corporeal connotation for the play’s early modern audiences.”  His 
evidence for this is that the OED identifies the phrase “out of joint” as having a 
predominantly physical connotation at this time (in the sense of the dislocation of a 
joint within the body), rather remarkably citing as evidence an instance in which 
Philip Sidney uses the term to denote the physiological consequences of a physical 
accident.  In fact, the OED also includes the definition “disordered, perverted, out of 
order, disorganized” as being in use from the fifteenth century and this is clearly 
more strongly suggested by the association with time (Harris 12; OED “joint” def. 
2.b).  Nevertheless, his claim that the line resonates with the idea of “a bony matter 
out of time with itself” is useful in that it highlights that the seemingly concrete 
structures of time are put into internal disarray through the effects of an external,  
a-temporal event – the coming of the spectre (12). 
     What Derrida seeks to do, of course, is to expose the impurity of time as a self-
contained or fixed structure – to demonstrate that its radical spectrality in Hamlet is 
possible because its traditionally linear logic is illusory.  If what arrives in time (in 
timely fashion, we might say) is only conceivable because of the possibility of 
untimeliness, then the structural integrity of linear time is predicated upon its own 
inadequacy.  Broadly speaking, the problem with the ghost is that it is anachronistic, 
which is, a “defining feature of ghosts . . . because haunting, by its very structure, 
implies a deformation of linear temporality” (Buse and Stott 1).  As Belsey puts it, 
“ghosts suspend the rules of logic just as they break the laws of nature.  They belong 
to the past, to a history that should have closed with their death, and yet they 
reappear to trouble the present and change the future.”  Hence “a ghost is always 
radically out of time, as well as out of place” (5).
66
  This is what Hamlet encapsulates 
in his complaint that “the time is out of joint”: the ghost’s appearance is a kind of 
impropriety, a temporal breach that thereby disrupts the order that is natural or 
proper.  More specifically, it is a quality of this specific ghost because the conditions 
of the environment in which he appears cannot assimilate his presence: despite the 
clear hint at a purgatorial origin, the text refuses any satisfactory explanation for the 
ghost’s existence.  He clearly belongs to an earlier time in terms of his physical form, 
his identity, and his relation to the living: none of these manifestations has a home in 
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 For an overview of philosophical approaches to the untimely, see Harris, pp. 11-12. 
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the present once he is dead and buried, since his life and death have both taken place 
before his appearance in the play.  More problematically, he is also not proper to a 
former age and this is true in more than one sense.  As I suggested earlier, not only is 
he not the living Old Hamlet, but neither is he the same as the living Old Hamlet: as 
both supplement and trace, he is never quite synonymous with his (former) self.  
Hence he does not belong to the past at all, although this does little to make him at 
home within the present.   
     Moreover, in Hamlet, the functioning and role of time is very clearly the product 
of perception.  Lyons observes that there is a pervasive line of criticism that indicates 
that Hamlet is isolated from others by the fact that “he cannot and does not want to 
adjust to their time scheme” (102).  I would argue though that Hamlet has little 
choice in this.  The catastrophic (dis)order generated by the ghost sufficiently 
damages the structural integrity of time that its functioning appears contingent upon 
whatever logic can be retrieved, a logic that is independent of the understanding of 
those who are unaffected by, or oblivious to, the ghost.  In terms of narrative 
structure, the tension between the understanding of a linear schema of time (in which 
past, present, and future function in catenation and thereby order events similarly) 
and the disordered presentation of events are what propels Hamlet forward, however 
unproductively, amidst chaos.  It is also at the very root of his problem.  When the 
ghost first appears (for the third time, having already been “twice seene of us”), we 
are given to understand that this is strange because Old Hamlet is excluded from this 
time: that is to say, his death marks his mortal being as a relic of the past and thereby 
disqualifies him from an appearance within the present (Sig. [B1v]).  This is the logic 
that prompts Horatio to ask the ghost “What art thou that usurpst this time of night, / 
Together with that faire and warlike forme, / In which the Majestie of buried 
Denmarke / Did sometimes march” (Sig. [B1v]).  In so doing, he divides the form of 
the ghost in two: the form in which Old Hamlet sometimes marched in the past and 
that which, in appearing now, disrupts the night because it is prohibited by the 
marker of death from doing so.   
     Horatio’s immediate problem, of course, is that he (along with Hamlet, Marcellus, 
and Barnardo) can neither conflate nor separate the two figures: the (re)presentations 
of the dead King’s form are the same and yet not synonymous.   At the same time, 
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this problematization of the relation between presence and time demonstrates that 
perception (including the perception of time) is specific to the cultural conditions of 
the environment in which it takes place.  The temporal rupture within the narrative 
functions as the product of a discordance between culturally driven perceptions 
(philosophical and theological norms in particular) and the ordering of actual events.  
Garber observes that, in its engagement with the uncanny, Hamlet becomes “the play 
that demonstrates that you can’t go home again.  Why?  Because you are home – and 
home is not what you have always and belatedly (from unhome) fantasized it to be” 
(159).  The category of home, which is defined by the alignment of events with the 
understanding of ordered structures such as time and space, emerges as an ideal or 
illusion produced through the conditions of its absence.  What is conceptualized as 
natural, or at least familiar, emerges only through the presence of what it is not: and 
its disruption does not simply constitute an instance of aberration but calls into 
question the very terms by which the familiar is understood.  
     This is the problem that Old Hamlet’s ghost presents when it appears on the 
battlements, stalking into territory to which it does not belong.  The ghost does not 
merely disturb but instead “usurpst this time of night” because its appearance stages 
a coup over all understanding or reason.  In response to the ghost’s appearances 
“jump at this dead houre,” and in “the dead wast[e]” of night, Royle observes that the 
ghost is not only “identified with the night” but “is at the same time that which 
‘usurp’st this time of night’ . . . . The ‘jump’ of the ‘dead hour’ of night is a jump, a 
usurping of time itself, absolute interruption and disordering of night” (Shakespeare 
Sig. [B1v], [C2r]; Royle, The Uncanny 125-26).  Put simply, because the form of Old 
Hamlet, which inevitably appears in the depths of the night because it is a ghost, has 
no place to do so because a ghost has no place at all.  Time, as that which underpins 
our understanding of what occurs in the middle of the night, cannot accommodate the 
appearance of that which is dead and therefore has no place in the present; hence, it 
is overthrown by the ghost’s appearance.   
     Worse still, the ghost cannot be accommodated in any other sense either, not even 
through a model of the ghosts of the past.  Not only does it function in markedly 
different form to its Elizabethan predecessors, which are almost always understood 
to be at least “vaguely classical visitors of indifferent theology and indefinite 
142 
 
origins,” but it evokes (without resolving) a range of other understandings of ghosts 
that plunge reason itself into peril (Pearlman 81).  Its ontological and theological 
status have been such contentious issues for critics over a prolonged period because 
it can neither be excluded from, nor confined to, any one branch of Elizabethan 
belief.  Greenblatt usefully summarizes the issue in regard to Shakespeare’s ghosts 
more generally when he points out that “Shakespeare’s contradictory, slippery, and 
complex deployment of spirits” does not align with any identifiable branch of 
mythology or theology: none of his apparitions is a “demon” or “a purgatorial spirit, 
begging for suffrages from the living,” nor do they particularly invoke the ghosts of 
“popular superstitions” or the classical world (Hamlet in Purgatory 195).  This does 
not prevent critics from trying to categorize Hamlet’s ghost, nevertheless, and 
Greenblatt himself, despite having claimed, firstly that he does not intend to seek a 
theological explanation for the ghost, and secondly, that “none of Shakespeare’s 
ghosts” are spirits from purgatory, subsequently asserts that Old Hamlet is “a 
distinctly Catholic ghost”  (4, 195, 240).
67
   
     The wider debate amongst critics is fuelled by a parallel debate within the text, as 
the ghost’s onlookers endeavour to locate the ghost within almost every conceivable 
category.  At various points, it is described as “this thing,” a “figure,” “a fantasie” 
“this dreaded sight,” an “apparition” (the latter of which might signify any kind of 
visible phenomena in the Elizabethan period), “a spirit of health, or goblin damn’d” 
(angel or demon), “an honest Ghost,” a “dead cor[p]se,” and “Hamlet, / King, father, 
royall Dane” (Sig. [B1v]; [D1v]; [D4r]).  The problem, as Jerrold Hogle observes, is 
that the ghost may equally be “the projection of an internal state of mind, like the 
‘dagger’ that Macbeth seems to see” or a product of the devil taking advantage of 
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 Beckwith provides an excellent critique of Greenblatt’s wider treatment of purgatory and its relation 
to performance and the theatre.   The debate that more specifically focuses on the issue of the origin of 
Old Hamlet’s ghost includes Clinton Atchley’s “Reconsidering the ghost in Hamlet: Cohesion or 
Coercion?”, Roy Battenhouse’s “The Ghost in Hamlet: A Catholic Linchpin?,” Dover Wilson’s What 
Happens in Hamlet, Christopher Devlin’s Hamlet’s Divinity, and Miriam Joseph’s “Discerning the 
Ghost in Hamlet,” amongst many others.  Joseph’s essay provides an interesting engagement with the 
idea that Shakespeare employs the doctrine of the “discernment of spirits” in order to have the ghosts’ 
audience systematically test out whether it is a Catholic ghost (494).  Watson suggests that the play 
replaces the hauntings of the start of the play with the “common graveyard,” reading the ghost 
accordingly as “an ‘illusion’ within a drama within a cultural mythology of denial” so that Hamlet, the 
ghost, and the play itself all “creep from death to dusty death” (76).  However, he elides the crucial 
fact that the fictions are real, insofar as their spectrality is generated through cultural constructions that 
enable death to be thought at all.     
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Hamlet’s spiritual turmoil to attach “a ‘shape’ to ‘melancholy’” (“Afterword” 208).  
There is simply no means by which we might firmly identify the nature of its 
presence or its relation to Hamlet.  In fact, it is never even accorded a definite 
gender.  Garber observes this to be a potential product of the lack of distinction 
between it/its and he/his in Elizabethan usage; yet it is sufficiently overt to 
compound the oscillation between “objectification” and personification of the spectre 
(145).  The problem of the ghost’s existence is met further with an obsessive interest 
in contextualising its appearance within time.  It appears at “this dead houre” and 
must disappear before the dawn; its lack of belonging within the present is 
illuminated by its occupation of the armour and “forme” that the dead King took in 
the past; it appears three times on the battlements; and “thrice” walks past Marcellus 
and Barnardo (Sig. [B1v]-B2[r]; [C2r]).  Much of this is formulaic – there is scarcely 
anything original in the appearance of a ghost at midnight or in the grouping of 
repetition into threes – but the intense attention paid to such matters demonstrates the 
importance of fixing (or rather, failing to fix) the ghost’s rightful place within time. 
     Although Hamlet does eventually accept the ghost as the return of his father’s 
spirit in embodied form, we are left none the wiser as to the secret of its origins.  
Despite arguments from critics such as Devlin and Wilson who read the ghost as 
essentially Catholic irrespective of its appearance in a seemingly Protestant 
Denmark, the impossibility of assimilating the ghost into a cogent, logical framework 
undermines any attempt to transmute it from a spectre into the merely dead (Devlin 
49-50; Wilson 70).  The ghost is refusing to talk (at least with any detail or sense of 
consistency) and the conditions of its existence – the conditions by which it fails to 
be understood within the parameters of Shakespeare’s Denmark – repeatedly disrupt 
any fixed reading of its ontological state.  Within the confines of the play, every 
indicator of the ghost having come from a Catholic purgatory is counteracted by a 
Protestant perspective, such as Horatio’s suspicion that the ghost is an evil spirit 
luring Hamlet toward the “somnet of the cleefe” (summit of a cliff) or enticing him 
“into madnes” (Sig. D2[r]).
68
  Atchley claims that “Shakespeare expects his audience 
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 It should be noted that such perspectives are not restricted to Protestantism: Marshall points out that 
Catholic beliefs did not designate all ghosts as genuine and left open the possibility that they might be 
evil spirits (Beliefs and the Dead 245).  In terms of dramatic effect, however, the clear association 
between the latter beliefs and the reformers’ strongest rebuttals of Catholic ghostlore informs these 
lines in a way that accords them a distinctly Protestant ring. 
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to perceive the Ghost for what it is, a diabolical manifestation on a mission to trick 
Hamlet into forfeiting his soul,” which he achieves by the play’s end (12).
69
  But the 
ghost’s “insider” knowledge, its traditional demands for justice, its intense troubling 
of the distinction between the dead and living king, all suggest equally that 
something else is at work here.  Even its desire to speak to Hamlet alone works 
against this simplified reading: why endanger one soul, when it could aim to ensnare 
all of its witnesses?   
     The ghost’s indeterminacy is heightened further by its simultaneous resonance 
with, and departure from, the stock figure of the vengeful Senecan-style ghost 
emerged from Hades.  Unable to assimilate it into the present, Horatio wonders if it 
may not function like the figures of the classical past.  He compares it to the events 
prior to Julius Caesar’s murder in Rome, when “the graves stood tenna[n]tlesse, and 
the sheeted dead / Did squeake and gibber in the Roman streets,” with this and other 
supernatural events acting “As harbindgers preceading still the fates / And prologue 
to the Omen comming on” (Sig. [B2v]).  This last speculation draws upon popular 
superstitions as well as the play’s classical predecessors and contemporary drama.
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Similar supernatural omens signalling catastrophe or evil occur most obviously in 
Shakespeare’s slightly earlier play Julius Caesar, as well as in the Senecan 
translations (particularly Oedipus), Macbeth, Antonio’s Revenge and an assortment 
of other drama.  Yet, as Pearlman points out, the ghost does not behave at all in the 
fashion that is traditional for the classical ghost.  Where his predecessors adopt “an 
otherworldly look,” Old Hamlet’s ghost appears in his mortal armour; where they 
invariably produce a “myth-encrusted narrative” of the afterlife, Old Hamlet’s ghost 
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 For an extensive argument in favour of this reading, see also Eleanor Prosser’s Hamlet and 
Revenge. 
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 Marjean Purinton and Marliss Desens point out in “Shakespearean Shadows’ Parodic Haunting of 
Thomas Love Peacock’s Nightmare Abbey and Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey” that Horatio elides 
“the most obvious reason” of all for a ghost’s appearance: that “the person was murdered.”  Thus he 
avoids raising the most problematic interpretation of all, which would suggest “political assassination” 
and therefore “treason” (103).  As they suggest, this does link to the nature of ghosts as “Gothicized 
signifiers” for covert threats to a society, but it is equally, perhaps, a matter primarily of dramatic 
impact: if Horatio were to make this suggestion, it would weaken the impact of the ghost’s own 
revelation to this effect.  See Belsey for a detailed exploration of the resonances between Old 
Hamlet’s ghost and folklore.  Lavater provides a useful (if rather subjective) account of popular 
beliefs in supernatural phenomena functioning as omens  - see esp. pp. 77-85.  Marshall supplies a 
historical overview of the broader way in which the ghost signals serious disruption, suggesting that 
even in the late Middle Ages, “the appearance of a ghost, numinous, portentous, terrifying, was a sign 
that something, somewhere had gone wrong” (Beliefs and the Dead 17).   
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refuses to reveal any details at all; where they are “not only voluble but florid” in 
their speech and inclined towards shrieking, wailing, or speaking in a “high treble,” 
this ghost communicates reluctantly, naturalistically, and apparently “in a standard 
baritone” (79, 75, 77, 80).  Thus the ghost is no more at home in the classical context 
than in any of the other frameworks that fail to accommodate its presence. 
     What renders the ghost’s ontological indeterminacy so uncannily disturbing is 
that, while failing to function within any one isolable context, it does not quite 
function outside of any of them.  Does the ghost function as a portent of catastrophe?  
Well, yes, we cannot claim otherwise, nor can we deny that Horatio’s fear that 
Hamlet may be lured to his death or to “madness” resonates remarkably with his 
actual fate.  And it does seem that if the ghost is not actually “a spirit of health, or 
goblin damn’d,” its agenda ultimately produces the effects of both – restorative 
justice coming in this play in the form of a double edged sword that destroys villain 
and victim alike.  The problem of the ghost is not only that it does not belong, but 
that, in failing to belong fully, it haunts the categories of knowledge that cannot 
accommodate and thereby confine it.  If completely other, alien and unknowable, the 
ghost might be more easily dismissed: but by entering partially into the frameworks 
by which its spectators endeavour to explain it, the ghost disrupts the delineations 
and oppositions through which those frameworks are produced to render them 
strange and strangely contaminate.  Old Hamlet’s ghost seemingly belongs 
everywhere – at every time – and in so doing, belongs nowhere at all.  In manifesting 
elements of the Protestant, the Catholic, the classical, and popular beliefs so that they 
not only coexist but also coincide, it renders them all untimely, ill at home.  It 
renders its onlookers out of joint in their inability to make sense of their vision.   
     Thus, the ghost’s anachronism begins to seem multifarious, spreading beyond the 
issue of its own form.  This effect is responsible for much of its corrosion of the 
structures of time.  Every reading of the ghost that functions as a predictor of the 
future – the suggestion that the ghost will endanger Hamlet or render him mad, that it 
functions as a portent of disaster, that it functions as a spirit from heaven or from hell 
– anticipates and reifies its role within future events.  In effect, the return of the past 
(King) to the present in which it does not belong both predetermines and warns 
against a future that has already returned in advance of itself.  The ghost’s presence 
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draws the mortal Old Hamlet’s past life into his present death, and in doing so calls 
Hamlet’s future death into the present and indeed the past.   
     This, then, is the environment within which Hamlet must choose his inheritance: 
an environment in which oppositional logic and linear progression – the passages 
from life to death, past to present, present to future, father to son, wrongdoing to 
justice – have no purchase.  In this context, the choice of logical progression, of a 
rational and ordered response to the ghost’s incitation, is no choice at all, for the 
“secret” around which Hamlet’s possible inheritances cluster, the “me” that Hamlet 
is to remember and to revenge, is that which undoes the structures of time (Specters 
of Marx 18).  What we see at this point is a loop, or rather a series of loops, cycles 
between opposing terms that destroy the possibility of origin or end.  Hamlet cannot 
inherit and depart with that inheritance because there is no possibility of proceeding 
from one fixed point to another: having subscribed to the ghost’s instruction to 
“remember me,” he is subject to the spectrality that folds such oppositions back in 
upon one another, rendering such movements futile.   
     This manifests itself particularly clearly in the graveyard scene, as Hamlet and 
Horatio observe the gravedigger preparing Ophelia’s grave.  Pesta points out that 
“Hamlet misreads the memento mori tradition” by focusing so intently on the 
“horrors of bodily decay” and “the impermanence of human life” that he loses sight 
of the fact that the “icons of death and decay are meant to signify a transcendence” 
beyond the inevitable corruption of the human body (31-32).  This may be so, but 
such transcendence implies a linear passage of the spirit after the moment of death 
that is difficult to fathom in the light of the problems generated through Old 
Hamlet’s return.  Contemplating the notion that even the highest-ranking of 
individuals must return to the dust after death and might therefore be reformed into 
the stopper for a “Beare-barrell,” Hamlet devises a ditty to this effect: 
 
          Imperious Caesar dead and turn’d to Clay, 
          Might stoppe a hole, to keepe the wind away. 
          O that that earth which kept the world in awe, 




At its most immediate level, this is one of a series of “allegories of mortification” in 
which Hamlet highlights the levelling effects of death as the force that inevitably 
annihilates all forms of individual identity (Neill 232).  But in its circularity, 
Hamlet’s poem erases the structure of time that underpins the phenomenon it 
describes.  The dead Caesar is “earth” all along, so that the distinction between 
imperial ruler and beer-barrel stopper is oddly eroded.  The dust that comprises the 
dead body simultaneously denotes the death of the body and enduring life, through 
the “untimely agent within a larger network that includes not only the physical 
substance of the wine cask but also the ‘imagination’ that ‘trace[s]’ it” (Harris 12).  
The figure of Caesar, who is already “dead and turn’d to Clay” from the beginning is 
at any point in time marked equally by the functions of keeping “the world in awe” 
and functioning to staunch the flow of liquid.  His passage through time is therefore 
not simply linear (from ruler to clay to stopper) but fragmented, with each of the 
states that seemingly occur at a particular point in time inhabiting the others because 
they are all comprised of “earth.” 
     The choice of the word “Caesar” in the poem – which is actually a substitute for 
Alexander the Great, who is the focus of the preceding discussion – not only 
generalizes the figure to implicate any head of state, but recalls Horatio’s linking of 
the ghost’s appearance to the events surrounding Julius Caesar’s murder.  
Consequently, the image of Caesar invokes that of Old Hamlet, not only because of 
the parallels between the two as fallen rulers but also through the recollection of Old 
Hamlet’s first appearance in the play.  Thus the ghost is drawn in to the earth along 
with Caesar and the stopper, creating another narrative thread that sees Old Hamlet’s 
past (as Denmark’s ruler) converge with his present as the dead who is consigned to 
the earth.  But again, this logical progression destroys its own point of departure and 
end, for Old Hamlet, while his body must surely be lying in its grave, is also roaming 
the night, freed from the constraints of the earth and the strictures of time.  At the 
same time, Hamlet, as he watches the gravedigger, watches one of the effects of his 
inheritance unfolding before his eyes, for Ophelia’s untimely death is a manifestation 
of the chaos into which he has now plunged and into which he draws those around 
him.  His observations on the nature of death call Ophelia’s future burial into the 
present: but in remaining as yet unaware of her death, that death, which belongs to 
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the past, is yet to come, in the moment that he finally discovers that the corpse is that 
of Ophelia.  Thus Hamlet’s vision of the dissolution of mortal humanity into clay is a 
vision of what the ghost has already shown him: the disintegration of the network of 
related oppositions that separate humanity from earth, life from death, past from 
future, and that thereby subvert in advance the restoration of order that he seeks to 
obtain through revenge.  
     Hamlet’s problem of inheritance is by no means a paradigm confined to familial 
or dynastical structures, nor even to a conscious acceptance of the injunction to 
remember and to choose.  Rather, it invokes a broader troubling of the ways in which 
the living inherit when time fails to function logically as an ordering principle.  In 
other plays, the linear pathways of inheritance are at times disrupted through quite 
different forms and imperatives.  For instance, in Macbeth, a similar problem 
emerges, not through an obligation to remember – for Macbeth would like to do 
anything but remember the dead – but through his need to isolate his inheritance of 
the crown from its origins and thereby prohibit its origins from a claim upon the 
future.  In “Macbeth’s War on Time,” Donald W. Foster suggests that Macbeth 
obsesses throughout the play over his inability to control the march of time, and in 
particular to alter the future through his own actions.  Foster links this to Macbeth’s 
frantic responses to the witches, whose prophecies indicate that “all growth is 
foreordained” and to his attempts to control the present and future by modifying his 
responses to the past: for example, when he acknowledges himself to be preoccupied 
“with things forgotten” (that is, with Duncan’s assassination) as “an attempt to 
murder the thought of killing Duncan” (Foster 327-28; Shakespeare 3.133).  In other 
words, Macbeth knows that in order to manipulate the future, he must equally control 
the present and the past.  For Foster, this is why Macbeth murders Duncan: although 
the Weїrd Sisters’ prophecies suggest that all he need do to obtain the crown is to 
wait, he will only gain from inheriting if he is “crowned not passively by the hands 
of time and chance, but actively, by his own mortal hands” (328).   
     At the same time, though, the witches’ predictions of his inheritance of the crown 
are accompanied also by those of Banquo’s rise, thereby threatening his solitary 
power in advance of its arrival.  Macbeth’s attempt to seize power for himself 
therefore attacks not only the structures of time but also those of inheritance.  Fearing 
149 
 
that Banquo may act as rival and producer of rival heirs, for “those that gave the 
Thane of Cawdor to me, / Promis’d no lesse” to Banquo’s children, Macbeth murders 
him in anticipation of wresting the line of monarchic inheritance into a single stream 
(3.133).  When the dead Banquo returns, Macbeth finds that, in failing to banish his 
rival to the past, the inheritance of the crown is subject to division and erosion within 
the present: 
 
                                                 The times has bene,  
           That when the Braines were out, the man would dye,  
          And there an end: But now they rise againe  
          With twenty mortall murthers on their crownes,  
          And push us from our stooles. This is more strange  
          Then such a murther is. (3.142) 
  
 
The use of “crownes” here is evocative, not only of the heads of the dead but also of 
the claim to the throne as Macbeth finds himself strangely thrust back from the stool 
that he has inherited.  As Banquo’s murderer, Macbeth cannot properly mourn him 
through literal or metaphorical burial.  Instead, he challenges the ghost to adopt a 
shape that would restore time and order:  
 
          Approach thou like the rugged Russian Beare,  
          The arm’d Rhinoceros, or th’ Hircan Tiger,  
          Take any shape but that, and my firme Nerves  
          Shall never tremble. Or be alive againe,  
          And dare me to the Desart with thy Sword:  
          If trembling I inhabit then, protest mee  
          The Baby of a Girle. Hence horrible shadow,  
          Unreall mock’ry hence. Why so, being gone  
          I am a man againe: pray you sit still.  (3.142)  
 
 
Macbeth is able to comprehend and therefore welcome the possibility of violence 
were Banquo to spring back to life: it is the corrosive effects of the dead man’s 
intrusion upon his inheritance and, indeed, his sanity that is the problem.  He 
therefore commands the figure to become mortal, to metamorphose into an animal or 
to “be alive againe” – even if it is in order to offer Macbeth violence – because any 
of these options would pose less threat than the ghost.   
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     With the ghost’s subsequent disappearance, Macbeth imagines that he can then 
return to being a “man againe,” or rather, a king: but in remaining unable to banish 
the dead to the past, his wrongfully “inherited” crown remains divided and deferred, 
his place uncertain.  Watson argues that “the specter forces Macbeth, and us, to 
attribute to a dead body the full emptiness of its experience; we confront a demonic 
inversion of the promised afterlife: form without content, animation without anima.”  
When Macbeth tells the ghost “Thou hast no speculation in those eyes / Which thou 
dost glare with,” we can see that “to be stared at by those blind eyes forces Macbeth 
to confront” his “mortality” as well as his “guilt” (Watson 142; Shakespeare 3.142).  
However, in the wider context of the passage, Macbeth’s assertion that the ghost has 
“no speculation” – no ability to see or to comprehend – seems more in keeping with 
his earlier insistence that “There’s no such thing” in response to the apparition of the 
dagger (3.136).  In order to contain the effects of the ghost’s failure to remain buried, 
he demands, rather than fears, that it has no speculation, that it has no ability to see 
or somehow admit itself to the present and his present inner state.  Macbeth’s 
problem is that where he would endeavour to banish the secret of his accession to the 
past and thereby to secure control over the future, he discovers instead that he cannot 
delimit either.
71
  The inheritance he chooses demands a conscious banishment of the 
crimes he has committed in order that he may proceed forward with the spoils 
untainted and his position secured.  He cannot erase his knowledge of past events 
though, or comprehend the secret of what sort of stake the dead continue to hold 
within the mortal realm.  When he visits the Weїrd Sisters with the claim that “I am 
bent to know / By the worst meanes, the worst, for mine owne good,” his conviction 
that “I am in blood / Stept in so farre, that should I wade no more, / Returning were 
as tedious as go ore” erases his ability to register his lack of control over the future 
(3.142). 
     With the arrested comprehension of a megalomaniac, he receives ample warning 
as to what the future will hold but cannot read the information he receives (3.142).  
Even though the dead Banquo appears again surrounded by the eight Stuart kings of 
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 Foster suggests that this inability “to stem the flow of time, or to clip the chains of causality” 
generates the “resentment” that Macbeth expresses through “bloody execution” (325).  This sequential 
logic is itself subject to disruption though, since Macbeth’s inability to control time is at least partly 
related to the temporal disruptions he generates through the unnatural acts of murder, so that there is 
no originary or end event in this chain. 
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Scotland – a sight that surely proclaims the pervasion of the past within both present 
and future – Macbeth seeks only to banish the knowledge.  Cursing “this pernitious 
houre” and declaring (prophetically) that “all those that trust” the witches should be 
“damb’d,” he proceeds to do precisely that, seizing upon their most heartening 
prophecies – that “none of woman borne / Shall harme Macbeth” and that he “shall 
never vanquish’d be, untill / Great Byrnam Wood, to high Dunsmane Hill / Shall 
come against him” – as evidence of his security (3.144-45).  Watson interprets 
Macbeth’s “mistaken” belief in the validity of the prophecies as a problem that arises 
from his acceptance that if they partly prove to be accurate then they must be wholly 
true (138).  But the problem is not that they are inaccurate, for a number of them do 
indeed come to fruition.  Rather, Macbeth’s difficulty is that, in attempting to use 
them as a further means to control the future that is already spiralling out of his 
power, he fails to grasp the range of implications that they hold.  Like Hamlet, 
Macbeth curses his own mission, securing his demise through his failed endeavour to 
control time or even to understand its intractability in the chaos he has engendered. 
     By the time Macbeth receives the news of Lady Macbeth’s death, he is beginning 
to register the disintegration of distinctions between past, present, and future, but is 
no more able to control its effects: 
 
           She should have dy’de heereafter;  
          There would have beene a time for such a word:  
          To morrow, and to morrow, and to morrow,  
          Creepes in this petty pace from day to day,  
          To the last Syllable of Recorded time:  
          And all our yesterdayes, have lighted Fooles  
          The way to dusty death. Out, out, breefe Candle,  
          Life's but a walking Shadow, a poore Player,  
          That struts and frets his houre upon the Stage,  
          And then is heard no more. It is a Tale  
          Told by an Ideot, full of sound and fury  
          Signifying nothing. (3.150) 
 
The construction of time here is ambiguous and complex.  Mallin argues that the first 
line of this passage resonates with an earlier line when the third witch addresses 
Macbeth as he “that shalt be King hereafter,” both of which indicate Macbeth’s 
belief (prior to this moment) that he and Lady Macbeth can somehow evade death 
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altogether (Shakespeare 3.132).  According to Mallin, this is why he so readily 
misinterprets the witches’ prophecies – because he is increasingly convinced as to 
“his own invulnerability.”  His response to Lady Macbeth’s death, then, does not 
suggest “she should or would have died ‘later’ or ‘eventually” but should not have 
died at any time.  In their endless rule, “then, to be sure, ‘There would never have 
been time for such a word’” (99).   
     Mallin’s reading is enticing, although perhaps more precise than the text supports.  
The time to which Macbeth refers is in fact somewhat more complex and unsettled 
than this might suggest.  Macbeth’s assertion that Lady Macbeth should have died 
tomorrow, when there was time for it, evokes the sense of a tomorrow that expands 
endlessly into a deferred future – “To morrow, and to morrow, and to morrow” – but 
at the same time, that tomorrow “creepes” also into the present.  While he seems in 
part to be referring to the looping of tomorrow as it continually rolls over to the next 
day, his phrasing implies also that it enters “to day,” through the “pace” – which 
signifies a “narrow passage” or “pass” as well as the act of movement (Brooke 204 
n.20).  As time rolls forward, it seems, and tomorrow endlessly belongs in the future, 
it also rolls toward us, contaminating the present with the future event of death.  
Where Watson comments that the play’s “obsession with time . . . reflects a central 
concern with mortality, with the way time inexorably propels us into timelessness,” 
we might equally perceive that it draws timelessness towards us – the infinitude of 
death called into the presence of life (136).  There is a further problem in the passage 
also.  If “all our yesterdayes, have lighted Fooles / The way to dusty death,” those 
fools appear to be created through their reliance upon “yesterday,” their dependence 
upon using the candle of what has already been in order to light the way forward.  
The candle that Macbeth announces to be extinguished is not only that of Lady 
Macbeth’s life but also the past that delivers us into the present clutches of death.  
Macbeth begins to show defeat as he recognizes that “three, or four, or a billion 
tomorrows cannot finally be distinguished from the plural yesterday which led like-
minded gentlemen to their inevitable, and redundant, conclusion” (Foster 333-34).   
     And then finally, there is a further twist: Macbeth insists “It is a Tale / Told by an 
Ideot, full of sound and fury / Signifying nothing.”  The subject represented by the 
“it” in this sentence is essential to its meaning but utterly ambiguous.  If the “It” 
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refers to the player on the stage, the life of the player (or of the character played) 
signifies nothing, being so much entertainment that is rendered meaningless through 
its inevitable extinction.  Life itself then becomes emptied of meaning through the 
trace of death, rather like Hamlet’s emptying of his mind in favour of the inscription 
to remember.  The destruction of linear temporality through death’s contamination of 
life removes all order and therefore all signification.  Equally though, Macbeth may 
be referring reflexively to the image he has just put forward.  If “It” is not life but 
rather the narrative of the player who “struts and frets” until death, then all that he 
has just said is negated: his clutching at time in an attempt to understand its relation 
to life gives way again to one more try at taking control over his present and future.  
After all, he has not yet consigned his own life to nothingness, nor accepted that his 
future is beyond his grasp.  In killing Young Seward two scenes later, he is still 
clutching at the witch’s prophecies in the hope that they indicate the security of his 
life, declaring “Swords I smile at, Weapons laugh to scorne, / Brandish’d by man 
that’s of a Woman borne” (3.150).  Here again, Macbeth endeavours to manipulate 
the past – in this case the past predictions of the future – into securing his control 
over the future so that the prophecies in this case serve to shore up, rather than 
counteract, the execution of his will upon the present.   
     In this, however, he is mistaken: Macbeth, like Hamlet and Hoffman, is marked 
by his future death in advance.  Even with no foreknowledge of how the Weїrd 
Sisters’ prophecies will come to pass, the audience can be in no doubt that Macbeth 
is proceeding towards the end that he assumes cannot arrive, for it is already here in 
advance.  In endeavouring to isolate the present from the past events through which 
he seized power and the future events of which the witches have warned, the past and 
future become the conditions through which Macbeth’s every moment is defined.  
Macbeth’s inheritance of ruling power is subject to the corruption – of time and of 
order as well as of morality – through which he perceives and obtains it.  In regard to 
the spectre’s relation to time, Derrida observes: 
 
          There are several times of the specter.  It is a proper characteristic of the    
          specter, if there is any, that no one can be sure if by returning it testifies to a  
          living past or to a living future, for the revenant may already mark the  
          promised return of the specter of living being. . . .  a ghost never dies, it  




In the presence of the spectral, there is no present that functions independently of the 
past or future against which it is defined.  After the banquet at which Banquo’s ghost 
appears, Macbeth speculates: “It will have blood they say: / Blood will have Blood: / 
Stones have beene knowne to move, and Trees to speake”.  His fear is that the 
ghost’s appearance signifies the discovery of the murder, that his own blood is called 
for by that of the murder he has instigated and that supernatural events may facilitate 
that discovery.  The fear draws upon popular ghost lore but it also functions as 
prophecy, for the moving stones and speaking trees call directly to the later 
actualization of the Weird Sister’s prophecy that the “Macbeth shall never 
vanquish’d be, until Great Byrnam Wood, to high Dunsinane Hill / Shall come 
against him” (3.144).   
     Macbeth interprets their predictions to mean that he will “live the Lease of 
Nature” and pay his breath / To Time, and mortall Custome” (3.144).  But his 
reaffirmation of the normal functioning of time elides the acknowledgement of what 
is apparent to his audience: that his breaches of the temporal order of “mortall 
Custome” through his murders have ensured that the linear ordering of events to 
which he clings is already in disarray.  As Harris suggests, “the coherence of linear 
time is repeatedly fractured in the play, as suggested by Macbeth’s insistence that his 
future . . . is not ahead of, but ‘behind’ him” (123-24).  The past murder and 
appearance of the ghost collude with Macbeth’s own responses and the witches’ 
prophecies to call Macbeth’s destruction into the present and expose the disordering 
of the inheritance he seeks to secure.  Macbeth himself, however, is too intent upon 
forcing his own order upon his environment to comprehend this until his final battle 
when, faced with the discovery that Birnam Wood has indeed risen up, he realises 
“There is nor flying hence, nor tarrying here” (3.150).  There is no escape as past 
prophecy and future event come crashing forcibly in upon the present. 
     This temporal disarray manifests the erasure of origin or end, so that the 
emergence of the ghost renders spectral the oppositional categories to which 
Macbeth endeavours to cling.  While the ghost magnifies and exacerbates an existing 
disruption, it does not function as a point of instigation or departure: rather, it figures 
the effects of a disorder that prohibits such distinctions.  Although it is only Macbeth 
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who sees the ghost, the wider supernatural disruption within the kingdom is by no 
means delimited to his perception alone.  Nevertheless, Macbeth becomes a kind of 
vehicle through whom the disorder of external events bleeds into those of the inner 
psychical world so that there is no clear distinction between the two: and so that the 
ordering of seeming external events becomes indistinguishable from his inner being.  
This is clearly apparent in the scene in which he sees a bloody dagger and cannot 
determine whether it is inner projection or an apparition with some kind of basis in 
the external world (a point to which I will return in Chapter Four).  Macbeth’s inner 
state is paradoxically both contingent upon, and a catalyst for, external events, so that 
those events are inseparable from his state of being. 
     It is a problem that is still clearer in Hamlet.  Before any mention of the ghost 
reaches his ears, Hamlet has already been admonished for failing to put his father’s 
death behind him and is finding the world in disarray, pondering “’tis an unweeded 
garden / That growes to seede, things rancke and grose in nature / Possesse it 
meerely” (Sig. [C1r]).  In his melancholic state, he already perceives, as Marcellus so 
memorably puts it, that “Something is rotten in the State of Denmarke,” (Sig. D2[r]).  
Thus, the effects of his subsequent vow to his father’s ghost – the descent into chaos, 
the fraught sense of stasis, the movement towards a death that already precedes him – 
precedes also the vow from which it originates.  Before he inherits the injunction to 
remember from his father’s ghost, his inability to mourn successfully has already 
raised another problematic inheritance, that of whether (or how) “To be, or not to be” 
(Sig. [G2r]).  What Hamlet faces prohibits mourning and therefore being: the 
question that underpins the question of “to be, or not to be” is, in part, a matter of 
whether “to be” is underwritten with its own impossibility.   
     In Derridean thought, inheriting and being are interdependent.  If the space for the 
self to come into being is made possible only through the act of mourning, then the 
mourner’s being and inheritance are inseparable: 
 
          To be, this word in which we earlier saw the word of the spirit, means, for the    
          same reason, to inherit.  All the questions on the subject of being or of what is  
          to be (or not to be) are questions of inheritance.  There is no backward-looking  
          fervor in this reminder . . . . Reaction, reactionary, or reactive are but  
          interpretations of the structure of inheritance.  That we are heirs does not mean  
          that we have or that we receive this or that . . . but that the being of what we  
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          are is first of all inheritance, whether we like it or know it or not.  And that, as  
          Hölderlin said so well, we can only bear witness to it.  To bear witness would  
          be to bear witness to what we are insofar as we inherit, and that – here is the  
          circle, here is the chance, or the finitude – we inherit the very thing that allows  




The “word of the spirit” to which Derrida refers here expresses an invitation to the 
spirit within the infinitive “to be”.  For him, the phrase “the time is out of joint” 
speaks of time “in the past perfect” but is “valid for all times”; it “says the time, but 
it refers singularly to this time, to an ‘in these times,’ the time of these times . . . this 
age and no other.”  In doing so, however, it is able to return always as the new, for 
“the grammatical present of the verb to be, in the third person indicative” need only 
be expressed in plural to offer itself as a habitation for spectres.  Hence “to be, and 
especially when one infers from the infinitive ‘to be present,’ is not a mot d’esprit 
but le mot de l’esprit, the word of the spirit, it is its first verbal body” (61-62).  It is 
from this basis that Derrida moves on to claim that “to be” is also “to inherit”: for in 
this state of being that is irreducible to a locus within the past or present lies always 
the issue of what is being, what spirits and/or spectres (the distinction is unclear at 
this point) inhabit that which is, in and through time.  Engagement with the past 
through processes or forms of reactivity may seem to hark back to what has been, but 
in fact constitutes only the lens through which we view the composition of 
inheritance.  In being, we bear witness to the fact of being through inheritance, whilst 
at the same time, that inheritance facilitates its own visibility within this cycle. 
     In formulating this loop, Derrida is addressing the inheritance of Marx, 
particularly the requirement that his heirs must inevitably “assume” rather than 
passively inherit it: for “inheritance is never a given, it is always a task” (Specters 
67).  But that is not to say that it is always a task executed perfectly.  If “all inheritors 
. . . are in mourning,” as Derrida claims, the refusal of mourning must disrupt the 
structures (such as they are) of both inheritance and being (67).  Therefore, whilst the 
time is out of joint for Hamlet, so too is his being.  Critics have made much of 
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 The passage of Friedrich Hölderlin that Derrida draws upon here is quoted in Heidegger’s 
“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry.”  Hölderlin writes that man “has been given arbitrariness, and to 
him, godlike, has been given higher power to command and to accomplish, and therefore has 
language, most dangerous of possessions, been given to man, so that creating, destroying, and 
perishing and returning to the ever-living, to the mistress and mother, he may affirm what he is – that 
he has inherited, learned from thee, thy most divine possession, all-preserving love” (Heidegger 296).   
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Hamlet’s baffling behaviour after he witnesses the ghost, as he becomes increasingly 
distracted, inept, and illogical in his actions.  Welsh responds to the issue with the 
remarkable assertion that the issue of “the hero’s beating about the bush” is “almost 
too obvious for comment,” as “the ‘delay’ of the hero results from the necessity of 
mourning over an appropriate period of time” (489).  For a time, the contemplation 
of revenge is sufficient, since immediate gratification of this imperative “would 
afford the mourner little relief” (489).  Welsh’s argument is scarcely endorsed by the 
evidence of Hamlet’s subsequent behaviour, which is anything but a leisurely 
immersion in the mourning process.  In contrast, Greenblatt interprets Hamlet’s 
behaviour to relate to the problem of “remembrance,” observing that the ghost’s 
gradual disappearance from the play and from Hamlet’s mind denotes the difficulty 
of remembering the dead (Hamlet in Purgatory 224-25).  By the point of the 
graveyard scene, Greenblatt suggests that the previous king is little more than a 
“marker of time,” as one of the gravediggers marks the length of his employment in 
regard to King Hamlet’s triumph over Fortinbras.  For Greenblatt, “this is what it 
means to be well and truly buried” (226).   
     Perhaps he is right if by buried we substitute “incorporated,” buried inside the son 
he now haunts, but the king’s visible absence from the play’s later events by no 
means denotes that he has simply been put to rest.  Greenblatt pinpoints a crucial 
lapsing of memory in the earlier scene in Gertrude’s bedchamber, in which Hamlet 
fears that the ghost comes “your tardy sonne to chide, / That lap’st in time and 
passion lets goe by / Th’important acting of your dread command” (Sig. [I3v]).  
Greenblatt points out that “Polonius’s bleeding body would seem ample evidence 
that Hamlet’s purpose was hardly blunted, but perhaps remembrance and revenge are 
not as perfectly coincident as either the prince or the Ghost had thought” (224).  
Greenblatt construes this as evidence that Hamlet’s memory is fading, and indeed the 
ghost does disappear from view and largely from conversation after this scene.  
However, Hamlet’s response to the spectre suggests something quite different if we 
consider that the ghost’s rebuke – “Doe not forget, this visitation / Is but to whet thy 
almost blunted purpose” – speaks to Hamlet’s disordered state of being and not 
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merely to his deeds or even his memory alone (Sig. [I3v]).
73
  Greenblatt states that 
Hamlet has “killed the man he thought was his uncle,” but in fact Hamlet has no idea 
when he stabs the “Rat” behind the arras as to who it is and is drawing upon pure 
optimism when he responds to his mother’s question as to what he has done with the 
confused response “I knowe not, is it the King?” (Greenblatt 223; Shakespeare Sig. 
I2[r]).  Sullivan strenuously argues, “it is the hoariest of critical commonplaces to 
assert that Hamlet does not take action” because “in truth, he never stops taking 
action”: the problem is much more specifically that his response to the injunction to 
remember has not resulted in the achievement of the singular act of revenge (14).  
Hamlet’s campaign, at this point, is erratic, neither the logical enactment of revenge 
that he endeavours to pursue, nor a diversion or loss of intent. 
     When the ghost appears, then, Hamlet has every cause to perceive that it may 
think he has “lap’st in time and passion”.  This is a complex phrase that suggests not 
only the possibility that he is guilty (of having lost sight of his goal) and has 
therefore exchanged action for immersion in “delay and suffering,” but equally (and 
more probably) that he has failed to carry out his task because he has become 
overcome by the delay and his own distress (MacDonald 173 n.12).
74
  Devlin offers 
another interpretation, suggesting that “lapsed” should be read as “snared,”  “time” 
as “politics” (based on a similar interpretation of “The time is out of joint”), and 
“passion” as “concupiscence” (39).  This reading is slightly strained in regard to its 
interpretation of “time” but does help to illuminate the link between Hamlet’s lack of 
success and the political and moral disorder in which he has become immersed.  For 
Hamlet, no matter whom he has killed or what steps he has taken, the promise to 
revenge remains unfulfilled.  Lyons argues that the ghost’s admonishments to 
Hamlet, and in particular his commandments “Remember me,” and “Do not forget,” 
resonate precisely with the “sloth” associated with melancholy and are reiterated by 
Hamlet when he accuses himself of being cowardly, “tardy”, “dull,” and “muddy 
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 Greenblatt is joined in this argument by a number of critics, including Stallybrass, Chartier, 
Mowery, and Wolfe, who argue that Hamlet’s usage of a symbolic table book marks his vow to 
remember with its inevitable erasure (414-19). 
74
 In his study of the play, The Tragedie of Hamlet, Prince of Denmarke, George MacDonald 
identifies six possible implications for this phrase: “1. ‘Who, lapsed (fallen, guilty) lets action slip in 
delay and suffering.’ 2. ‘Who, lapsed in (fallen in, overwhelmed by) delay and suffering, omits’ &c. 3. 
‘lapsed in respect of time, and because of passion’ . . . . 4. ‘faulty both in delaying, and in yielding to 
suffering, when action is required.’ 5. ‘lapsed through having too much time and great suffering.’ 6. 
‘allowing himself to be swept along by time and grief’” (173 n.12).   
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metteld” (Lyons 88-89; Shakespeare Sig. [I3v], [F4v] ).  He falls back on the 
terminology of melancholy, not because he views himself (in the same way that 
others do) as having an “illness” or being a “social danger” but because he views his 
melancholy “in relation to the task that he must perform” and has so far failed to do 
(90-91).  He does not fail in remembering the ghost: he fails in achieving the re-
ordering of time that is to be accomplished through the execution of justice.   
     The point, then, is not that Hamlet fails to remember or that he is mad or even 
incompetent: it is that, in his melancholic state, his disastrous enactment of his 
inheritance reflects the disorder within and the failure of mourning.  The trace of 
remembrance that he seizes upon in the act of inheriting ensures that “to be” involves 
the incorporation of the dead father.  Therefore, to be is not to be fully present or in 
some way intact or self-contained, but to inherit the temporal, spiritual, and spatial 
disruption of a spectre that now pervades the conditions of his being.  “Not to be” is 
not, in this paradigm, one of his options: for quite aside from its connotations of the 
forbidden act of suicide, it can only be thought through Hamlet’s present state of 
being, which, in remembering and inheriting, cannot nullify its own existence.  Thus, 
as Hamlet continues to be and to pursue (however ineffectually) revenge, the 
remembrance of the spectre no longer needs to be visibly or verbally affirmed.  As 
the incorporated figure of the father pervades Hamlet from the inside out, it is 
inherent within the very structures of Hamlet’s continuing existence. 
     For Hoffman too, the process of inheriting and therefore being is oddly disjointed, 
for reasons that are secret, interior, but externalised through the unnatural lingering 
of his father’s form.  In fetishizing his father’s remains, Hoffman prohibits the 
departure that is integral to the process of inheritance.  If to inherit requires a choice 
– if it requires the filtration, interpretation, and selection of the multiple 
heteromorphic possibilities within the injunction to inherit – then that choice enables 
and indeed requires forward momentum.  This is not to suggest that it entails a 
division between past, present, and future – for the process of inheritance is never 
complete, never a final judgement that severs past from present and future – but it 
requires selection and action, however endless they may be.  The choice made, 
Hoffman might take up the inherited thread(s); he might mourn, he might defend his 
father’s honour, he might exact revenge, thereby carrying his inheritance forward.  In 
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bringing his father with him, though, a peculiar corruption of the process occurs.  
Hoffman acts, not in memory of his father, but with his “remembrance,” with its 
flurry of confusion between the collapsing distinctions of absence, presence, 
memory, memorial, living and death.  He inherits, but he cannot depart or progress 
with his inheritance because, in his failure to mourn, he carries his father with him.  
Like Hamlet, Hoffman’s pursuit of revenge falls to the wayside, as he is unable to 
proceed methodically in the presence of the spectral.  Having “sworne unto my 
fathers soule” to kill five of his father’s enemies, he dispatches only three “to the 
fiends” before becoming diverted and ultimately entrapped by his lust for Otho’s 
mother, Martha (Sig. L2[r]).   
     It is remarkable that the source of Hoffman’s distraction is the mother of one of 
his victims and a key member of the family that Hoffman holds responsible for his 
father’s execution.  In a few lines, Hoffman goes from intending to strangle her to 
suggesting that to do so would “wrong nature that did ne’re compose / One of her 
sexe so perfect” (Sig. H2[r-v]).  By the end of the scene, he declares himself in a 
state of “lust and hot desire” (Sig. [H4v]).  Even more bizarrely, Martha has, upon 
the discovery of her son’s death (the true nature of which she remains ignorant), 
declared the deceptively helpful Hoffman to take his place, telling him “I here adopt 
thee myne, christen thee Otho, / Mine eyes are now the font, the water, teares / That 
doe baptize thee in thy borrowed name” (Sig. [H4r]).  Not only has Hoffman’s 
vengeance transmuted into lust for a woman he perceives to be implicated in killing 
his father, but that woman now considers him as a son, her tears momentarily erasing 
the identity he currently hides to replace it with one of his victims.  Hoffman’s own 
identity, so thoroughly inextricable now from the dead father, disintegrates to the 
point that he momentarily enters into the family he seeks to destroy.  It is as though, 
amidst the rupturing of time that occurs as a result of the ubiquitous skeleton 
dangling from the tree, Hoffman can no longer maintain a sense of the origin or end 
of his revenge campaign so that his identity dissolves along with his purpose.  Hence 
he declares, when the truth is finally out, “’tis well, ’tis fit,” that he is to be executed 
for his failures: like Hamlet, he too perceives himself to have failed to live up to the 
requirements of the paternal spectre.  
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     Earlier on, Hoffman does seemingly endeavour to take permanent leave of his 
father’s corpse with the declaration: “Rest, goe rest, and you most lovely Couplets / 
Leggs and armes reside, for ever heere / This is my last farewell” (Sig. [B3v-B4r]).  
It is a tenuous farewell at best though, given that no burial follows.  Moreover, the 
event precedes his murder of Otho in revenge for his father, an act that serves only to 
perpetuate his preservation of the dead man and results in another corpse left 
unburied.  The reunion between dead father and living son is thereafter inevitable 
and a striking reification of the dissolution of time that marks both Hoffman’s 
inheritance and his incorporation of the father.  Pesta comments that “Hoffman fails 
to see” that the skeletons of his father and Otho “speak not to each other but to him”: 
his “obsession to obtain his desired revenge blinds him to the image of his own death 
grinning back at him – twice” (29).  These exteriorized figures of death are 
inseparable from his inner (living) self though.  His preservation of the death is also a 
selection of death as inheritance: but if to inherit is to be, then death is a problematic 
inheritance indeed.  In effect, Hoffman’s decision to preserve his father’s corpse as 
well as his cause is inseparable from the being (identified by the descriptor Hoffman) 
that we subsequently witness throughout the play.  This proposition exceeds the 
functioning of the dead within that, along with the dead other (s/he who is mourned), 
generates the space necessary for the existence of the self.  It invites and preserves 
death, not as an element of the structure of being, but rather as being itself.  
Thereafter, Hoffman’s identity becomes inseparable from that of his deed.  He is at 
the start of the play “Hannce Hoffmans sonne that stole downe his fathers Anotamy 
from the gallowes” and at the end: ““Hoffman, who upon yon tree / Preserv’d his 
fathers bare anatomy” (Sig. I3[r]).  Hoffman’s son is now indistinguishable from the 
dead father who, despite having no living role within the play, is present even as his 
son steps into precisely the same death as the father he preserves externally and 
carries within him. 
     Hoffman, like Hamlet and other heirs such as Macbeth, thereby enacts the 
problem of inheritance as something that is not taken up, but rather constitutive of 
the state of being, and therefore subject to disruption in the event of the failure of 
mourning.  More specifically, these characters demonstrate that where a spectre 
erodes temporal structures, this effect extends beyond the parameters of its own 
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anachronism and bleeds into the functioning of its heirs.  The spectre is not only a 
singular presence but also an event: but it is an event with no beginning and no end 
and therefore, crucially, no containment.  It cannot merely be witnessed and 
disregarded because it alters the conditions of the environment into which it enters 
and the subject to whom it appeals.  Hoffman and Hamlet’s failures and disordered 
quests for revenge manifest the problem of being (and therefore doing) where the 
conditions of being – the process of mourning and the task of inheriting – prohibit 
the delineation of either the inheritance or the conditions in which that inheritance is 
to function.  That is to say, as they remember obsessively, inscribing the trace of a 
spectre within, that “within” is conditioned by, and indeed produced through, the 
secret that is obtained (but not read) of the spectral other: and that inheritance is 
rendered still more impenetrable by the incorporation of he who is mourned.  The 
spectre that visibly appears externally and disrupts the functioning of seemingly 
independent structures such as time and categories such as life and death, is equally 
inside, haunting the interior that it calls into being.  In the end, the problem of 
Hoffman and Hamlet’s botched revenge campaigns does not concern whether they 
remember, but why they are unable to forget sufficiently to evacuate the spectre and 
restore their respective environments to rights. 









Is this a Dagger, which I see before me,  
The Handle toward my Hand? Come, let me clutch thee:  
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.  
Art thou not fatall Vision, sensible  
To feeling, as to sight? or art thou but  
A Dagger of the Minde 
 
                                  (Shakespeare, Macbeth 3.136) 
 
 
Flection and Apparition 
     When Macbeth reaches towards the invisible dagger hovering before him, he 
clutches not only at a vision of his murder weapon, but at one of the problems 
underpinning the spectre’s entry into the visual realm.  How is one to understand 
sensory information that is riven with contradiction?  Forced to reconcile the visible 
appearance of the floating knife with his understanding of plausible daggerly 
behaviour, Macbeth rapidly persuades himself that “There’s no such thing: / It is the 
bloody Businesse, which informes / Thus to mine Eyes” (3.136).  In this he is 
correct, insofar as the dagger does not appear to exist in the material plane outside of 
his perception.  This does not resolve the problem, however, of what it is he sees.  
Lady Macbeth protests that it is an “Ayre-drawne-Dagger” that “would well become 
/ A womans story, at a Winters fire” – a popular reading of the matter, although 
perhaps a prejudiced one given her fear that Macbeth’s visions may sabotage her 
own ambitions (3.142).  Typically, the play’s critics have concurred with her, 
presuming that the dagger is a hallucination and that Macbeth recognizes it as such.  
For instance, Brooke comments that “the dagger is entirely specific in form though 
not literally seen by anyone – even Macbeth knows it is not there” (4).  Similarly, in 
Shakespeare and Cognition, Arthur Kinney describes the dagger as “Macbeth’s 
sudden – and self-acknowledged – hallucination,” observing that Macbeth’s 
subsequent drawing of his own knife to “realize . . . what is in his mind’s eye” 
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resolves the situation by exchanging his visual image for a reassuringly corporeal 
substitute (78).  Macbeth’s response is considerably more clouded than such readings 
suggest though: he wonders if it is a “false Creation / Proceeding from the heat-
oppressed Braine,” but this is in fact one of a series of questions in which he 
endeavours to reconcile the evidence of his eyes with the conflicting evidence of his 
sense of touch (3.136).  Despite his best efforts, the vision persists – he subsequently 
complains that despite his interrogations, “I see thee still; / And on thy Blade, and 
Dudgeon, Gouts of Blood, / Which was not so before.”  It is only at this point, with 
his own dragger drawn for reassurance, that he asserts, somewhat unconvincingly, 
“There’s no such thing” (3.136).  It would perhaps be more accurate, therefore, to 
suggest that Macbeth knows the only means to restore his courage is to believe that 
there is no such thing, rather than to assume that he is wholeheartedly convinced as 
to the truth of the matter.  
      Critical responses to this scene often elide consideration of the complexities of 
early modern belief in the supernatural in relation specifically to the field of sensory 
perception.  Broadly speaking, the fact that an object is not haptically or 
epistemologically present in the material world – that its existence cannot be verified 
by touch or by existing categories of knowledge – does not automatically prohibit it 
from another, equally legitimate form of existence.  For instance, within classical, 
folk, and Christian narratives, there are numerous accounts in which supernatural 
phenomena appeal to the senses before a violent event.  Lavater recounts stories of 
“great stirrings or noises” and “stra[n]ge things” that occur before great upheavals 
within a nation.  More significantly still, he reports that “swords, speares, and suche 
like” may be sighted “in the aire” and that various “Gunnes, launces and halberdes, 
with other kindes of weapons and artillerie, do often times move of their owne 
accord as they lye in the armories” (77, 81).  Considered in this context, Macbeth’s 
dagger may not seem any more physically real, but it certainly occupies a place that 
extends, at least potentially, beyond the sphere of pure hallucination.  Moreover, it is 
not only he who sees and hears supernatural phenomena.  Other characters also 
witness “lamentings heard I’th’Ayre; / Strange Schreemes of Death, / And 
Prophecying, with Accents terrible, / Of dyre Combustion,” along with earthquakes, 
cannibalistic horses, and the turning of daytime to “Darknesse . . . When living Light 
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should kisse it (3.137-38).
75
  It is as though the disruption of Macbeth’s inner state 
and the unnaturalness of his actions are integrally linked to the contamination of the 
entire realm.  Problematically, perception becomes impossible to isolate from interior 
as well as exterior states of existence.  Macbeth’s dagger might equally be a 
supernatural omen of what is to come, a defect in his visual perception, a psychic 
product of guilty anticipation, or a response to his fatigue and the pressures placed 
upon him by his pushy wife.  Whether we accept any of these or a different 
explanation entirely, though, the result is the same: what Macbeth sees cannot be 
trusted or verified, but nor can it be explained or dismissed.  As Karin Coddon 
observes in regard to spectacle more generally in Macbeth, the vision in this scene 
constitutes “the locus of doubt rather than revelation, confusion rather than 
containment” (“Unreal Mockery” 491).  This disjuncture between sight and 
comprehension perhaps reaches its peak in the dagger scene, in which gazing alone is 
insufficient to enable Macbeth to ascertain the dagger’s ontological status because he 
has no means of verification (or nullification) for what he sees.  Seeing is not 
believing, but when faced with a spectre, neither is it meaningless nor even 
necessarily misleading. 
     Macbeth’s apparition is therefore better understood when located within the 
context of the wider Renaissance debate concerning the nature of visual perception.  
What he faces is scarcely an isolated problem: although the bloody dagger is very 
specific to the immediate events of the play, its challenge to the role of vision in 
determining the implications of an apparition exemplifies a much wider issue than 
that of his eyesight or his sanity.  The problem of the apparition vexes early modern 
theologians and demonologists alike, not least because of the challenges it poses in 
charting the nature and extent of experiential spiritual phenomena within mortal 
territory.  Stuart Clark points out that the heightened instability of the figure of the 
ghost during the Reformation meant that the “visual status” of apparitions became 
increasingly problematic: “as the nature and content of apparitions became more and 
more important, so their very identification as visual phenomena became less and 
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 Mallin argues convincingly that a number of these events are comedic: for instance, when Macbeth 
responds to Lennox’s account of terrifying supernatural events with the line, “’Twas a rough Night” 
(3.137).  At the same time though, Mallin acknowledges that such “comic possibilities or 
opportunities” arise alongside the generation of “terrors” because they “signify a system out of 
balance, and out of human control” (91).  
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less secure” (“The Reformation of the Eyes” 147, 149).  Both Protestant and Catholic 
theologians who engaged extensively with the debate regarding ghosts therefore had 
to address this problem through “a common epistemology of the visual sense and its 
deceptions” (147).   
     In this, they entered into a longstanding philosophical debate that stems back to 
Plato and Aristotle, both of whom prioritized vision as a sense that is crucial in 
facilitating knowledge.  Kinney usefully summarizes Plato’s approach as positioning 
“vision and hearing” as “the higher senses, those which exalted man on his 
intellectual journey toward understanding the natural and supernatural worlds” (2).  
Aristotle develops this line of inquiry with a focus on perception of the material 
world, observing, however, that vision goes beyond the immediate visual registering 
of material objects.  He not only differentiates between different types of physical 
vision (perception of light and dark being distinct from perception of colours, for 
instance) but also observes that “the sense-organ is capable of receiving the sensible 
object without its matter.  That is why even when the sensible objects are gone the 
sensings and imaginings continue to exist in the sense-organs” (“On the Soul” 677).  
This work is then carried further by later philosophers such as Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, who distinguishes between two types of “sense-perception”: that in which 
“the senses are actually stimulated by what they sense” (immutation) and that which 
is generated through the imagination “even in the absence of what has been sensed” 
(formation) (“The Ladder of Being” 142).  Kinney observes that Aquinas thereby 
allows for “verbal as well as intellectual reference to the initiating object” so that 
“this referential way of establishing meaning” can extend to objects that are not 
visible or present (5).
76
  Thus, well before the Renaissance, the senses are established 
as functioning in a complex relation between the physical or external stimulation of 
the senses and the intellectual and imaginative faculties. 
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 Although it is not immediately significant here, it is worth noting that many of the original threads 
of this debate have considerable resonance with modern, scientific research into the nature of vision.  
Kinney provides a useful summary of how scientific research into anatomy and physiology has 
exposed the individual nature of cognition and perception, demonstrating that what the individual sees 
is considerably more complex than merely registering what is physically present and is significantly 
influenced by “memory and experience” (21).  In “Visualizing Hamlet’s Ghost: The Spirit of Modern 
Subjectivity,” Alan Ackerman Jr. provides an interesting glimpse into eighteenth- and nineteenth-




     When Renaissance theologians such as Lavater and Le Loyer take up the issue of 
using vision to determine the validity and nature of apparitions, then, they call forth a 
series of pre-established problems in the relationship between vision and perception 
or comprehension.  In keeping with Plato’s work, they too subscribe to the classical 
prioritization of sight as a crucial sense in shaping knowledge, but face the problems 
that emerge through the variable means by which a specific vision may be generated.  
If, as Aquinas suggests, visual perception occurs not only when the senses are acted 
upon by an “external sensible object” but also when the imagination is stimulated 
through some other means of reference, there remains always the possibility of 
slippage: a blurring between the registering of outer images and the imaginative 
production of images with no external origin (“Consciousness” 227).  In the 1599 
English translation of A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight, the French 
physician André du Laurens claims that sight is “the most noble, perfect and 
admirable” of the senses, being “the most infallible . . . and that which least 
deceiveth” (13, 17).
77
  However, “the eye doth not onely see that which is without, 
but it seeth also that which is within, howsoever it may judge that same thing to be 
without” (91).  Here, vision is marked by the possibility of the brain’s fallibility in 
processing the information recorded through sight; and as he goes on to record 
extensively, man is “now and then so farre abased, and corrupted in his nature, with 
an infinit number of diseases” that the way in which he comprehends and interprets 
the information of his eyes is radically altered (81).  Visual perception takes place as 
much in the mind as it does through the organs of the eyes: so the sense that 
constitutes our most important means of acquiring information about the external 
world and facilitates also the imaginative faculties is subject to corruption through 
the very mechanisms by which it achieves this. 
     Lavater makes considerable capital of the unreliability of the sight when it comes 
to witnessing apparitions.  As he seeks to dissuade the reader from any form of belief 
in ghosts, he accounts for numerous means by which people might mistakenly see 
apparitions (several of which resonate with the circumstances of Macbeth’s vision of 
the dagger).  Drawing upon notions stemming back to Aristotle and even earlier, 
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 Du Laurens (or M. Andreas Laurentius, as his name appears on the title page) originally published 
this work in French in 1597 under the title of Discours de la conservation de la vene: des maladies 
mélancoliques des catarrhes, & de la vieillesse. 
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Lavater suggests that the susceptible include those who “are timorous,” “drinke wine 
immoderately,” are “Madde,” “have utterly loste the use of reason,” are 
“melancholic,” or “are weake of sight,” particularly when “feare and weaknesse of 
the syghte and of other sens[e] s méete togyther”.  In every instance, we are always 
to remember that “the outward eyes . . . can easily darken and dazell the inwarde 
sight of the mynde” (17, 13, 9, 16, 19, 141).  Such ideas have a firm place within the 
popular imagination as well as in theological debates concerning apparitions, and 
Shakespeare draws upon precisely such ideas when he has Hamlet worry that the 
devil may have taken on the shape of the ghost “Out of my weakenes, and my 
melancholy, / As he is very potent with such spirits” (Sig. G[1r]).
78
  It is not only the 
inner state that renders vision deceptive, however.  For Lavater, there is also the 
ever-present possibility that fraudulent characters (typically priests and monks) may 
dress up and create false apparitions to fool the onlooker, one of a number of 
nefarious ploys used by Catholics to indoctrinate or defraud the gullible.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, an apparition may be a divine vision, for God creates “many 
wonders in the aire, and in the earth, to the ende he may stir men up from idlenesse 
and bring them to true repentaunce” (17).  Alternatively, personified apparitions may 
in fact be “good Angels” or spirits sent from God to help, or, more probably, a 
demonic spirit attempting to endanger the soul (159, 163).
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     The difficulty that runs through all of these explanations is the central concern 
that vision is hazardous in its ability to impart certainty.
80
  It is still more so where it 
concurs with the “other sens[e]s,” for “then men fall into straunge and marvellous 
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 Du Laurens provides another example of this stating that the “imagination” of melancholics “is 
troubled by their physical constitution and “the minde”, but also “by the intercourse or medling of 
evill angells, which cause them oftentimes to foretell and forge very strange things in their 
imaginations” (100).  Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy supports the basic principle involved here, 
although he remains non-committal as to the cause of the connection between melancholy and the 
devil: “whether by obsession, or possession, or otherwise, I will not determine, t'is a difficult 
question” (Sig. E3[r]).  Gowland describes the association between melancholy and the sighting of 
apparitions as one means for physicians and theorists to “interpret the symptoms of melancholy and 
other mental illnesses without recourse to supernatural or occult factors,” although they often took the 
“middle ground” in respect to “debates between natural and occult interpretations of melancholy” 
(92).  Gowland cites Lavater’s arguments here as an example of contemporary perspectives on 
apparitions commonly stemming from a psychological cause, but makes a very substantial error in 
claiming that Lavater’s “overarching purpose” is “to prove the real existence of ghosts” (93). 
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 For more on the range of contemporary theologians’ perspectives as to the nature of such sightings, 
see Marshall’s Beliefs and the Dead, esp. p. 241.  
80
 For more on the absence of a clear division between natural, supernatural, and illusory causes of 
ghost-sightings, see Marshall’s Beliefs and the Dead, pp. 250-52.  Clark also explores these problems 
in Thinking with Demons, although primarily with reference to witchcraft rather than ghosts (192-94).  
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imaginations,” and will not “bee brought from theyr owne opinions by any meanes or 
reason” (19).  In this opinion, Lavater is endorsed by French Catholic demonologist 
Le Loyer.  However, Le Loyer, who works to rebut Lavater’s arguments against 
ghosts, addresses much more extensively the problems of vision as a means of 
measuring the nature and veracity of visible phenomena.  He endeavours to 
taxonomize the nature of visual perceptions, producing a series of categorizations 
designed to guide spiritual understanding of such matters.  It is a fraught endeavour, 
riven with inconsistencies and ambiguities.  To begin with, Le Loyer outlines five 
forms of vision.  He first identifies three types of vision within Saint Augustine’s 
teachings: physical vision, “which is done by the eyes of the body”; “Imagination,” 
through which “wee see nothing by the exteriour senses: but we imagine onely by 
some divine and heavenly inspiration”; and “Intellectuall” vision, which “is done 
onely in the understanding”.  In addition, he adds two categories of his own: dream 
visions that occur either “in full sleepe” or in a state “betweene sleeping and waking” 
(Sig. [B2v]).  Unsatisfied with the comprehensiveness of this list, he then observes 
that the scriptures “plainly expresse, That the vision of face to face” (that is, direct 
contact with God), “is farre divers and different from the other visions,” citing a 
scriptural example in which God indicates Moses might see him “face to face . . . 
without any impediment; but that other Prophets should see him onely by vision” 
(Sig. [B2v]). 
81
  Here, Le Loyer appears to refer to the first and second modes of 
vision respectively (physical vision and “Imagination”), but in order to differentiate 
the divine encounter, insists upon an unofficial sixth category that exceeds both.  
Like earlier philosophers, he recognizes that vision consists of more than the mere 
reception of physical images by the eye, extending the input of the mind or 
imagination to include also the unconscious (in sleep or the hypnotic state of partial 
waking) and an ambiguous form of spiritual sight. 
     By outlining the means by which such an image is obtained, Le Loyer attempts to 
provide a framework through which an apparition may be accurately classified and 
judged.  The difficulty, of course, is that the actual identification of which category a 
specific apparition falls into may not be anything like so clear in practice.  Moreover, 
Le Loyer immediately complicates the picture further by introducing “the Fantasie, 
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 The Biblical passage to which Le Loyer refers is Numbers 12.6-8. 
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which is . . .  an Imagination and impression of the Soule, of such formes and shapes 
as are knowne” or that can “bee imagined” or that are constructed based on 
information from others (Sig. [B2v]).  The first of these refers to the production of 
visual images that are familiar due to having been physically viewed at another time 
– effectively, visualized memories.  The second and third roughly duplicate but 
slightly blur the earlier categories of the Imagination and the Intellectual, as sights 
that are “not known nor seene, but imagined in the minde”.  The imagined sights “are 
for the most part spirituall, and without corporall substance,” whilst the constructed 
sights are generated and comprehended through a rational process in which the 
individual draws upon the “corporall” world to comprehend that which is 
“incorporall, and universall,” such as God’s existence (Sig. B3[r-v]).
82
   
     It is important to note here that although Le Loyer acknowledges the registering 
of physical sight as one source of vision – whether due to the perception of an object 
immediately before one’s eyes or the recollection of a previous instance of physical 
sight – he spends substantially more time considering the ways in which vision may 
be partly or wholly a product of mental construction.  Moreover, whether the latter is 
generated through the memory of a previous sighting, the present imagination (with 
or without divine help), or through a process of reception of information and 
subsequent intellectual construction, has no immediate bearing on the vision’s 
validity: it is more a methodological distinction than a register of veracity.  Le Loyer 
does move on to consider the possibility of sheer falsity of vision, but even then, it 
assists us very little.  In a substantial complication of his earlier taxonomy, he asserts 
that there are in fact “two sortes of Imagination, namely, one Intellectuall, and 
without corporall substance: The other sensible and corporall” (B3[r]).  Amidst this, 
we are plunged into the possibility of illusion.  The second of these categories, that 
which relies upon sensory information rather than reason, is either “false” and arises 
from “the imaginative power corrupted” or “the senses hurt and altred: or else it is 
true; and then it is that which we call a Specter” (Sig. B4[r]).
83
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 For more on Le Loyer’s approach to vision, see Clark’s “The Reformation of the Eyes,” which 
contextualizes Le Loyer’s arguments in this area within the broader historical and contemporary 
contexts of related work from other European philosophers and theologians – see esp. pp. 152-53. 
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 To be clear, Le Loyer’s definition of the spectre here is “a substance without a body, presenting it 
self sensibly unto men” – in other words, a spiritual entity that lacks corporeality because “Spirits” 
have only the option of  “clothing themselves with an ayrie bodie” and are therefore asomatous (B4[r-
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     There remains always the possibility too, of simple duplicity.  Le Loyer shares 
with Lavater a common concern in this matter and indeed borrows directly from the 
latter in order to repeat a cautionary tale in which disguised youths dance in a 
churchyard throughout the night, whilst “one of them . . . taking up the bone of a 
dead man, did play therewithall upon a beere of wood that was neere, by,” producing 
a noise “as if he had beene playing on a Tabor.”  As a result of the hoax, certain 
witnesses “reported, that they had seene a daunce of dead men: and that it was 
greatly to be doubted, that some plague and mortalitie would follow after it” (Sig. 
X2[r]).  In such an instance, corruption of the senses is not really the problem.  The 
central issue continues to be the problem of visual information being potentially 
inaccurate.  How one is to tell the difference, however, remains entirely problematic.  
As Clark observes, Le Loyer identifies “so many problems with what is supposed to 
be ‘the most excellent, lively, and active’ sense” that he ultimately renders it the least 
reliant of them all (“The Reformation of the Eyes” 153). 
     Le Loyer’s attempts to establish different categories of visual perception function 
as a means of navigating through the problems of aligning sensory information with 
received understandings.  The distinctions appear crucial in understanding and 
distinguishing between phenomenal experiences, thereby offering a kind of pseudo-
scientific basis for Le Loyer’s wider rebuttal of Lavater’s dismissal of ghosts in Of 
Ghostes and Spirites.  But Le Loyer’s taxonomy collapses even in the process of its 
construction, as he struggles to shore up the boundaries between the various 
categories of vision.  Even before we are told that spectral images may be a sign of 
sensual or mental corruption or of a genuine supernatural encounter, it is evident that 
the complexity of the relationship between physical, intellectual, psychic, and 
spiritual comprehension counteracts clear distinctions between the perceptions that 
they produce.  In Le Loyer’s framework, Macbeth’s vision of the dagger that 
imposes itself into his physical sight might equally belong to the categories of the 
Imagination or the Intellectual, and perhaps even to that of the dream state, given the 
strains under which Macbeth is labouring and the lateness of the hour.  If it is the 
Imagination, we are faced with the additional possibilities that the dagger is either 
                                                                                                                                          
v]).  Unsurprisingly, he therefore refers broadly to ghosts and spirits as supernatural entities in his use 
of the term “spectre” rather than to the more diffuse definition commonly used in deconstructive and 
psychoanalytic critical theory to denote technical processes of haunting and spectrality. 
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intellectually constructed and incorporeal, a corporeal vision arising from corrupted 
senses, or a corporeal vision which is a genuine manifestation of the supernatural.  
     Le Loyer’s treatment of this complex issue thus provides a useful snapshot of the 
complexities and problems of early modern approaches to vision and the import of 
the issue in a climate in which the nature of apparitions is integrally linked to 
theological imperatives.  In Le Loyer’s shifting schema of vision, Macbeth’s 
“Dagger of the Minde” has the potential to be as real (in one way or another) as the 
dagger he holds in his hand, an outright hallucination, or something somewhere in 
between, but this range of possibilities provides no means of assessing which it is.  
The dagger therefore demonstrates the principle of “flection” at work within the 
visual process, in a way that markedly disturbs the relation between the gazing 
subject and the object of vision.  The term flection evolved across the seventeenth 
century to indicate, amongst other things, “a turning of the eye in any direction” an 
“alteration, change, modification,” and “bending” or “curvature,” (OED “flection,” 
def. 1.d, 2, 1.a).  The first two of these definitions are now obsolete, but if re-
assimilated into the action of gazing, suggest that the bending of the eye towards the 
object of vision might also imply the potential for some kind of transformation 
therein.  It disturbs the assumption that the act of looking provides the gazer with a 
true and accurate image of an exterior object and opens up the possibility that the 
flexures involved in directing the gaze and receiving an image in return may also 
generate warp.  Worse still, they may not generate warp, but rather expose 
discontinuities and maladjustment already present within the relation between gazing 
subject and the object, thereby threatening, by extension, the relation between the 
subject and the wider exterior world.   
     This is why Macbeth’s vision of the dagger is often interpreted as a symptom of a 
greater disorder, whether it is by Lady Macbeth, who considers both the dagger and 
the subsequent sighting of Banquo’s ghost to be “the very painting of your feare,” or 
critics such as Kenneth Muir, who describes the vision as “clearly an hallucination” 
(Shakespeare 3.142; Muir, “Folklore and Shakespeare” 233).  Such readings invoke a 
psychological cause for what Macbeth sees, but in doing so, they expose that vision 
is not merely a vessel for garnering information but a medium through which subject 
and world emerge in a reciprocal, interactive relation.  Clark indicates that mirroring 
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was strongly associated with the spectre in Renaissance Europe, to the point that one 
French scholar had “suggested that all apparitions and spectres could be attributed to 
the natural effects of mirrors” (“The Reformation of the Eyes” 148).
84
  This claim is 
curiously inscribed with the reverse reflection to that which it endeavours to 
propound: if mirroring calls the spectre into view, it is perhaps not always through 
deception within the light or the physical environment, but through another kind of 
“natural” reflection, that of the gazing subject himself.  Here, we may recall again 
Derrida’s “visor effect”: this “spectral someone other looks at us, we feel ourselves 
being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on 
our part, according to an absolute anteriority . . . and asymmetry, according to an 
absolutely unmasterable disproportion” (Specters 6-7).  To the extent that Macbeth 
looks at and perceives the spectral dagger, the dagger anticipates him, exposing 
something (we are not sure what) about his inner state and his functioning within the 
world he is attempting to comprehend.     
     This may seem an unusual observation to make about an inanimate object, but 
that is precisely because this is the one thing the dagger is not.  Invisible to the 
watching audience, the dagger cannot be fixed as illusion or object but instead 
becomes the product and locus of a radical problematization of the nature of 
perception. Zimmerman suggests that the dagger evokes “an eerie agency that is not 
included in the signified of its corporeal referent” (the other dagger that he physically 
draws): “Macbeth reaches a breach between his two modes of seeing,” (the evidence 
of his eyes as well as that of his other senses), but in endeavouring to argue that 
“There’s no such thing” he “locates the crux of his dilemma.  There is no such thing 
as the imagined dagger, but it exists none the less in some frame of vision” (177).  
While the dagger has no logical or verifiable existence, its entry into his visual field 
is real and problematizes sensory perception and cognition.  This is an instance of 
what Coddon describes as the integral relationship between the “problematics of 
Macbeth’s identity” and “the problematics of spectacular identification: beings as 
well as objects are interrogated, named, and renamed, but they resist fixity” (491).  In 
the dagger scene, the indeterminacy of the object that Macbeth sees shows that visual 
perception functions as a register of the perceiver as much as of the external world, 
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 The scholar to which Clark refers is Jean Pena, a Mathematics professor who made this claim in the 
“preface to the first Latin edition of Euclid” in 1557 (Clark 148). 
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but refuses a clear correlation between the two so that neither functions simply as a 
reflection of the other’s state.   
     In this respect, the dagger scene is a duplicate of the banquet scene in which 
Macbeth is the only one able to see Banquo’s ghost.  Instead of the affirmation of the 
political and “social hierarchy” that the banquet is designed to provide, the scene 
produces a sharp descent into disorder as Macbeth is confronted with the spectre of 
his victim, alone, in a crowded room (Coddon 494).  Worse still, Macbeth appears to 
have summoned him, although it is certainly not his intent.  John Jump highlights the 
fact that, prior to the murder, Macbeth had pressed Banquo to “Faile not our Feast” 
and his sighting of the ghost during the banquet directly follows Macbeth’s 
disingenuous lament that the company is deprived of “the grac’d person of our 
Banquo” (“Shakespeare’s Ghosts” 340; Shakespeare 3.139, 3.141).  This is scarcely 
wish fulfilment: Macbeth does not want to see the ghost, but it is as though it 
somehow emerges through a direct connection to the power of Macbeth’s language.  
At the same time, we certainly cannot separate it from his psychological state, its 
appearance functioning at once as the cause, reification, and reflection of his 
worsening psychological state.  That Macbeth sees the ghost is indisputable: what it 
means that he sees the ghost is impossible to determine.  Greenblatt observes that the 
latter provides “two starkly conflicting possibilities: either the apparition is 
something real in the universe of the play – the spirit of the murdered Banquo . . . or 
it is the hallucinatory production of Macbeth’s inward terror” (Hamlet in Purgatory 
190-91).  It would perhaps be more accurate to suggest that the play does not allow 
any polarisation of possibilities but instead problematizes the nature of perception to 
the extent that almost any configuration of the relation between the watcher and the 
spectre is possible and therefore none is endorsed.   
     One of the problems that Macbeth faces, of course, is that in both incidents he is 
alone in his perception of the spectre.  This is a problem that faces Hamlet also.  It 
has attracted much critical comment that Old Hamlet’s ghost, initially witnessed by 
Barnardo, Marcellus, Horatio, and Hamlet (and thereby taking up a firm position 
within the visual plane) is visible to Hamlet alone when it enters Gertrude’s closet.  
In response to Hamlet’s question as to whether she sees nothing, Gertrude replies: 
“Nothing at all, yet all that is I see” (Sig. [I3v]).  Muir implies that it is a figment of 
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Hamlet’s imagination, pointing out that “the Ghost’s words about Gertrude are a 
reflection of Hamlet’s attempt to persuade her to repent” (233).  In a more specific 
line of argumentation, Greenblatt, persisting with the idea that the ghost functions as 
one of Hamlet’s “memory traces,” comments that “Gertrude sees and hears nothing 
or, rather, more devastatingly, she sees and hears what exists” (225).  Yet her failure 
to see the ghost cannot firmly signal anything of the sort, given the popular 
Elizabethan belief that ghosts are not always visible to everyone in their presence.
85
   
     Scott Huelin argues more persuasively that the ghost may be the product of 
“Hamlet’s brain and yet . .. not a hallucination, a manifest psychotic break.”  He 
points out that “one of the key experiences within meditative piety is what is known 
as the memorial phantasm, the image that appears before the mind’s eye unbidden 
yet prompted by sensory or intellectual stimuli” (“Reading, Writing, and Memory in 
Hamlet” 39).  Huelin’s point is helpful here in further establishing the complexity of 
the relation between viewer and (spectral) image.  It suggests the construction of the 
image to be more than a matter of merely capturing external information or 
projecting outwardly an internal state and instead gestures towards a reciprocity 
between the image and the gazing subject that allows for vision to extend the purely 
material realm.  This effect is further compounded by the stage direction that requires 
the ghost to appear onstage so that, whilst Gertrude cannot see the ghost, the 
audience can.  With the ghost visibly present before our own eyes and audibly 
issuing Hamlet with instructions, we might as well question Gertrude’s powers of 
perception as those of Hamlet.  As in the banquet scene of Macbeth, the only thing of 
which we may be certain is that looking is no guarantee of ascertaining objective 
information about one’s external environment, for the nature of the returned image is 
                                                 
85
 Bradley supports this point also, commenting that critics who interpret the ghost purely as an 
“hallucination” are failing to take into account that a ghost in this period is “able for any sufficient 
reason to confine its manifestation to a single person in a company” (136).  In “Visualizing Hamlet’s 
Ghost: The Spirit of Modern Subjectivity,” Ackerman argues that Bradley’s explanation is 
unconvincing, although he gives no reason for this and it is well supported by evidence of Elizabethan 
ghostlore.  For instance, in The Discoverie of Witchcraft, Scot complains about the longstanding belief 
that ghosts “never appeare to the whole multitude, seldome to a few, and most commonlie to one 
alone” (535).  Ackerman’s own argument is rather more strained, suggesting in very specific terms 
that “the walls of Elsinore serve as a metaphor for the parameters of the self” and Gertrude’s closet as 
a movement “deeper into the problem of subjectivity,” which then sees Hamlet barring her from 
further intrusion into his own inner world (130).  Like Greenblatt, he assumes Gertrude’s perspective 
to be “the more empirical,” although his evidence to support this point is somewhat tenuous (131).  
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as dependent upon the position and inner state of the gazer as it is upon the object of 
perception. 
     Shakespeare exploits a similar device in Julius Caesar, when he has Caesar’s 
ghost appear to Brutus while his attendants sleep.  This leaves Brutus unable to gain 
corroboration of the ghost’s existence from his companions.  Although he is sitting in 
a chair holding a book at the time, it is possible that the exhausted Brutus has dreamt 
the whole thing in the state “betweene sleeping and waking” that Le Loyer describes 
(Sig. [B2v]).  In “The Nature of an Insurrection: Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar,” 
Colbert Kearney claims the apparition to be a “hideous hallucination” generated by 
Brutus’s meditation upon “his own death” (149).  He also describes it as “an 
objectification” of Brutus’s guilty “conscience” (150).  We can scarcely be 
thoroughly convinced of this though when the ghost simultaneously enters into other 
recognisable constructions for such visitations.  Classical ghosts often make their 
appearances to those who are sleeping, leaving the distinction unclear between a 
dream and a communication between the dead and the living.  Given that the ghost is 
appearing in a play purporting to convey a crucial historical moment within classical 
Rome, it is at least partially assimilated within a classical framework from the outset.  
We are reminded, for instance, of Plutarch’s historical report that Caesar’s death is 
preceded by numerous supernatural portents.  As in Macbeth, Shakespeare exploits 
Plutarch’s imagery to the full, telling us that “The noise of Battell hurtled in the 
Ayre: / Horsses do neigh, and dying men did grone, / And Ghosts did shrieke and 
squeale about the streets” (3.117).
86
  This is a device that Shakespeare repeats in 
Hamlet by having Horatio recollect precisely the same historical accounts of 
supernatural portents prior to Ceasar’s death in an attempt to contextualize the 
appearance of Old Hamlet’s ghost: “starres with traines of fier, and dewes of blood / 
Disasters in the sunne; and the moist starre . . . Was sicke almost to doomesday with 
eclipse” (Sig. [B2v]).  Caesar’s ghost has a well-established basis in classical history 
and mythology. 
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 The relevant passage in Plutarch includes accounts of “fires in the element, and spirites running up 
and downe in the night,” “divers men . . . seene going up and donwe in fire,” “a slave . . . that did cast 
a marvelous burning flame out of his hande,” and Caesar going to bed with his wife, only to have “all 
the windowes and dores of his chamber flying open” to reveal strange lights (792-93). 
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     At the same time, this is not a particularly classicized ghost.  Pearlman points out 
that the ghost is innovative for this reason: he “possesses an appealing, matter-of-
fact, almost ghost-next-door  quality.  He is not bloody, he does not shriek, he does 
not deal in hyperbole or injunction . . . and he speaks in relaxed tones and in 
quotidian language” (74-75).  Moreover, despite its classical setting, the play 
functions largely within an Elizabethan context and Brutus’s reaction alone is 
sufficient to indicate that this is an environment in which the presence of ghosts is 
neither familiar nor comprehensible.  Thus, the whole difficulty is that neither we, 
nor Brutus, have an adequate frame of reference for the ghost’s appearance to 
account with any certainty for the nature of the vision. Whilst Brutus initially 
protests that it is “the weaknesse of mine eyes / That shapes this monstrous 
Apparition,” we have no means of ascertaining whether his vision is genuinely 
flawed or accurate (3.126).  The apparition might signify a genuine ghost, a 
projection of his conscience, a prophetic visitation, a deception produced by an evil 
spirit, a psychological disorder.  The event wholly disrupts any possibility of 
determining the truth through vision; and the uncertainty of Brutus’s connection to 
what he is seeing renders us unable to determine the state of his present existence and 
inner functioning in relation to the external world. 
     By drawing the figure of the ghost into this epistemological problem, such 
episodes render strange not only the ghost, but also the human.  Shakespeare 
repeatedly exploits the instability of existing understandings of perception as a means 
of acquiring knowledge in an area that is critical to the functioning of the inner being 
within the external world they inhabit.  Le Loyer’s schematization of vision seeks to 
establish a means by which to understand the variations within visual perception in 
order to comprehend the material and spiritual worlds; Lavater seeks to undermine 
all certainty so that the only option is to read all sensory information through a 
particular, theologically-informed understanding of what is and is not possible.  
Shakespeare, in search of good drama and perhaps a broader understanding of the 
world that his characters inhabit, instead relinquishes all hold upon certainty and 
enables the proliferation of existing understandings to escalate to the point that 
certainty is no longer possible. 
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     Shakespeare is by no means the only playwright to produce this effect, although it 
might well be true that he is the most successful.  While the results may be less 
startling than in plays such as Hamlet and Macbeth, John Marston’s Antonio’s 
Revenge similarly exploits disparities in the visual plane to render the ghost’s 
presence more disruptive in both its ontological functioning and its relation to the 
living.  As Rick Bowers observes in “John Marston at the ‘Mart of Woe’: the 
‘Antonio’ Plays”, the play is disruptive from start to finish in its excesses.  While this 
means that it often “overleaps boundaries of convention” and “expectation,” its 
incorporation of a glut of traditional representations of supernatural apparitions 
produces a ghost that is more than the sum of its spectral parts (15).
87
  Andrugio’s 
ghost is in many respects a stock Senecan-style figure with an overtly corporeal 
presence, but its shifting place within other characters’ visual perception differs from 
that of other pseudo-classical revenants.  Antonio first sees his father’s ghost when it 
appears, along with Feliche’s ghost, in the form of a dream.  Antonio describes the 
dream thus: 
  
                                               to my slumbring powers,  
          Two meager ghosts made apparition.  
          The on[e]’s breast seem’d fresh pauncht with bleeding wounds: 
          Whose bubling gore sprang in frighted eyes.  
          The other ghost assum’d my fathers shape:  
          Both cride Revenge (Sig. [B2v]). 
 
The audience can be in little doubt that these apparitions are in some way the 
products of these characters’ deaths, for, unlike Antonio, we know that his father has 
been poisoned and Feliche stabbed.   Moreover, Antonio wakes to witness the 
affirmation of his dream by a raft of ominous phenomena, including “The verge of 
heaven . . . ringd with flames” and a “blazing Comet,” indicating, as in the previous 
plays, a catastrophic breach of the natural and accompanying supernatural disruption 
(Sig. B3[r]).  What Antonio has seen may be the returned spirit of the dead, returned 
in classical fashion to demand revenge, or a kind of imaginative vision that registers 
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an external state of affairs.  In the absence of any physical act of perception, or 
indeed any external object, we can only be sure that Antonio’s unconscious vision 
has somehow exposed to him some kind of material and spiritual truth about his 
father’s murder.   
     In its subsequent appearances, Andrugio’s ghost takes up an independent presence 
onstage, but adopts a curiously shifting presence within the space of the living.  In 
Act Three, Scene One, Antonio calls out to his father’s spirit and the ghost promptly 
arrives to supply him with crucial information as to his mother’s guilt and his 
fiance’s chastity, and to incite revenge: 
 
          Thy pangs of anguish rip my cerecloth up: 
          And loe the ghoast of ould Andrugio 
          Forsakes his coffin, Antonio, revenge –  
          I was impoyson’d by Piero’s hand: 
          Revenge my bloode; take spirit gentle boy: 
          Revenge my bloode.  Thy Mellida, is chaste: 
          Onely to frustrate thy pursuite in love, 
          Is blaz’d unchaste.  Thy mother yeelds consent 
          To be his wife, and give his bloode a sonne, 
          That made her husbandlesse, and doth complot 
          To make her sonlesse (Sig. [E3v] – E4[r]). 
 
Here too, we are faced with uncertainty, for Antonio is given no response to the 
ghost’s speech and it remains up to interpretation as to whether he sights the figure 
before it departs from the stage and the scene ends.  Evidently, he does register its 
words in some way, for in the following scene, he shifts from his former melancholic 
gloom to a homicidal rage, declaring “May I be cursed by my fathers ghost, / And 
blasted with incensed breath of heaven, / If my heart beat on ought but vengeance” 
([E4v]-F1[r]).  He subsequently hears Andrugio as a disembodied voice, crying 
“murder” along with the voice of Feliche, and in the third scene witnesses his 
presence directly.  In both of these scenes, his perception of the ghost is now clear as 
he responds in each instance with an assurance of his commitment to revenge.   
     At this point, it remains plausible that the apparition is a product of Antonio’s 
imagination, or at least the imagined emodiment of his earlier dream: but in the 
fourth scene, the ghost appears visibly not only to Antonio, but also to Andrugio’s 
widow, Maria.  As in Hamlet, Andrugio invades his wife’s bedchamber and then 
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chastises her (quite unjustly) for her supposed inconstancy after his death.
88
  After 
yet another outline of the need for revenge, he then physically draws the curtains to 
her bedchamber.  He thus endeavours to achieve symbolically what Old Hamlet 
cannot – blocking access to his wife’s bed.  Pearlman claims that Hamlet and Locrine 
are the only Elizabethan plays in which the ghost who calls for revenge also 
participates in the action; however, Andrugio’s interference with the living directly 
parallels Old Hamlet’s intrusion and considerably exceeds the traditional Senecan-
style revenge tragedy in which the ghost remains removed from onstage events and 
interacts only with the audience (77).  Indeed the ghost is, in Jump’s words, “the 
busiest of all busy apparitions” (344).  Andrugio’s ghost is able to make its presence 
felt both visibly and invisibly and to interact with material objects.  Subsequently, the 
ghost makes a further, solitary appearance to the audience in order to deliver a 
classically Senecan soliloquy and a final appearance in which he cannot be seen by 
anyone onstage, appearing amidst a whole selection of players who remain oblivious 
to his presence (Sig. [K1v] – K3[r]).
89
  (Marston is apparently anxious to capitalise 
on the figure’s dramatic appeal, perhaps in an effort to outdo the ghost of the Ur-
Hamlet or Shakespeare’s Hamlet.)   
     In its shifting relation to the realm of visual perception, the ubiquitous ghost is not 
particularly radical, in that individual aspects of its behaviour and appearance 
function in accordance with a range of classical and folk beliefs (not to mention 
Elizabethan staging practices) concerning ghostly norms.  It is not unusual that the 
ghost should not be visible to some or all of the living.  Its initial appearance in the 
dream is a standard means for a classical ghost to contact the living, and its desire to 
secure justice in order that it may be laid to rest is in keeping with the social 
functions of ghosts within popular and Catholic beliefs since the medieval period 
(not to mention any number of earlier Elizabethan revenge tragedies).  What is 
unusual is the sheer range of means by which Andrugio’s ghost asserts its presence 
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 Existing evidence indicates that Shakespeare wrote Julius Caesar in 1599, although it was not 
printed until the first folio in 1623 (Humphreys 1).   Antonio’s Revenge was entered into the 
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overview, see Gair 12-13 and James Taylor’s “Hamlet’s Debt to Sixteenth-Century Satire.”   
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and its oscillation between physically intervening in the affairs of the living and 
being totally invisible.  While it does not explicitly problematize the functioning of 
the living within the world they inhabit in the same way that we see in Hamlet and 
Macbeth, we cannot quite assimilate its presence satisfactorily into any existing 
framework for understanding the supernatural.  It creates an environment in which 
the act of looking is out of joint with both the registering of another being’s presence 
and the acquisition of knowledge.  The task of living is informed by, and interfered 
with by the dead, even where the dead remain outside of their awareness. 
     In Antonio’s Revenge, this creates no great disruption or unease for the characters, 
as they go about their business either unaware of the meddling ghost or, as in the 
bedchamber scene, oddly unperturbed by it.  The exception to this is in the ghost’s 
influence upon Antonio, but even then, Antonio shows no great difficulty in 
comprehending or accepting the ghost’s presence.  The degree to which the ghost 
might evoke a sense of the uncanny is therefore unclear, although it could certainly 
be heightened in performance.  In Macbeth, the uncanny arises quite explicitly 
through the epistemological issues that disturb Macbeth’s understanding of what he 
perceives.  Macbeth’s question “Is this a Dagger, which I see before me” tests out 
much the same problem as Lavater’s rotation between accounts of the supernatural 
that are false and those that are genuine, witnessed by “men of good corage, and such 
as have bin perfectly in their wits” (88).  Because Shakespeare’s dagger episode ends 
with Macbeth hearing a bell – the sound of which he interprets as the signal for him 
to proceed on to his murder of Duncan – Kinney argues that “Macbeth has 
surrendered vision, as at times unreliable, to sound, which may not be.  In a 
transformation of cognition from hallucination to acknowledged sound,” the ringing 
of the bell, which is to be taken as real because a stage direction calls for it to be 
heard, “is overcome by a further hallucinated meaning giving it full and final 
agency” as Macbeth perceives that “‘the Bell invites me’”.  Hence, although the 
sound of the bell is present (unlike the physical bell itself), it “is compounded with a 
sound that calls even further attention to its absence” (Kinney 78; Shakespeare 
3.136).  Kinney’s reading elides a portion of Macbeth’s speech, however.  Macbeth 
does not really trade vision for sound because he has already talked himself out of 
believing in the dagger twelve lines before the bell rings.  
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     Moreover, it is by no means clear that the sound of the bell has more validity than 
the vision of the dagger.  It is true that other appeals to the senses are often accorded 
some epistemological priority over vision, despite the greater attention that the latter 
commands.  Le Loyer, for instance, claims that “Feeling, Smelling, Tasting and 
Hearing” are generally unaltered “by maladies or sickenesse” and are difficult to 
deceive, “especially the Touching: the which being dispersed and (as it were) spread 
abroade throughout all the members, is esteemed to be more certaine than the sight” 
(Sig. [R1v]).  This view would seem to endorse Macbeth’s attempt to dismiss the 
dagger after he discovers that its “form” is “as palpable” as that of his own knife, but 
he is unable to grasp it.  Finding a disparity between what he sees and what he feels, 
Macbeth complains that “Mine Eyes are made the fooles o’th’other Sences, / Or else 
worth all the rest” (3.136).   On the other hand, the other senses do remain fallible.  
We cannot rule out that Macbeth’s eyes are worth all the rest of his senses, that they 
are registering something that is in some way a visible form of truth.  Even Le Loyer 
acknowledges that the other senses are still corruptible.  He discusses hearing with 
concern for the prospect that we may be “deceived in taking things naturall for other 
than they be” and complains that the devil “adhereth unto soundes . . . and 
insinuateth himselfe into smelles and odours” (Sig. [Ii3v]).  Furthermore, there 
remains always the possibility that other senses, like the sight, may “bee both 
violated and wounded,” and that, worse still, the “phantasie” – which offers the 
means to use rational perception to overcome sensory flaws – may be similarly 
affected (Sig. [Aa1v]).   
     The point here is not merely that it is impossible to produce a firm means of 
“reality-testing” (as Freud calls it) for any of the supernatural phenomena in 
Macbeth, but rather that the example of Macbeth’s dagger demonstrates that the 
relation of the spectre to the senses, and more specifically to the visual plane, is a 
crucial element in its spectrality (“The Uncanny” 249).  This is not to suggest that a 
spectre is only a spectre if it is visible, but rather that the visible spectre’s function is 
not extraneous to its visibility: that is to say, its visibility is not coincidental to, or 
isolable from, that which renders it spectral.  Of course, this is true generally because 
spectrality is not something that claims an independent or material existence in the 
first instance but instead takes up a position within and between the structures of 
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human knowledge and therefore perception.  But it is also to do with a more specific 
relation between the gazing subject and the apparition.  The process of flection 
suggests that the gaze is often transformative – that the image returned in response to 
the gaze is not a register of the material “reality” of the object but rather of the object 
in relation to the subject’s perception.  It follows that the emergence of spectrality 
within the image is indicative of a specific kind of relation between what governs 
and generates perception (the inner “being”) and the apparition or object.  In 
particular, it suggests that where the apparition enters the uncanny, where it becomes 
truly spectral, is in the process of reflection. 
 
Re/flections 
     It is clear that what the spectre renders visible is that which cannot or should not 
ordinarily be seen.  This is not just the case in terms of the way in which it breaches 
our understanding of the material world of objects but, more specifically, in its 
capacity to expose visibly that which has no place within the visual realm and in so 
doing to render it uncanny.  Freud expresses surprise (although not disagreement) at 
Schelling’s notion that “everything is unheimlich that ought to have remained secret 
and hidden but has come to light” (“The Uncanny” 225).  In terms of the spectre, 
though, this conception is particularly apposite: the word itself is contingent upon the 
notion of drawing forth and illuminating that which is not ordinarily subject to 
visibility.  The OED’s definitions for the spectre include “an unreal object of 
thought; a phantasm of the brain,” “an object or source of dread or terror, imagined 
as an apparition,” and “an image or phantom produced by reflection or other natural 
cause,” (OED "spectre," def. 1, 3).  All three constructions are closely related.  In 
having no identifiable locus within the physical realm – no objective, material 
presence – the spectre must be in some way a product of thought or imagination.  
Yet, if it is seen, it is real, insofar as it is a genuine object of perception.  In its 
incorporeality, it testifies to the existence of something that is disturbingly both 
perceptible and incomprehensible.  In doing so, it exposes that, as the product of 
184 
 
perception, the spectre functions as a mirror for the gazing subject.  It returns the 
gaze of its audience in an act of re-flection.
90
 
     Derrida’s outline of the spectre’s visibility is particularly helpful here: 
     
          the spectre, as its name indicates, is the frequency of a certain visibility.  But  
          the visibility of the invisible.  And visibility, by its essence, is not seen, which  
          is why it remains epekeina tes ousias, beyond the phenomenon or beyond  
          being.  The specter is also, among other things, what one imagines, what one    
          thinks one sees and which one projects – on an imaginary screen where there is  
          nothing to see.  Not even the screen sometimes, and a screen always has, at  
          bottom, in the bottom or background that it is, a structure of disappearing  
          apparition.  But now one can no longer get any shut-eye, being so intent to  
          watch out for the return.  Whence the theatricalization of speech itself and the  
          spectacularizing speculation on time.  The perspective has to be reversed, once  
          again: ghost or revenant, sensuous-non-sensuous, visible-invisible, the specter  
          first of all sees us.  (Specters of Marx 125)   
 
Derrida’s deployment of the term “frequency” draws the usually auditory conception 
of the nature or pitch of a sensory experience into the visual arena, so that it invokes 
not only recurrence – although the sense of a repetition remains significant – but also 
the idea that the visibility of the spectre occurs at a particular “wavelength”.  It 
suggests that the point at which the spectre becomes visible is the point at which 
specular conditions propel it into the requisite frequency, rather than the marker of 
some kind of ontological movement of the spectre entering into “being.”  At the 
same time, the spectre is that which occurs where vision exceeds being, arising in the 
absence of any known phenomena.  Thus the spectre destroys any fixed correlation 
between phenomenal existence and visual perception.  This is not a critique of the 
unreliability of vision.  Rather, it is an exposure of the fact that what is seen (the 
object) and what is (the gazing subject) are neither unrelated nor systematically 
linked, but function within an interdependent and shifting relation with one another 
that troubles the very basis of comprehension.  The act of looking, rather than 
retrieving information about the outer world, returns an ungraspable reflection of the 
inner subject who gazes.  The sense of the “disappearing apparition,” the spectre that 
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must always return and for which one must always watch, is that which 
paradoxically eludes the gaze and yet also returns it.    
     Thus, the relation between the subject and the spectre invokes and simultaneously 
disrupts the principles of reflection.  Of the definitions listed in the OED, the 
following are particularly significant here: 
 
          2.a. Chiefly Anat. and Med. The action of bending, turning, or folding back,  
          recurvation; a state of being bent or folded back. . . . 
          c. The action of turning back from a point; return, retrogression. . . .  
          3.a. The action of a mirror or other smooth or polished surface in reflecting an     
          image; the fact or phenomenon of an image being produced in this way. . . . 
          b. An image produced by or seen in a reflective surface, esp. a person's image    
          in a mirror. . . .  
          c. fig. and in extended use. A depiction or reproduction . . . . an embodiment.   
          (OED  “reflection”)   
 
In all of these conceptualizations, reflection is predicated upon the opposition of two 
terms, assuming an originary source and a secondary reflection.  In the first two 
definitions, there is a non-specific return of an object that, in order to be “folded 
back” or turned, relies upon the assumption of an originary movement that was in 
some sense straight or linear. In the following two, an independent object is 
duplicated as an image via the reflective surface of the mirror in a process that is 
specific to the act of perception: the eye of the subject gazing into the mirror is 
turned back towards itself, producing the simultaneous reversal of the gaze as well as 
a visual duplication of the original.  This process is implicit also in the last definition, 
which, in referring to a secondary “reproduction” or re-presentation, assumes the 
prior existence of an original.  Taking these various manifestations together, 
reflection implies a recurrence or reversal, or a potential restoration of the seemingly 
originary state of flection.
91
  This process offers an enticing and duplicitous promise 
of truth, providing entry into a seemingly contained system of signification that 
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promises to yield a one-to-one correlation between what is and what is reflected.  In 
functioning thus, the mirror appears to be a perfectly positioned, flat surface in which 
the source is reflected without distortion.  However, this ideal is itself illusory, for 
the reflection is dependent upon the gaze, the positioning of the gazing subject in 
relation to the mirror, the variable process of perception, and the integrity of the 
mirror itself.  The image returned is infinitely variable in accordance with these 
factors.  Hence, the reflection may be duplicitous in two senses, in its production of a 
double and in its potential to dupe.   
     This problem is made evident in Julius Caesar, when Cassius asks Brutus 
whether he can see his own face and Brutus responds in the negative: “No Cassius: / 
For the eye sees not it selfe but by reflection, / By some other things.”  Brutus 
appears to differentiate between self and reflection, suggesting that they are not 
synonymous.  However, with a hidden agenda to pursue, Cassius insists upon a direct 
correlation if only he chooses the proper mirror:  
 
               since you know, you cannot see your selfe  
          So well as by Reflection; I your Glasse,  
          Will modestly discover to your selfe  
          That of your selfe, which you yet know not of. (3.110)   
 
Kearney suggests that, in positioning himself as Brutus’s mirror, Cassius – who is 
“envious of Caesar” – reflects a potentially matching envy in Brutus (“The Nature of 
an Insurrection” 145).  We might add to this that Cassius has already inadvertently 
exposed the hidden danger of the mirror, in lamenting that Brutus has hitherto had 
“no such Mirrors, as will turne / Your hidden worthinesse into your eye, / That you 
might see your shadow” (3.110).  Arthur Humphreys glosses the word “shadow” as a 
“reflected image” in the 2008 Oxford edition of the play; similarly, David Daniell 
signals in the 1998 Arden edition that it connotes a “reflection” and compares it 
directly to the Narcissus myth, suggesting that it appears “in a context of questioned 
self-knowledge” (Humphreys 105; Daniell 167).  Daniell also acknowledges that the 
shadow “carries a sense of out of the light, as Brutus’ look has been veiled” (167).  
However, by the time the play was written in the late sixteenth century, the term had 
a whole host of significations, including “the dark figure” produced on a surface 
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when a body intercepts the light; something that is “fleeting or ephemeral”; 
something that has “an unreal appearance; a delusive semblance or image”; “a 
spectral form” or “phantom,” and “one that constantly accompanies or follows 
another like a shadow” (OED “shadow,” def. 4.a, 4.c, 6.a, 7, 8).   
     It is worth noting that the first of these definitions includes the additional qualifier 
that the shadowy image of the “intercepting body” may be “approximately exact or 
more or less distorted”: this quality is precisely what manifests itself within the 
instability of Cassius’s choice of word.  Whilst Cassius insists that his accurate 
mirroring will expose Brutus’s “hidden worthinesse” to himself, his choice of 
language suggests a host of other qualities it may simultaneously reveal, 
foreshadowing the darkness and treachery that sees Brutus betray and murder Caesar.  
Even this last signification of shadowing or following a person has resonance here, 
for in allowing Cassius to manipulate him, Brutus can no more escape his role as an 
inferior follower of Caesar after the murder than he could before.  After the death, he 
is still forced to present himself to Antony as “I, that did love Caesar”; he must still 
grant Caesar “all true Rites, and lawfull Ceremonies” because “It shall advantage 
more, then do us wrong”; he finds it necessary to follow Caesar’s ghost to Philippi 
(3.120).  His political position, his understanding of his own behaviour, and his 
course of action remain dependent upon his treatment of Caesar even in death.  The 
mirror, in this instance, exposes more than what the gazing subject wishes to see: but 
crucially, what it exposes is dependent upon the positioning of the gazing subject, for 
if Brutus’s “mirror” exposes such darkness, its reflection fails to be received thus by 
Brutus himself.  When Caesar’s ghost subsequently appears to Brutus after the 
murder, Brutus might initially blame the vision upon “the weakenesse of mine eyes”, 
but the spectre clearly identifies itself as a more accurate reflection than that 
produced by Cassius (3.126): 
 
          BRUTUS.  Art thou any thing? 
          Art thou some God, some Angell, or some Divell,  
          That mak’st my blood cold, and my haire to stare? 
          Speake to me, what thou art. 
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          GHOST.  Thy evill Spirit Brutus? (3.126)
92
    
 
     Greenblatt suggests that this last line generates “the odd sense not only that this 
haunting is for Brutus alone but also that it was somehow a part of him, his evil 
spirit” (Hamlet in Purgatory 183).  More specifically, it holds up a mirror to this part 
of him.  Kearney, who distinguishes between the ghost of Caesar (as visible 
apparition) and the “spirit . . . of Caesar” (whose lingering power influences the 
wider events of the play), identifies the last line of this passage as the ghost 
“identifying itself as Brutus’ evil spirit”.  That is to say, it is “Brutus . . . recognizing 
the Caesar in himself” (“The Nature of an Insurrection” 150).  For Kearney, this 
complicates the “hallucination” to provide an “insight into Brutus’s own character” 
as he “confront[s] the Caesar, the autocrat, in his own psyche.”  Brutus now becomes 
“doomed by such self-destructive knowledge” and proceeds rapidly towards securing 
his own death (150).  Thus, the spectre functions as both product and reflection of 
Brutus’s tarnished soul.  I would argue, however, that this psychological effect is not 
separable or distinct from the implication that the ghost is also “Thy evill Spirit” 
because it is the spirit that has been rendered a ghost at Brutus’s hands.  It is not only 
an outward, embodied projection of an inner state, but equally an outer phenomenon 
– visible, after all, to the audience as well as to Brutus – that troubles the distinction 
between the two.  By turning the process of re/flection into one of mediation, it 
refuses the originary structures that would see Brutus’s inner being functioning as the 
source of both the flexion and reflection.  Instead, it inscribes the image of each 
within the other, so that the ghostly image is as much generative of Brutus’s inner 
self as it is reflective of it.  If “the specter first of all sees us,” it does not do so in the 
sense that it somehow captures an originary or pre-existing interior state of existence, 
but rather turns the act of perception into a fleeting glimpse of the shifting relation 
between inner and outer constructions (Derrida, Specters 125). 
     It is worth noting here that, although Shakespeare follows his historical source 
closely, his adaptation of his predecessor plays an essential part in heightening the 
uncanniness of the interaction between the two figures in these lines.  Belsey notes 
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that “the eeriness” of Caesar’s ghost cannot simply be traced back to North’s English 
translation of Plutarch, from which Shakespeare draws.  She points out that “in 
North’s version, as the lamp burns dim, a horrible figure is seen” that terrifies Brutus, 
but once he realises it will not harm him, he moves to interrogate the ghost.  As a 
result, “the fear and the question are divided”.  However, Shakespeare instead draws 
the two “together, so that the fear is brought into being by the unknown” – by 
Caesar’s inability to identify the apparition so that it “challenges the limits of mortal 
knowledge” (7).  We might add to this that Shakespeare specifically draws the ghost 
into a context that is specific to Elizabethan epistemology (and its limits).  In North’s 
translation of “The Life of Brutus,” Brutus asks the ghost whether he is “a god, or a 
man, and what cause brought him thither.”  The ghost then replies: “I am thy evill 
spirit, Brutus: and thou shalt see me by the citie of PHILIPPES” (The Lives of the 
Noble Grecians and Romanes 1072).  In “The Life of Caesar,” an earlier section in 
the same large volume, we are given no specific version of Brutus’s question and the 
ghost describes himself instead as “thy ill angell, Brutus” (796).  In both accounts, 
the ghost appears when Brutus is awake, and it disappears after he responds to its 
promise to appear in Philippi with the comment that he will see it there.   
     The differences between Shakespeare’s and Plutarch’s versions are small, but 
significant.  Shakespeare’s adaptation utilizes the language of Elizabethan 
demonology and theology so that Brutus expresses the typically Protestant 
polarization of spirits, modified according to its classical context: if it is “any thing,” 
the ghost is either entirely good (“some God, some Angell”) or entirely evil (“some 
Divell”) – and yet we cannot be sure that it is “any thing” at all.  Despite his 
physicalized fear of what he is seeing, Brutus is anxious to get more out of the ghost.  
After its announcement that he will see it at Philippi, he presses it further in an effort 
to affirm that this is correct, asking “Well: then I shall see there againe?” Receiving 
an affirmative reply – “I, at Phillipi – he then repeats the response described by 
Plutarch, “Why I will see thee at Phillipi then” (3.127).  By drawing the issue of the 
ghost’s ontological state into a contemporary Elizabethan context, Shakespeare’s 
version renders it more corrosive to the frameworks upon which Brutus draws as he 
attempts to comprehend the ghost’s presence.  By intensifying the interaction 
between the two figures, he makes the relation between the two the crux of the 
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encounter rather than the mere narrative issue of setting the scene for their future 
meeting at Philippi. 
     This slight reimagining of the ghost’s appearance enables the perfusion of the 
boundaries between ghost and man and gives Brutus’s “evill Spirit” a markedly 
unsettling effect.  Caesar’s ghost renders visible that which Cassius’s mirror does 
not.  It reflects something within that he cannot and does not wish to see.  And if he 
cannot grasp that which is before him, nor can he willingly dismiss it: “Now I have 
taken heart, thou vanishest,” he complains, “Ill Spirit, I would hold more talke with 
thee” (3.127).  Like Horatio in the opening scene of Hamlet, Brutus seeks to render 
the ghost static and conjure it away – to remove its spectrality and its spectral threat 
– by affixing its position and extracting information from it.  Unsuccessful, he cannot 
leave the matter alone.  Functioning precisely within Derrida’s outline of the relation 
between spectator and apparition, Brutus is literally unable to “get any shut-eye” 
because he is “intent to watch out for the return” (Specters 125).  Late though it is, he 
rushes out to wake Lucius, Varro, and Claudius to check as to whether they saw 
anything, as though obtaining a secondary account of the ghost might enable him to 
obtain the ghost’s return by proxy.  Failing to achieve this, he adopts an alternative 
tactic, calling for Cassius to agree to set out at once for Philippi.  But even his final 
moments remain haunted by the ghost’s reflection.  Faced with imminent capture by 
his enemies, Brutus contemplates suicide with the soldierly rationale that “Our 
Enemies have beat us to the Pit: / It is more worthy, to leape in our selves, / Then 
tarry till they push us” (3.129).  But the speech is preceded by the revelation that: 
 
          The Ghost of Caesar hath appear’d to me  
          Two severall times by Night: at Sardis, once; 
          And this last Night, here in Philippi fields:  
          I know my houre is come. (3.129)   
 
The desire for a noble death is therefore permeated by the preceding justification in 
which the ghost’s presence functions as the principal determinant of death.  
Similarly, his subsequent claim that “My heart doth joy, that yet in all my life, / I 
found no man, but he was true to me” registers that the ghost’s existence is 
attributable to his own failure to provide precisely that loyalty to Caesar (3.130).  
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With this in mind, his final words – “Caesar, now be still, / I kill’d not thee with 
halfe so good a will” – speaks not only of his apparent embrace of his own death but 
also of the perpetuation of Caesar’s presence within his final act (3.130).  Brutus may 
consciously believe that he is obtaining “glory by this loosing day” but that which 
Caesar’s ghost reflects – Brutus’s moral weakness, his disregard for human life, his 
inner darkness – is literalized through his physical self-destruction (3.130).   
     Here, reflection enters into psychoanalytic paradigms of the double’s place within 
the uncanny.  The uncanny double replicates a familiar originary form in a way that 
denies the containment and unity of that form and thereby destabilizes its seeming 
independence.  This destabilization begins within the revelation that what lies on one 
side of the imagined divide must be somehow be present within the other.  In its most 
extreme forms, the double not only duplicates but even usurps the source, thereby 
dismantling the former hierarchy between the two (an event particularly popular 
within later forms of Gothic literature).  For Freud, the double relation “is marked by 
the fact that the subject identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in doubt as 
to which his self is, or substitutes the extraneous self for his own.  In other words, 
there is a doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self” (“The Uncanny” 234).   
The persistent reflection of Caesar’s presence within Brutus’s inner life nudges 
towards this relation, aided in part by the absence of clarity as to the ontological 
status of Caesar’s ghost.  Put simply, we cannot quite tell where or even if a 
boundary exists between the inner world of Brutus and the exterior apparition of 
Caesar, although nor can we conclude that they are identical or continuous.  
Something that should remain hidden has become visible within Caesar’s ghost and 
Brutus alike, but it is something that we cannot grasp, for at every turn it disappears 
as readily as the ghost itself.   
     This problem emerges in a different context in Hamlet.  Upon seeing Old 
Hamlet’s ghost for the third time, Barnardo concedes that it is “In the same figure 
like the King that’s dead” and Horatio shortly afterwards tells Marcellus that it is as 
similar to the King “as thou art to thy selfe” (Sig. [B1v]-B2[r], italics my emphasis).  
Marcellus’s analogy is then extended by Horatio who, in the second scene, compares 
the relationship between the dead man and his ghost to his two hands – “I knewe 
your father, / These hands are not more like” (Sig. [C2r-v]).  As Greenblatt observes, 
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Horatio’s comment to Marcellus strangely erodes the division between “likeness and 
identity: Marcellus is not ‘like’ himself; he is himself.”  Thus, the line suggests “the 
possibility of a difference between oneself and oneself” (Hamlet in Purgatory 211).  
Although observing that this sense of self-division is played out in other respects 
elsewhere, Greenblatt forecloses his own argument here by emphasizing that while 
“Marcellus should look like himself,” there is no longer anything that should look 
like the king who is buried and presumably decaying (212).  For Greenblatt, the point 
is that what the spectators are witnessing cannot be “physical reality” as, without any 
need to investigate the King’s physical grave, they know that his corpse must be 
lying in a state of decay.  They must therefore be viewing a kind of “embodied 
memory” (212).  In making this point, Greenblatt draws upon Le Loyer’s A Treatise 
of Specters, which argues that if souls do return, they do not utilise their original 
bodies but return in an “ayrie” or immaterial form (Sig. B4[r]).  He does not quite 
explain the union, but if phantasm and memory can function synonymously in this 
context, it is presumably at the intersection of the image: the King is not real but his 
spirit somehow connects with the onlookers’ memories in order to manifest an image 
of when he was.  Subsequently, Greenblatt turns to Aristotle to address the issue of 
how likeness is perceived, “an issue inseparable from the ghost as memory and 
memory as ghost”.  Aristotle posits that when perceiving an image, the mind 
distinguishes between a genuine presence and a memory of the past through a kind of 
“ratio between what is imagined and what actually once existed”.  A memory is 
measured as being only a likeness of “something else” (Greenblatt, Hamlet in 
Purgatory 215).
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  Consequently, the problem that the ghost raises for Hamlet, in its 
extreme likeness to his father, is the erosion of “the ratio of likeness and difference” 
that facilitates distinction between the two (216).   
     Such a reading tacitly seeks to close the gaps, to de-spectralize the spectre by 
explaining its spectrality as a product of the limitations of perception.  Presumably, 
Hamlet’s problem would be solved if only he could maintain the capacity to 
distinguish between identifying the ghost as what it is like (the remembered dead 
father) and what it is (a phantasm born of memory).  The difficulty with this 
proposition is that the ghost, as trace, is manifestly both of these and neither.  It 
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inhabits the gaps in between, generating and simultaneously eroding the categories of 
past/present and memory/perception.  Neither the living King nor his mere 
simulacrum, neither his spirit alone nor his memory, the spectre draws forth all of 
these (and more) but cannot be limited to, nor reify, any of them in full.  And its 
capacity to exceed these categories is a product of much more than his audience’s 
states of mind or perception.  If Marcellus is as similar to himself and Horatio’s 
hands are as similar to each other as the ghost is to the formerly living King, then we 
are viewing a haunting of the living in more than one respect.  Not only is the ghost 
inhabiting the external environment of its audience, but in generating an uncanny 
indistinction between itself and the living King, it haunts also the selves of the 
onlookers.  That is to say, if the ghost’s appearance erodes the terms by which its 
audience understands the identity and ontological state of the dead King Hamlet, it 
has the same effect upon the means by which they understand their own.  We cannot 
trace the problem of the ghost back to an originary failure of differentiation between 
memory and perception because these acts are themselves contingent upon the 
categories that crumble away in its presence.  How are we to define memory in the 
absence of a clear distinction between past and present?  By what means can 
perception function as an accurate register of the external world where the conscious 
mind cannot fully process and understand sensory information?  Without the security 
of such means to determine the nature of the ghost as an object of perception, the 
inner being that watches it becomes subject to the same type of corrosion that the 
ghost has upon the figure of the dead King. 
     It may seem from this that the ghost’s ability to disturb the seeming order of 
re/flection is a function of its spectrality.  However, in some texts it becomes equally 
apparent that the disturbance of the mirror is what generates the presence of the 
spectral.  In his 1596 edition of Piers Gaveston, Michael Drayton uses a single stanza 
to draw the vanity of the dead narrator – the “ghost of wofull Gaveston” – into a 
complex structure of self and reflection through a metaleptic engagement with the 
Narcissus myth (Sig. [K4r]).
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  Returning from the underworld in corporeal form – 
lent “breath” once more from “the blessed Heavens” and with “soul and body” 
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reunited – the ghost recounts his autobiography in the form of a tragedy, highlighting 
his tragic flaw through retrospective advice to his living self:  
 
          Foolish Narcissus, with thy selfe in love,  
          Yet but to be thy selfe thou canst not see,  
          Remove thy sight, which shall that sight remove,  
          Which doth but seeme, and yet not seeming thee:  
          A shaddow, shaddowed underneath a wave,  
          Which each thing can destroy, and nothing save. (“Piers Gaveston” Sig. [K4v],  
          [M5v]) 
 
Gaveston’s ghost accuses his formerly living self of having a misplaced investment 
in the mirror: in order to view himself accurately, he must turn away from the 
reflection of his beauty.  The reflection offered by the pool is strikingly similar to 
that offered by Cassius to Brutus, projecting his higher qualities (in this case, his 
physical beauty), whilst simultaneously offering a “shadow.”  The shadow as 
reflection is underpinned by an accompanying signification of the shadow as 
darkness and unreliability – the “shaddow, shaddowed underneath a wave”.  The 
wave refers to the water of the pond, but water carries the threat that, if disturbed, it 
will instantly destroy the reflection that it bears.  Gaveston/Narcissus’s reflection 
should not be relied upon.  The word “seemes” offers a similarly layered 
signification.  The reflection “doth but seeme” but is “yet not seeming thee”.  The 
phrasing invokes “seem” both in the more common sense – for something to “have a 
semblance or appearance” – but also in the sense of to “befit” or “beseem” (OED 
“seem,” def. I.1.a, II).  Thus the image is that of Narcissus and yet is deceptive in 
what it reflects: it befits his physical beauty but it does not become him to see this as 
a reflection of himself in totality.  The reflection thereby manifests an excess, a 
capacity to exceed the image perceived by the gazing subject and reveal a shadow 
that is perceptible only retrospectively, simultaneously exposing the threat of the 
subject’s destruction.   
     To complicate matters further, the reflection is not only a prediction or warning 
but is itself responsible for the gazing subject’s demise.  In choosing the Narcissus 
legend specifically, the ghost highlights not only his living self’s vanity, but also the 
danger of entrapment within self-reflection.  As Drayton’s readers would know, in 
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some versions of the myth, Narcissus is so enamoured with his reflection that he falls 
into the water and drowns: as Marlowe puts it in his comparison of Leander to 
Narcissus, he “leapt into the water for a kis / Of his owne shadow, and despising 
many, / Died ere he could enjoy the love of any” (Hero and Leander Sig. [Biv]).  To 
put this another way, he falls into his reflection and drowns.  The living Gaveston’s 
difficulty lies not in the act of gazing nor even in the integrity of the reflection.  
Given Drayton’s prefatory argument that identifies Gaveston as a “child of singuler 
beautie” and Gaveston’s political rise as King Edward’s favourite (in both historical 
and literary accounts), we have no cause to doubt his immodest declaration “That all 
perfection seem’d in mee to dwell, / And that the heavens me all their graces lent” 
(Sig. K3[r], [K6v]).  Rather, Gaveston’s downfall lies in his entrapment within the 
immediately visual aspect of the reflection.  The more he gazes at the reflection of 
his physical beauty, the less he is able to perceive the other facets of the reflection 
that are more visible from the vantage point of the ghost’s teleological narrative: the 
fleeting, shadowy reflection of his inner deficiencies.  He thereby fails to grasp the 
elusive reflections that emerge within the mirror, despite their inhabitance of the very 
form at which he gazes. 
     Here, we may observe a certain correspondence between literal and philosophical 
reflection.  In The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, 
Rodolphe Gasché describes the latter as a movement in the process of determining a 
pure origin, whereby “reflection tries to return as to an ultimate ground from which 
everything else can be deduced” (180).  He argues that, in observing the reflective 
process, we may perceive the origin to function intact and anterior to the reflection, 
thereby constituting a foundational and apparently pure term from which all else 
follows and to which it must return.  The reflection, in other words, functions as a 
secondary signifier for the original term that occupies a superior position in the 
hierarchical opposition between the two.  This is the case even if the two terms are 
reversed, for although this may alter which is designated origin and which is 
reflection, it maintains the structural relation between the two terms and ensures that 
they remain within a closed system.  Any given instance of reversal in the 
paradigmatic arrangement of original and reflection may be subject to further 
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overturns of a similar nature but does nothing to disrupt the concepts contained 
therein.   
     Drawing upon Derrida’s deconstruction of western metaphysics, Gasché points 
out that this totality appears to characterize the formulation of philosophical concepts 
in general.  Even where philosophers such as Husserl and Heidegger work to identify 
plural origins of a heterogeneous nature, thereby complicating the relationship 
between a singular origin and its reflection, the overall system of reflection 
inevitably functions within a structure of unity and containment (180-82).  For 
Gasché, the point is to critique (via deconstruction) “the classical concept of origin” 
as a foundational “point of presence and simplicity” (180).  For my purposes, his 
argument is useful at a figurative level for the way in which it exposes and delimits 
the mechanisms of the mirror.  At the same time though, the mirror into which 
Drayton’s Gaveston stares refuses the closures of the formulation. Drayton’s 
Narcissus stanza initially appears a simple, literalized version of the closed structure 
of reflection, consisting as it does of a series of hierarchical origins and reflections in 
which each pairing gives way to another, whilst maintaining an oppositional 
relationship.  Functioning in the position of origin and reflection, we may observe 
Gaveston and Narcissus; Narcissus and the image in the pond; and, by a reflective 
substitution, Gaveston and the image in the pond (in that the gazing Narcissus is also 
representative of the gazing Gaveston).  The ghostly narrator slightly problematizes 
but does not disrupt this system.  As the figure that has claim to both chronological 
and ontological priority, the living Gaveston constitutes an origin for which the ghost 
is reflection, but as the ghost is the narrator and the living Gaveston is the image he 
constructs, this particular hierarchy is also easily reversed.   
     None of this seems particularly disruptive of the paradigmatic reflection that 
Gasché describes.  However, a closer look at this series of configurations and at their 
specific contexts rapidly disallows such a straightforward correlation between 
original and reflection.  Although Gaveston’s ghost refers to Narcissus alone, the 
spectre of Echo tacitly appears alongside as the voice that returns in response to 
Narcissus’s gaze in the Ovidian myth.  Goldberg writes on this myth: “mere 
iterability, Echo is profoundly an image of the origin of iterability.”  If Narcissus is 
“the solicitude of the mirror,” then Echo is “the disturbance of the mirror of 
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reflection: the disturbance . . . marks the origin of the image” because “its after-effect 
is an original effect” (Voice Terminal Echo 11-12).  Drawing upon Derrida’s work in 
this area, Goldberg develops this paradigm further to suggest that as “Narcissus 
speaks to his reflection,” he is answered not through the “shattered” image of the 
mirror but through “the resonance of Echo.  ‘The sonorous source attempts to rejoin 
itself only by differentiating itself, dividing differing, deferring without end’” (13).
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What is returned in response to the gaze of Narcissus is not an image of himself as 
origin but an echo that is simultaneously the return of his gaze, a new and newly 
originary reflection, but also the rupturing of the mirror as a figure of reflective 
containment.  To put it another way, Narcissus’s mirror, as it fractures, reflects back 
not a single image or even a multitude of fragments but splinters the process of 
mirroring itself to produce an endlessly reflective signification that rewrites anew 
through its erasure of either origin or end. 
     In utilizing multiple layers of reflection, then, Drayton’s extraordinary hall of 
mirrors actually produces a disconcertingly spectral “structure of disappearing 
apparition” (Derrida, Specters 125).  To begin with, the narrative structure of the 
poem, and of this stanza in particular, creates a shifting foundation that destabilizes 
the subject of the poem so that we are never quite watching a singular, fixed identity.  
A distinction arises between the narrator-ghost who recites the tale – he who returns 
“From gloomy shaddow of eternall night” to “To pen the processe of my tragedie” – 
and the narrator’s past, living self, whose progress the narrator traces from childhood 
to his eventual arrival at the scaffold where “I lost my head” (Sig. [O7v]).  
Gaveston’s ghost narrates the story as one of chronological progress from early life 
to death and then to the afterlife, from which the tale is told.  But despite the ghost’s 
lengthy account of his transition into the afterlife, the figure that stands before us is 
not quite identical with the living Gaveston.  Like Old Hamlet’s revenant, 
Gaveston’s ghost functions as his supplement, replacing without displacing his 
previously mortal self.   
     The ghost’s persona, unlike the living Gaveston, is formulated partly through the 
experience of death and his retrospective account of the mortal Gaveston’s life is 
read through this lens.  The living Gaveston is vain, blindly ambitious, and myopic, 
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as the Narcissus image suggests: the ghost, in contrast, is worldly, astute, and all too 
aware that if his living self must succumb to “ambition,” he should “At least disguise 
her in humilitie” (Sig. [M5v]).  The self that the ghost recounts, then, is 
simultaneously the arrogant fop who deservedly brings about his own downfall, and 
the lost living self whom the ghost now mourns.  In The Tears of Narcissus: 
Melancholia and Masculinity in Early Modern Writing, Lynn Enterline draws 
attention to a connection between melancholic loss and the figure of Narcissus, 
pointing out that “encounters with a mirror frequently and abruptly give way to 
expressions of the self’s utter diminishment” (1).  She argues that this often emerges 
“as a literary, and not just a psychological, problem” in early modern literature 
because, in disrupting the inner, emotional state of the subject, the mirror also 
disturbs the linguistic structures that constitute the inner being. Thus, within a 
number of texts, she identifies melancholia with “the text’s implicit or explicit 
commentary on its own poetic and rhetorical problems” (5).  Enterline finds that “the 
melancholic subject’s relentless search for its own origin – which is figured, in the 
mirror, as a place from which the self may see and know itself – constantly puts the 
possibility of knowing such origin into doubt” (16).  For her, “many moments of 
self-reflection” in early modern texts “seem to displace the subject from the very 
point from which it seeks to see itself” (15).   
     This is true in the most radical sense for Drayton’s spectral narrator.  What the 
ghost recollects and what it describes in the mirror, then, is not the original living self 
(which is now supplemented by its own demise).  While the ghost narrates his past 
life as though he is simply recalling the events that have shaped his present memory, 
he is separated sharply from his living self through the physical immediacy of the 
severing of head from body.   
 
          Like as Adonis wounded with the Bore,  
          From whose fresh hurt the life-warme blood doth spin,  
          Now lieth wallowing in his purple gore,  
          Stayning his faire and Allablaster skin,  
          My headles body in the blood is left,  




The two are alienated, not only in time and space, but through the visceral image of 
the beheaded corpse.  Thus, Gaveston already seems like a dislocated reflection of 
the originary figure of the ghost who stands in the present before us, gazing back into 
the transformed image of its past.  However, as the chronologically preceding figure, 
the living Gaveston equally functions as the source of a reflection formed by the 
ghost, so that the ghost is both the primary figure and reflection at the same time.  It 
is, precisely as Enterline describes, an example of how “melancholic returns to 
Narcissus’s predicament” expose “the death of origins” (16). 
     Added to this is a series of reflective slippages present within the Narcissus stanza 
itself.  In addressing his self as “Foolish Narcissus,” the ghost establishes a reflection 
(Narcissus) of his own reflection (Gaveston), in order to describe the literalized 
reflection of the subject and the mirror.  In addressing his living self as Narcissus 
throughout the stanza rather than offering a mere simile, he erases any fixed 
distinction between Narcissus and Gaveston, or between their gazes.  Moreover, in 
order to function as the reflection of Gaveston, Narcissus must simultaneously 
function as the origin of the reflection in the pool, so that the reflective function of 
Narcissus not only coincides with, but is in fact contingent upon, concomitantly 
functioning as its own origin.  We are drawn into a kind of reflective maze in which 
each term – ghost, Gaveston, and Narcissus – functions in a series of reflective 
configurations in which there there is neither true origin nor end.   
     We might add to this that the hierarchical relation between Gaveston (as origin) 
and Narcissus (as reflection) is complicated from the beginning by the fact that 
Gaveston is not in fact an “original” term even as an individual figure.  Rather, he is 
a reflection of the historical figure of Gaveston who appears in accounts of Edward 
II’s reign as well as in literary interpretations such as Marlowe’s Edward II 
(published in 1594, two years before Drayton’s poem).  Hence, our “original” is in 
fact a reflection of earlier originals that have been refracted through the glass of an 
Elizabethan mirror.  The same is true of Narcissus, who can function as a reflection 
in Drayton’s brief allusion only because his figure is already recognizable to the 
educated audience as the Narcissus of classical myth, already popular amongst other 
Elizabethan writers.  The figure’s capacity to reflect is predicated upon its own re-
presentation of earlier originals.  Furthermore, the literary precedence of the 
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reflection of Narcissus positions his figure as an original of Gaveston also, because 
Gaveston reflects the classical Narcissus to precisely the same extent that Narcissus 
reflects him.  Thus, the figure of Narcissus arrives in advance of itself, not in a linear 
fashion but in a manner that renders it reflection and origin at once.   
     Viewed in this way, the figures may seem to continue functioning within a closed 
loop to produce a series of simple rearrangements of its terms.  However, the shifting 
paradigms of the ghost’s reflection so thoroughly pervade the reflective process that 
they disrupt the very premise of hierarchical order: the relation between Gaveston 
and Narcissus disrupts the structural integrity of reflection by exceeding the 
containment of the structure as a whole.  The mirror that should reliably represent the 
visible image of the gazing subject remains bound to reflect, but in doing so, it 
captures more than a solid, stable visual image, or a clear relation between origin and 
reflection.  Where no origin can function independently of its simultaneous 
enactment of reflection, its fracturing disrupts the closure of the homogeneous 
system.  Instead, the entire structure becomes spectral as each term pervades, and is 
pervaded by, the oppositional terms against which it is differentiated and defined.  
Every term becomes displaced, uncertain, contaminated.  Rather than forming a 
single unified totality, this reflection produces a radical fragmentation of its own 
system to reverse the very mechanisms by which the unity of reflection is achieved. 
     Drayton’s invocation of Narcissus thereby demonstrates that the act of flection 
may return an image that exposes the instability, fragmentation, and impurity of the 
gazing subject even as it returns the perfect image of the material form.  What the 
subject actually perceives is no measure of objective “reality” but rather an 
unreliable register of some aspect of his inner state, expressed through a physical 
image.  The same mirror into which Gaveston originally gazes to perceive his beauty 
as a route to social and political power reflects equally his pathway to destruction 
when viewed from another angle.  It also reflects his lack of anteriority to the 
reflected image; the image’s own lack of unification, priority, or containment; the 
deficits of his living state in relation to his heightened awareness in death.  Instead of 
simply exposing a correlation between the image and one or all of these states, 
though, it enacts its own fracturing.  Like Macbeth’s vision of the dagger or Brutus’s 
vision of Caesar’s ghost, this apparition undermines the closure of the categories that 
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enable a distinction between original and reflection, subject and object, inner and 
outer worlds.  If knowledge  remains plausible here, it is defined by its own lack of 
boundaries, the impossibility of stabilizing or containing the concepts that it seeks to 
comprehend.  Flection produces simultaneously the conditions of reflection 
necessary to generate the awareness of an isolable inner self and the elements of its 
destruction. 
     In this poem, the reflection is itself more spectral than the ghost who narrates the 
story.  It emerges as a spectre because, in reflecting the gazing subject, it returns the 
gaze in a manner that disturbs the sense of a self-contained interiority that functions 
independently of outer conditions.  Spectrality in this sense extends far beyond the 
mere disturbance of the dead by the figure of the ghost: indeed, the spectre need not 
involve a “real” ghost at all.  The doubling and reflection of Banquo’s figure in 
Macbeth’s dumb show further exemplifies this.  Engel suggests in Death and Drama 
in Renaissance England that dumb shows carry an association with “magical 
knowledge” and the “occult arts,” with the spectacle onstage holding “a mirror up to 
nature” that helps to provide clarification in order to combat the deficiencies of sight.  
Thus, dumb shows “are like miniature mirrors within the larger mirror of the play,” 
that also extend past “the contours of the main spectacle” (42).   
     I would suggest that, in functioning thus, they have the potential also to mirror the 
gaze along with its defects, exposing the disjuncture between what the audience sees 
and what it comprehends by turning the spectacle into the spectral.  In response to 
Macbeth’s question “Shall Banquo’s issue ever / Reigne in this Kingdome?”, the 
Weїrd Sisters respond with a silent procession of eight Scottish Kings, tailed by the 
figure of the dead Banquo (3.144).  Although Macbeth finds the entire spectacle 
unsettling because of the threat it signals to his ambitions, it is Banquo’s form at the 
end of the procession that seems to expose to him something formerly hidden from 
view: “Horrible sight: now I see ’tis true, / For the Blood-bolter’d Banquo smiles 
upon me, / And points at them for his.”  Although this figure is not, apparently, 
Banquo’s actual ghost – it is “like the Spirit of Banquo” but not the spirit itself – this 
only amplifies its displacement of Banquo’s identity and the corresponding 
corruption of Macbeth’s perception (3.144).  Old Hamlet unsettles his viewers who, 
in observing the ghost’s likeness to the King, observe the splitting of presence 
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through the rhetorical comparison of Marcellus’s likeness to himself.  The ghost of a 
ghost, this figure’s inseparability from the living Banquo or even from the dead 
Banquo whose presence was independent of the Weїrd Sisters’ powers, only further 
serves to heighten the disjunctures that render authoritative perception of the material 
world impossible.  Like the ghost at the banquet table, it returns Macbeth’s gaze, 
reflecting back not only the horror of his past actions, but the future as well, a future 
that has already come back to haunt him.  Macbeth’s subsequent response, “Let this 
pernitious houre, / Stand aye accursed in the Kalender,” only serves as a stark 
reminder of just how little of his world now adheres to the “Kalender” as the 
uncanniness of events exposes the interdependency of external world and the 
disorder of his inner being (3.144). 
     This scene demonstrates that the inner disruption generated under the returned 
gaze of the spectre is as much a formative aspect of spectrality as the visual 
apparition itself.  Indeed, it is a key reason as to why there is always a distinction 
between the spectre of an object and one of the human form in terms of the effects 
they generate.  If we turn again to Macbeth’s vision of the dagger, we might recall 
that it returns Macbeth’s gaze in the sense that it holds up a mirror to his inability to 
impose order upon inner or outer states or the alignment between the two.  The 
floating dagger illuminates Macbeth’s impending murder of Duncan and 
metaphorizes the unnaturalness of his actions but also exposes the fact that time is 
failing to function linearly in accordance with a logical ordering of events – for if the 
murder is yet to occur, even the image of the blood-soaked dagger has no place in the 
present.  Despite his terror, though, Macbeth is much quicker to gather his wits and 
attempt to dismiss his vision of the dagger – which cannot literally cast a gaze – than 
he is when faced with his later vision of Banquo’s ghost.  Where he is able to 
struggle through to the assertion that “There’s no such thing” when faced with the 
dagger, he does not even begin to question the existence of Banquo’s ghost until after 
he has successfully persuaded it to depart and even then makes no firm 
pronouncements as to the veracity (or otherwise) of its existence (3.136).  Whilst the 
audience may find the ghost more persuasive because it visibly sits onstage, we 
should remember that Macbeth has no such advantage: in both scenes, he alone is 
faced with the vision.   
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     This does not really appear to reflect a greater credibility in the ghost’s 
appearance in terms of, for example, being able to position it within a recognizable 
theological or mythological framework.  Macbeth shows not the slightest sign of 
advancing a Catholicized explanation for Banquo’s return that might link his figure 
to the doctrine of purgatory or a classical one that might assign it a place within the 
underworld.  Were it present, such a context might be expected to render the ghost 
less disturbing, since it would then ascribe it a logical, if not comfortable presence.  
Instead, his complaint that “The times has bene, / That when the Braines were out, 
the man would dye, / And there an end: But now they rise againe” suggests quite the 
reverse.  “Blood hath bene shed . . . Murthers have bene perform’d” both before and 
since legal intervention by “humane Statute,” yet it is only now that men are failing 
to stay buried (3.142).  Historically, as well as in the immediate context of the 
banquet hall, Macbeth perceives himself to be all alone in his relation with the 
ambulatory dead.  Banquo’s ghost has a place within physical or spiritual “reality” 
that is neither more or less credible (or verifiable) than the vision of the dagger. 
     What renders the ghost more startling than the dagger, then, is that, as the 
returned dead, the ghost has a substantially more intrusive effect upon Macbeth’s 
psyche.  It is not necessarily disruptive that a ghost is in the room: Banquo’s ghost 
troubles no-one at the banquet table other than Macbeth; Old Hamlet’s ghost does 
not directly trouble Gertrude.  By definition, one has to perceive a spectre for it to be 
rendered spectral, to perceive and thereby enter into the ruptures and unease that its 
presence generates and reflects.  This is in part a result of the “visor effect” that 
Derrida takes as a presupposition throughout his subsequent consideration of the 
spectre: 
 
Nor does one see in flesh and blood this Thing that is not a thing, this thing that is 
invisible between its apparitions, when it reappears.  This Thing meanwhile looks 
at us and sees us not see it even when it is there.  A spectral asymmetry interrupts 
here all specularity.  It de-synchronizes, it recalls us to anachrony.  We will call 
this the visor effect: we do not see who looks at us.  Even though in his ghost the 
King looks like himself . . . that does not prevent him from looking without being 





This effect is not a matter of literal sight, for as Royle points out, the haunting in 
Hamlet to which Derrida refers is not marked by a concealment of the face at all: the 
ghost of Old Hamlet has his beaver up and Horatio is able to provide a detailed 
account of his facial appearance to Hamlet.  Rather, it is a matter of “the possibility 
of the visor,” for Derrida insists a little later on that “the helmet effect is not 
suspended” by the raising of the visor (Royle, The Uncanny 247-48; Derrida, 
Specters 8).  Rather than corresponding to the literal field of vision, the visor effect 
refers to the power of the spectre “to see without being seen,” a power that it retains 
through the very principle of spectrality (Derrida 8).  Hence, like Old Hamlet’s 
onlookers in Hamlet, Macbeth cannot see the ghost in the sense that he can see other 
people in the room; he cannot assimilate or grasp the information fed to him by his 
eyes, nor dismiss it either.  It is visible and yet not quite there; beyond his 
comprehension and yet clearly comprehending him.   
     I suggested in Chapter Two that the threat to the living posed by the failure of 
burial occurs as the intrusion of death erodes the containment of the mortal sphere.  
In failing to remain buried, static, and contained so that the living may insulate 
themselves from death in order to move on with the business of living, the figure of 
the returned dead functions as a contaminant.  Macbeth’s responses to his visions 
further demonstrate that what enables death not only to make itself felt but to 
resonate, to invade the very interior of the watching subject, is the way in which the 
entry of the ghost into the visual field establishes an unwelcome reflection of its 
observers.  This problem registers itself within Macbeth’s curious phrasing: “they 
rise again” to “push us from our stooles” (3.142, italics my emphasis).  The “us” here 
is not indicative of the majestic plural because the entire complaint is framed in the 
plural even though it is Banquo’s solitary ghost that plagues him, murdered only 
once and occupying only one stool.  Macbeth’s phrasing not only reverses the roles 
of victim and murderer to redraw them as the dead usurper and the living victim but 
also positions them within a kind of universalized reciprocal relation that exceeds the 
bounds of their individual positions.  Unable to cope with the ramifications of 
Banquo’s return, Macbeth clutches at the one shred of reassurance that he can find, 
by extending the individual threat of the ghost to a universal one.  Fear loves 
company, or at least so he hopes.  It is, of course, to no avail, since his companions 
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are utterly oblivious to the spectre in the room.  It is Macbeth alone who is unable to 
perceive Banquo to be at rest and it is Macbeth alone whose inner world begins to 
crumble beneath the force of the ghost’s stare.  When the apparition takes up a place 
within Macbeth’s line of visual perception and then returns his gaze, it exposes to 
him his inability to isolate and preserve his interior self from the chaos of the exterior 
world because it attests to the instability of his self’s positioning, in time, in space, 
even in the line of political inheritance.   
     Throughout the play, Macbeth works obsessively to shore up his position against 
this and other threats through an overwhelming preoccupation with controlling time.  
Banquo’s appearance out of time – after his own death – reflects Macbeth’s 
fundamental inability to impose order and control upon the events of the past or 
future while heightening his need to do so.  Macbeth seems to assume that if only he 
can pin time down, to make it behave in a fashion that will smooth, not only his 
course of action, but his troubled perceptions, he will have mastery over both his 
present and future perceptions.  Such a hope is, of course, pure illusion amidst the 
total dissolution of order within his chaotic world.  Before he has even committed his 
first murder, Macbeth complains that in anticipating the event, “My Thought . . . 
Shakes so my single state of Man, / That Function is smother’d in surmise, / And 
nothing is, but what is not.”  His perception thus plagued by a future that has not yet 
arrived, he proceeds to reassure himself with the platitude that “Time, and the Houre, 
runs through the roughest Day” – his problem, he hopes, will pass along with the 
time (3.133).  Just after his vision of the dagger, he calls upon the earth to “take the 
present horror from the time, / Which now sutes with it,” again hoping to relocate 
and fix the moment of the murder so that it will not pervade his inner perception out 
of its own time – that is to say, outside of the moment of the actual murder (3.136).  
It is, of course, a failed pursuit, for despite the frequent meditations on time right up 
until his death, Macbeth’s inability to follow his own advice to “Let every man be 
master of his time” is both what haunts and ultimately kills him (3.139).  Unable to 
accept that such mastery is impossible, he fails to anticipate the possibility that the 
Weїrd Sisters cryptic advice about his death might suggest that “Macduffe was from 
his Mothers womb / Untimely ript” (3.151).   
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     Thus, the profound degree to which Banquo’s ghost unsettles Macbeth connects 
to the extent to which it exposes an existing state of disorder.  Indeed, it appears that 
the visibility and indeed the very existence of a spectre is proportionate to the extent 
to which it anticipates, inhabits, and disrupts its audience’s own understanding.  A 
distinction (however unsettled) may be made between different levels of spectral 
visibility that are correlative to the degree to which the visor effect is at work.  
Marcellus, Barnardo, and Horatio all see Old Hamlet’s ghost and are all fascinated 
and unsettled by its appearance; they cannot dismiss it even after its departure.  
When Horatio suggests that it is “fitting our duty” to advise Hamlet of the ghost’s 
appearance, it is plain that his real motivation is to serve his own desire to extract 
information from the ghost, to affix its meaning, for the original reason he gives for 
telling Hamlet is actually that if the ghost will not speak to them, it will surely 
“speake to him” (Sig. [B3v]).  Yet Marcellus, Barnardo, and Horatio do not go mad 
or become obsessed by the ghost because, although the ghost sees them – it sees 
them fail to grasp or conceptualize its appearance, their inability to align their 
perception with their understanding of time and specifically the past – it does not see 
them in the same way that it sees Hamlet.  It does not reflect back to them an interior 
disjuncture in the same way that it reflects this to Hamlet because Hamlet is the one 
whose inner state, familial relationships, and inheritance are inextricable from Old 
Hamlet’s death and who therefore enters a state of radical maladjustment in response 
to its return.  So whilst the three original viewers are disturbed by the ghost 
sufficiently to anticipate its return and pursue an encounter through Hamlet that 
would ascribe it a meaning, it is for Hamlet that the ghost’s spectrality escalates into 
a full-scale corrosion of his ability to comprehend the structures of the world that he 
inhabits. 
     For Hamlet, though, there is a reward to be found in the presence of the spectre 
that runs counter to its threat.  In response to Horatio’s report of the ghost, Hamlet 
proceeds to question him by running through a catalogue of the ghost’s physical 
attributes: 
           
          HAMLET.  
          Arm’d, say you? 
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          ALL.  
          Arm’d my Lord. 
          HAMLET. 
          From top to toe? 
          ALL.  
          My Lord from head to foote. 
          HAMLET. 
          Then sawe you not his face. 
          HORATIO. 
          O yes my Lord, he wore his beaver up. 
          HAMLET. 
          What look’t he frowningly? 
          HORATIO. 
          A countenance more in sorrow then in anger. 
          HAMLET.  
          Pale, or red? 
          HORATIO.   
          Nay very pale. 
          HAMLET. 
          And fixt his eyes upon you? 
          HORATIO.  
          Most constantly. 
          HAMLET. 
          I would I had beene there. (Sig. [C2v]) 
 
Derrida comments that in the process of running through this list, it appears as 
though Hamlet “had been hoping that, beneath an armor that hides and protects from 
head to foot, the ghost would have shown neither his face, nor his look, nor therefore 
his identity” (Specters 8).  However, I would argue that Hamlet’s desire to have been 
there to see the ghost himself, followed shortly thereafter by his declaration that he 
must lie in wait and see it himself, suggests otherwise.  What Hamlet really seeks is 
for the ghost to fix its eyes upon him, for it to see him even if “the helmet effect” or 
“visor effect” cannot be suspended.  Hamlet rushes to see that which might expose to 
him the form of the father he has not yet finished mourning – however elusive it may 
be – and finds a clear but impenetrable connection between the independent 
existence of this spiritual entity and his melancholic inability to relinquish his dead 
father.   
     When he finally meets the ghost, instead of watching the familiar form from a 
distance and drawing comparisons between its visual appearance and that of the 
living King as the others have done, Hamlet immediately addresses the spectre to 
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demand the meaning of its “questionable shape” (Sig. [D1v]).  In so doing, what he 
finds is not his father, but a reflection that far exceeds the constraints of origin and 
secondary term.  In this vision that reifies hidden truths, Hamlet sees the affirmation 
of his own dis-order – an affirmation that liberates him by endorsing his inability to 
accept his father’s death and simultaneously binds him to a quest that can only secure 
his demise.  Immediately before hearing news of the ghost, he tells Horatio “me 
thinkes I see my father” and, when questioned as to where, responds “In my mindes 
eye” (Sig. [C2r]).  In his mind’s eye – he sees the figure in the imaginative field of 
vision that knits memory with visual perception, a form of vision that is most subject 
to distortion, deception or illusion, yet somehow, prior to any event of physical sight, 
accurately perceives the continued presence of the figure that is walking the night.      
     In this respect, the spectre haunts in advance of itself, emerging within the 
disrupted space of Hamlet’s melancholic psyche to position truth or reality as 
categories that function in a complex relation with inner perception.  When Hamlet’s 
gaze is returned by the spectre, what he sees is the mirror of an inner state that 
accurately (and disastrously) functions outside of the strictures of acquiring 
information through the physical senses alone.  In inhabiting the structures that 
should deny it entry – structures such as time, mortal space, and the division between 
the living and the dead – the spectre demonstrates that these crumbling interior 
edifices paradoxically constitute both the apparatus through which Hamlet 
comprehends and orders his world and through which that order is exposed as 
illusion.  No longer inhabiting a world in which inner state and outer world are 
separable, Hamlet finds an oddly displaced home within the uncanny as the vision of 
the ghost invites him into an altered world that affirms the disunity and confusion in 
which he is already immersed.  As in the cases of Macbeth, Julius Caesar, and 
Gaveston, however, that reflection does not bode well – for as this intractable ghost 
functions outside of limits, of comprehension, and control, it exposes to the gazing 






How to Talk to a Ghost 
 
 
Enter into no communication with suche spirites, neither aske them what thou must 
give, or what thou must d[o], or what shal happen hereafter.  Aske them not who they 
are, or why they have presented them selves to bée séene or hearde. 
                                                                                                              (Lavater 196) 
 
Thou com’st in such a questionable shape,  
That I will speake to thee 
                                          (Hamlet Sig. [D1v]) 
 
 
     Lavater recounts a curious story in which a man needing to cross a river late one 
evening calls out for assistance and receives an echo in reply.  The man mistakes the 
sound for the voice of another man and asks “if he might passe ouer héere,” to which 
the echo returns “in the Italian tong, Here, here.”  He is duly persuaded to make the 
attempt, with the result that he throws “himself hedlong into the river” and nearly 
drowns.  This tale arises in a chapter that addresses the problem “That many naturall 
things are taken to be ghosts,” although the man who is thus victimized does not 
perceive a ghost at all, but afterwards tells his friends that the incident occurred “by 
the persuasion of the divell” (49-50).  Lavater remains silent on this point, leaving us 
to infer through the wider context of the chapter that it is nature which is in fact to 
blame.  As a result, the story conflates nature, the devil and the ghost – the natural 
and the supernatural, the known and the unknown – but oddly locates all of these 
within the originary point of the man himself.  In externalizing the man’s voice in an 
alien context, the echo transforms it into something sinister, something that threatens 
the interior and indeed the life itself of the man from whom it emanates.  While 
reinforcing Lavater’s broader prohibition of communicating with spectral voices, the 
tale exemplifies that in speaking with them, we may end up speaking with ourselves.  
Equally, it suggests that speaking with ourselves is in some sense analogous with 
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talking to a ghost: to an alien voice that somehow exceeds the boundaries that divide 
our inner being from the external world. 
     In this brief, historicized tale, we are thereby confronted with a miniature version 
of the spectrality that pervades the texts I have discussed throughout this thesis.  
Lavater reminds us once more that in order to establish our position in the world and 
to find our way, we may find ourselves speaking with that which is unknown, 
summoning spectres that threaten to expose the possibility that the strange, the 
unassimilable, and, most troublingly, the site of death, lies within.  Lavater’s wider 
attempts to enforce the burial of the dead work to prohibit this danger, this 
dissolution of the circumscribed spaces that divide the living from the dead.  In a 
sense, he seeks to banish history, in that to circumscribe and immobilize the dead is 
to prevent them from (re)writing the present and future.  But here, we might return to 
Punter’s reading of Derrida’s Spectres of Marx, in which he observes that “the 
narratives of history” are “written by ghosts” or “the dead,” so that the “voices” that 
emerge when we engage with such histories “spectralize the possibility of 
knowledge” (“Spectral Criticism” 262).  When the living speak of history, they speak 
also of the present.  They call upon a discursive network that is haunted by that 
which appears to have passed but pervades the constructions of the present and 
presence.  Historical narratives, then, do not recount a contained event or space from 
the past that may be accurately encapsulated through the knowledge of the present, 
but trouble the containment of the position from which such knowledge is claimed.  
When Lavater calls up the histories of the dead and their relationship with the living, 
he cannot avoid himself speaking with their language and with the voice of one who 
is also marked by death.  While the dead may be physically absent, the address to 
them must inevitably expose that they are present still (and still to come) within the 
structures by which the living construct, narrate, and differentiate themselves from 
that which has been and which awaits them still.   
     As I have suggested elsewhere in this thesis, this effect is heightened by the 
movement within Reformation England to exclude the dead entirely from the space 
of the living.  Greenblatt observes that when Hamlet hears the ghost’s voice 
demanding the swearing of a pact, “he addresses it directly in words that would have 
been utterly familiar to a Catholic and deeply suspect to a Protestant: ‘Rest, rest, 
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perturbèd spirit’” (Hamlet in Purgatory 233).  This is accurate insofar as it represents 
the most stringent Protestant views on the prohibition of speaking to or crediting the 
figure of the returned dead.  Yet Lavater does nothing but echo precisely this 
command throughout the course of his work: rest, perturbed spirit, for you have no 
place here.  In a sense, in trying to secure the absence of the dead, he endeavours also 
to lay to rest the lingering spirit of Catholicism along with an assortment of other 
sources of ghost beliefs: but instead of conjuring them away, he instead calls their 
spectres forth.  Despite his repeated protests that he works to propagate “the worde of 
God,” his historical sources extend beyond biblical scriptures to include stories and 
doctrines from “Gentiles, Jewes, and Turkes,” the “auncient Churche,” 
“historio[gr]aphers, holy fathers,” “Councels, Bishops, and common people,” and an 
array of other sources ranging through to “Daily experience” (219, 98, 62, 159, 151, 
71).  These diverse sources speak to one another so that, where his Protestant line of 
reasoning is intended to dominate and expose the falsities of other beliefs in regard to 
the nature of apparitions, it instead becomes one more voice in the ever-expanding 
and perpetually shifting crowd.  Lavater’s account becomes riddled with the spectres 
of history, his text haunted from the inside out.  In a sense, his project is specifically 
to do battle with history, to draw upon, categorize, and file away each spectral 
encounter as a means to bar its entry to the present.  Instead, each story piles one 
upon the other in a manner that increasingly erodes the circumscription of its 
historical, social, and epistemological contexts and marks it with precisely the 
phenomena Lavater endeavours to exclude.  What Lavater’s work becomes, in effect, 
is a reification of that which he forbids: a speech act that, in commanding the dead to 
depart, conjures more and more of them forth until he is surrounded by a veritable 
crowd of them clamouring for attention.   
     The declaration that ghosts are not to be spoken to and that they are not what they 
seem is marked with its own contradiction: that they stand before us and wait for us 
to speak.  Lavater’s wider argument is therefore quite right, in that speaking with the 
ghost is not a matter of speaking with the dead at all in the sense of something that is 
buried, an inanimate relic of the past or of history.  Rather, it is a matter of appealing 
to that which we do not recognise and cannot quite see, but that makes its presence 
felt nevertheless as it sees us.  It is this to which Lavater responds in his attempt to 
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lay down a guide for the living as to how they must respond when they perceive a 
ghost.  If the apparition is not the returned dead but rather a product of some kind of 
perceptual error, delusion, or spiritual entity that visits to influence the state of the 
onlooker’s soul, it is in every instance a reflection of some element of its audience’s 
inner being(s).  Hence, to banish the spectre does not involve dismissing or 
disregarding an external, independent entity, but rather drawing it forth and therefore 
acknowledging its uncanny intrusion within the protected space of the present and 
the presently living.  It tacitly acknowledges that the spectre emerges at some kind of 
intersection between the material world and the human psyche but thereby renders 
the distinctions that generate such intersections uncertain and unreliable. 
     This is why Macbeth fails to elicit a response when he instructs Banquo, “if thou 
canst nod, speake too”; why Brutus’s objection to Caesar’s vanished ghost that “I 
would hold more talke with thee” is fruitless; why Barnardo’s assumption that Old 
Hamlet’s ghost “would be spoke to” is wrong, at least in the absence of Hamlet 
(Macbeth 3.142; Julius Caesar 3.127; Hamlet Sig. [B1v]).  It is irresistible and 
perhaps unavoidable to interrogate the figure that so threatens the position and 
functioning of the living, but because, by definition, the spectre cannot be controlled 
or yield up its secrets, doing so seems bound to failure.  Persuading the spectre to 
depart may appear at least to restore the natural or familiar order of things, but that 
order is no longer so familiar where it has already been disrupted: where the present 
is now infused by the effects of a spectre that has already exposed that it be cannot be 
isolated to the past.  To hail the spectre, even in the attempt to expel it, only 
generates further spectrality, an escalation of the erosion of boundaries that starts to 
spread and contaminate all it touches. 
     Because this problem has to do with the limits of knowledge, and, in particular, 
the ontological structures through which the living are conceived, it is embedded 
within issues of scholarship in Elizabethan literature and modern criticism alike.  
Lavater construes his endeavour to identify and expose the deceptive nature of the 
ghost as the site of proper (Protestant) scholarship.  In his dedication to his patron, 
Lavater asserts that he is writing his work in part because ministers have a duty to 
carry out such projects in order to illuminate the path of God’s people and thereby 
“bring them out of all wavering and dout.”  He then commends the “study and 
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diligence” of theologians “who for these fewe yeares ago, have set foorth certayne 
bookes drawen out of the scriptures written in the Germayne tong against sundry 
errours: and theirs likewise who in these our dayes by writing of bookes do teache, 
instructe, and confirme the rude and unlearned people.”  This benefit is a gift from 
God which ensures, not only the dissemination of the wider teachings of 
Protestantism, but also the correction of “divers and sundry errours, which by little 
and little have crept into the Church” (Sig. [biv]).  Thus, the teaching of God’s word 
is inseparable from the pursuit of truth, which can only be accessed and taught 
through the superior understanding of the properly educated.  Lavater’s ability to 
shed God’s light on the divine separation of the living from the dead is integrally 
linked to, and authorized by, his position as a scholar. 
     Subsequently, he draws extensively on the issue of the limits of human 
knowledge as evidence for this argument.  For instance, he argues that even in the 
hypothetical instance of encountering “the wandring spirites of deade bodies,” we 
must ignore them because if the apparitions are “the soules of the faithful, they will 
be interested in advising only that we must “Heare him” (Christ) alone and if they 
are “the soules of Infidels and of wicked men,” there is no cause “to heare them, or 
beléeue any thing they say” (194).  Moreover, any spirit’s words “eyther agrée with 
the holy Scriptures, or else are contrary unto them”; the former are to be approved 
only on the basis that they are “comprysed in the woorde of God” and the latter to be 
automatically rejected because they are not (194).  Hence, we must disregard the 
word of such spirits on the epistemological grounds that they cannot add further to 
our existing sources of truth.  In effect, what Lavater requires, or would have his 
reader believe that God requires, is a retreat back behind the veil of established 
modes of enquiry.  Lavater’s task as a scholar is not to engage with spectrality but to 
shore up the boundaries that help to keep spectres at bay.  His role is specifically to 
banish the “middle place” in a way that does not only eliminate any possibility of 
purgatory but that reinforces the oppositions of illusion and spiritual reality, good 
and evil, life and death, heaven and hell.  The middle ground, for Lavater, is the 
ground of contamination: polarization is where safety lies in the form of sanctioned 
knowledge.   
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     In this, he bears a marked resemblance to Horatio, the scholar whose knowledge 
appears to prohibit communication with a ghost in a quite different way.  Faced with 
the unexpectedly real presence of the ghost on the ramparts of Elsinore, Horatio is 
urged to address it by Marcellus, who suggests: “Thou art a scholler, speake to it 
Horatio” (Sig. [B1v]).   Horatio duly steps up with a formal address, asking the ghost 
“What art thou that usurpst this time of night” and finishing with the instruction: “by 
heaven I charge thee speake” (Sig. [B1v]).  The ghost is unmoved by the imperative, 
and promptly “sta[l]kes away,” with Horatio vainly repeating “Stay, speake, speake, 
I charge thee speake” and Marcellus helplessly observing “Tis gone, and will not 
answere” (Sig. [B1v]-B2[r]).  So much for the scholar’s ability to speak with ghosts.  
Shortly thereafter, the ghost returns, with similar results:  
 
          HORATIO. 
          If thou hast any sound or use of voyce,  
          Speake to me, if there be any good thing to be done  
          That may to thee doe ease, and grace to mee, 
          Speake to me.  
          If thou art privie to thy countries fate  
          Which happily foreknowing may avoyd 
          O speake:  
          Or if thou hast uphoorded in thy life  
          Extorted treasure in the wombe of earth  
          For which they say your spirits oft walke in death.  
          Speake of it, stay, and speake, stop it Marcellus.  
          MARCELLUS.  
          Shall I strike it with my partizan? 
          HORATIO. 
          Doe if it will not stand. (Sig. [B3r]) 
 
     Of course, as a scholar from Wittenberg, Horatio is not supposed to subscribe to 
anything other than Protestant readings of the apparition, but they collapse here 
under the weight of the evidence before his eyes.  In “Let Me Not Burst In 
Ignorance: Skepticism and Anxiety in Hamlet,” Aaron Landau outlines Horatio’s 
approach to the ghost as a “debacle of human knowledge,” in which the “self-
confident agent of sober rationalism” is so stricken by the ghost’s appearance that his 
educated ideas collapse into a farcical series of guesses as to the explanation for the 
apparition (219).  Landau claims that as Horatio “draws on an embarrassment of 
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disparate pneumatological sources” in order to explain the ghost’s appearance, he 
exposes the “uselessness” of the “learned stance” that had initially refuted the ghost’s 
existence but also qualified him to speak to the ghost in the first place (219-220).  
However, given the inconsistency of the clergy during the Reformation on the issue 
of ghost beliefs, and the ghost’s ability to exceed all frameworks of understanding, it 
is perhaps not surprising that the spectre corrodes the position of knowledge that 
Horatio ostensibly occupies.  Horatio does not so much open up alternative means of 
seeking information from the ghost as he endeavours to confine it to existing 
frameworks of knowledge and thereby delimit the threat it poses to knowledge itself: 
an agenda that is manifestly clear at the point that he allows Marcellus to strike out in 
a bizarre effort to immobilize it.  As Derrida puts it, “by charging or conjuring him to 
speak, Horatio wants to inspect, stabilize, arrest the spectre in its speech”: to 
constrain it along with the information it holds, to place it in one of the categories by 
which he understands ghosts to function and thereby restore some kind of order 
(Specters 13).  Such an endeavour is scarcely likely to generate a response, to invite 
the spectre to offer up secrets that function beyond what Horatio can (or wants) to 
comprehend. 
     Horatio’s attempt to speak to the ghost has drawn a strong response amongst 
critics, in part because of the justification Marcellus uses in asking him to talk to it.  
The impact of Marcellus’s exhortation to Horatio, “Thou art a Scholler; speake to it,” 
is such that it often appears within debates about the nature and functions of 
scholarship and criticism.  As Christopher Warley comments in “Specters of 
Horatio,” the phrase has become “a sort of mantra, a shorthand for criticism itself” 
(1024).  It raises an issue that is common to Elizabethan and contemporary scholars 
and critics alike, the matter of the extent to which critical practices and vantage 
points enable (or limit) our ability to communicate with that which lies outside of 
existing frameworks of knowledge.  In terms of relevant ghost lore, Horatio is 
ostensibly more qualified to undertake the conversation because, as a scholar, he is 
“armed with the necessary weapons of defence, in the shape of Latin formulae for 
exorcism should the spirit prove to be an evil one” (Wilson 76).  Indeed, Wilson 
points out that this is undoubtedly the reason for Horatio to have been invited to the 
scene in the middle of the night, “both as a precaution and as an aid to further 
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enquiry” of the ghost that the sentinels have seen on the two preceding nights (75-
76).  Nevertheless, it appears that Horatio’s position as a scholar also accords him “a 
privileged interpretive position,” as someone who is in a position to produce a 
rational, “impartial and apparently unbiased” interpretation of the play’s events: as 
Derrida puts it, he is “the learned intellectual . . . the man of culture as a spectator 
who better understands how to establish the necessary distance or how to find the 
appropriate words for observing, better yet, for apostrophizing the ghost” (Warley, 
1023, 1027; Derrida, Specters 12).  The problem is that Horatio is nothing of the sort.  
As Warley points out, from Marcellus’s position, Horatio is “something of an elitist – 
one who tacitly or explicitly rejects Marcellus’s belief in ghosts in favour of some 
form of scholarship that is at the same time aligned with insider political knowledge” 
to which the castle guard has no access (Warley 1027).  Hence, from the outset, he 
cannot be “disinterested” in what he observes.  Furthermore, despite his active 
investment in scepticism, his position is instantly eroded by the ghost’s appearance, 
subverting not only the “security of the scholar” but also the “security of the idea that 
one could be disinterested, objective, and just” (Warley 1027).  Horatio is neither 
detached from, nor open to, whatever knowledge the spectre might bring, nor 
equipped to elicit that which invites his own undoing.   
     It is little surprise, then, that his attempt to talk to the ghost fails utterly.  Derrida 
draws upon this failure to claim that: 
 
          There has never been a scholar who really, and as scholar, deals with ghosts.   
          A traditional scholar does not believe in ghosts – nor in all that could be called  
          the virtual space of spectrality.  There has never been a scholar who, as such,  
          does not believe in the sharp distinction between the real and the unreal, the  
           actual and the inactual, the living and the non-living, being and non-being (‘to  
           be or not to be,’ in the conventional reading), in the opposition between what  
           is present and what is not, for example in the form of objectivity.  Beyond this  
          opposition, there is, for the scholar, only the hypothesis of a school of thought,  
          theatrical fiction, literature, and speculation. (Specters 12) 
 
It is this figure, according to Derrida, of which Marcellus is apparently unaware 
when he optimistically perceives Horatio to be best positioned to speak with Old 
Hamlet’s ghost.  Horatio is unable to speak with the spectre because he does not 
believe in spectrality.  His belief in categorizations such as real and unreal, living and 
217 
 
dead, past and present, is so pronounced that the best he can manage is to fall back 
on alternative constructions of ghosts from an assortment of discourses because any 
set of distinctions is better than none.  Warley criticizes Derrida here for according 
this “traditional scholar” a “purportedly objective position,” but it is objective only in 
the sense that it endeavours to restore the nature of objects, the ordering of the 
material (and by extension, the spiritual) world (1028).  Derrida’s scholar is actively 
invested in a particular outcome for authorization of his function as scholar in 
mapping out and defending certain boundaries as he ostensibly pursues (or thinks he 
pursues) that which lies beyond them.  Horatio’s efforts to immobilize the spectre 
and loosen its tongue are unsuccessful because they function as a (failed) means to 
intercept and delimit its implications, that is, to counteract its spectrality by 
determining its purpose and its ontological status, thereby assigning it a meaning and 
a fixed position.   
     Accordingly, Derrida suggests that speaking with spectres is “even more difficult 
for a reader, an expert, a professor, an interpreter, in short, for what Marcellus calls a 
‘scholar.’  Perhaps for a spectator in general.  Finally, the last one to whom a specter 
can appear, address itself, or pay attention is a spectator as such” (Specters 11).  
Those who “believe that looking is sufficient” take up their perceptual role in the 
visual spectacle at the cost of participating in it as an event (11).  For Derrida, this is 
Marcellus’s fundamental error, and such a pervasive error that Derrida refers to it as 
“the illusion, the mystification, or the complex of Marcellus”.  Marcellus is unable to 
realise “that a classical scholar would not be able to speak to the ghost” because he 
“did not know what the singularity of a position is, let’s not call it a class position as 
one used to say long ago, but the singularity of a place of speech, of a place of 
experience, and of a link of filiation, places and links from which alone one may 
address oneself to the ghost.”  Instead, he “naively” asks Horatio to address it “as if 
he were taking part in a colloquium” (12).  Warley objects that Marcellus is, on the 
contrary, “far from a naïve student,” for he already holds his own beliefs about the 
possible nature of the ghost (1028).  He makes his request to Horatio “not only as 
part of a deference to ‘he that knows’,” but also in mockery of him: “go ahead, 
scholar, speak to this.”  Thus, according to Warley, “the line that is regularly taken as 
a scholarly call to arms is, in part, making fun of the pretensions of scholarship” 
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(1029).  He thereby redefines the “Marcellus complex” as something that signifies, 
“not the misidentification of a position as universal – Derrida’s account – but rather 
the means by which positions themselves become apparent: the distinctions that 
distinguish the distinguisher” (1030). 
     The two readings are not so far apart though, for both establish that the inability 
of Horatio to speak to the ghost rests with his role as scholar, his subscription to the 
structures of knowledge that refuse to accommodate the presence or effects of the 
spectre.  In looking at the spectre, Horatio can only see reflected back a form of what 
he already knows, a form that, although utterly alien, can only be viewed through the 
familiar frameworks and systems of belief that shape the world and the position that 
he occupies in it.  Although he can view the spectre, hail it and demand that it expose 
itself, he cannot elicit a response because his own viewpoint is in the way.  He 
cannot realise his inability to read the unreadable.  As Derrida observes, the spectre 
“is something that one does not know, precisely, and one does not know if precisely 
it is, if it exists, if it responds to a name and corresponds to an essence.”  The 
onlooker cannot hope to assimilate the spectre within his existing framework of 
knowledge, “not out of ignorance, but because this non-object, this non-present 
present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to 
knowledge.  At least no longer to that which one thinks one knows by the name of 
knowledge.  One does not know if it is living or if it is dead” (Specters 5).  Horatio 
does not know if it is living or dead, or what purpose it might have, or how (or why) 
it takes the dead King’s form, although he does know prior to seeing the ghost that it 
is purely Marcellus and Barnardo’s “fantasie” (Sig. [B1v]).  He also does not know 
that to pursue this knowledge by endeavouring to ascertain the precise nature of the 
ghost through the systems of thought that had, until a moment before, excluded its 
existence, is to learn nothing at all.  Worse still, it is to fail in the attempt to quell the 
ghost’s effect upon the living and the present.  Horatio’s conjuration – his recitation 
of the list of possible reasons for the ghost’s appearance and his demands for the 
ghost to speak – conjures up the voices of both present and past, the somewhat more 
tractable ghosts of numerous beliefs and mythologies from other contexts and times, 
but it cannot lay the spectre to rest. 
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     Here, of course, is where Hamlet steps in, who is willing to “wipe away all triviall 
fond records, / All sawes of books, all formes, all pressures past,” to erase all 
knowledge from his mind in order to speak with the spectre, to subscribe to the 
spectre’s story and commandments despite its frightening indeterminacy and to 
suffer the consequences (Sig. [D3v]).  Derrida speculates that Marcellus may in fact 
have been “anticipating the coming, one day, one night, several centuries later, of 
another ‘scholar,’ one who is able: 
 
          beyond the opposition between presence and non-presence, actuality and    
          inactuality, life and non-life, of thinking the possibility of the specter, the  
          specter as possibility.  Better (or worse) he would know how to address  
          himself to spirits.  He would know that such an address is not only already  
          possible, but that it will have at all times conditioned, as such, address in  
          general.  In any case, here is someone mad enough to hope to unlock the  
          possibility of such an address. (Specters 13) 
 
If Hamlet is not that scholar, then he is surely the figure that anticipates and inherits 
his arrival.  Horatio is in no doubt as to whether Hamlet is better equipped to talk to 
the ghost.  After the botched attempt to force the ghost into speaking, Horatio swears 
“uppon my life / This spirit dumb to us, will speake to him” (Sig. [B3v]).  Upon my 
life – Horatio is so certain that he is correct in this assessment that he is willing to 
offer up this most serious vow in anticipation of Hamlet’s success with the spectre.  
And Horatio is right; his fellow scholar Hamlet, who knows of the dangers, who calls 
out “Angels and Ministers of grace defend us” as he approaches the ghost, can speak 
to the spectre where Horatio has failed (Sig. D1v]).   
     Landau argues that Hamlet fares no better than Horatio, insofar as he too resorts 
to employing “a cumulative embarrassment of incompatible discursive modes,” 
vacillating between “Catholicism, Protestantism, agnosticism, neo-stoicism, and 
sheer materialism” (221).  But unlike Horatio, Hamlet’s principal motive is not 
epistemological.  Hamlet ends his own, less formed speculations with a series of 
open-ended questions.  “What may this meane,” he asks the ghost, that it makes “we 
fooles of nature / So horridly to shake our disposition / With thoughts beyond the 
reaches of our soules, / Say why is this, wherefore, what should we doe[?]” (Sig. 
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[D1v]).  Although he does subsequently become more insistent with the ghost, he is 
willing nevertheless to allow it to dictate the terms of their conversation: 
 
          HAMLET 
          Whether wilt thou leade me, speak,  Ile goe no further. 
          GHOST 
          Marke me. 
          HAMLET.  
          I will. (Sig. D2[r]) 
 
The ghost speaks: Hamlet offers him pure attention.  For good measure, the ghost 
then insists “but lend thy serious hearing / To what I shall unfold.”  Hamlet reaffirms 
“Speake, I am bound to heare” (Sig. [D2v]).  Hamlet knows what Horatio does not: 
that for the ghost to speak, he must be willing to hear anything, to erase all other 
considerations, and to suspend his reliance upon his preconceptions of what the ghost 
might be able or likely to say.  Just as Marcellus warns Hamlet that the ghost “waves 
you to a more remooved ground,” this willingness to enter into the ghost’s world 
inevitably dislocates Hamlet at least partially from the structures of his existing 
knowledge of ghosts (Sig. [D1v]).   
     He succeeds in speaking with the ghost, because, although he too wishes to 
ascertain what the ghost’s presence means, he is willing to accept its radical 
indeterminacy in order to grasp at the father whom he has lost and to retrieve some 
kind of inheritance where he has been denied any.  He does not quite step into the 
role that Derrida envisions for a non-traditional scholar.  He cannot think his way 
through, beyond, or between the oppositions that the ghost so disturbs, and indeed 
spends much of the rest of the play in meditating upon life and death and working to 
restore the logical functioning of time and justice.  But he can speak to the spectre 
nevertheless because he is willing to immerse himself in spectral illogic, in the 
disruption of the present and of Denmark.  It is not, as Landau claims, that the ghost 
“merely confirms what Hamlet had already suspected or, even worse, simply tells 
him what he wants to hear”; nor is it that Hamlet is a superior scholar, for he shows 
no more sophistication in his reading of the ghost than his fellow student and 
notoriously continues to show signs of doubt as to its nature well after reaching the 
conclusion that it is an “honest Ghost” (Landau 224; Shakespeare Sig. [D4r]). 
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Rather, it provides him with a focal point, a cause for the destruction of origins that 
has put his world asunder and a task to perform in remembering the father who 
inexplicably stands before him once more.  Unlike Horatio, he does not really need 
to settle upon a final, fixed interpretation of the ghost’s ontological state.  On the 
contrary, his willingness to accept what the ghost says without ever really fixing 
upon a firm determination of the nature of its existence is precisely what renders him 
able to speak with it.  Hamlet is willing to hear the ghost, to subscribe to its message 
even where it turns the emotional, political, and spiritual structures of his world 
upside down and inside out.  He is willing to be haunted in every aspect of his life 
thereafter, and to proceed in an environment that, under the influence of the spectre, 
has long since ceased to make sense.  Here, the ghost has the audience that it requires 
in order to be heard. 
     Of course, this does not resolve the matter of what it is that the ghost has to tell 
us; what secrets it holds, what is the nature of its frighteningly indeterminate state, or 
what it might mean for the ontology of the living.  Landau offers up a useful image 
where he argues the general inconsistencies of the early ghost scenes to be a 
reflection of the epistemological disorder of early modern England: 
  
          It is human knowledge on the whole – whether classical, superstitious, or  
          religious – which keeps wandering in the dead of night, calling for others to  
          unfold when it should actually unfold itself, speaking to what cannot be spoken  
          to, charging what cannot be charged, offering vain blows to what seems to be  
          here, and here, and gone.  (220) 
 
Landau’s image appears to refer to Horatio in its reference to a figure calling out for 
others to reveal themselves, but conflates it with Marcellus (who strikes at the 
unknown), and the ghost (who stalks through the night), in order to draw all three 
into a metaphor for knowledge itself.  It is curiously apt, for if Marcellus and 
Horatio’s attempts to identify the ghost’s meaning and render it static emerge 
through the structures of “human knowledge,” it becomes all too clear that this 
knowledge is itself inadequate to call out to the spectre or to identify its function or 
substance.  Like Horatio, knowledge is therefore displaced by Hamlet, whose ability 
to speak to the ghost draws upon the same frameworks of understanding but disrupts 
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them so that we see that its structural integrity was illusory all along.  The spectre 
threatens to become more real than that which it unsettles and erodes. 
     Thus, the figure of Old Hamlet becomes exemplary of a wider ontological 
problem.  If the effects it wreaks upon its audience draws out the inadequacies and 
instabilities of existing constructions of the living, the dead, and the apparition, the 
ghost not only troubles the categories themselves, but also the state of the living who 
function through their underlying structures.  In “The Last Act: Presentism, 
Spirituality and the Politics of Hamlet,” Fernie reads Derrida’s argument in Specters 
of Marx as one that “all others are ultimately beyond knowledge” and that, “because 
identities are determined by the free play of difference,” the issue of “‘to be and ‘not-
to-be’” in Hamlet is not a matter of either, but rather, “of being-in-between” (193).  
He contends that Specters of Marx paints the ghost as “an avatar of the Other that 
additionally reveals the fleetingness and dependency of human being as such.  In 
exemplifying our own ‘lack-in-being’, mortality and difference, it encourages 
solidarity not just with the living but equally with the dead and unborn” (193).  For 
Fernie, Derrida’s argument locates the ghost within his “philosophy of différance” in 
a way that mitigates its “terrifying strangeness,” “crucially stripping it of the uncanny 
sameness that is a main source of its terrifying power” (195-96).  In other words, by 
drawing the ghost’s disturbing and uncertain ontological state into the same 
parameters as the living, Derrida paradoxically makes it less strange (in that its 
unfixed state is analogous to that of the human) but also not strange enough, in that it 
overemphasizes the alienness of the other and thereby safely distances it. 
     Fernie argues that it is instead Old Hamlet’s “death-defying sameness” – 
manifested through the repeated observations that it is “‘most like’ Old Hamlet,” that 
it is “‘like the king that’s dead’” and that it is as similar to the King as Horatio’s 
hands are to each other – that renders it uncanny.  It “at once reduces difference to 
sameness and alienates self from self. . . . The sameness of the other is what 
encroaches on and threatens the autonomy of the self, particularly in the case of a 
father and son both called simply ‘Hamlet’”.  Fernie positions this sameness as at 
least partly a matter of identity, an erosion of the son’s interiority by the father but 
also an “identification and solidarity” between the two that then informs the way in 
which death erases distinction when Hamlet is in the graveyard (196).  However, the 
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distinction between the two arguments is not as substantial as Fernie seems to think.  
Derrida is very clear in linking the capacity of the ghost (all ghosts) to be uncannily 
“frightening” to their relative familiarity (Specters 181).  His reading of “man” as 
“the most ‘unheimlich’ of all ghosts” arises on this basis, because “the most familiar 
becomes the most disquieting.”  That which we know best – that which we are – 
becomes “strange, distant, threatening” when disrupted by the fleeting impression of 
a presence that, in its similitude, encroaches upon our sense of unique, contained 
interiority (181).  In Derrida’s reading, as in Fernie’s, the ghost becomes most 
terrifying where it identifies most closely with the living because, where the utterly 
alien figure of the ghost overlaps with ourselves, the self no longer appears identical 
with itself but becomes frighteningly unfamiliar and contaminate.  This is why “the 
specter first of all sees us” – because it returns our gaze with the use of our own eyes 
so that, in perceiving the anomaly that appears before us, we must see also the 
disjunctures within – the disjunctures that constitute within.  The spectre’s evocation 
of a sense of perpetual movement of differences, deferrals, and referrals is what 
brings about the sameness that Fernie describes – the sense that one is not quite 
oneself by oneself. 
     Hence Derrida raises the possibility of inviting the spectre in, despite our wariness 
of it and our “desire to exclude” it, without “accepting him or her,” but recognizing 
that the “stranger . . . is already found within (das Heimlich-Unheimliche), more 
intimate with one than one is oneself” (216-17).  This illicit knowledge arises from 
the spectre’s entry into movements of which we are normally unaware, the gaps, the 
discontinuities, the slippage that characterizes the containment of our selves and that 
of the other, particularly where that other is a ghost.  The reflections generated by the 
spectre thereby expose discontinuities and instabilities within the very relation 
between outside and inside.  And it is our reception of this disintegration of the 
oppositions upon which we rely and through which we live that determines our 
ability to speak with the spectre, to ask questions that enable it to return a response, 
and to listen to that response rather than endeavour to suppress it.  Derrida envisions 
a “‘scholar’ of the future” who might discover “not how to make conversation with 
the ghost but how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give 
them back speech, even if it is in oneself, in the other, in the other in oneself; they are 
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always there, specters, even if they do not exist, even if they are no longer, even if 
they are not yet” (221).  It is a seductive thought, this scholar, and it is an idea that 
undoubtedly informs the growing critical enquiry into issues of spectrality.  At the 
same time, it seems clear, at least within the body of literature I have discussed in 
this thesis, that the living speak with spectres whether they know it or not, whether 
they want to or not, even or especially in the course of attempting to banish their 
existence.  As Lavater shows in his repeated conjurations of the dead and Horatio 
discovers when Hamlet unwittingly escalates the indeterminacy and the threat of Old 
Hamlet’s ghost, spectres are most inclined to arise where the living work hardest to 
eradicate them. 
     It is for this reason that Elizabethan literature is rife with ghosts.  As the presence 
of the dead becomes increasingly unwelcome and the theological and ideological 
frameworks of the living work to exclude them, spectres find ever more sturdy 
structures to haunt.  They arise precisely where they cannot belong, where they have 
no place because their presence is prohibited and illogical.  The epistemological 
systems through which the living comprehend their world is subject to this kind of 
breaching because the language through which those systems arise is based upon the 
instabilities and the spectral relation between constituent parts that they work to 
exclude.  Spectrality is particularly prone to arise in relation to the subject of death 
because, in haunting the terms of both language and psyche, the disruption to 
divisions between the living and the dead threaten the distinctions that tell us who the 
living are and what they carry with them from the past.  The ghosts that haunt the 
living in the theatre but also the Elizabethan period’s wider discourses of the dead 
speak not only about those who have breached the strictures of burial, but about 
those who view them, who find themselves peering into a spectral mirror that denies 
their separation from the dead, the past, and even from the outer world that surrounds 
them.  They tell us that what is inherited from that which has gone before – whether 
medieval theology or Senecan drama, classical mythology or popular superstition – 
is not isolated from that which has departed but inhabits the present still.  They tell us 
the same thing about the future also, for this too is marked within the living as it is 
within the period’s literature and culture.   
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     Lavater writes that “They which will strike spirits and ghosts with a sword . . . 
fight with their owne shadow” (215).  Horatio might learn something: but so might 
we all.  To hit out at a ghost is to attempt to silence it but in the process, to strike at 
that which is part of ourselves.  If we wish to speak with spectres, it seems, we must 
learn the lesson that Horatio cannot, that blinds his realisation that the ghost who 
holds the keys to the unknown has more to say than what we know to ask.  We must 
look to that which hovers just beyond our field of vision and outside our grasp; we 
must listen to hear what it might have to say if asked the right questions, if we invite 
it in rather than seeking to exclude its presence.  In this way of talking to the ghost, 
we may find newly productive ways of addressing the ontologies of the living and 
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